Thomas Wayne Riordan v. State ( 2016 )

NUMBER 13-15-00380-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
THOMAS WAYNE RIORDAN, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Rodriguez, Benavides, and Perkes
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rodriguez
A jury convicted Thomas Wayne Riordan of one count of intoxication assault, a
third-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 49.07(a) (West, Westlaw through
2015 R.S.). The trial court sentenced Riordan to eight years’ imprisonment in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice and assessed a $5,000
fine. In a single issue, Riordan contends that the evidence is insufficient to support his
conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
It is undisputed that on June 27, 2013, at approximately 5:15 p.m., while driving
his vehicle west on State Highway 188 in San Patricio County, Riordan failed to stop at
the four-way stop intersection of Highway 188 and Farm to Market Road136. Riordan’s
vehicle collided with a vehicle driven by Joshua Bridges, who suffered serious bodily
injuries as a result of the collision.
Dwayne Hinojosa, a State Trooper for the Texas Department of Public Safety,
testified that he was dispatched to the accident; the day was hot, sunny, dry, and clear.
According to Trooper Hinojosa, the highways “are straightaways leading up to the four-
way intersection.” He explained that the intersection was “marked with four big red stop
signs” and agreed that the stop signs had blinking red lights on them. He also testified
that, at that time and in the direction Riordan was traveling, there was a red blinking light
and a roadside warning sign indicating there was a stop sign ahead.
Trooper Hinojosa testified that when he spoke to Riordan at the scene of the
accident, he “detected a heavy odor of an alcoholic beverage emit from his person” and
“saw bloodshot, glassy eyes, which is another indicator of alcohol in someone’s system.”
He also testified that Riordan “stepped with unsure footing.”
Following these observations, Trooper Hinojosa performed the standardized field
sobriety test on Riordan. Trooper Hinojosa identified all six clues of intoxication for the
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horizontal gaze nystagmus portion of the test. 1 He testified that when Riordan was
placed in his unit “the odor of an alcoholic beverage got even more intense,” explaining
on cross-examination that this was not the result of spilt beer. Trooper Hinojosa also
described State’s Exhibit 1 as two pictures of Riordan’s truck: one showing a 12-ounce
Miller Lite beer can in a Koozie on the ground below the door of the truck and the second
showing a 12-ounce Miller Lite can inside the truck. According to Trooper Hinojosa,
Riordan consented to a blood draw. Testimony at trial revealed a blood alcohol content
of 0.133. Trooper Hinojosa offered his opinion as to what caused this accident. He
testified “the contributing factor here was intoxication.”
Riordan testified that he was unfamiliar with the road on which he was driving.
Riordan explained that he had on green-lens sunglasses and when he got to the
intersection, the lights looked like yellow, blinking caution lights: he thought he had the
right of way. As he got closer to the intersection, Riordan realized “it was not blinking
yellow lights. So [he] slammed on the brakes, and it was too late.” Riordan also testified
that he did not see any stop sign because the sun was “right there in the road.” He saw
a yellow, flashing light, which Riordan agreed was a hanging light. According to Riordan,
there were no blinking lights on the stop signs.
Finally, Riordan testified that he had a few beers that day—less than six beers; he
denied being intoxicated. Riordan also did not think that the beer can found on the
1 Testimony revealed that because Riordan had either a prior knee injury or a broken leg and he
could “hardly walk,” Trooper Hinojosa did not administer the “walk-and-turn and the one-leg stand”
standardized field sobriety tests.
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ground outside his truck was his. And although he acknowledged that there was a beer
can on the console inside his truck, Riordan testified, “I wouldn’t say I was drinking it.”
Riordan was charged with intoxication assault. He entered a plea of not guilty.
The jury convicted Riordan, and the trial court sentenced him to eight years’ incarceration.
This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Courts of appeal review the sufficiency of evidence establishing the elements of a
criminal offense for which the State has the burden of proof under the single sufficiency
standard set out in Jackson v. Virginia. 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); see also Matlock v.
State, 392 S.W.3d 662, 667 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
Gear v. State, 340 S.W.3d 743, 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at
318–19); see Matlock, 392 S.W.3d at 667. When viewing the evidence in the light most
favorable to the verdict, “the reviewing court is required to defer to the jury’s credibility
and weight determinations because the jury is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility
and the weight to be given their testimony.” Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 899 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2010); see also Winfrey v. State, 393 S.W.3d 763, 768 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Additionally, the sufficiency of the evidence adduced at trial is “measured against
the elements of the offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Villarreal
v. State, 286 S.W.3d 321, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The hypothetically correct jury
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charge is one that accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s
theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried. Id.
III. APPLICABLE LAW
A person commits the offense of intoxication assault if, by accident or mistake,
“while operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, by reason of that
intoxication causes serious bodily injury to another.” See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §
49.07(a)(1). Under the Texas Penal Code, “intoxication” is defined as not having the
normal use of mental or physical faculties by reason of the introduction of alcohol, a
controlled substance, a drug, a dangerous drug, a combination of two or more of those
substances, or any other substance into the body. Id. § 49.01(2)(A) (West, Westlaw
through 2015 R.S.).
“A person is criminally responsible if the result would not have occurred but for his
conduct, operating either alone or concurrently with another cause, unless the concurrent
cause was clearly sufficient to produce the result and the conduct of the actor clearly
insufficient.” See id. § 6.04(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.). In other words,
when concurrent causes are present, the “but for” requirement under the Texas Penal
Code is satisfied when either (1) the accused’s conduct is sufficient by itself to have
caused the harm; or (2) the accused’s conduct coupled with another cause is sufficient to
have caused the harm. Id.; see Robbins v. State, 717 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. Crim. App.
1986) (en banc) (op. on reh’g); Martinez v. State, 66 S.W.3d 467, 471 (Tex. App.—
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Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, pet. ref’d). The State was required to prove that Riordan’s
intoxication, and not just his operation of a vehicle, caused the serious injury. See
Wooten v. State, 267 S.W.3d 289, 295 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, pet. ref’d);
see also Glauser v. State, 66 S.W.3d 307, 313 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet.
ref’d) (op. on reh’g en banc) (determining evidence was sufficient to prove causation by
appellant’s intoxication because testimony reflected that someone in “full command of his
mental and physical faculties while driving” at the rate of speed the appellant claimed to
have been driving would have been able to avoid hitting the disabled vehicle).
Moreover, whether such a causal connection exists is normally a question for the
jury’s determination. See Hardie v. State, 588 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979);
see also Wooten, 267 S.W.3d at 295. A jury may draw reasonable inferences regarding
the ultimate facts from basic facts. Lacour v. State, 8 S.W.3d 670, 671 (Tex. Crim. App.
2000) (en banc). Because the jury was free to believe or disbelieve any portion of the
testimony, we are to presume that the jury resolved conflicts regarding causation in favor
of the prevailing party. See Sharp v. State, 707 S.W.2d 611, 614 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986)
(en banc).
IV. DISCUSSION
In his sole issue, Riordan claims that the evidence was not sufficient to support the
judgment of guilt. Challenging only the causation element of the offense, Riordan
contends that “the evidence presented at trial that [his] intoxication caused the intoxication
assault [was] insufficient to support the guilty finding.” He argues that the evidence was
insufficient because the State offered no evidence of how his intoxication caused the
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accident. Instead, Riordan testified to other possible causes of the accident, for
example, his unfamiliarity with the road, the sun setting in the direction he was driving,
and his mistaken belief that, because he was wearing sunglasses with green lenses, the
flashing, intersection lights were yellow, not red. Riordan contends that any of these
alternate causes were sufficient to cause the harm in this case.
First, we conclude that based on the evidence set out above, a reasonable fact
finder could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that “but for” Riordan’s intoxication
and his operation of a motor vehicle on a public street, the serious bodily injury of another
would not have occurred. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(a). The jury may have
drawn reasonable inferences from the evidence that “but for” Riordan’s intoxication he
would have stopped. See Lacour, 8 S.W.3d at 671. The jury could have inferred that
Riordan’s intoxication caused the harm because testimony reflected that someone who
was not intoxicated would have seen the flashing light, looked for and noticed the warning
and stop signs, determined the flashing light was red and not yellow, and realized that
this was a four-way stop intersection, at which the driver needed to stop. See Glauser,
66 S.W.3d at 313. And the jury was free to believe Trooper Hinojosa’s testimony
regarding the location of the stop signs, the warning sign, and the flashing red lights and
disbelieve those portions of Riordan’s testimony, resolving conflicts regarding causation
in favor of the State. See Sharp, 707 S.W.2d at 614. We must defer to the jury’s
credibility and weight determinations. See Brooks, 323 S.W.3d at 899.
But even if Riordan’s unfamiliarity with the road, his green-lens sunglasses, the
sun, and the location of the flashing lights and signs contributed in some way to the
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accident, we cannot conclude that they were clearly sufficient to cause the serious injuries
in this case. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(a); Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351;
Martinez, 66 S.W.3d at 471. Instead, we would conclude that Riordan’s intoxication and
his driving on a public highway coupled with one or more of these other alleged causes
was sufficient to have caused serious bodily injury to Bridges. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 6.04(a), 49.07(a); Robbins, 717 S.W.2d at 351; Martinez, 66 S.W.3d at 471.
In sum, considering all of the evidence in a light most favorable to a verdict, the
State presented sufficient evidence for the jury to find all elements of intoxication assault.
See Gear, 340 S.W.3d at 746 (citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19). We overrule
Riordan’s sole issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
NELDA V. RODRIGUEZ
Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
Delivered and filed the
21st day of July, 2016.
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