St. John Backhoe Service v. Donald Vieth and Ken Alan Scott ( 2016 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-15-00098-CV
ST. JOHN BACKHOE SERVICE APPELLANT
V.
DONALD VIETH AND KEN ALAN APPELLEES
SCOTT
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FROM THE 97TH DISTRICT COURT OF CLAY COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 2013-0118C-CV
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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In three issues, Appellant St. John Backhoe Service (SJBS) appeals from
the trial court’s orders granting the motions for summary judgment filed by
appellees Donald Vieth and Ken Alan Scott. We reverse and remand.
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
I. BACKGROUND
Scott hired Vieth to cut hay growing on property owned by Nicholas
Oleson. While Vieth was cutting hay on the property on September 13, 2011, the
field caught fire. The fire spread to property where a piece of farm equipment
owned by SJBS was located and destroyed the equipment.
SJBS filed suit against Vieth, Scott, and Oleson, alleging that their
negligence caused the fire and resulted in the total loss of its piece of farm
equipment. SJBS mailed its original petition against Vieth, Scott, and Oleson to
the trial court clerk for filing on September 11, 2013. On September 16, 2013,
the clerk filed the petition and issued citations on Vieth and Scott.2
SJBS unsuccessfully attempted personal service on Vieth and Scott three
times in October 2013. In December 2013, SJBS filed a motion for substituted
service on Vieth, which the trial court granted on December 30, 2013. See Tex.
R. Civ. P. 106(b). Vieth was served by substituted service on January 18, 2014.
SJBS filed a motion for substituted service on Scott in January 2014. Scott was
served by substituted service on February 8, 2014.
In their answers, Vieth and Scott both asserted the affirmative defense of
limitations. They filed separate motions for traditional summary judgment on
their limitations defenses, contending that they were entitled to summary
judgment because SJBS filed its lawsuit after limitations expired and,
2
SJBS nonsuited its case against Oleson in November 2014.
2
alternatively, because they were not served until several months after limitations
expired. Scott further moved for traditional summary judgment on the following
grounds: (1) he was not liable in his individual capacity, (2) he was not liable for
Vieth’s negligence because they were not in a partnership or joint venture, (3) he
was not liable for Vieth’s negligence because Vieth was an independent
contractor over whose work Scott had no control, and (4) Scott did not take any
action that may have caused the fire. Scott also moved for no-evidence
summary judgment, alleging that there was no evidence that (1) a partnership or
joint venture existed between Scott and Vieth, (2) Scott exercised any control
over the details of Vieth’s cutting and baling work, (3) Scott was responsible for
Vieth’s actions in connection with the fire, (4) Scott should have foreseen that
Vieth’s cutting and baling work would have caused a fire, (5) SJBS filed suit
within the two-year limitations period, (6) SJBS exercised due diligence at all
times in effecting service on Scott, and (7) Scott performed any actions in his
individual capacity.
The trial court granted Vieth’s and Scott’s motions. SJBS has appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a summary judgment de novo. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Joachim,
315 S.W.3d 860, 862 (Tex. 2010). We consider the evidence presented in the
light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to the
nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the
nonmovant unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp
3
Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289 S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every
reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in the nonmovant’s favor. 20801,
Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). A defendant is entitled to
summary judgment on an affirmative defense if the defendant conclusively
proves all the elements of the affirmative defense. Frost Nat’l Bank v.
Fernandez, 315 S.W.3d 494, 508–09 (Tex. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 1180
(2011); see Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(b), (c). To accomplish this, the defendant-
movant must present summary judgment evidence that conclusively establishes
each element of the affirmative defense. See Chau v. Riddle, 254 S.W.3d 453,
455 (Tex. 2008).
III. LIMITATIONS
In its first and second issues, SJBS argues that the trial court erred by
granting Vieth and Scott summary judgment on limitations grounds because its
original petition was timely filed and because it used reasonable diligence in
serving Vieth and Scott.
The statute of limitations on a negligence claim is two years. See Tex. Civ.
Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 16.003(a) (West Supp. 2015); KPMG Peat Marwick v.
Harrison Cty. Hous. Fin. Corp., 988 S.W.2d 746, 750 (Tex. 1999). Therefore,
limitations on SJBS’s negligence claims against Vieth and Scott expired on
September 13, 2013. To bring suit within the limitations period, SJBS was
required to file suit within the limitations period and to use diligence in having
Vieth and Scott served with process. See Gant v. DeLeon, 786 S.W.2d 259, 260
4
(Tex. 1990); see also Proulx v. Wells, 235 S.W.3d 213, 215 (Tex. 2007)
(explaining that “a timely filed suit will not interrupt the running of limitations
unless the plaintiff exercises due diligence in the issuance and service of
citation”). If SJBS was diligent in serving Vieth and Scott after the expiration of
the statute of limitations, then the date of service related back to the date SJBS’s
original petition was filed. See Gant, 786 S.W.2d at 260; see also Proulx, 235
S.W.3d at 215.
A. Did SJBS file suit within the limitations period?
Both Vieth and Scott moved for summary judgment on the ground that
SJBS did not file its petition before limitations expired. In the order granting
Scott’s motion, the trial court expressly found that “there is no genuine issue of
material fact as to Defendant’s affirmative defense of Statute of Limitations and
Defendant is entitled to summary judgment thereon” and that “Defendant is
entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law because the litigation was filed
more than two years after the cause of action of negligence in this case accrued.”
However, the trial court struck identical findings in the order granting Vieth’s
motion.
Vieth concedes that the trial court granted him summary judgment “solely
on the remaining issue of diligent service.” But because the order granting
Scott’s motion includes an express finding that Scott was entitled to summary
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judgment for the reason that SJBS’s petition was filed outside the statute of
limitations, we address whether summary judgment was proper on this ground.
Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 5 provides in pertinent part as follows:
If any document is sent to the proper clerk by first-class United
States mail in an envelope or wrapper properly addressed and
stamped and is deposited in the mail on or before the last day for
filing same, the same, if received by the clerk not more than ten days
tardily, shall be filed by the clerk and be deemed filed in time. A
legible postmark affixed by the United States Postal Service shall be
prima facie evidence of the date of mailing.
Tex. R. Civ. P. 5. SJBS attached to its summary judgment response an affidavit
executed by Laura Martinez, a custodian of records for the law firm representing
SJBS. Attached to Martinez’s affidavit were (1) a copy of a cover letter
addressed to the trial court clerk and dated September 11, 2013, transmitting the
original petition and filing fees and requesting the issuance of citation and (2) a
copy of the envelope in which the cover letter and original petition were mailed.
The envelope was postmarked by the United States Postal Service on
September 11, 2013. Martinez averred in her affidavit that she was “the
individual who signed the transmittal letter and sent it along with the above-
referenced documents to the Clay County District Clerk on September 11, 2013”
and that “[t]he petition was stamped five days later by the District Clerk’s office.”3
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to SJBS, Scott did not
establish as a matter of law that SJBS failed to file its petition before limitations
3
SJBS’s original petition was file-marked September 16, 2013.
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expired on September 13, 2013, because, under rule 5, SJBS’s petition was
deemed filed on September 11, 2013. Accordingly, the trial court erred to the
extent that it granted summary judgment for Scott on this ground.
B. Did SJBS use reasonable diligence in serving Vieth and Scott?
Vieth and Scott also moved for summary judgment on the ground that
SJBS did not use reasonable diligence in serving them. They argued that
because there were multiple periods of unexplained lapses between service
efforts from when SJBS’s original petition was filed on September 11, 2013, until
they were served—Vieth on January 18, 2014, and Scott on February 8, 2014—
SJBS failed to exercise diligence in serving them as a matter of law.
When a defendant has affirmatively pled the defense of limitations and
establishes that service occurred after the limitations period expired, the burden
shifts to the plaintiff to explain the delay. Ashley v. Hawkins, 293 S.W.3d 175,
179 (Tex. 2009); Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216. The plaintiff must then present
evidence to raise a fact issue as to due diligence in service of process. Proulx,
235 S.W.3d at 216. If the plaintiff’s evidence raises a material fact issue
regarding the diligence of service, the burden then shifts back to the defendant to
conclusively show why, as a matter of law, the explanation is insufficient. Id.
To explain a delay in service, “it is the plaintiff’s burden to present
evidence regarding the efforts that were made to serve the defendant, and to
explain every lapse in effort or period of delay.” Id. (citing Gant, 786 S.W.2d at
260); see also Zimmerman v. Massoni, 32 S.W.3d 254, 256 (Tex. App.—Austin
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2000, pet. denied) (stating that a plaintiff’s attorney must evaluate continuously
the state of efforts to secure service). “Generally, the question of the plaintiff’s
diligence in effecting service is one of fact, and is determined by examining the
time it took to secure citation, service, or both, and the type of effort or lack of
effort the plaintiff expended in procuring service.” Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216.
The “relevant inquiry is whether the plaintiff acted as an ordinarily prudent person
would have acted under the same or similar circumstances and was diligent up
until the time the defendant was served.” Id. However, if “one or more lapses
between service efforts are unexplained or patently unreasonable,” then the
record demonstrates lack of diligence as a matter of law. Id. “[W]hile the time
period is important, it is not necessarily determinative of the question of diligence.
Rather, we must consider the overall effort expended over the gap in service,
and whether the search ceased to be reasonable, especially when other methods
of service were available.” Ashley, 293 S.W.3d at 181 (citing Proulx, 235 S.W.3d
at 217; Gant, 786 S.W.2d at 260).
As explained above, limitations on SJBS’s claim expired on September 13,
2013. Vieth and Scott met their initial summary judgment burdens by
establishing that they were served with citation after limitations expired. See
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(c). The burden then shifted to SJBS to explain its delay in
serving Vieth and Scott and to present evidence to raise a fact issue as to its due
diligence in effectuating service. See Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215–16.
8
The district clerk issued citations directed to Vieth and Scott on September
16, 2013, five days after SJBS filed its original petition by mail. Marcia McBride,
a private process server, attempted to personally serve Vieth and Scott on
October 8, 24, and 28, 2013. With respect to SJBS’s attempted service on Vieth,
McBride executed an affidavit on November 12, 2013, in which she stated that
she attempted to serve Vieth at an address in Henrietta, Texas, believed to be
his residence or business (the Henrietta address). On October 8, McBride
knocked on the door, and Vieth’s wife answered. She stated that he was out of
town. McBride observed two cars in the driveway. McBride knocked on the door
again on October 24, but no one answered. On October 28, Vieth’s wife
answered the door and stated that he was not home.
On December 5, 2013, SJBS’s counsel’s office mailed to the trial court
clerk a motion for substituted service on Vieth supported by McBride’s affidavit.
The clerk filed the motion on December 30, 2013,4 and the trial court signed an
order granting the motion that day. The trial court found that “attempted service
has not been successful, despite numerous and diligent attempts to serve
Defendant” and ordered that Vieth could be served by leaving the citation and
petition with any person over the age of sixteen at the Henrietta address or by
attaching the citation and petition to the door at the Henrietta address. On
4
There is no explanation in the record as to why twenty-five days elapsed
between the mailing of the motion for substituted service and its filing by the trial
court clerk.
9
January 18, 2014, McBride served Vieth by substituted service at the Henrietta
address by leaving the citation and the original petition with Vieth’s daughter.
With respect to SJBS’s attempted service on Scott, McBride executed an
affidavit on November 12, 2013, stating that on October 8, 24, and 28, 2013, she
attempted personal service on Scott at an address in Bellevue, Texas, that was
believed to be Scott’s residence or business (the Bellevue address). With
respect to each attempt, she noted, “Property Posted—PRIVATE PROPERTY.
Unable to enter w/o trespass violation.”
According to SJBS’s summary judgment evidence,5 SJBS’s counsel’s
office contacted Robert Allen, another process sever, by email on January 2,
2014, and January 10, 2014, asking him to provide proof that Scott resided at the
Bellevue address. In an affidavit executed on January 11, 2014, Allen stated that
he personally searched the online tax database for Clay County and that the
database listed Scott as the owner of the real property located at the Bellevue
address. On January 15, 2014, SJBS’s counsel’s office mailed to the trial court
clerk a motion for substituted service on Scott with McBride’s and Allen’s
affidavits attached as support. The trial court signed an order granting the
5
Exhibits E and F to SJBS’s response to Scott’s motion for summary
judgment each contained a timeline of events related to SJBS’s attempts to serve
Scott. Exhibit E was a business records affidavit from Martinez with “a page
containing copies of entries made in [the firm’s] electronic database for [the firm’s
file related to this case].” Exhibit F was a document entitled “Documented
Events: Service on Defendant Scott,” which was list of dates and events related
to service on Scott. The trial court overruled Scott’s objections to Exhibits E and
F, and he does not complain about these rulings on appeal.
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motion on January 21, 2014. The trial court found that “attempted service has
not been successful, despite numerous and diligent attempts to serve Defendant”
and ordered that Scott could be served by leaving the citation and petition with
any person over the age of sixteen at the Bellevue address or by attaching the
citation and petition to the door at the Bellevue address.
SJBS received the order on January 23, 2014, forwarded it to Allen that
day, and asked Allen to have Scott served “using” the order. SJBS contacted
Allen again on February 6, 2014, asking whether Scott had been served yet. On
February 8, 2014, McBride served Scott by substituted service at the Bellevue
property by posting the citation and the original petition on the gate.
Both Vieth and Scott rely on Proulx to argue that SJBS did not use due
diligence in serving them because the lapses between service efforts were
unexplained and were patently unreasonable. See 235 S.W.3d at 216 (“[T]he
plaintiff’s explanation of its service efforts may demonstrate a lack of due
diligence as a matter of law, as when one or more lapses between service efforts
are unexplained or patently unreasonable.”) In Proulx, the supreme court
considered whether an almost nine-month delay between the time suit was filed
and the defendant was served by substituted service demonstrated a lack of
diligence as a matter of law. Id. at 215–16. Proulx filed a personal injury suit
against Wells on May 2, 2003, and the process server received the citation on
May 20, 2003. Id. at 214. Limitations expired on May 21, 2003, and from then
until July 22, 2003, a process server attempted to serve Wells eleven times at
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one address. Id. On July 31, 2003, the process server informed Proulx’s
attorney that he did not believe that Wells lived at that address. Id. An in-house
investigator informed the process server that he located three alternative
addresses for Wells. Id. at 214–15. Between August 5, 2003 and September 17,
2003, the process server made twelve attempts to serve Wells at those
addresses. Id. at 215. A second process server made seven service attempts at
two different addresses between October 17, 2003 and December 5, 2003, and
made twenty phone calls to Wells’s brother (who resided at the address listed on
Wells’s driver’s license) between December 5, 2003, and December 10, 2003.
Id. On December 5, 2003, a second private investigator Proulx hired to locate
Wells concluded that he was moving from relative to relative to evade service
and suggested substituted service. Id. Proulx filed a motion for substituted
service on January 15, 2004, and service was effected by substituted service on
Wells’s brother on January 26, 2004, a little over eight months after limitations
expired. Id.
Despite these delays, the supreme court concluded
that some periods of time elapsed between service efforts does not
conclusively demonstrate that Proulx was not exercising diligence in
his efforts to locate Wells. According to the summary-judgment
evidence, Proulx utilized two process servers and two investigators
in attempting to locate an address at which service could be
effected. Over the course of the nine months that elapsed before
substituted service was obtained, thirty service attempts were made
at five different addresses. The difficulties that Proulx encountered
in effecting service were attributed by a private investigator to the
fact that Wells was “moving from relative to relative and doing his
best to avoid service from the courts and creditors.”
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Id. at 217. The court went on to conclude that “[i]n light of the evidence that was
presented regarding Proulx’s continuous investigation and repeated service
attempts, coupled with evidence that Wells was deliberately avoiding service, we
conclude that Wells failed to conclusively establish lack of diligence.” Id. Thus,
the trial court erred by granting summary judgment for Wells. See id. at 215.
Vieth also relies on Webster v. Thomas, a case in which the court of
appeals affirmed summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff failed to
show due diligence as a matter of law. 5 S.W.3d 287, 289–90 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.). In Webster, five months elapsed between
the filing of the petition and service on the defendant. Id. at 290. Webster filed
suit in county court on May 8, 1997, the day limitations expired. Id. at 288.
Three months later, on August 8, citation was issued. Id. On August 11, 1997,
Webster’s attorney sent the citation to the wrong precinct for service, and the
constable returned the citation unserved on August 29, 1997. Id. Two weeks
later, on September 15, 1997, the attorney mailed the citation to the correct
precinct. Id. The constable made eighteen attempts to serve Thomas. Id. On
October 8, 1997, the constable suggested filing a motion for substituted service,
and the attorney began preparing the motion. Id. Before the motion could be
filed, the constable served Thomas with citation on October 13. Id.
Webster’s attorney stated in an affidavit supporting Webster’s summary
judgment response that he called the district clerk’s office “several times
[inquiring] when the citation would be issued.” Id. at 290. The appellate court
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noted that the affidavit reflected that the attorney had called the wrong clerk’s
office and did not reflect what the attorney said to the clerk, that there was an
additional three week lapse of time because the attorney sent the citation to the
wrong precinct, and that there was an unexplained two-week delay in sending
the citation to the correct precinct. Id. at 290–91. The court concluded that these
actions, which were taken over a period of four months and ten days “were not
designed to procure the issuance of citation and service” and were not prudent.
Id. at 291. Thus, the plaintiff did not exercise due diligence. Id.
Here, SJBS served Vieth approximately four months after it filed suit and
served Scott approximately a month after it served Vieth. Although there were
periods of time that elapsed between the issuance of citation and the first service
attempts, between the three service attempts, between the last service attempt
and the filing of the motions for substituted service, and between the granting of
the motions for substituted service and substituted service, these lapses do not
conclusively demonstrate that SJBS was not exercising due diligence in its
efforts to serve Vieth and Scott. Four attempts were made to serve both Vieth
and Scott, SJBS prepared and filed motions for substituted service, and SJBS
served Vieth and Scott by substituted service. Most of these periods were made
up of various short delays ranging from a few days to just over three weeks. Like
the various two- and three-week delays in Proulx, the delays in this case do not
conclusively establish that SJBS did not use due diligence in its efforts to serve
Vieth and Scott. See Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216–17; see also Fontenot v.
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Gibson, No. 01-12-00747-CV, 2013 WL 2146685, at *2 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] May 16, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding a two-week delay between the
request for the first citation and the court’s issuing the citation, followed by a two-
week delay in delivering it to a process server; a three-week delay between the
court clerk’s issuing a second citation and Fontenot’s sending the citation to a
process server; and a three-week delay between the process server’s receipt of
the citation and the process server’s first attempt at service did not demonstrate
a lack of diligence).
The longest period of delay was the approximately two and half months
between McBride’s third service attempt on Scott, which occurred on October 28,
2013, and the filing of the motion for substituted service on Scott on January 15,
2014. During that time, McBride prepared an affidavit detailing her service
attempts on Scott at the Bellevue address, and SJBS asked Allen to search
appraisal district records to confirm that Scott lived at the Bellevue address and
to execute an affidavit regarding his search. These efforts raise a fact issue
regarding diligence. See Fontenot, 2013 WL 2146685, at *3 (concluding that
evidence that plaintiff’s attorney had requested that the process server
investigate defendant’s whereabouts, requested a forwarding address from the
postal service, and searched various websites for defendant’s address over a
two-month period raised a fact issue); Tate v. Beal, 119 S.W.3d 378, 381 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. denied) (holding facts raised issue on diligence
when first citation was returned unserved and plaintiff searched for two and one-
15
half months before discovering defendant’s address and requesting service
again).
The delays between SJBS’s efforts are not so “unexplained or patently
unreasonable” that they demonstrate a lack of diligence as a matter of law. See
Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 216–17. We recognize that there was no evidence that
either Vieth or Scott was attempting to evade service like the defendant in Proulx,
but we conclude that this case more closely resembles Proulx than Webster. In
Webster, the court held that there was no due diligence as a matter of law when
the evidence showed that Webster’s actions over a four month period were not
designed to procure the issuance and service of citation. See Webster, 5 S.W.3d
at 291. In this case, citation was issued immediately, not three months after suit
was filed, and a process server was working to serve Vieth and Scott. Thus,
viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to SJBS, we
conclude that SJBS’s actions were designed to procure issuance and service of
citation.
Finally, we note that the trial court expressly found in its orders granting
the motions for substituted service that SJBS made “numerous and diligent
attempts to serve” Vieth and Scott. This, combined with SJBS’s evidence of its
attempts to secure service, is sufficient to raise a fact issue regarding its due
diligence. See Elam v. Armstrong, No. 03-07-00565-CV, 2008 WL 3539968, at
*3–4 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 14, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op.) (holding that internet
searches for defendant’s address over approximately eight months between
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second service attempt and filing of motion for service by publication were
sufficient to raise a question of fact regarding diligence, particularly in light of the
trial court’s express finding in order granting motion for service by publication that
plaintiff had exercised due diligence in attempting to serve defendant). Viewing
the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to SJBS, we
conclude that the evidence raised a genuine issue of material fact as to SJBS’s
diligence in effecting service on Vieth and Scott and that Vieth and Scott have
not shown why, as a matter of law, SJBS’s explanation is insufficient. See
Proulx, 235 S.W.3d at 215.
Because Vieth and Scott each failed to conclusively establish his
limitations affirmative defense as a matter of law,6 we sustain SJBS’s first and
second issues.
IV. SCOTT’S ADDITIONAL
SUMMARY JUDGMENT GROUNDS
The trial court granted Scott summary judgment on his limitations
affirmative defense, but as outlined above, Scott moved for summary judgment
on several additional traditional and no-evidence grounds. The trial court did not
6
Scott also moved for no-evidence summary judgment on limitations. He
was not entitled to a no-evidence summary judgment on limitations because
limitations is an affirmative defense on which he would have the burden of proof
at trial. See Fieldtech Avionics & Instruments, Inc. v. Component Control.Com,
Inc., 262 S.W.3d 813, 830 n.8 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2008, no pet.); see also
Tex. R. Civ. P. 166a(i) (providing that a party may move for no-evidence
summary judgment on a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have
the burden of proof at trial). Thus, the trial court erred to the extent that it granted
Scott summary judgment on limitations on no-evidence grounds.
17
rule on these additional grounds. Scott has raised a cross-point arguing that
summary judgment was proper because the summary judgment evidence
established that Scott was not negligent as matter of law and because SJBS
failed to produce more than a scintilla of probative evidence that raised a genuine
issue of material fact as to Scott’s negligence.
When reviewing a summary judgment granted on specific grounds, the
summary judgment can only be affirmed if the ground on which the trial court
granted relief is meritorious. Cincinnati Life Ins. Co. v. Cates, 927 S.W.2d 623,
625–26 (Tex. 1996). But if a party preserves the other grounds presented that
were not ruled on by the trial court, a court of appeals may consider, in the
interest of judicial economy, those other grounds that the trial court did not rule
on. Id. at 626. To preserve the grounds, the party must raise them in the
summary judgment proceeding and present them in an issue or cross-point on
appeal. Id. at 625–26.
Although we may consider Scott’s cross-point in the interest of judicial
economy, we are not required to do so. See id. at 624; City of Brownsville ex rel.
Pub. Utils. Bd. v. AEP Tex. Cent. Co., 348 S.W.3d 348, 358 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2011, pet. denied). We conclude that our consideration of Scott’s cross-point
would not further the interest of judicial economy in this matter. See City of
Brownsville, 348 S.W.3d at 358–59. Thus, we decline to consider Scott’s cross-
point.
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V. CONCLUSION
Having sustained SJBS’s first and second issues, we reverse the orders
granting summary judgment for Vieth and Scott and remand the case for further
proceedings consistent with this opinion. See Tex. R. App. P. 43.2(d).
/s/ Anne Gardner
ANNE GARDNER
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DELIVERED: August 4, 2016
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