Daniel Gray v. TDCJ, Sharon Webb, Sgt. Duttine, Cpt. Doe, Property Officer Rust, and Warden Parker ( 2019 )


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  •                             In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    No. 06-19-00020-CV
    DANIEL GRAY, Appellant
    V.
    TDCJ, SHARON WEBB, SGT. DUTTINE, CPT. DOE, PROPERTY OFFICER RUST,
    AND WARDEN PARKER, Appellees
    On Appeal from the 5th District Court
    Bowie County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 18C1613-005
    Before Morriss, C.J., Burgess and Stevens, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Daniel Gray, an inmate confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ),
    complained of the alleged improper confiscation of his personal property, including legal papers
    and documents. Proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, he sued the TDCJ, Sharon Webb, Sgt.
    Duttine, Cpt. Doe, Property Officer Rust, and Warden Parker. Gray appeals the trial court’s
    dismissal of his lawsuit as frivolous. We affirm.
    Chapter 14 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code governs an inmate action in
    which an affidavit of inability to pay costs is filed. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.002(a)
    (West 2017). “Chapter Fourteen was designed to control the flood of frivolous lawsuits being filed
    in the courts of this State by prison inmates, consuming valuable judicial resources with little
    offsetting benefit.” Hickson v. Moya, 
    926 S.W.2d 397
    , 399 (Tex. App.—Waco 1996, no writ). A
    Chapter 14 dismissal is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Smith v. Tex. Dep’t of Criminal
    Justice-Institutional Div., 
    33 S.W.3d 338
    , 339 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. denied) (citing
    
    Hickson, 926 S.W.2d at 398
    ). A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts without reference to
    any guiding rules and principles. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 
    701 S.W.2d 238
    , 241–
    42 (Tex. 1985).
    Chapter 14 requires the exhaustion of administrative remedies as a condition precedent to
    filing suit. 
    Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 340
    . “The two-step ‘Offender Grievance Program’ is the sole
    source of administrative remedy for TDCJ inmates.” Crain v. Prasifka, 
    97 S.W.3d 867
    , 868 & n.3
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2003, pet. denied). An inmate must first present his or her complaint
    in a step-one grievance within fifteen days of the incident and may appeal the ruling on the step-
    2
    one grievance by filing a step-two grievance within fifteen days of receiving the response to the
    step-one grievance. See 
    id. at 868–69.
    An inmate has exhausted all administrative remedies once
    he or she receives a written response to a step-two grievance. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN.
    § 501.008 (West 2012). As we stated in Smith,
    An inmate may not file a claim in state court regarding operative facts for which
    the TDCJ grievance system provides the exclusive administrative remedy until the
    inmate receives a written decision issued by the highest authority provided for in
    the grievance system, or the 180th day after the date the grievance is filed if the
    inmate has not received a written decision.
    
    Smith, 33 S.W.3d at 340
    (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 501.008(d)).
    “An inmate who files a claim that is also subject to the grievance system must file an
    affidavit stating the date a grievance was filed and the date a written decision was received, and a
    copy of the written decision.” 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 14.005(a) (West
    2017)). “If the inmate fails to file a claim within thirty-one days of receiving a final decision from
    the grievance system, the trial court must dismiss the suit.” 
    Id. (citing TEX.
    CIV. PRAC. & REM.
    CODE ANN. § 14.005(b) (West 2017)).
    Here, as stated in the trial court’s order of dismissal, Gray failed to attach a step-two
    grievance or response. Because Gray failed to provide a copy of the written step-two decision, as
    required by Section 14.005(a)(2), the trial court could not determine whether the substance of
    Gray’s complaint was raised in a step-two grievance or whether Gray’s lawsuit was timely filed.
    3
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Josh R. Morriss, III
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:      March 29, 2019
    Date Decided:        April 24, 2019
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 06-19-00020-CV

Filed Date: 4/24/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/24/2019