Michael Murphy v. City of Austin ( 2005 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-04-00332-CV
    Michael Murphy, Appellant
    v.
    City of Austin, Appellee
    FROM THE DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY, 345TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
    NO. GN303935, HONORABLE SCOTT H. JENKINS, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    The question presented by this case is whether the payroll records of a subcontractor
    on a public works project constitute “public information” that is subject to disclosure under the
    Texas Public Information Act. See Tex. Gov’t Code Ann. § 552.002 (West 2004). Appellant
    Michael Murphy requested that the City of Austin disclose copies of payroll records maintained by
    a subcontractor relating to a public construction project. The City denied Murphy’s request pursuant
    to a letter ruling from the Attorney General determining that the records were not public information.
    Murphy then sought a writ of mandamus to compel the City to disclose the records, which the trial
    court denied. Murphy appeals, claiming in a single issue that the order should be reversed because
    the records satisfy the Act’s definition of “public information.”
    BACKGROUND
    The City of Austin entered into a contract with M.B. Home Construction Services,
    Inc., in December 2002 to renovate the Austin-Bergstrom International Airport’s operations building.
    In June 2003, Michael Murphy, a member of the City’s Construction Advisory Committee and
    organizer for the International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers Local 520, requested copies of the
    certified payroll records from Crane Electric and/or ADB Construction, two companies that Murphy
    believed were working as subcontractors on the airport project. Murphy subsequently acknowledged
    at oral argument that the records of ADB Construction are not at issue, and that he is only seeking
    the disclosure of payroll records from Crane Electric.
    The records sought by Murphy are required to be maintained by Crane Electric
    pursuant to chapter 2258 of the government code, which states that “[a] contractor and subcontractor
    shall keep a record showing: (1) the name and occupation of each worker employed by the contractor
    or subcontractor in the construction of the public work; and (2) the actual per diem wages paid to
    each worker,” and that “[t]he record shall be open at all reasonable hours to inspection by the officers
    and agents of the public body.” 
    Id. § 2258.024
    (West 2000); see also 
    id. § 2258.021
    (West 2000)
    (workers on public works projects must be paid “prevailing wage”). The contract executed between
    the City and M.B. Home Construction Services, Inc., expressly included the language of section
    2258.024 in its terms. Thus, Crane Electric was obligated, both statutorily and contractually, to
    maintain records evidencing that its employees were paid prevailing wages, and to make those
    records available for governmental inspection at reasonable hours.
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    The City asked the Attorney General to determine whether it was required to disclose
    these records. See 
    id. § 552.304
    (West 2004). The Attorney General ruled that the City was “not
    required to make the records available to the requestor” because “the requested payroll records do
    not constitute public information under section 552.002.” Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-5923 (2003).
    Accordingly, the City refused to disclose the records, and Murphy petitioned the trial court for a writ
    of mandamus to compel the City to disclose them. Following the hearing, the trial court issued an
    order in agreement with the Attorney General’s ruling, “find[ing] as a matter of fact and conclud[ing]
    as a matter of law” that the records are not “public information.” The court did not make any
    additional findings of fact or conclusions of law. Murphy now appeals, asserting that the trial court’s
    denial of mandamus relief was improper because it was based on a misinterpretation of the term
    “public information.”
    ANALYSIS
    Whether the requested documents are “public information” as defined by section
    552.002 is a question of law. City of Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 
    22 S.W.3d 351
    , 357 (Tex.
    2000). As such, we review the trial court’s decision de novo. City of Fort Worth v. Cornyn, 
    86 S.W.3d 320
    , 322 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, no pet.).
    The Texas Public Information Act defines “public information” as “information that
    is collected, assembled, or maintained under a law or ordinance or in connection with the transaction
    of official business: (1) by a governmental body; or (2) for a governmental body and the
    governmental body owns the information or has a right of access to it.” Tex. Gov’t Code Ann.
    3
    § 552.002(a). The parties agree that subsection (2) governs this dispute because Crane Electric is
    not a governmental body and, hence, subsection (1) does not apply. The parties also agree, based
    on section 2258.024 and the contract, that the records were “maintained under a law” and that the
    City had a “right of access” to them. See 
    id. § 2258.024.
    The parties disagree, however, whether
    Crane Electric’s payroll records were maintained “for a governmental body,” as to satisfy the
    definition “public information” in section 552.002(a)(2).
    Murphy urges that, absent some exception in the Act, if an entity is required by statute
    to maintain records, then those records are held “for” the government. Accordingly, Murphy
    contends that Crane Electric’s payroll records are maintained “for” the City because the government
    code and the contract obligate Crane Electric to keep such records and to make those records
    available for governmental inspection at reasonable hours. See 
    id. The City
    claims that Murphy
    misinterprets section 552.002 because he ignores the “for a governmental body” prong, which is an
    essential element that must be proven independently of the other requirements. The City argues that
    Crane Electric’s records are not maintained “for” the City because, regardless of its statutory and
    contractual obligations, Crane Electric is required to maintain its payroll records for independent
    reasons such as social security, income tax, and accounting purposes.1
    Neither Murphy nor the City cite any cases involving the precise issue of what is
    required to satisfy the “for a governmental body” portion of section 552.002(a)(2)’s definition. Both
    1
    George Loney, a supervisor in the City’s Contract Compliance Office, testified that private
    subcontractors are required to maintain payroll records for these reasons, and Murphy agreed at oral
    argument that Crane Electric was required to maintain payroll records for such “dual purposes.”
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    parties assert that their position is supported by Blankenship v. Brazos Higher Education Authority,
    Inc., 
    975 S.W.2d 353
    (Tex. App.—Waco 1998, pet. denied). In Blankenship, a request was made
    for the City of Waco to produce documents showing what monies had been paid to two individuals
    by the Brazos Higher Education Authority, a non-profit organization that issued revenue bonds for
    the purchase of student loans. 
    Id. at 354.
    As here, whether Waco had to disclose the documents
    depended on whether the records were considered “public information” under section 522.002(a)(2).
    
    Id. at 363.
    The court noted that the Authority was operating “at the request of” and “on [] behalf”
    of Waco, and that Waco exercised substantial control over the Authority because Waco’s approval
    was required before the Authority could issue bonds or appoint a board of directors. 
    Id. Based on
    this evidence, the court did not address whether the “for a governmental body” element was satisfied,
    and remanded the case only to determine whether Waco had a “right of access” to the documents.
    Id.; see also Baytown Sun v. City of Mont Belvieu, 
    145 S.W.3d 268
    , 269-71 (Tex. App.—Houston
    [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.).
    Murphy also relies on dicta in Blankenship that “records which a public entity is
    entitled to examine are ‘maintained’ for that public entity within the meaning of section
    522.002(a)(2).” 
    See 975 S.W.2d at 363
    . Murphy urges that a private entity’s records are maintained
    “for” a governmental body whenever the governmental body has a right to access the records. It does
    not follow that a “right of access” alone renders the information “public.” This reasoning is circular
    and makes a single-pronged inquiry out of two prongs: To satisfy section 522.002(a)(2), the
    information must be maintained under a law or in connection with the transaction of official business
    both (i) for a governmental body and (ii) the governmental body must own or have a right of access
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    to it. Where an entity is acting in the stead of a governmental body, or is so involved in
    governmental operations as to be the functional equivalent of a governmental body, courts have
    concluded that the entity’s records were subject to disclosure under the Act, either because the entity
    constituted a governmental body itself or because the entity held the information “for” a
    governmental body. See, e.g., Baytown 
    Sun, 145 S.W.3d at 269-71
    ; 
    Blankenship, 975 S.W.2d at 363
    . There is no such relationship here. Until the legislature speaks with a clearer voice, we may
    not broaden the scope of the statute to include private entities that, without more, merely contract
    with a governmental body or, as here, subcontract with a third party who in turn contracts with a
    governmental body.
    That more than a mere contractual relationship is required to satisfy section
    552.022(a)(2) is supported by Attorney General decisions interpreting the phrase “for a governmental
    body” to apply only when a private entity is acting “on behalf of,” “at the request of,” or “under the
    direction of” the government. Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-462 (1989), cited by 
    Blankenship, 975 S.W.2d at 363
    ; see also Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-2277 (2002); Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-0066 (2002). Such situations
    include when an entity is carrying out a task “delegated” to it by the government, “which otherwise
    would have been left to the governmental body itself,” or where the entity is employed “as an agent”
    of the governing body. Tex. Att’y Gen. ORD-462 (records of law firm considered “public
    information” because they were prepared at direction of and under substantial control by University
    of Houston, for which law firm was acting as agent). However, if the private entity maintains
    records “for its own purposes” and has control over its own methods and details of work, then the
    records are not public information because they are not maintained “for” the governing body,
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    regardless of whether the governing body has an ability to investigate the records. See Tex. Att’y
    Gen. LA-1728 (2002).
    In more recent rulings, the Attorney General has directly addressed the question
    presented here—whether the payroll records of a subcontractor on a public works project, maintained
    pursuant to chapter 2258, are “public information.” See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-6044 (2003); Tex.
    Att’y Gen. LA-4925 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-3026 (2003); Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-0283 (2003).
    Although decisions by the Attorney General are not binding, we afford them due consideration,
    especially in cases involving the Texas Public Information Act, because the Attorney General is
    mandated to determine whether records must be disclosed pursuant to that Act. Abbott v. City of
    Corpus Christi, 
    109 S.W.3d 113
    , 121 (Tex. App.—Austin 2003, no pet.). In each of these decisions,
    the Attorney General ruled that the records failed to satisfy the definition of public information
    because the subcontractor did “not prepare the requested payroll records as the agent of the
    [governmental body],” but instead did so “in the performance of its own statutory duties under
    section 2258.024 of the [Texas] Government Code.” See, e.g., Tex. Att’y Gen. LA-6044 (2003).
    The Office of the Attorney General adopted this reasoning in its 2004 Public Information Handbook,
    which states that section 552.002(a)(2) applies “when a governmental body has contracted with a
    private consultant to prepare information for the governmental body” and “[t]he private consultant
    is acting as the governmental body’s agent in holding the records.” Greg Abbott, Attorney Gen. of
    Tex., Pub. Info. Handbook (2004).
    Crane Electric did not have a contract directly with the City of Austin, but rather was
    a subcontractor hired by M.B. Home Construction Services, Inc. In turn, Crane Electric’s workers
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    were employed and paid by it, a private entity, and were not employees of the City. The City did not
    exercise control over the method or details of Crane Electric’s work. Further, the task of maintaining
    Crane Electric’s payroll records was not one that the City would be obligated to do itself; the City
    did not “delegate” this task to Crane Electric, and Crane Electric was not maintaining these records
    “on behalf of” the City. Instead, Crane Electric maintained the payroll records for its own purposes,
    including statutory compliance, social security, income tax, and accounting purposes. As such,
    Murphy’s case is clearly distinguishable from, and thus not supported by, Blankenship and the
    Attorney General decisions upon which the Blankenship court relied. 
    See 975 S.W.2d at 363
    .
    The Attorney General reached the same conclusion in the instant case as it had in the
    other cases involving subcontractors’ payroll records, reasoning that “Crane Electric does not prepare
    the requested payroll records as the agent of the city. Rather, Crane Electric does so in the
    performance of its own statutory duties under section 2258.024 of the Government Code.” Tex.
    Att’y Gen. LA-5923 (2003). Giving due consideration to the Attorney General’s consistent
    interpretation of section 552.002(a)(2) as excluding the payroll records of subcontractors on public
    works projects from the definition of “public information,” we conclude that Crane Electric’s records
    do not fall within the statutory definition.
    CONCLUSION
    Because Crane Electric did not maintain its payroll records “for” the City, the records
    are not “public information” as defined by section 552.002(a)(2) of the government code. As a
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    matter of law, the trial court correctly denied Murphy’s petition for a writ of mandamus. Murphy’s
    sole issue is overruled, and the court’s order is affirmed.
    Jan P. Patterson, Justice
    Before Chief Justice Law, Justices Patterson and Puryear
    Affirmed
    Filed: February 10, 2005
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