Harvey Chynoweth v. State ( 2008 )


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  •       TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
    NO. 03-07-00692-CR
    Harvey Chynoweth, Appellant
    v.
    The State of Texas, Appellee
    FROM THE COUNTY COURT AT LAW NO. 1 OF HAYS COUNTY
    NO. 82824, HONORABLE HOWARD WARNER, JUDGE PRESIDING
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Harvey Chynoweth pleaded no contest to driving while intoxicated, second
    offense. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 49.04(a) (West 2003), § 49.09(a) (West Supp. 2007). The
    trial court adjudged him guilty and assessed punishment at one year in jail and a $700 fine. As called
    for in a plea bargain, the court suspended imposition of sentence and placed appellant on community
    supervision for two years. In his only point of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred
    by overruling his pretrial motion to suppress evidence. We overrule this contention and affirm
    the conviction.
    The only witness at the suppression hearing was San Marcos Police Officer
    Paul Beller. Beller testified that at 3:21 a.m. on July 15, 2006, he was parked at a gas station at the
    intersection of Interstate 35 and Wonder World Drive when he received a dispatch reporting a
    possible intoxicated driver traveling north on the interstate and exiting at Wonder World. Beller
    spotted a car matching the description he had been given approach the intersection. Beller testified:
    That vehicle failed to stop at the designated point at the intersection, passing the stop
    sign, entering into the opposing lane of traffic which then drew my attention to it.
    I then followed said vehicle northbound on the east access road, observed it failing
    to maintain single lanes of traffic, then initiated a traffic stop near the east access at
    123.
    Beller testified that the vehicle did not immediately respond to his signal to stop. Instead, it “turned
    northbound onto 123 crossing the broken turn lane line, which failed to maintain a lane of traffic,
    proceeded northbound on 123 which turns into Guadalupe . . . .” The vehicle eventually stopped
    after Beller activated his siren two times. Appellant was the driver of the vehicle. Based on his
    observations of appellant following the stop, Beller arrested him for driving while intoxicated.
    During cross-examination, Beller was asked, “[W]hat violations of law did you
    observe?” He answered, “Failed to maintain a single lane of traffic or failed to drive in a single
    lane.” Asked if he observed any other violations, Beller replied, “Other than putting a blinker on
    within a required distance when turning left.” Based on these responses, appellant argues that Beller
    did not have reasonable suspicion to stop him. Beller testified that there were no other vehicles in
    the area, and appellant argues that his one failure to maintain a single lane did not give the officer
    reasonable suspicion to believe that he had observed a lane violation. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
    § 545.060 (West 1999); State v. Huddleston, 
    164 S.W.3d 711
    , 716 (Tex. App.—Austin 2005,
    no pet.); Aviles v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 74
    , 77 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d).
    Appellant argues that Beller’s testimony that he did not see appellant use a “blinker” does not
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    exclude the possibility that appellant signaled his turn by hand. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann.
    § 545.106 (West 1999).
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence for an abuse of
    discretion. Villareal v. State, 
    935 S.W.2d 134
    , 138 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). In this review, we defer
    to the district court’s factual determinations but review de novo the court’s application of the law
    to the facts. Guzman v. State, 
    955 S.W.2d 85
    , 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). We will sustain the trial
    court’s ruling admitting evidence if the ruling is reasonably supported by the record and correct on
    any theory of law applicable to the case. Willover v. State, 
    70 S.W.3d 841
    , 845 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2002). Because the court below did not make explicit findings of fact, we review the evidence in
    the light most favorable to the court’s ruling and assume the court made findings that are supported
    by the record and buttress its conclusion. Carmouche v. State, 
    10 S.W.3d 323
    , 327-28 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2000).
    Beller’s testimony that appellant “failed to stop at the designated point at
    the intersection, passing the stop sign” was sufficient to warrant a finding that the officer had
    reasonable suspicion to believe that appellant failed to comply with the stop sign at the intersection.
    See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 544.010 (West 1999). Although Beller did not mention appellant
    running the stop sign when he was later asked by defense counsel to identify the violations he had
    observed, we must assume that the trial court found Beller’s earlier testimony to be true.
    Accordingly, we hold that reasonable suspicion was shown, and that the trial court did not err by
    overruling the motion to suppress.
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    The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
    __________________________________________
    Jan P. Patterson, Justice
    Before Justices Patterson, Waldrop and Henson
    Affirmed
    Filed: August 13, 2008
    Do Not Publish
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