Michael Litton v. Jason Baugh , 122 N.E.3d 1034 ( 2019 )

FILED
Apr 30 2019, 9:16 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
Donna Jameson
Greenwood, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael Litton, April 30, 2019
Appellant-Petitioner, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JP-2066
v. Appeal from the Johnson Circuit
Court
Jason Baugh, The Honorable K. Mark Loyd,
Appellee-Intervenor. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
41C01-1710-JP-192
Tavitas, Judge.
Case Summary
[1] Michael Litton (“Biological Father”) appeals the trial court’s denial of his
petition to establish paternity. We affirm.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 1 of 24
Issue
[2] Biological Father raises one issue, which we restate as whether the trial court
properly dismissed Biological Father’s petition to establish paternity. We
affirm.
Facts
[3] Jessica Boyd (“Mother”) was in a relationship with Jason Baugh (“Legal
Father”), and they had a child in 2005. Mother and Legal Father were
estranged at some point during 2008, and she had a brief relationship with
Biological Father. Mother and Legal Father resumed their relationship, and
Mother had another child, K.B., who was born in January 2009. Mother and
Legal Father executed a paternity affidavit listing Legal Father as K.B.’s
biological father shortly after K.B.’s birth. Mother’s relationship with Legal
Father ended sometime in 2010.
[4] Mother married Andy Boyd (“Stepfather”) in June 2010. In December 2010,
Legal Father filed a petition to establish paternity regarding K.B. and his older
child with Mother. The trial court issued an order establishing paternity in
Legal Father with respect to K.B. and the older child. The trial court awarded
Mother and Legal Father joint legal custody of the children with Mother having
primary physical custody and Legal Father having parenting time pursuant to
the Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines.
[5] In April 2017, Legal Father filed a petition for modification of parenting time
and a motion for rule to show cause to address parenting time issues and other
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 2 of 24
disputes between Legal Father and Mother. Mother contacted Biological
Father in the spring of 2017 and asked him to take a private DNA test. DNA
testing in June 2017 revealed a 99.9% probability that Biological Father is
K.B.’s biological father.
[6] On October 12, 2017, Biological Father and Mother filed a joint verified
petition to establish paternity under Indiana Code Section 31-14-7-1(3). At that
time, Biological Father was incarcerated at the Marion County Jail. Legal
Father was joined as a necessary party. Legal Father also filed a motion to
intervene in the action, which the trial court granted. The trial court appointed
a guardian ad litem (“GAL”). In June 2018, Biological Father and Mother
filed a petition to amend the caption to file as next friends on behalf of K.B.
[7] After a hearing, the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
dismissing Biological Father’s and Mother’s petition to establish paternity. The
trial court found:
.....
27. [ ] The GAL submitted a report which was admitted into
evidence. The Court finds the following points articulated
by the GAL as salient to the present issues before the
Court:
a. [Older child] and [K.B.] are well adjusted despite
the conflict between the parents;
b. Biological Father was likely to only be a tangential
part of [K.B.’s] life in the long run given his history;
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 3 of 24
c. Mother was primarily responsible for the heightened
hostility between she and Legal Father;
d. [T]he GAL questioned Mother’s timing in seeking
out Biological Father given Legal Father’s Petition
for Modification of Parenting Time;
e. [I]t is not in [K.B.’s] best interest to substitute
Biological Father for Legal Father in her life and be
separated from her brother [ ] during parenting time
rotation with Legal Father;
f. Biological Father has a criminal history which
includes a term in the Indiana Department of
Corrections for pointing a firearm, multiple citations
for driving while suspended and seven (7) substance
abuse related cases;
g. Mother’s choice to not only draw [Biological
Father] into this situation but to tell the child about
him, shows a deeply disturbing lack of perspective
and principle;
h. [K.B.] has developed a nine (9) year bond with
Legal Father, spent consistent time with him, had
him come to school functions and established a life
with him and with her brother;
i. [K.B.] has shared the same schedule, going between
Legal Father and Mother’s house her entire life;
and,
j. [W]hen asked about Biological Father, [K.B.]
responded with short, curt answers about her
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 4 of 24
familiarity with him and denied much knowledge or
involvement.
28. Legal Father has acted as [K.B.’s] father since birth,
seeking to establish paternity and providing regular
financial support. [K.B.] accepted Legal Father as her
father and until recently he was the only father she had
known.
29. Biological Father is a recovering opiate addict. He has
only periodic, but not meaningful contact, with his other
four (4) children . . . . He only pursued establishment of
paternity for one (1) of those four (4) children. According
to Biological Father, [K.L.] is the only child he’s ordered
to pay child support on, and he is more than $5,000.00 in
arrears on that obligation.
30. Despite Biological Father’s track record of lackluster
parenting, Mother has chosen at this juncture to involve
him in [K.B.’s] life, going so far as to allowing regular
contact with Biological Father contrary to her daughter’s
best interests.
31. There is no dispute that the possibility of adoption of K.B.
by Mother’s current husband, should Legal Father’s
parental rights be terminated, has been discussed. It
appears that Mother is paying Biological Father’s expenses
in this action.
32. Mother’s timing, the nature of conversations, and the true
motives behind the filing of this joint petition[] with
Biological Father are transparent.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 5 of 24
33. Her motivations have little, if anything, to do with the
child’s best interest. Legal Father’s request for contempt
and a modification seeking more time with his children is
telling. The Court finds the true motivation for the joint
filing of this petition by Mother is to eliminate Legal
Father from [K.B.’s] life. Mother had an opportunity to
have DNA testing done at the time the Petition for
Paternity was filed, but instead, she voluntarily entered
into an agreement acknowledging Legal Father as [K.B.’s]
biological and natural parent.
34. Biological Father had unprotected sexual relations with
Mother, learned that Mother was pregnant soon thereafter,
and failed to make any further inquiries as to the biology
of the child Mother carried. Biological Father did not file
a petition to establish paternity within two (2) years after
[K.B.] was born.
35. Counsel for Petitioner proposed in her findings and
conclusions that Mother’s motivations are unknown. As
stated herein, the Court disagrees.
36. The Court does agree that Biological Father’s motives are
unknown. However, the Court can only conclude that he
will not voluntarily assume financial responsibility for
[K.B.] any more than he has for his other children. He is
clueless and uninterested.
37. Mother suggests she had suspicions from early on that
[K.B.] may not be the biological child of Legal Father and,
without excuse, failed to pursue legal remedies that were
available to her until [K.B.] was eight (8) years of age, had
bonded with Legal Father, and developed familial
relationships with Legal Father’s extended family.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 6 of 24
38. Mother and Biological Father now ask this Court to enter
an Order that is completely contrary to [K.B.’s] best
interest, removing the only father she had ever known.
The circumstances in this matter have changed
dramatically with the passing of time, given the established
and long-standing relationship which developed between
[K.B.] and Legal Father.
39. To disestablish paternity in Legal Father is contrary to
[K.B.’s] best interests and damaging and injurious to Legal
Father given the close relationship he has with his
daughter.
Appellant’s App. Vol. II pp. 10-12.
[8] After analyzing the relevant statutes, the trial court concluded:
There is no doubt that Legal Father is the legal father of [K.B.]
Likewise, Mother and Biological Father have not alleged fraud,
duress, or material mistake of fact. Further, Legal Father has not
requested DNA testing. Therefore, it would appear there is no
basis for rescinding the Paternity Affidavit signed by Mother and
Legal Father.
Id. at 13. The trial court concluded that neither Mother’s nor Biological
Father’s actions were in K.B.’s best interest. The trial court also concluded that
Mother could not collaterally attack the prior paternity affidavit and prior
paternity proceedings, to which she was a party. As to Biological Father,
however, the trial court concluded:
.....
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 7 of 24
58. The same may not be said as it relates to the Biological
Father and/or the child, however. Neither was a party to the
2011 paternity action. As a result, neither is precluded from a
collateral attack on the Legal Father’s paternity. In Re Paternity of
SRI, 602 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1992); see also Poteet v. Rodgers, 92
N.E.3d 1158 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018); and, Davis v. Trensey, 862
N.E.2d 308 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007).
59. The Joint Petition asserts Indiana Code 31-14-4-1(3) as its
only basis for the paternity filing. Of course, other provisions of
that statute may be available to the Biological Father, should he
choose to pursue the same and have his day in Court. However,
until those issues are appropriately framed, the Court is unable to
address the merits of his request.
Id. at 15. The trial court then dismissed the petition to establish paternity. The
trial court, however, noted that the dismissal was without prejudice as to
Biological Father and/or child “to reinitiate the same on other grounds.” Id.
The trial court allowed Biological Father twenty days to amend his paternity
petition. Biological Father now appeals.
Analysis
[9] Biological Father argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition to
establish paternity. Before addressing the merits of Biological Father’s claim,
we note that Legal Father did not file an appellee’s brief. “When an appellee
fails to submit a brief, we apply a less stringent standard of review with respect
to the showing necessary to establish reversible error.” In re Paternity of S.C.,
966 N.E.2d 143, 148 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), aff’d on reh’g, 970 N.E.2d 248 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. “In such cases, we may reverse if the appellant
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 8 of 24
establishes prima facie error, which is an error at first sight, on first appearance,
or on the face of it.” Id. “Moreover, we will not undertake the burden of
developing legal arguments on the appellee’s behalf.” Id.
[10] At Biological Father’s request, the trial court entered findings of fact and
conclusions of law pursuant to Indiana Trial Rule 52(A). In reviewing the
findings made pursuant to Rule 52, we first determine whether the evidence
supports the findings and then whether the findings support the judgment. K.I.
ex rel. J.I. v. J.H., 903 N.E.2d 453, 457 (Ind. 2009). On appeal, we “shall not set
aside the findings or judgment unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be
given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the
witnesses.” Id.; Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). A judgment is clearly erroneous when
there is no evidence supporting the findings or the findings fail to support the
judgment. K.I., 903 N.E.2d at 457. A judgment is also clearly erroneous when
the trial court applies the wrong legal standard to properly found facts. Id.
[11] Biological Father argues that the trial court erred by dismissing his petition to
establish paternity. Biological Father’s argument requires us to interpret the
relevant paternity statutes. Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we
review de novo. Anderson v. Gaudin, 42 N.E.3d 82, 85 (Ind. 2015). In
interpreting a statute, the first step is to determine whether the Legislature has
spoken clearly and unambiguously on the point in question. Id. When a statute
is clear and unambiguous, we apply words and phrases in their plain, ordinary,
and usual sense. Id. “[W]hen a statute is susceptible to more than one
interpretation it is deemed ambiguous and thus open to judicial construction.”
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 9 of 24
Id. If the statute is ambiguous, our primary goal is to determine, give effect to,
and implement the intent of the Legislature with well-established rules of
statutory construction. Id. We examine the statute as a whole, reading its
sections together so that no part is rendered meaningless if it can be harmonized
with the remainder of the statute. Id. We do not presume that the Legislature
intended language used in a statute to be applied illogically or to bring about an
unjust or absurd result. Id.
A. Disestablishment of Paternity
[12] We begin by noting that Legal Father established paternity through a paternity
affidavit and also later filed a paternity action in which the trial court issued an
order establishing paternity in Legal Father. Indiana Code Section 31-14-2-1
provides that paternity may only be established: “(1) in an action under
[Indiana Article 31-14]; or (2) by executing a paternity affidavit in accordance
with IC 16-37-2-2.1.” “[I]f a man has executed a paternity affidavit in
accordance with [Indiana Code Section 16-37-2-2.1], the executed paternity
affidavit conclusively establishes the man as the legal father of a child without
any further proceedings by a court.” Ind. Code § 16-37-2-2.1(p).
[13] Once paternity is established, Indiana Code Section 31-14-7-3 provides: “A
man is a child’s legal father if the man executed a paternity affidavit in
accordance with IC 16-37-2-2.1 and the paternity affidavit has not been
rescinded or set aside under IC 16-37-2-2.1.” The circumstances under which a
paternity affidavit can be rescinded or set aside are limited. Indiana Code
Section 16-37-2-2.1 provides:
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 10 of 24
(k) Notwithstanding any other law, a man who is a party to a
paternity affidavit executed under this section may, within sixty
(60) days of the date that a paternity affidavit is executed under
this section, file an action in a court with jurisdiction over
paternity to request an order for a genetic test.
(l) A paternity affidavit that is properly executed under this
section may not be rescinded more than sixty (60) days after the
paternity affidavit is executed unless a court:
(1) has determined that fraud, duress, or material mistake
of fact existed in the execution of the paternity affidavit;
and
(2) at the request of a man described in subsection (k), has
ordered a genetic test, and the test indicates that the man is
excluded as the father of the child.
*****
(n) The court may not set aside the paternity affidavit unless a
genetic test ordered under subsection (k) or (l) excludes the
person who executed the paternity affidavit as the child’s
biological father.
I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1. 1 None of these circumstances are present here.
[14] Although Legal Father’s paternity cannot be rescinded pursuant to Indiana
Code Section 16-37-2-2.1, Indiana courts have held that paternity may be
1
Indiana Code Section 16-37-2-2.1 has been amended since Father executed the paternity affidavit. The
relevant portions of the statute, however, remain the same except for changes to the subsection numbering.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 11 of 24
indirectly disestablished by establishing paternity in another man. See In re
Paternity of Infant T., 991 N.E.2d 596, 600 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied; In
re Paternity of N.R.R.L., 846 N.E.2d 1094, 1097 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (“Although
Rogge’s execution of the paternity affidavit established him as the child’s legal
father, that does not preclude another man from attempting to establish
paternity of the child.”), trans. denied.
[15] In the context of a child born during a marriage and a biological father later
seeking to establish paternity, our Supreme Court relied on public policy
concerns 2 and held that:
In many cases, the parties to the dissolution will stipulate or
otherwise explicitly or implicitly agree that the child is a child of
the marriage. In such cases, although the dissolution court does
not identify the child’s biological father, the determination is the
legal equivalent of a paternity determination in the sense that the
parties to the dissolution—the divorcing husband and wife—will
be precluded from later challenging that determination, except in
extraordinary circumstances. See Fairrow v. Fairrow, 559 N.E.2d
597, 600 (Ind. 1990) (husband entitled to relief from support
judgment only in event that “the gene testing results which gave
2
The Court held:
We appreciate the Court of Appeals’ concern for a man who may be deprived of parental rights
that he assumed for many years and wishes to retain even though he is not the child’s biological
father. However, a countering important policy concern is identifying correctly parents and
their offspring. “Proper identification of parents and child should prove to be in the best
interests of the child for medical or psychological reasons. It also plays a role in the just
determination of child support; we have already declared that public policy disfavors a support
order against a man who is not the child’s father.” In re S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014, 1016 (Ind.
1992). In the end, such policy choices are the province of the legislature. Also, a husband who
is not the biological father of his wife’s child may pursue legally adopting the child, bringing
such child within the statutory definition of “child.”
Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 517 n.7 (Ind. 1997).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 12 of 24
rise to the prima facie case for relief in this situation became
available independently of court action.”). However, a child or a
putative father is not precluded by the dissolution court’s finding
from filing a separate action in juvenile court to establish
paternity at a later time. See J.W.L. by J.L.M. v. A.J.P., 682
N.E.2d 519 (Ind. 1997) (child); K.S. v. R.S., 669 N.E.2d 399 (Ind.
1996) (putative father); In re S.R.I., 602 N.E.2d 1014 (Ind. 1992)
(putative father).
Russell v. Russell, 682 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ind. 1997); see also K.S. v. R.S., 669
N.E.2d 399, 400 (Ind. 1996) (holding that a man claiming to be the biological
father of a child born during the marriage of the child’s mother to another man
may bring a paternity action while the mother’s marriage is still intact); S.R.I.,
602 N.E.2d at 1016 (holding that “a putative father may establish paternity
without regard to the mother’s marital status”). 3 Given the prior opinions of
3
We acknowledge and share Judge Baker’s concerns expressed in his dissent in Paternity of I.I.P. v. Rodgers,
92 N.E.3d 1158, 1165 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), where he stated:
The plain language of Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1(l) provides that where, as here, a
paternity affidavit has already been executed pursuant to that section, it may not be rescinded
unless the trial court:
(1) has determined that fraud, duress, or material mistake of fact existed in the execution of the
paternity affidavit; and
(2) at the request of a man described in subsection (k), has ordered a genetic test, and the test
indicates that the man is excluded as the father of the child.
Neither of those circumstances has occurred in this case.
The majority cites Indiana Code section 31-14-5-3 as support for its conclusion. In my view,
this statute applies only if a paternity affidavit has not already been executed pursuant to
Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1. To say that judicial action can trump a valid paternity
affidavit even if the parties have not complied with Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1 is to render
that statute meaningless, which is a result that should be avoided.
Moreover, the majority points to In re Paternity of D.L., 938 N.E.2d 1221, 1225 (Ind. Ct. App.
2010), in support of its conclusion that “establishing paternity in another man effectively
operates to disestablish the paternity of a man who executed a paternity affidavit.” Op. para.
14. In D.L., however, paternity was not first established by a paternity affidavit under Indiana
Code section 16-37-2-2.1; instead, it “was established by an action commenced pursuant to
Article 31-14 . . . .” 938 N.E.2d at 1225. That paternity established by Article 31-14 can be
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 13 of 24
our Supreme Court and this court, Legal Father’s paternity could be indirectly
disestablished by the establishment of paternity in Biological Father.
B. Establishment of Paternity
[16] Because our courts have held that Legal Father’s paternity may be
disestablished by the establishment of paternity in another man, we will address
whether the petition to establish paternity filed by Mother and Biological Father
was proper. The paternity action filed by Mother and Biological Father must
comply with the requirements of Indiana Code Article 31-14.
[17] Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1 governs persons permitted to file a paternity
action and provides:
disestablished by the same set of statutes is both unsurprising and irrelevant to the case before
us.
Both the plain language of Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1 and caselaw support a conclusion
that once a paternity affidavit has been executed, it may not be rescinded unless the terms of
that statute are met. See, e.g., In re Paternity of H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175, 1177 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)
(holding that “[o]nce a man executes a paternity affidavit in accordance with I.C. § 16-37-2-2.1,
he ‘is a child’s legal father’ unless the affidavit is rescinded or set aside pursuant to that same
statute” and that “once a mother has signed a paternity affidavit, she may not use the paternity
statutes to deprive the legal father of his rights, even if he is not the biological father”). I
acknowledge that there is also caselaw supporting the opposite conclusion, but respectfully
disagree with those cases given the plain language of the relevant statutes. See Davis v. Trensey,
862 N.E.2d 308, 312-14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that prosecutor had a right to file
paternity action and seek a genetic test where paternity had been established in another man by
affidavit in the past); In re Paternity of N.R.R.L., 846 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006)
(noting that while a man is established as legal father after executing a paternity affidavit, “that
does not preclude another man from attempting to establish paternity of the child” via a
paternity action).
I believe that the plain language of Indiana Code section 16-37-2-2.1 compels us to affirm, and
therefore respectfully dissent.
I.I.P., 92 N.E.3d 1165 (Baker, J., dissenting). We are constrained, however, to follow our Supreme Court’s
opinions in Russell, S.R.I., and K.S. regarding whether paternity in one man can be disestablished by a finding
of paternity in another man.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 14 of 24
A paternity action may be filed by the following persons:
(1) The mother or expectant mother.
(2) A man alleging that:
(A) he is the child’s biological father; or
(B) he is the expectant father of an unborn child.
(3) The mother and a man alleging that he is her child’s
biological father, filing jointly.
(4) The expectant mother and a man alleging that he is the
biological father of her unborn child, filing jointly.
(5) A child.
(6) If paternity of a child has not been established, the
department[ 4] by filing an action under this article for a child who
is the subject of a child in need of services proceeding.
(7) If the paternity of a child has not been established:
(A) the department; or
4
“Department” refers to the department of child services. See Ind. Code § 31-9-2-38.5 and Ind. Code § 31-25-
2-1.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 15 of 24
(B) a prosecuting attorney operating under an agreement
or contract with the department described in IC 31-25-4-
13.1.
[18] Mother and Biological Father’s petition was filed jointly under subsection (3). 5
The trial court, however, found that:
Mother was a party to the both the prior paternity affidavit and
the prior paternity proceedings involving the Legal Father which
resulted in this Court’s issuance of the Paternity Order. The
Paternity Order was a final appealable determination which has
not been set-aside. As such, Mother may not now collaterally
attack that determination by joining in the paternity proceeding
with the Biological Father. In re HH, 879 N.E.2d 1175 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008); see also Tierney v. Greene (In Re A.N.S.), 741 N.E.2d
780 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001).
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 15. We agree with the trial court.
[19] The doctrine of res judicata bars litigation of a claim after a final judgment has
been rendered in a prior action involving the same claim between the same
parties or their privies. Dickson v. D’Angelo, 749 N.E.2d 96, 99 (Ind. Ct. App.
2001). The principle behind this doctrine is the prevention of repetitive
5
Mother and Biological Father filed a motion to amend the caption to file as next friends on behalf of K.B.
Their motion specifically provided: “The granting of this motion will allow the Petitioner and Co-Petitioner
to change the form of the caption and not the substance of their Petition to Establish Paternity.” Appellant’s
App. Vol. II p. 22. The trial court’s order notes that the magistrate approved the caption change on June 26,
2018, but the CCS does not show that the magistrate approved the motion. Regardless, Mother’s and
Biological Father’s motion specifically provided that the substance of the petition did not change, only the
caption changed. The substance of the petition provides that it is filed under Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-
1(3).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 16 of 24
litigation of the same dispute. Id. The following four requirements must be
satisfied for a claim to be precluded under the doctrine of res judicata: 1) the
former judgment must have been rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction;
2) the former judgment must have been rendered on the merits; 3) the matter
now in issue was, or could have been, determined in the prior action; and 4) the
controversy adjudicated in the former action must have been between the
parties to the present suit or their privies. Id. at 100.
[20] The fourth factor requires that the parties to the subsequent action must be the
same parties as, or those in privity with, those in the first action. Id. The term
“privity” describes the relationship between persons who are parties to an
action and those who are not parties to an action but whose interests in the
action are such that they may nevertheless be bound by the judgment in that
action. Id. The term includes those who control an action, although not a party
to it, and those whose interests are represented by a party to the action. Id.
[21] Mother was a party to both the paternity affidavit and the prior paternity action,
which determined K.B.’s paternity. We have held that “once a mother has
signed a paternity affidavit, she may not use the paternity statutes to deprive the
legal father of his rights, even if he is not the biological father.” In re Paternity of
H.H., 879 N.E.2d 1175, 1178 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008). As such, Mother may not
use the paternity statutes to deprive Legal Father of his rights, and a joint
petition to establish paternity under Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(3) was
improper. The trial court properly dismissed Mother’s and Biological Father’s
petition for paternity on this basis.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 17 of 24
[22] Although the trial court dismissed Mother’s petition with prejudice, the trial
court noted that other provisions of Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1 may be
available to Biological Father and dismissed Biological Father’s petition
without prejudice. Biological Father was thus permitted to amend his paternity
petition. See Ind. Trial Rule 12(B). The CCS indicates that Father has done so,
and the trial court stayed the petition pending this appeal.
[23] Because these issues may arise on remand, we will mention the relevant
statutory considerations. We note that only the persons listed in Indiana Code
Section 31-14-4-1(2)—a man alleging that he is the child’s biological father—
and in Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(5)—the child—are possible persons
permitted to file the paternity action here. 6
1. Biological Father
[24] Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(2) allows a “man alleging that . . . he is the
child’s biological father” to file a paternity action. Indiana Code Section 31-14-
5-3, however, governs the time for filing a paternity action and is also relevant
here. It provides:
(a) This section does not apply to an action filed by the
department or its agents under section 4 of this chapter (or IC 31-
6-6.1-6(c) before its repeal).
6
A petition filed under Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(1) by Mother would be barred by res judicata, and
Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(4), (6), and (7) do not apply here.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 18 of 24
(b) The mother, a man alleging to be the child’s father, or the
department or its agents must file a paternity action not later than
two (2) years after the child is born, unless:
(1) both the mother and the alleged father waive the
limitation on actions and file jointly;
(2) support has been furnished by the alleged father or by a
person acting on his behalf, either voluntarily or under an
agreement with:
(A) the mother;
(B) a person acting on the mother’s behalf; or
(C) a person acting on the child’s behalf;
(3) the mother, the department, or a prosecuting attorney
operating under an agreement or contract described in IC
31-25-4-13.1 files a petition after the alleged father has
acknowledged in writing that he is the child’s biological
father;
(4) the alleged father files a petition after the mother has
acknowledged in writing that he is the child’s biological
father;
(5) the petitioner was incompetent at the time the child
was born; or
(6) a responding party cannot be served with summons
during the two (2) year period.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 19 of 24
(c) If any of the conditions described in subsection (b) exist, the
paternity petition must be filed not later than two (2) years after
the condition described in subsection (b) ceases to exist.
I.C. § 31-14-5-3. Consequently, a biological father is required to file a paternity
action within two years after the child’s birth unless one of the above statutory
exceptions applies.
2. Child
[25] Indiana Code Section 31-14-4-1(5) allows a “child” to file a paternity action.
Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-2 addresses a paternity petition filed by a minor
and provides:
(a) A person less than eighteen (18) years of age may file a
petition if the person is competent except for the person’s age. A
person who is otherwise incompetent may file a petition through
the person’s guardian, guardian ad litem, or next friend.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), a child may file a
paternity petition at any time before the child reaches twenty (20)
years of age.
(c) If a child is incompetent on the child’s eighteenth birthday,
the child may file a petition not later than two (2) years after the
child becomes competent.
a. Next Friend
[26] “There is no statutory definition of ‘next friend.’” In re Paternity of S.A.M., 85
N.E.3d 879, 886 (Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting R.J.S. v. Stockton, 886 N.E.2d
611, 614 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008)). Our courts, however, have held that “only
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 20 of 24
parents, guardians, guardians ad litem, and prosecutors may bring paternity
actions as next friends of children.” Id. at 887.
As a general rule, a next friend for an infant plaintiff is required
only when the infant is without a parent or general guardian,
since ordinarily it is the duty of the parent or general guardian of
an infant to institute and prosecute an action on behalf of the
infant for the protection of his rights.
Id. (holding that paternal grandfather did not have standing to file as child’s
next friend). This court has interpreted the statute “to permit a putative father
to file a paternity action as a child’s next friend.” In re Paternity of K.H., 116
N.E.3d 504, 511 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018), trans. denied.
[27] We acknowledge the apparent inconsistency that a mother and biological father
may not be permitted to file a paternity action in their own names but could file
a paternity action as next friend of a child. We discussed a similar concern in
In re Adoption of E.L., 913 N.E.2d 1276 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). There, the alleged
biological father failed to timely register as a putative father. Consequently, his
consent to the child’s adoption was implied, and he was not entitled to establish
paternity. See I.C. § 31-19-9-14. Moreover, his paternity petition was time-
barred under Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-3. We held, however, that he could
file a paternity action as the child’s next friend. We noted that “our precedents
indicate the fact R.J. is time-barred from petitioning in his own name does not
preclude him from filing a petition as next friend on behalf of E.L.” E.L., 913
N.E.2d at 1282; see also In re Matter of Paternity of P.L.M. by Mitchell, 661 N.E.2d
898 (Ind. Ct App. 1996), trans. denied.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 21 of 24
[28] After E.L., our General Assembly enacted Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-9,
which provides: “A man who is barred under IC 31-19 from establishing
paternity may not establish paternity by: (1) filing a paternity action as next
friend of a child; or (2) requesting a prosecuting attorney to file a paternity
action.” Consequently, a man barred from establishing paternity under the
adoption statutes may not file a paternity action as the child’s next friend. This
statutory change does not, however, prevent a man who is time-barred by
Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-3 from filing as the child’s next friend. 7 See In re
Adoption of K.G.B., 18 N.E.3d 292, 302-03 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (discussing E.L.
and the enactment of Indiana Code Section 31-14-5-9).
b. Guardian Ad Litem
[29] A guardian ad litem is also permitted to file a paternity petition on behalf of a
child. See I.C. § 31-14-5-2(a). The paternity statutes do not directly address
whether a next friend or guardian ad litem is preferred to represent a child. We
note, however, that Indiana Trial Rule 17(C) provides:
An infant or incompetent person may sue or be sued in any
action:
(1) in his own name;
(2) in his own name by a guardian ad litem or a next friend;
7
We respectfully invite the General Assembly to address this inconsistency.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 22 of 24
(3) in the name of his representative, if the representative is a
court-appointed general guardian, committee, conservator,
guardian of the estate or other like fiduciary.
The court, upon its own motion or upon the motion of any party,
must notify and allow the representative named in subsection (3)
of this subdivision, if he is known, to represent an infant or
incompetent person, and be joined as an additional party in his
representative capacity. If an infant or incompetent person is not
represented, or is not adequately represented, the court shall appoint a
guardian ad litem for him. The court may, in its discretion, appoint
a guardian ad litem or an attorney for persons who are
institutionalized, who are not yet born or in being, who are
unknown, who are known but cannot be located, or who are in
such position that they cannot procure reasonable representation.
The court shall make such other orders as it deems proper for the
protection of such parties or persons. Persons with claims
against the estate of the ward or against the guardian of his estate
as such may proceed under this rule or provisions applicable to
guardianship proceedings. It shall not be necessary that the
person for whom guardianship is sought shall be represented by a
guardian ad litem in such proceedings. Nothing herein shall
affect the right of a guardian to sue or be sued in his personal
capacity.
The court, in its discretion, may honor the infant’s or incompetent’s
choice of next friend or guardian ad litem, but the court may deny
approval or remove a person who is not qualified. A next friend or
guardian under subsection (C) of this rule may be required by the
court to furnish bond or additional bond and shall be subject to
the rules applicable to guardians of the estate with respect to
duties, terms of the bond required, accounting, compensation
and termination.
(emphasis added).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 23 of 24
[30] Importantly, both a person acting as a next friend and a guardian ad litem are
required to act in the child’s best interest. See In re R.P.D. ex rel. Dick, 708
N.E.2d 916, 918 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999), trans. denied. In R.P.D., the mother filed
a paternity action as the child’s next friend. The mother asserted that it was in
the child’s best interest to determine his biological father. The guardian ad
litem, however, filed a motion to dismiss, asserting that the paternity action was
not in the child’s best interest. We held that, “[b]ecause of this conflict, the
trial court was required to determine, prior to reaching the merits, whether the
paternity action was in [the child’s] best interest.” Id. “If the paternity action
was not in [the child’s] best interest, the trial court was required to dismiss it
since neither [the mother], as next friend, nor the GAL could continue to
prosecute an action on [the child’s] behalf where it was contrary to his best
interest.” Id.
Conclusion
[31] The trial court properly dismissed Mother’s and Biological Father’s petition to
establish paternity. We affirm.
[32] Affirmed.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Opinion 18A-JP-2066 | April 30, 2019 Page 24 of 24