in the Matter of D. R. B. III ( 2016 )

Opinion issued November 22, 2016
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-16-00442-CV
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IN THE MATTER OF D. R. B., III
On Appeal from the 314th District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. 2015-04361J
MEMORANDUM OPINION
This is an accelerated interlocutory appeal from the juvenile court’s order
waiving jurisdiction over appellant, a juvenile, and transferring jurisdiction to a
criminal district court. In two issues, appellant challenges the legal and factual
sufficiency of the evidence to support the juvenile court’s findings of probable
cause that he committed capital murder and that the welfare of the community
requires criminal proceedings. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a), (f). We conclude
that the juvenile court’s determinations were supported by legally and factually
sufficient evidence, and that the court did not abuse its discretion by certifying
appellant to stand trial as an adult. Accordingly, we affirm.
Background
Kenneth Flemings owned and operated a convenience store in Harris
County. When a disturbance occurred outside his store involving a group of
teenagers and young adults, he intervened, told them to leave, and flashed a
handgun at Jalen Coby. At the time, Coby suggested that he also had a gun, and he
knew when the store closed. Coby told Flemings that he would return in two weeks
and threatened, “I’ll get you.”
Approximately two weeks later, appellant D.R.B., III, then age 15, entered
the convenience store about an hour before it closed. His movement in the store
was captured on surveillance video. He was looking for cigars or candy, but he left
without buying anything. About an hour later, Flemings, his wife Camtu Nguyen,
and their employee left the store, locked the door, and got into their three separate
vehicles. Nguyen had taken the store’s cash with her.
Surveillance video showed that just after the three entered their vehicles,
Coby ran to the driver’s side of Flemings’s car, shot him in the head at extremely
close range, and then motioned to appellant and another youth, both of whom were
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wearing shirts over their faces. They ran to the car, opened the passenger-side
doors, and searched the car briefly. All three men quickly fled as an unidentified
car drove along the adjacent street and directed its headlights on the scene.
Nguyen emerged from her vehicle to summon help, and at one point she
grabbed Flemings’s handgun, which eventually ended up on the front passenger
floorboard of his car. Flemings later was taken by ambulance to a hospital where
he was pronounced dead. His wallet was found in the grass several blocks from the
store a few days later, but there was no cash in it.
The State filed a petition alleging that appellant had committed capital
murder, and that he engaged in delinquent conduct by “unlawfully, intentionally
causing the death” of Flemings “while in the course of committing and attempting
to commit” robbery by shooting him “with a deadly weapon, namely a firearm.”
Appellant was served with a petition asking the court to waive its exclusive
original jurisdiction and transfer him to the criminal district court for further
proceedings. The juvenile court ordered a certification examination, which was
conducted prior to the two-day certification hearing.
At the hearing, Houston Police Department Sergeant M. Holbrook testified
that he investigated the murder of Flemings. Sgt. Holbrook met Ray Rideaux, a
neighbor who had been across the street at the time of the shooting. Rideaux
identified appellant in court as the person who entered the convenience store about
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an hour before the fatal shooting. When Rideaux heard the gunshot, he looked
across the street, saw three black men at the scene, and heard someone yell, “kill
the bitch too.” He fired a round from his own handgun into the air as a warning
shot, and then he saw the three men run from the scene.
Sgt. Holbrook made still images from the surveillance video and showed
them to Officer Demby, a police officer assigned to the nearby public high school.
Officer Demby identified appellant as one of the two young men who opened the
passenger-side doors after Coby shot Flemings. Appellant was carrying a chrome
weapon that flashed in the video. Sgt. Holbrook interviewed appellant at school.
Appellant admitted that he was affiliated with the “103 Clique” street gang, he was
involved with this offense, and he was aware of Coby’s earlier encounter with
Flemings.
Sgt. Holbrook also spoke with Coby, who was an adult at the time of the
shooting. Coby turned himself in, and he quickly admitted his role in the offense.
He told Sgt. Holbrook that someone gave him the gun used in the murder, and he
believed it was not loaded. Sgt. Holbrook testified that the weapon was determined
to belong to a close friend of appellant. Coby told Sgt. Holbrook that he confronted
Flemings, who reached for a weapon. Coby said he fired the gun intending to
frighten Flemings with an unloaded gun. Instead, Flemings was shot, and he
slumped over bleeding onto the front passenger seat. Coby told Sgt. Holbrook that
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he and appellant were members of the “103 gang,” appellant knew he was planning
to confront Flemings, and appellant was the person who took Flemings’s wallet.
Psychologist Dr. Uche Chibueze testified about appellant’s certification
evaluation. She testified that a colleague, Dr. Linda B. Wittig, a child and
adolescent psychiatrist, conducted the full competency evaluation and found
appellant was ”fit to proceed” in the case. Dr. Chibueze testified that appellant had
been “out of control” while living with his mother. Though appellant denied that
he had been abused, he admitted having physical altercations with his stepfather,
sometimes striking first to gain a “competitive advantage.” He admitted to being
affiliated with the 103 Clique since the age of 13, and he said that the majority of
the 30 fights he had been in during his life were gang-related. Dr. Chibueze
testified that appellant was forthcoming about his hatred for rival gang members
and his unprovoked aggression toward drug abusers.
Dr. Chibueze testified that although appellant is more agreeable and well-
behaved when under the care of his grandparents, they had no idea that he was
involved with gangs. In addition, appellant confessed to using a significant amount
of cannabis daily and occasionally using codeine. She testified that appellant has
an average I.Q. and no intellectual disabilities. She also explained that he had a
“history of severe violations of people’s rights” and, excluding the charged
offense, he had a “high level of criminal sophistication.” When asked about his
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“overall risk of dangerousness,” she said it was “high” compared with other
adolescent offenders due to his low level of empathy and lack of regard for human
life. She also noted that in the juvenile system he could benefit from various
therapeutic and rehabilitative programs, and at age 16 he still had a significant
amount of time to benefit from these programs.
Dr. Chibueze’s amended certification evaluation report was introduced into
evidence. This report took into account the results of various emotional and
personality evaluations, including the Jesness Inventory Revised, the Personality
Assessment Inventory Adolescent version, the Structured Assessment of Violence
Risk in Youth, and the Risk Sophistication Treatment Inventory (RSTI).
In her report, Dr. Chibueze opined that appellant appeared more motivated
for treatment than other adolescents who were not being seen in a therapeutic
setting and that he reported a positive attitude. The Jesness Inventory suggested no
strong evidence of antisocial tendencies. She wrote, “Among serious offenders,
there is a lower risk of reoffending.” As to the RSTI, appellant acknowledged a
significant history of violence and a desire to harm rival gang members. He also
reported that he had been selling drugs since the age of 13. Dr. Chibueze observed
that his crimes tended to be premeditated and he was “likely to have a delinquent
peer group.” Dr. Chibueze further opined that appellant had an “average level of
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intellectual-based sophistication,” an “above average level of criminal
sophistication and dangerousness,” and “an above average level of maturity.”
Appellant had only one prior referral to the Harris County Juvenile
Probation Department. This referral was for evading arrest, and at the time of the
report, it was still pending. Although appellant claimed he “adjusted well” on pre-
adjudication supervision, he was detained for capital murder during that time.
While in supervision, he received four disciplinary infractions, including one for
gang-related violence and one for gang-related activity or material.
Dr. Chibueze expressed her concern that appellant had rated low on the
RSTI’s measure of empathy. Although appellant “scored in the high level of
treatment amenability range on the RSTI,” Dr. Chibueze nevertheless considered
him to exhibit “an average level of treatment amenability in comparison to most
individuals his age” because his “pervasive history of violating the rights of
others” and his “entrenched involvement with his gang” were mitigating factors
that impacted his “ability to benefit from treatment.” Dr. Chibueze also stated that
“without treatment, without legal consequences of any kind, and without time to
mature, it would appear” that appellant is “at Moderately High risk for some type
of reoffending in both instances when the index offense is included and excluded.”
Private investigator Charles Marler was hired by the defense to investigate
the offense. He testified that appellant was not involved with the murder of
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Flemings. He testified that appellant believed he was to be “backup” when Coby
beat up Flemings due to the prior incident. He testified that there was no plan to
rob Flemings, but appellant admitted to being at the scene, having a gun, and
looking in the car.
Michael Harrison, appellant’s juvenile supervision officer, testified about the
positive behavior he had exhibited while being in custody, saying that he does not
cause problems, is highly intelligent, has goals for the future, and wants to improve
his life. Appellant’s grandfather testified that he and his wife, who works as a
deputy constable, cared for appellant for a period of time when he was younger and
his mother was in prison. The grandfather refused to acknowledge or believe that
appellant was involved with a gang, blaming his bad behavior on his environment
and his mother’s poor parenting.
The juvenile court issued an order waiving its exclusive original jurisdiction
and transferring the case to a district court. In doing so, it provided specific factual
findings to support its decision.
Analysis
In two issues, appellant argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion
by waiving jurisdiction because the evidence was legally and factually insufficient
to support the two-pronged certification determination under Family Code
Section 54.02(a)(2). In his first issue he argues that the evidence was insufficient to
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support the determination that there was probable cause that he committed the
alleged offense. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a)(3). In his second issue he argues
that the evidence was insufficient to support the determination that the welfare of
the community required criminal proceedings. See id. § 54.02(a)(3), (f).
“Children ordinarily are not subject to criminal proceedings like adults.” In
re S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d 235, 238 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
Instead, when a child engages in conduct that would be considered criminal if
committed by an adult, it is called “delinquent conduct,” which includes, among
other things, the violation of “a penal law of this state or of the United States
punishable by imprisonment or by confinement in jail.” TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 51.03(a)(1). Murder and capital murder, when committed by a minor, constitute
delinquent conduct. See id.; see also TEX. PENAL CODE §§ 19.02, 19.03.
Juvenile courts have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving
delinquent conduct by children between 10 and 17 years old. TEX. FAM. CODE
§§ 51.02(2)(A), 51.04(a). A court may waive its exclusive original jurisdiction as
to a child who is at least 14 years old when he is alleged to have committed certain
felony offenses, including a capital felony, and no adjudication hearing has been
conducted concerning that offense. Id. § 54.02(a)(2)(A). To support waiver of
jurisdiction, the juvenile court also must determine, after a full investigation and a
hearing, that (1) “there is probable cause to believe that the child before the court
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committed the offense alleged” and (2) “because of the seriousness of the offense
alleged or the background of the child the welfare of the community requires
criminal proceedings.” Id. § 54.02(a)(3); see Moon v. State, 451 S.W.3d 28, 46–47
(Tex. Crim. App. 2014). If the juvenile court waives jurisdiction, it “shall state
specifically in the order its reasons for waiver.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(h).
On appeal, we review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to
support the juvenile court’s specific findings. Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. Our
sufficiency review is limited to the facts the juvenile court expressly relied on in its
transfer order. Id. at 50. In conducting a legal sufficiency review, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the findings, disregarding contrary proof
unless a reasonable factfinder could not reject it. S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 239. If
there is more than a scintilla of evidence supporting a finding, then the proof is
legally sufficient. Id. When reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we
consider all of the evidence presented to determine if the juvenile court’s findings
are so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to be clearly
wrong and unjust. Id.If the findings of the juvenile court are supported by legally and factually
sufficient evidence, then we review the court’s ultimate decision to waive
jurisdiction under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. We
will not substitute our discretion for that of the juvenile court, but only determine if
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the court’s waiver decision was made without reference to guiding rules and
principles. Id. at 47–49; see S.G.R., 496 S.W.3d at 239.
I. Probable cause that appellant committed the offense
Appellant argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the court’s finding that there was probable cause to believe that he
committed capital murder. Under Texas law, and as relevant to this case, a person
commits the offense of capital murder if he intentionally causes the death of an
individual in the course of committing or attempting to commit robbery. TEX.
PENAL CODE §§ 19.02(b)(1), 19.03(a)(2), 29.02; see Nickerson v. State, 478
S.W.3d 744, 755 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, no pet.). A person is
criminally responsible for an offense committed by another, among other reasons,
if he acts with intent to promote or assist the commission of the offense by
soliciting, encouraging, directing, aiding, or attempting to aid the other person to
commit the offense. TEX. PENAL CODE § 7.02(a)(2). The juvenile court is required
to state in its order the facts underlying its determinations. TEX. FAM. CODE
§ 54.02(h); Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 49–50. “Courts employ a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis for probable-cause determinations.” Manuel v. State, 481
S.W.3d 278, 283 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (citing Illinois
v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238, 103 S. Ct. 2317, 2332 (1983)).
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Appellant first contends that the order must be reversed because there are
“no case specific findings of fact set forth in the order that support the probable
cause determination.” That argument apparently is premised on the order’s lack of
a separately denominated section of fact findings specifically connected to the
probable-cause determination, because appellant also identifies specific factual
findings from the court’s order and argues why each, in isolation, is insufficient to
connect him in a logical way to the offense for which was charged. For example,
he isolates the court’s finding that he acted with a “callous disregard for human
life,” and he responds that this is not an element of capital murder. He challenges
the court’s finding that he “cased” the store by arguing that his behavior of
entering the store and leaving without having made a purchase was innocent and,
in any event, the plan was never to rob the store but to assault Flemings.
Rather than analyzing each piece of evidence in isolation, a court evaluates
probable cause by considering whether there are sufficient facts and circumstances
to justify a prudent person in believing the suspect committed the offense. See,
e.g., In re J.G., 495 S.W.3d 354, 374 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet.
filed). In this case, the evidence showed that appellant went to the store an hour
before the offense, purchased nothing, then went across the street and told Coby
that Flemings was there. Appellant returned to the scene after Coby shot Flemings.
This time he was with a co-actor, and both had covered their faces with t-shirts. He
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was carrying a gun. He opened the passenger-side car door and partially entered
the car, where he would have seen Flemings slumped over the center console,
bleeding from his head. He ran from the scene as a car approached. He confessed
that he was aware of the prior confrontation that Coby had with Flemings and that
he was carrying a gun that night. Coby told Sgt. Holbrook that he and appellant
were both 103 Clique members, appellant knew he had a gun that night, and
appellant took Flemings’s wallet. In addition, Sgt. Holbrook testified the murder
weapon belonged to appellant’s close friend.
Considering the totality of the circumstances in the light most favorable to
the juvenile court’s order, we conclude that the evidence was legally sufficient to
support the court’s implied determination that a prudent person would be justified
in believing appellant committed the charged offense. The contrary evidence was
testimony from the private investigator. Cross-examination showed gaps in his
investigation that could cause a reasonable factfinder to question the credibility of
his statements or give less weight to his testimony. Thus, considering all of the
evidence, we further hold that the court’s determination of probable cause is not
against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence and is supported by
factually sufficient evidence.
We overrule the first issue.
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II. Welfare of the community
In his second issue, appellant contends that the evidence was both legally
and factually insufficient to support the court’s findings regarding the statutory
factors affecting whether the welfare of the community requires criminal
proceedings. In particular, appellant asserts that the court did not properly credit
the opinion evidence offered by Dr. Chibueze.
Before a juvenile court can waive jurisdiction, it must find “that because of
the seriousness of the offense alleged or the background of the child the welfare of
the community requires criminal proceedings.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(a)(3). In
making this determination, the court must consider the following non-exclusive
statutory factors:
(1) whether the alleged offense was against person or
property, with greater weight in favor of transfer given to
offenses against the person;
(2) the sophistication and maturity of the child;
(3) the record and previous history of the child; and
(4) the prospects of adequate protection of the public and the
likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of
procedures, services, and facilities currently available to
the juvenile court.
Id. § 54.02(f). These factors enable the juvenile court to balance the potential
danger that the juvenile poses to the public against his amenability to treatment and
rehabilitation. Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 38.
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The State bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that
waiver of the juvenile court’s exclusive jurisdiction is appropriate. S.G.R., 496
S.W.3d at 238. We first review the juvenile court’s specific findings of fact
regarding the Section 54.02(f) factors under “traditional sufficiency of the evidence
review.” Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47. We then review the juvenile court’s ultimate
waiver decision under an abuse-of-discretion standard. Id. The State need not
prove all four Section 54.02(f) factors; the juvenile court may make its
determination, exercising appropriate discretion with reference to guiding rules and
principles based on the strength of any combination of the criteria. See id. at 47 &
n.78.
A. Sufficiency of the evidence to support Section 54.02(f) findings
1. Offense against person or property
The first statutory factor asks whether the offense was against a person or
property, “with greater weight in favor of transfer given to offenses against the
person.” TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(f)(1). In the transfer order, the juvenile court
found that the alleged offense, capital murder, was “an offense against the person
of another.” The court found certain facts “particularly egregious and aggravating.”
These facts included appellant’s use of a firearm, his role in planning the crime by
going to the store an hour before the shooting and then waiting with his co-actors
until Flemings closed the store, his cooperation and participation in the offense,
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and his opening the car door to aid in theft as Flemings bled from a gunshot wound
to his head.
Appellant admitted having a gun with him, entering the store prior to the
actual shooting, and opening the car door. He denied stealing anything, but Sgt.
Holbrook testified that Coby told him that appellant had stolen the wallet. In
addition, the offense was captured on surveillance video. We conclude legally and
factually sufficient evidence supported the determination that the alleged offense
was against a person.
2. Sophistication and maturity of the child
The second statutory factor considers the “sophistication and maturity of the
child.” Id. § 54.02(f)(2). In the transfer order, the juvenile court relied on the report
and testimony pertaining to the psychological evaluation performed by Dr.
Chibueze. The court found that appellant has an average I.Q., an average level of
intellectual sophistication, an above-average level of criminal sophistication and
dangerousness, and an above-average level of maturity—all compared to offenders
his age. The court also found that despite a high score on a treatment amenability
test, Dr. Chibueze opined that his “pervasive history of violating the rights of
others and his entrenched involvement with his gang” were “mitigating factors that
impact his ability to benefit from treatment.” All of the statements in the court’s
order about Dr. Chibueze’s determinations are supported by her testimony or the
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psychological report. As such, we conclude that the evidence is legally and
factually sufficient to support the court’s findings.
Appellant questions some of the assumptions implicit in Dr. Chibueze’s
opinions, such as whether appellant knew that Coby intended to murder Flemings.
While such doubt could affect the weight the factfinder would give to the evidence,
it did not contradict the evidence that was adduced.
3. Record and previous history of the child
The third statutory factor considers the “record and previous history of the
child.” Id. § 54.02(f)(3). In the transfer order, the court found that appellant had
four behavior infractions while in the Harris County Juvenile Detention Center, he
admitted to having physical altercations with his stepfather, which he sometimes
instigated to gain an advantage, and that he had been in 30 fights in his lifetime. In
addition, the court took note of appellant’s confessed association with the 103
Clique, his admission to having instigated unprovoked physical assaults on rival
gang members, and his display of weapons as a form of intimidation. The court
also credited appellant’s history of unprovoked aggression toward “crackheads”
and self-professed enjoyment of assaulting such individuals. The court found that
appellant admitted to selling crack cocaine in exchange for the opportunity to drive
a vehicle, and his use of cannabis and opioids.
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Appellant argues that he has no history of adjudicated delinquent behavior,
only four infractions while in supervision, and a positive recommendation from his
juvenile supervision officer, who testified that he is cooperative, helpful, and
bright. Section 54.02(f)(3) asks the court to consider the record and previous
history of the child, but it does not limit the court to adjudicated delinquent
behavior. As such, the juvenile court is free to consider unadjudicated previous
history, such as appellant’s admitted use of illegal drugs, underage driving,
assaultive behavior toward drug abusers, rival gang members, and his stepfather,
and his gang association. Appellant’s good behavior while in the Juvenile
Detention Center is commendable, but the juvenile court was nevertheless entitled
to consider the four infractions that appellant received there as well. All of these
facts find support in the evidence adduced at the hearing. As such, we hold that the
court’s findings were supported by legally sufficient evidence. In addition,
considering all of the evidence in a neutral light, including the evidence of
appellant’s more recent good behavior, we conclude that the trial court’s findings
were not against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We hold that
the court’s findings were supported by factually sufficient evidence.
4. Protection of the public and rehabilitation of the child
The fourth statutory factor balances the “prospects of adequate protection of
the public and the likelihood of the rehabilitation of the child by use of procedures,
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services, and facilities currently available to the juvenile court.” Id. § 54.02(f)(4).
The court found there was “little, if any, prospect of adequate protection of the
public and little, if any, likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation” of appellant by use
of the procedures, services, and facilities available to the juvenile court. The court
listed several reasons for its determination, including that appellant was at a high
risk for reoffending if he stayed in the juvenile system, he was “not amenable to
treatment and rehabilitation,” and he had “exhibited a danger to society and to the
public.”
In support of the finding of a high risk of reoffending, the court stated its
finding was based on “a review of all of the evidence that was presented,”
including “the facts and circumstances of the offense,” Dr. Wittig’s psychological
evaluation, and the testimony of Dr. Chibueze. Although Dr. Chibueze
characterized appellant’s risk for reoffending as “Moderately High,” which the
juvenile court expressly acknowledged, the other evidence referenced in the order
supported the characterization of the risk of reoffending as “high,” including his
gang affiliation, his drug use, and Dr. Wittig’s characterization of him as “at some
chronic risk for self-destructive and aggressive behaviors in light of his current
situation and his history.”
The finding that appellant was “not amenable to treatment and
rehabilitation” was based on Dr. Chibueze’s opinion that appellant’s gang
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involvement and pervasive history of violating people’s rights mitigated against his
ability to benefit from treatment. Appellant also relies on recommendations by Dr.
Chibueze and Dr. Wittig regarding possible treatments that might be beneficial to
him. He argues, “there is no evidence that the services these doctors recommended
could not be provided in the juvenile system.” But the juvenile court’s finding is
supported by legally sufficient evidence, and to show that the evidence was
factually insufficient, appellant would need to point out specific evidence that
outweighs the evidence the court relied on in reaching its conclusion or making its
findings. Appellant’s reliance on a lack of evidence that the services could not be
provided is unpersuasive. We hold that the court’s finding that appellant was not
amenable to treatment and rehabilitation was not against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence and was supported by factually sufficient evidence.
B. Review of waiver determination
We have found that the court’s factual findings as to the Section 54.02(f)
factors are supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. We have
explained that Dr. Chibueze’s testimony and report provide legally sufficient
evidence to support the trial court’s finding regarding appellant’s lack of
amenability to treatment. And we have demonstrated how appellant has failed to
advance an argument on appeal that would show the factual insufficiency of this
finding.
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With respect to the finding that the alleged offense was against a person, the
juvenile court noted this would be given “greater weight in favor discretionary
transfer.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 54.02(f)(1). The court stated its finding that
appellant was of average intelligence weighed “in favor of the Court’s waiver of its
jurisdiction.” See id. § 54.02(f)(2). The court found that appellant’s previous
history weighed “in favor of discretionary transfer.” See id. § 54.02(f)(3). Finally,
the juvenile court indicated its finding of “little, if any, prospect of adequate
protection of the public and little, if any, likelihood of reasonable rehabilitation.”
See id. § 54.02(f)(4).
Appellant challenged the juvenile court’s determination that the finding
about his sophistication and maturity weighed in favor of waiver. He argues that
the court provided no justification for its conclusion that an average intellect,
above-average maturity, and above-average criminal sophistication weigh in favor
of the court’s waiver of jurisdiction and transfer to a criminal district court. We
have affirmed similar conclusions in other similar cases. E.g., In re K.J., 493
S.W.3d 140, 151 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.).
The combination of factors that were proved, reflected in the court’s
findings in accordance with Moon, and found by this court to be supported by
legally and factually sufficient evidence together support the court’s decision to
waive its jurisdiction. The juvenile court considered the entirety of the record in
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light of the factors set forth in Section 54.02(f) and determined that appellant’s
lack of prior recorded delinquency history did not outweigh all the other factors
favoring waiver of jurisdiction. Because the court’s ultimate waiver decision was
made with reference to guiding rules and principles such as the factors set forth in
Section 54.02(f), we conclude that the court did not abuse its discretion by waiving
its jurisdiction. See Moon, 451 S.W.3d at 47–49.
Conclusion
We affirm the order of the juvenile court.
Michael Massengale
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Massengale, Brown, and Huddle.
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