State v. Jones , 2011 Ohio 4404 ( 2011 )


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  • [Cite as State v. Jones, 
    2011-Ohio-4404
    .]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 94408
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    VINCE JONES
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    APPLICATION DENIED
    Cuyahoga County Common Pleas Court
    Case Nos. CR-525681-A and CR-526447-A
    Application for Reopening
    Motion No. 442499
    RELEASE DATE:            August 31, 2011
    FOR APPELLANT
    Vince Jones, Pro Se
    Inmate No. 572-912
    Marion Correctional Institution
    P.O. Box 57
    Marion, OH 43301
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    William D. Mason
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY:    Robert Botnick
    Kristen L. Sobieski
    Assistant County Prosecutors
    The Justice Center
    1200 Ontario Street, 8th Floor
    Cleveland, OH 44113
    MELODY J. STEWART, P.J.:
    {¶ 1} In State v. Jones, Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas Case Nos.
    CR-525681 and 526447, applicant – Vince Jones – pled guilty to identity fraud, theft, forgery,
    and tampering with records.      This court affirmed his convictions, vacated his sentence, and
    remanded the case for resentencing because of several sentencing errors in State v. Jones, 8th
    1
    Dist. No. 94408, 
    2011-Ohio-453
    .
    “This case has several sentencing errors that must be corrected.   First, the court failed to
    1
    {¶ 2} Jones has filed with the clerk of this court a timely application for reopening.
    He asserts that he was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel because appellate
    counsel did not assign several errors pertaining to his plea and sentencing.            We deny the
    application for reopening.    As required by App.R. 26(B)(6), the reasons for our denial follow.
    {¶ 3} Having reviewed the arguments in the application for reopening in light of the
    record, we hold that Jones has failed to meet his burden to demonstrate that “there is a genuine
    issue as to whether the applicant was deprived of the effective assistance of counsel on
    appeal.”    App.R. 26(B)(5).     In State v. Spivey, 
    84 Ohio St.3d 24
    , 
    1998-Ohio-704
    , 
    701 N.E.2d 696
    , the Supreme Court specified the proof required of an applicant.              “In State v.
    Reed (1996), 
    74 Ohio St.3d 534
    , 535, 
    660 N.E.2d 456
    , 458, we held that the two-prong
    analysis found in Strickland v. Washington (1984), 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 
    104 S.Ct. 2052
    , 
    80 L.Ed.2d 674
    , is the appropriate standard to assess a defense request for reopening under App.R.
    26(B)(5).   [Applicant] must prove that his counsel were deficient for failing to raise the issues
    he now presents, as well as showing that had he presented those claims on appeal, there was a
    ‘reasonable probability’ that he would have been successful.            Thus [applicant] bears the
    burden of establishing that there was a ‘genuine issue’ as to whether he has a ‘colorable claim’
    mention restitution for both cases during the sentencing hearing but ordered restitution in the journal
    entry. Secondly, the court failed to order court costs for both cases as part of the sentence. Third,
    the court confused which charge carried the four-year sentence in Case No. CR-526447. On remand,
    the trial court must resentence Jones to correct these errors so that the journal entry directly
    corresponds to the sentence stated in the presence of Jones at his sentencing hearing.” Id. at ¶56.
    of ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal.”      Id. at 25.   Applicant cannot satisfy either
    prong of the Strickland test.    We must, therefore, deny the application on the merits.
    {¶ 4} In his first proposed assignment of error, Jones contends that the trial court failed
    to determine “that the defendant is making the plea voluntarily, with understanding of the
    nature of the charges and of the maximum penalty involved ***.”              Crim.R. 11(C)(2)(a).
    Specifically, Jones asserts that the trial court did not inform him of the maximum penalty.
    {¶ 5} Yet, during the plea hearing, the prosecution recited a potential penalty for each
    charge resulting in a guilty plea.   The state also stated the potential postrelease control.   See
    Tr., Aug. 27, 2009, at 17-18. “At the plea hearing, the state set forth the charge, maximum
    penalty, and plea discussions on the record.             The trial court engaged Davis [the
    defendant/appellant] in a Crim. R. 11 colloquy.        During the colloquy, Davis affirmatively
    expressed that he understood his rights, and that he understood he was giving up those rights
    by entering a guilty plea.”     State v. Davis, Cuyahoga App. No. 95016, 
    2011-Ohio-2514
    .
    {¶ 6} As was the case in Davis, the state set forth the charges and range of penalties.
    Jones has not, therefore, demonstrated that appellate counsel was deficient or that he was
    prejudiced by the absence of this assignment of error.
    {¶ 7} In his second through sixth assignments of error, Jones complains regarding
    various purported sentencing errors:
    2.   A four-year sentence for fourth-degree felony theft is outside the statutory range.
    3.   The trial court did not sentence him on identity fraud.
    4.   The trial court sentenced him to a charge to which he had not pled guilty.
    5.   The trial court failed to apply postrelease control properly.
    6.   The trial court imposed an incorrect amount of restitution.
    {¶ 8} As noted above, on direct appeal, this court vacated the sentence and remanded
    the case for resentencing because of several sentencing errors.             In its response to the
    application, the state observes that the trial court issued resentencing entries on March 8, 2011.
    As a consequence, the state argues that the application for reopening is moot.     With respect to
    proposed assignments of error two through six, we agree.
    {¶ 9} This court vacated the original sentence.    That is, appellate counsel succeeded in
    persuading this court to vacate the sentence.      Jones may not maintain an application for
    reopening by challenging a sentence which, in effect, no longer exists.       We cannot conclude
    that appellate counsel was deficient or that Jones was prejudiced by the absence of any
    proposed assignments of error regarding sentencing.
    {¶ 10} This court has previously determined that applications for reopening are moot
    after the Supreme Court of Ohio reversed the judgment of this court and remanded the cases to
    the trial court for resentencing.   State v. Abboud, 8th Dist. No. 85750, 
    2005-Ohio-5847
    ,
    reopening disallowed, 
    2006-Ohio-4265
    ; State v. Bryant, 8th Dist. No. 85836, 
    2005-Ohio-6358
    ,
    reopening disallowed, 
    2006-Ohio-4105
    .    Likewise, because this court vacated the sentence,
    proposed assignments of error two through six are moot.
    Jones has not met the standard for reopening.      Accordingly, the application for
    reopening is denied.
    MELODY J. STEWART, PRESIDING JUDGE
    LARRY A. JONES, J., and
    KATHLEEN ANN KEOUGH, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 94408

Citation Numbers: 2011 Ohio 4404

Judges: Stewart

Filed Date: 8/31/2011

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014