Constance Anthony v. Seaside Rentals ( 2019 )

NUMBER 13-17-00178-CV
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
CONSTANCE ANTHONY, Appellant,
v.
SEASIDE RENTALS, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
of Nueces County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Hinojosa
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
Appellant Constance Anthony appeals from the county court’s judgment of
eviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
On February 6, 2017, appellee Seaside Rentals (Seaside) filed a petition for
eviction against Anthony in the justice court, alleging that Anthony owed unpaid rent and
was unlawfully holding over. A hearing was held in the justice court and a judgment of
eviction was entered awarding Seaside damages for the unpaid rent and court costs.
Anthony appealed the justice court’s order to the county court. On April 5, 2017, the
county court held a bench trial with both parties appearing pro se. The court heard
testimony from both parties regarding the eviction proceedings.
Joan Zimmerman testified on behalf of Seaside. In her testimony to the court, she
explained that Seaside had made a decision not to re-sign their contract with the Corpus
Christi Housing Authority (CCHA) for the Section 8 Voucher Program; the contract expired
December 21, 2016. She testified that the decision was for all residents using vouchers.
The CCHA required that Seaside notify all tenants currently using the vouchers to afford
them the opportunity to relocate, which Zimmerman testified Seaside did. Seaside is a
private landlord and no longer contracts with CCHA to accept the Section 8 vouchers.
Zimmerman testified that Seaside gave Anthony more than 30 days’ notice to
vacate and relocate, which was more than required by the CCHA. She further testified
that two letters of non-renewal were sent to Anthony through registered mail. Zimmerman
explained that she communicated with the CCHA regarding notification of Anthony and
that the CCHA stated it would notify Anthony, should she not receive the notices.
Zimmerman stated that Seaside presented Anthony the opportunity to sign a lease with
it directly, but she did not sign it. When Anthony did not vacate the premises at the
expiration of her lease, Seaside filed a three-day notice to vacate in the justice court.
Anthony testified that she receives housing vouchers under what is commonly
referred to as Section 8. At the time of trial, she resided in a property owned by Seaside,
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though she testified that Seaside often changed its corporate identity and name. Her
lease was through the voucher program. She also testified that she had a pending case
of discrimination against the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).
Anthony explained that she did not believe she could be evicted while the case against
HUD was pending because it would be considered retaliation.
Anthony stated that she did not receive a notice of the contract termination and
that she still had vouchers to remain in the property, but that the CCHA tried to “make
[her] come in for relocation.” She did not have a hearing or any formal grievance process
with the CCHA, which she believed she was entitled to.
On April 5, 2017, the county court signed a judgment of eviction against Anthony
and ordered that the right of possession of the premises belonged to Seaside. No unpaid
rent or attorney’s fees were awarded. This appeal followed.
II. FORCIBLE DETAINER AND MOOTNESS
As a preliminary matter, we address Seaside’s argument that this appeal is moot.
The only issue in a forcible-detainer action is the right to actual possession of the subject
property; “the merits of the title shall not be adjudicated.” See Wilhelm v. Fed. Nat’l Mortg.
Ass’n, 349 S.W.3d 766, 768–69 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
Judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be a final
determination of whether the eviction is wrongful; rather it is a determination of the right
to immediate possession. Marshall v. Housing Auth. of the City of San Antonio, 198
S.W.3d 782, 787 (Tex. 2006). Therefore, although the failure to supersede a forcible-
detainer judgment does not divest an appellant of the right to appeal, an appeal from a
forcible-detainer action becomes moot if the appellant is no longer in possession of the
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property, unless the appellant holds and asserts “a potentially meritorious claim of right
to current, actual possession” of the property. Id. at 786–87; see Wilhelm, 349 S.W.3d at
768; see also Cholick v. TSPC Bros., LLC, No. 13-17-00622-CV, 2018 WL 1325795, at
*1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Mar. 15, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.).
The record reflects that Anthony did not supersede the judgment; a writ of
possession was executed on April 11, 2017; Anthony was evicted from the premises on
April 14, 2017; and Anthony no longer has possession of the property at issue in the
underlying forcible detainer action. Anthony’s brief argues that: (1) the county court did
not have jurisdiction, (2) the county court erred by not allowing appellant to exhaust her
administrative remedies, (3) the eviction was a retaliation, (4) the county court erred by
excluding evidence relating to wrongful eviction, (5) the county court’s ruling was
irrational, (6) the county court abused its discretion in rendering the judgment, and (7) this
Court “has a justiciable interest” in the outcome of the underlying proceeding.
In light of her timely and clear expression of intent to appeal, Anthony’s action in
giving up possession did not moot her appeal so long as appellate relief was not futile;
that is, so long as she held and asserted a potentially meritorious claim of right to current,
actual possession of the apartment. See Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. However, any
appellate relief regarding the right to current possession here is futile. The lease
governing the premises has expired. In the trial before the county court, Anthony stated
that she still had valid vouchers to remain on the property extending “through 2018.”
There is no indication of any date beyond 2018 that Anthony would be entitled to
possession of the property. Therefore, there was no live controversy as of that date. See
id. Anthony presents no basis for claiming a right to possession after expiration of her
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vouchers. See id. Even if Anthony is correct on the merits of the eviction suit, she would
not be entitled to possession because her original lease term has already expired. See
id. (explaining a judgment of possession in a forcible detainer action is not intended to be
a determination of whether an eviction was wrongful, but rather a determination of the
right to immediate possession). We conclude that Anthony’s appellate issues two through
six of are therefore moot; no controversy currently exists between the parties with regard
to possession of the property. See id.; see also TEX. R. APP. P. 42.3(c); Devilbiss v. Burch,
No. 04-16-00711-CV, 2018 WL 2418476, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio May 30, 2018,
pet. denied) (mem. op.) (holding that appellant’s issues relating to whether the eviction
was wrongful were moot in an appeal of a forcible detainer action); Bey v. ASD Fin., Inc.,
No. 05-14-00534-CV, 2014 WL 4180933, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2014, no pet.)
(mem. op.) (dismissing appeal of forcible detainer action as moot because appellant no
longer possessed property at issue).
III. JURISDICTION
By her first issue, appellant argues that the county court did not have jurisdiction.
Specifically, she argues that she raised a federal question in her affirmative defenses
which divested the county court of jurisdiction.
A. Standard of Review
Whether a court has subject-matter jurisdiction is a question of law, subject to de
novo review. See Tex. Dep’t of Parks & Wildlife v. Miranda, 133 S.W.3d 217, 226 (Tex.
2004); Mayhew v. Town of Sunnyvale, 964 S.W.2d 922, 928 (Tex. 1998). Subject-matter
jurisdiction is fundamental and may be raised for the first time on appeal. Tex. Ass’n. of
Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 445 (Tex. 1993).
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B. Applicable Law
A justice court in the precinct in which the property is located has jurisdiction over
forcible detainer actions. See TEX. PROP. CODE. ANN. § 24.004 (West, Westlaw 2017
through 1st C.S.). The sole issue to be determined in a forcible detainer suit is the
entitlement to actual and immediate possession. Marshall, 198 S.W.3d at 787. From the
justice court, a forcible detainer suit may be appealed to the county court for a de novo
review. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 749; Hong Kong Dev., Inc. v. Nguyen, 229 S.W.3d 415, 433–
34 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.). The appellate jurisdiction of the county
court is confined to the jurisdictional limits of the justice court. Salaymeh v. Plaza Centro,
LLC, 264 S.W.3d 431, 435 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2008, no pet.); Hong Kong,
229 S.W.3d at 434; see also In re Gallegos, 13-13-00504-CV, 2013 WL 6056666, at *3
(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Nov. 13, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.).
Forcible detainer actions are cumulative of any other remedy that a party may have
in the courts of this state. Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 436. Forcible detainer suits in justice
court may run concurrently with an action in another court—even if the other action
involves adjudication of matters that could result in a different determination of possession
from the decision rendered in the forcible detainer suit. Id.
C. Analysis
Seaside brought a forcible detainer action in the justice court in the precinct where
the real property at issue was located. The justice court entered an order of eviction, from
which Anthony properly appealed to the county court. Anthony argues that her inclusion
of a federal question in her affirmative defenses divested the county court of jurisdiction.
We disagree. The county court was the appropriate appellate forum. See TEX. R. APP.
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P. 506; Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 435. The county court had the jurisdiction to hear the
forcible detainer action and to determine actual and immediate possession of the
property. Hong Kong, 229 S.W.3d at 433–34. Anthony was free to pursue her separate
claims in another court. Salaymeh, 264 S.W.3d at 436. Accordingly, the county court
had jurisdiction to hear and determine possession of the property at issue. Anthony’s first
issue is overruled.
IV. JUSTICIABLE INTEREST
By her seventh issue, Anthony contends that this Court has “a justiciable interest
in the outcome of the underlying proceeding.” Anthony, however, does not present any
argument, authority, or support on this issue. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i). Anthony has
failed to adequately brief this issue. Accordingly, we overrule Anthony’s seventh issue.
V. CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the county court.
NORA L. LONGORIA
Justice
Delivered and filed the
24th day of January, 2019.
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