In the Term. of the Parent-Child Relationship of: R.P., C.P. and A.A. (Minor Children), and L.B. (Mother) v. The Ind. Dept. of Child Services (mem. dec.) ( 2016 )


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  • MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
    FILED
    this Memorandum Decision shall not be                              Dec 07 2016, 9:41 am
    regarded as precedent or cited before any                               CLERK
    Indiana Supreme Court
    court except for the purpose of establishing                           Court of Appeals
    and Tax Court
    the defense of res judicata, collateral
    estoppel, or the law of the case.
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT                                   ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    John T. Wilson                                           Gregory F. Zoeller
    Anderson, Indiana                                        Attorney General of Indiana
    Robert J. Henke
    James D. Boyer
    Deputy Attorneys General
    Indianapolis, Indiana
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                           December 7, 2016
    Child Relationship of:                                      Court of Appeals Case No.
    R.P., C.P. and A.A. (Minor Children),                       48A02-1603-JT-482
    and                                                         Appeal from the Madison
    Circuit Court
    L.B. (Mother)
    The Honorable George G.
    Appellant-Respondent,                                       Pancol, Judge
    v.                                                  Trial Court Cause Nos.
    48C02-1505-JT-35
    48C02-1505-JT-36
    The Indiana Department of Child                             48C02-1505-JT-37
    Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Robb, Judge.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016      Page 1 of 17
    Case Summary and Issue
    [1]   L.B. (“Mother”) appeals the juvenile court’s termination of her parental rights
    to her children R.P., C.P., and A.A. (“Children”), raising a sole restated issue:
    whether the juvenile court’s termination order is supported by clear and
    convincing evidence. Concluding the termination order is not clearly
    erroneous, we affirm.
    Facts and Procedural History
    [2]   In the summer of 2012, the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”)
    received a report regarding the well-being of Mother’s youngest child, A.A.
    DCS investigated the report and concluded there was sufficient probable cause
    to determine A.A. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”) because the
    children were found dirty and one child stated Mother smoked marijuana,
    Mother was never home, and Mother rarely cooked for the Children.
    Thereafter, DCS implemented a program of informal adjustment.
    [3]   On August 16, 2013, DCS received a report regarding Mother’s arrest for
    burglary; Mother committed the crime while A.A. was with her. Mother
    remained in jail for three months, and because no suitable caregivers were
    available to care for the Children, DCS removed the Children and placed them
    in foster care. DCS then filed a petition alleging the Children were CHINS.
    Following a fact-finding hearing at which Mother admitted the allegations set
    forth in the petition, the juvenile court adjudicated the Children as CHINS and
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 2 of 17
    ordered Mother to participate in reunification services. Specifically, the
    juvenile court ordered Mother to obtain and maintain suitable housing and
    employment and to participate in home-based case work, home-based therapy,
    a family functional assessment, and supervised visitation. Mother’s
    participation in these services was sporadic.
    [4]   On December 26, 2013, Mother was sentenced in her criminal case to four
    years in the Department of Correction, with the entirety of the sentence
    suspended to probation. In July 2014, Mother failed a drug screen and the trial
    court in her criminal case issued a warrant for her arrest. Knowing she violated
    a condition of her probation, Mother left town in an attempt to evade law
    enforcement. Mother was later apprehended. The trial court revoked Mother’s
    probation and ordered her to serve a portion of her remaining sentence on
    house arrest. In November 2014, Mother—while on house arrest— failed
    another drug screen, cut off her ankle monitoring device, and left town. Mother
    was not apprehended until March 2015 and was incarcerated in the county jail
    until May 2015. The trial court then ordered Mother to serve the remainder of
    her sentence at a work release facility.
    [5]   On May 4, 2015, DCS filed a request to end Mother’s reunification services and
    a petition for termination of Mother’s parental rights. The juvenile court
    granted the request to end services and scheduled an evidentiary hearing on the
    termination petition for September 15, 2015. At the evidentiary hearing, both
    the court-appointed special advocate (“CASA”) and the DCS family case
    manager testified Mother’s parental rights should be terminated, relying in part
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 3 of 17
    on Mother’s sporadic participation in services, criminal history, inability to
    comply with the terms of probation and house arrest, and the improved
    attitude, stability, and lifestyle the Children enjoyed in their foster homes.
    Mother acknowledged she did not participate in services as she should, was
    confined to work release, and could be sent to the Department of Correction if
    she failed to comply with the terms of her work release. However, Mother
    believed she was making the rights changes at the time of the hearing.
    Specifically, she stated she had been working as an assistant manager at
    Subway for over three months and was taking classes to attain her GED.
    Mother’s work release case manager testified Mother had not yet failed any
    drug screens or violated any policies or procedures. The case manager further
    explained Mother paid ahead on rent, completed a substance abuse evaluation,
    and completed numerous classes related to substance abuse, budgeting, and
    employment. At the conclusion of the hearing, the juvenile court took the
    matter under advisement.
    [6]   Nearly six months later, the parties convened for a review hearing. At the
    beginning of the hearing, the juvenile court stated it intended to terminate
    Mother’s parental rights, but wanted to give Mother one last opportunity to
    admit any additional evidence showing why her parental rights should not be
    terminated. Mother stated her work release had been modified to house arrest
    and she had rented a house. Mother further explained she still worked at
    Subway as an assistant manager.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 4 of 17
    [7]   Following the review hearing, the juvenile court issued an order terminating
    Mother’s parental rights, finding in relevant part,
    2. On or about August 16, 2013, Mother was arrested for
    burglary while [A.A.] was with her. Mother was subsequently
    incarcerated, and the children had no willing and/or available
    caregivers. On August 20, 2013, Mother entered an admission to
    the allegations in DCS’ Verified Petition Alleging Children are
    Children in Need of Services.
    3. The children were found to be Children in Need of Services
    . . . and a dispositional order was issued on October 9, 2013. The
    children have remained out of the parents’ care continuously
    since that date.
    4. Pursuant to dispositional orders, Mother was offered the
    following services: home-based therapy, home-based casework,
    family functional assessment, substance abuse evaluation,
    random drug screens and visitation.
    ***
    6. Mother failed to demonstrate an ability to remedy her stability
    issues. Mother was provided home-based casework in order to
    find employment, find housing, develop life skills and develop
    parenting skills. Mother participated in home-based case work
    during the CHINS case but demonstrated patterns of
    inconsistency in attendance and participation. Mother stopped
    participating in home-based casework in November 2014.
    Mother was unable to secure stable housing during the course of
    the underlying CHINS case. In the past five (5) years, Mother
    resided at approximately thirteen (13) residences and was evicted
    twice. At the time of the Termination Hearing, Mother was
    residing at a work release facility and did not have a place to
    reside upon her release. Due to her inconsistency in attendance
    and failure to continue services past November 2014, Mother
    was unable to attain her home-based case goals regarding life and
    parenting skills.
    7. Mother failed to demonstrate an ability to remedy her
    substance abuse issues. Mother was first offered home-based
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 5 of 17
    therapy and random drug screens by DCS in August 2012
    through the implementation of an informal adjustment. DCS
    continued to offer Mother a substance abuse evaluation, home-
    based therapy and random drug screens throughout the existence
    of the underlying CHINS case. Mother participated in the
    substance abuse evaluation which recommended a family
    functional assessment, home-based therapy, home-based
    casework and random drug screens. Mother had approximately
    three years to address her substance abuse issues. Mother failed
    to follow any recommendations from her substance abuse
    assessment.
    8. Mother failed to demonstrate an ability to remedy and/or
    improve her mental health. Mother was offered home-based
    therapy during the course of the CHINS case. The goals of
    home-based therapy were to work through past traumatic
    incidents in Mother’s life, to develop coping skills and to develop
    coping skills relating to substance use. Due to Mother’s
    inconsistency in attendance and participation in home-based
    therapy, Mother was unable to meet any of her therapeutic goals.
    Mother voluntarily stopped participating in home-based therapy
    in November 2014.
    9. Mother failed to demonstrate a commitment to her children.
    The last time Mother visited her children was in November 2014.
    Prior to November 2014, Mother demonstrated patterns of
    inconsistency in her attendance and participation in visitation.
    Mother arrived to visitations late, left visitations early and failed
    to attend visitations without notice. [A.A.] has demonstrated
    severe behavioral issues linked to his mother’s disappearance and
    instability in his life. Mother is aware of the effect her
    inconsistency in visitation had on her children.
    10. Mother attended approximately seven (7) to nine (9) child
    and family team meetings during the course of the underlying
    CHINS case. Mother understood what she needed to
    accomplish in order for reunification to occur. Mother had three
    years to accomplish the reunification goals. Mother did not
    benefit from the services offered to her by DCS.
    11. Prolonging permanency for these children is detrimental to
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 6 of 17
    their well-being. All three children are engaged in home-based
    case work and therapy. [R.P.] and [C.P.] participate in services
    to develop their life skills. All three children struggle with
    anxiety regarding instability in their lives. Prolonging
    permanency for these children will have a negative effect on their
    mental health.
    12. The Court accepts the recommendations made by the DCS
    family case manager and CASA that the continuation of the
    parent-child relationship poses a threat to the children’s well-
    being.
    13. The Court accepts the recommendations made by the DCS
    family case manager and CASA that termination is in the
    children’s best interest.
    Appellant’s Appendix at 43-45. Mother now appeals. Additional facts will be
    added as necessary.
    Discussion and Decision
    I. Standard of Review
    [8]   When we review a termination of parental rights, we neither weigh the
    evidence nor judge witness credibility, In re C.G., 
    954 N.E.2d 910
    , 923 (Ind.
    2011), and we consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences most
    favorable to the judgment, S.L. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    997 N.E.2d 1114
    ,
    1123 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). As required by statute, the juvenile court entered
    findings of fact and conclusions. See 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    (c). We therefore
    apply a two-tiered standard of review: we first determine whether the evidence
    supports the findings and then determine whether the findings support the
    judgment. In re C.G., 954 N.E.2d at 923. “We will set aside the court’s
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 7 of 17
    judgment terminating a parent-child relationship only if it is clearly erroneous.
    Clear error is that which leaves us with a definite and firm conviction that a
    mistake has been made.” S.L., 997 N.E.2d at 1123 (citation omitted).
    II. Termination Order
    [9]   “[T]he involuntary termination of parental rights is an extreme measure that is
    designed to be used as a last resort when all other reasonable efforts have failed
    . . . .” In re K.W., 
    12 N.E.3d 241
    , 249 (Ind. 2014) (alteration in original)
    (citation omitted). Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2) sets out what must be
    proven in order to terminate parental rights, which we quote in relevant part:
    (B) that one (1) of the following is true:
    (i) There is a reasonable probability that the
    conditions that resulted in the child’s removal or the
    reasons for placement outside the home of the
    parents will not be remedied.
    (ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a
    threat to the well-being of the child.
    ***
    (C) that termination is in the best interests of the child . . . .
    The State must prove each element by clear and convincing evidence. 
    Ind. Code § 31-34-12-2
    ; In re G.Y., 
    904 N.E.2d 1257
    , 1261 (Ind. 2009). If a juvenile
    court determines that the allegations of the petition are true, then the court shall
    terminate the parent-child relationship. 
    Ind. Code § 31-35-2-8
    (a).
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 8 of 17
    [10]   Mother contends the juvenile court’s termination order was clearly erroneous. 1
    Specifically, she claims DCS failed to present clear and convincing evidence to
    establish there is a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the
    Children’s removal will not be remedied, a reasonable probability the
    continuation of the parent-child relationship poses a threat to the well-being of
    the Children, and that termination is in the best interests of the Children.
    A. Remedy of Conditions
    [11]   “In determining whether the conditions that led to a child’s removal will not be
    remedied,” the juvenile court “must judge a parent’s fitness to care for her child
    at the time of the termination hearing and take into consideration evidence of
    changed conditions.” In re A.B., 
    924 N.E.2d 666
    , 670 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010).
    “[I]t is not just the basis for the initial removal of the child that may be
    considered for purposes of determining whether a parent’s rights should be
    terminated, but also those bases resulting in the continued placement outside of
    the home.” In re A.I., 
    825 N.E.2d 798
    , 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.
    The juvenile court must also “evaluate the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct
    to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child.” In re
    A.B., 
    924 N.E.2d at 670
     (citation omitted). However, the trial court’s findings
    cannot focus solely on historical conduct absent findings as to the parent’s
    1
    We note Mother does not challenge any findings of fact and we therefore accept those as true. See In re
    B.R.., 
    875 N.E.2d 369
    , 373 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (noting a parent waived a claim the juvenile court’s findings
    or conclusions were clearly erroneous by failing to specifically challenge the court’s findings or conclusions),
    trans. denied.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016              Page 9 of 17
    current circumstances or evidence of changed conditions. In re C.M., 
    960 N.E.2d 169
    , 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). The juvenile court may also consider the
    services the State offered to the parent and the parent’s response to such
    services. In re A.B., 
    924 N.E.2d at 670
    .
    [12]   The findings establish the Children were initially removed from Mother’s care
    because Mother committed burglary while with A.A., Mother was arrested, and
    no suitable caregivers were available for the Children. The juvenile court
    continued the Children’s removal due to Mother’s sporadic participation in
    services, Mother’s drug use, Mother’s violation of the terms of her probation
    and house arrest, and Mother leaving town twice to evade law enforcement. In
    maintaining DCS did not meet its burden, Mother argues the juvenile court
    focused solely on her past parental shortcomings and failed to consider
    evidence of her current circumstances and changed conditions, namely her
    progress through work release. Mother points to evidence at the time of the
    termination hearing that she had not failed any recent drug tests, she was
    working toward her GED, she attended several classes, including substance
    abuse classes, and had maintained stable employment. Mother also points to
    evidence admitted at the review hearing that her work release had been
    modified to house arrest, she rented a home, and continued to work at Subway.
    [13]   We acknowledge the trial court’s findings must contain evidence of Mother’s
    current circumstances and changed conditions and the juvenile court did not
    enter any specific findings pertaining to Mother’s current circumstances except
    for the finding that Mother was confined to work release. However, we further
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 10 of 17
    note a juvenile court has discretion to weigh such evidence against “evidence of
    a parent’s prior criminal history, drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect,
    failure to provide support, and lack of adequate housing and employment.”
    McBride v. Monroe Cty. Office of Family and Children, 
    798 N.E.2d 185
    , 199 (Ind.
    Ct. App. 2003). A juvenile court also has the discretion to disregard the efforts
    a parent makes only shortly before termination and to weigh more heavily a
    parent’s history of conduct prior to those efforts. K.T.K. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child
    Servs., 
    989 N.E.2d 1225
    , 1234 (Ind. 2013).
    [14]   We commend Mother for her conduct during recent periods of work release
    and house arrest. We are mindful, however, the juvenile court was within its
    discretion to consider the fact Mother’s progress only occurred a few months
    prior to the termination hearing and while Mother was confined to work release
    and house arrest, both of which carried the threat Mother could be incarcerated
    for any misconduct. The juvenile court weighed Mother’s recent
    accomplishments while on work release and house arrest against her conduct
    while on informal adjustment, her criminal and substance abuse history, her
    inability to secure stable housing, and her lack of participation in reunification
    services.2 As to services, DCS offered reunification services years before the
    2
    This is evidenced by the juvenile court giving Mother an additional opportunity to update the court on her
    progress and further evidenced when it stated,
    This has been a very difficult decision for me. I do think that the Department is correct. That at
    the time of the hearing and even know [sic], I do feel . . . what has happened that caused the
    removal and everything [that] has happened since, that even though [Mother], I congratulate
    you on what you have done to get yourself on your feet and I hope you keep doing it and keep
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016          Page 11 of 17
    termination hearing and it is clear the juvenile court considered Mother’s
    historical responses to such services. Mother did not begin to take consistent
    steps towards a better lifestyle until she was confined to work release—only four
    months prior to the termination hearing. It was Mother’s responsibility to
    rehabilitate herself during the CHINS proceedings and prior to DCS filing a
    petition to terminate her parental rights. See Prince v. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    861 N.E.2d 1223
    , 1230 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). Mother failed to do so and we cannot
    say Mother’s current conduct would remain consistent but-for the court’s
    current supervision.
    [15]   Further, the evidence establishes Mother was placed on probation and house
    arrest and violated the terms of each, all while she was supposed to be
    completing services to reunify with the Children. In addition, not only did
    Mother violate the terms of her probation and house arrest, she left town each
    time in an attempt to evade law enforcement. Such a decision required her to
    cease participation in services, including visitation with her Children. It is clear
    Mother put herself before her Children’s interests. We conclude DCS presented
    sufficient evidence to show a reasonable probability the conditions leading to
    yourself out of any further trouble . . . . [F]or your life, that at this point, I don’t think that the
    issues that were presented to me have been or can be remedied . . . .
    Transcript at 110.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016                 Page 12 of 17
    the Children’s removal or to their continued placement outside the home will
    not be remedied.3
    B. Best Interests of the Children
    [16]   Mother argues DCS failed to prove termination of her parental rights was in the
    Children’s best interest. “In determining what is in the best interests of the
    child, the [juvenile] court is required to look beyond the factors identified by the
    DCS and look to the totality of the evidence.” In re H.L., 
    915 N.E.2d 145
    , 149
    (Ind. Ct. App. 2009).
    The court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed before
    terminating the parent-child relationship. Recommendations of
    the case manager and court-appointed advocate, in addition to
    evidence that the conditions resulting in removal will not be
    remedied, are sufficient to show by clear and convincing
    evidence that termination is in the child’s best interests.
    In re A.S., 
    17 N.E.3d 994
    , 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (citations omitted), trans.
    denied.
    [17]   As noted above, DCS presented evidence sufficient to show a reasonable
    probability the conditions resulting in the Children’s initial and continued
    3
    Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in finding continuation of the parent-child relationship
    posed a threat to the Children’s well-being. However, Indiana Code section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is
    written in the disjunctive and requires only one element in that subsection be proven to support
    termination of parental rights. See In re I.A., 
    903 N.E.2d 146
    , 153 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). Because we
    conclude the evidence is sufficient to show a reasonable probability the conditions resulting in the
    Children’s removal will not be remedied, we need not determine whether the juvenile court erred in
    concluding continuation of the parent-child relationship posed a threat to the Children’s well-being.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016           Page 13 of 17
    removal will not be remedied. In addition, both the CASA and family case
    manager testified at the evidentiary hearing that Mother’s parental rights should
    be terminated. We further note permanency is a vital consideration in
    determining a child’s best interest. In re G.Y., 904 N.E.2d at 1265. Here, the
    findings indicate Mother and the Children lived in thirteen different residences
    over a five-year period. In addition, Mother has not had visitation with the
    Children since November 2014. The Children have been in foster care since
    August 2013 and both the CASA and family case manager testified Mother’s
    reunification with the Children would negatively affect the Children because
    the Children have thrived in their foster homes. We conclude DCS presented
    clear and convincing evidence from which the juvenile court could conclude
    termination of Mother’s parental rights was in the Children’s best interest.
    Conclusion
    [18]   DCS established by clear and convincing evidence the elements necessary to
    support the termination of Mother’s parental rights. The judgment of the
    juvenile court terminating Mother’s parental rights is affirmed.
    [19]   Affirmed.
    Mathias, J., concurs.
    Brown, J., dissents with separate opinion.
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 14 of 17
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
    In the Termination of the Parent-                        Court of Appeals Case No.
    Child Relationship of:                                   48A02-1603-JT-482
    R.P., C.P. and A.A. (Minor
    Children),
    and
    L.B. (Mother),
    Appellant-Respondent,
    v.
    The Indiana Department of
    Child Services,
    Appellee-Petitioner.
    Brown, Judge, dissenting.
    [20]   I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to affirm the juvenile court’s
    termination of Mother’s parental rights in that the juvenile court failed to make
    any findings or otherwise consider Mother’s efforts at remediation presented
    either at the September 15, 2015 hearing or at the review hearing held six
    months later. In determining whether the conditions that resulted in the
    children’s removal will not be remedied, this Court engages in a two-step
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 15 of 17
    analysis. In re E.M., 
    4 N.E.3d 636
    , 642-643 (Ind. 2014). First, we identify the
    conditions that led to removal, and second, we determine whether there is a
    reasonable probability that those conditions will not be remedied. Id. at 643. In
    the second step, the trial court must judge a parent’s fitness as of the time of the
    termination proceeding, taking into consideration evidence of changed
    conditions, balancing a parent’s recent improvements against habitual patterns
    of conduct to determine whether there is a substantial probability of future
    neglect or deprivation. Id.
    [21]   In this matter, the Children were removed following Mother’s arrest for
    burglary in 2013. Evidence was presented that, at the time of the final review
    hearing, Mother had rented a home and was serving the remainder of her
    sentence on house arrest. She also had held a job as an assistant manager at
    Subway for nine months and had been taking classes to obtain her GED.
    Mother’s work release case manager testified at the termination hearing that
    Mother had not failed any drug tests or violated any policies or procedures, had
    completed a substance abuse evaluation, had completed classes related to
    substance abuse, budgeting, and employment, and even paid ahead on her rent.
    The court’s termination order overlooked such evidence and did not include it
    in its findings, instead focusing almost exclusively on evidence derived from the
    underlying CHINS case.
    [22]   Terminating a parent-child relationship is of such importance that we must be
    convinced the trial court has based its judgment on proper considerations and
    did so based upon clear and convincing evidence. See, e.g., Parks v. Delaware
    Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 48A02-1603-JT-482 | December 7, 2016   Page 16 of 17
    Cnty. Dep’t of Child Servs., 
    862 N.E.2d 1275
    , 1280-1281 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007). I
    do not believe that this court can make such a determination based on the trial
    court’s findings. Although the termination order addressed Mother’s past
    parental shortcomings in its findings of fact, the court failed to make any
    findings regarding her fitness to care for the Children at the time of the
    termination hearing. I believe that the trial court’s focus on historical conduct,
    absent any factual findings as to Mother’s current circumstances or evidence of
    changed conditions, is akin to terminating parental rights in order to punish the
    parent. See, e.g., In re C.M., 
    960 N.E.2d 169
    , 175 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). I would
    reverse the court’s termination order and remand for the court to consider and
    make findings concerning mother’s efforts at remediation and their impact on
    these proceedings. See K.E. vs. Ind. Dept. of Child Servs., 
    39 N.E.3d 641
    , 649, 652
    (Ind. 2015) (holding that the father’s release from prison was impending and
    that he has made substantial efforts toward bettering his life through programs
    available during his incarceration, that the court did not balance such recent
    improvements against his habitual patterns of conduct in its order, and that
    accordingly it was not proven by clear and convincing evidence that the father
    could not remedy the conditions leading to the child’s removal, and reversing
    the court’s termination order).
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