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541 U.S. 36, (2004). :2. Where a child describes past events during an interview with a forensic interviewer and there is no on-going emergency being addressed in the interview, the resulting statement should be deemed testimonial. Here the videotaped interview of the child was watched outside the interview room by the investigating Detective, and spoke with the Forensic Interviewer during the child's interview in order to extract other evidence. 3. Where a collateral source reports past criminal behavior by the defendant to an organization statutorily required to investigate such complaints (in this case, Child Protective Services and the Fort Worth Police Department) and where the record contains no evidence that the contact served anything other than an investigative purpose, the statements will be found to be testimonial. Wells v. State,
241 S.W.3d 172, 175-76 (Tex. App.-Eastland 2007, pet. refd) 4. Interviews of the alleged injured party and video/audio of same by caseworkers with Alliance for Children and/or Child Protective Services, or other law enforcement agency, constitute inadmissible evidence under the grounds stated in this motion. 5. The interview of the alleged victim by the forensic interviewer was improperly suggestive. Repetition of questions designed to elicit answers favorable to the prosecution constitutes improper suggestibility, as well. 6. Defendant requests the Court to suppress the forensic interview of the child in this case. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, RICHARD BROWN prays that the Court exclude the forensic interview of the child as requested. Respectfully submitted, George B. Mackey 101 Summit Avenue, Suite 318 Fort Worth, Tx 76102 Tel: (817) 336-1008 Fax: (817) 336-5437 By: __________________________________ GEORGE B. MACKEY State Bar No. 12779500 Attorney for RICHARD BROWN I '· CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on , 2012, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on the District Attorney's Office, Tarrant County, Texas, by hand delivery. GEORGE B. MACKEY ORDER FOR A SETTING . On , 2012, the Defendant filed a Motion to Suppress the Forensic Interview ofthe Child With C.P.S., Alliance For Children, Or Other Law Enforcement Agency. The Court finds that the party is entitled to a hearing on this matter, and it is THEREFORE ORDERED that a hearing on this motion IS set for ___________________________,2012,m _____ Signed on _________________________, 2012. JUDGE PRESIDING r·. .· ·• NO. 1250248 THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT § vs. § NUMBER THREE OF § RICHARD BROWN § TARRANTCOUNTY,TEXAS MOTION TO SUPPRESS TESTIMONY OF CHILD WITNESS Motion No. TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: Now comes RICHARD BROWN, Defendant, and moves the Court to dismiss the indictment in this cause, or in the alternative to suppress the testimony of the alleged child victim and for cause would show the Court as follows: I. Defendant is charged in this cause by indictment alleging eleven counts involving sexual abuse of Defendant's niece, age 8, alleged to be the victim. The State will most likely seek to introduce the testimony o the alleged victim in the trial of this cause. II. The indictment arose from an investigation conducted by the Fort Worth Police Department, Texas Department of Human Services, Alliance For Children, and other agencies of the State unknown to the Defendant. During these investigations, the alleged child victim was repeatedly interviewed by representatives of those agencies. During all of the interviews, notes were taken of the questions asked and the responses of the witness. Some of the interviews were videotaped and otherwise recorded. The recordings of the interviews contain inconsistent statements of the witness. Motion To Suppress Testimony of Child Witness Page I III. The techniques used in these interviews were inherently suggestive in that the child witness was repeatedly questioned by adult authority figures in a leading and suggestive manner. The cumulative effect of the repeated suggestive interviews was to taint the memory of the child witness, a phenomenon known as secondary gain. (See attached affidavit). Secondary gain, in effect, substitutes the knowledge implanted in the child's memory by the suggestive interviews for the child's memory of the actual event. The inconsistencies in the taped statements and other statements of the child indicate a substantial likelihood that secondary gain has occurred. There further exists a substantial risk the testimony of the alleged child victim s now irreparably tainted and the facts that the child will elate in their testimony at trial will be the result of the suggestive interrogation rather than the child's accurate recollection of the events. The process is irreversible and a fair trial cannot be had if the testimony of the alleged child victim is presented. IV. Because the State's action in this case has rendered a fair trial impossible Defendant's right to due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution ofthe United States and right to due course of law guaranteed by Art. 1 Sec. 19 of the Texas Constitution has been violated. v. Since the State's case rests almost entirely on the testimony of the child, the only meaningful remedy would be dismissal of the indictment herein or in the alternative suppression of the testimony of the child and all statements made by the witnesses which are shown to be the result of the improper investigative technique. Motion To Suppress Testimony of Child Witness Page 2 MEMORANDUM A. Due process.· The Courts have long recognized that improper interview techniques by law enforcement in the context of lineups and photo lineups may be so impermissibly suggestive as to lead to a substantial likelihood of misidentification. Such procedures, therefore render the testimony of the identification witness so untrustworthy that introduction of the evidence constitutes a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution. See, Foster v. California
394 U.S. 440(1969); Stovall v. Denno,
388 U.S. 293(1967). Recently, in Ex Parte Bradley,
781 S.W.2d 886(Tex.Crim.App. 1989), the Court of Criminal Appeals observed that improper investigative techniques in contexts other than identification procedures may so affect the trustworthiness of the proceeding as to constitute a violation of the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the due course of law clause of Article 1 Sec. 19 of the Texas Constitution. Ex Parte Bradley, at 891 of781 S.W.2d. While studies on the effect of improper interview techniques of child witnesses are a recent innovation, their conclusions indicate a real danger of irreparable damage to the child victim's ability to relate accurately the occurrences in question. Psychologist experienced in the field can evaluate the impact of investigative techniques on the memory of a child. The social sciences have begun to recognize the phenomenon of secondary gain which amounts to the substitution of facts learned during the interview process for those observed by the child at the time of the event in question. The process renders the child incapable of accurately remembering the event in question. Motion To Suppress Testimony of Child Witness Page 3 ' I B. Suggested procedure. Another analogous phenomenon which has been dealt with by the courts is the hypnosis of a witness in an attempt to aid recall. In Zani v. State,
758 S.W.2d 233(Tex.Crim.App. 1988), the Court of Criminal Appeals dealt directly with the issue of the admissibility of a witness' testimony after hypnosis. The opinion reviewed the opinion of other courts and scientific literature on the subject of hypnosis and noted the dangers associated with the use of the procedure on witnesses in an attempt to enhance their memory of an event. Generally, the noted dangers can be categorized as follows: 1. Hypersuggestibility. The witness is extremely susceptible while under hypnosis to suggestion of facts which the witness later recalls as having actually occurred. Often this may be the result of the witnesses compelling desire to please the interviewer by "remembering" facts suggested by the interviewer. 2. Loss of crl.tical judgment. The witness loses his critical judgment and causes him to give credence to memories so vague and fragmentary they would not have relied on them before being hypnotized. 3. Confabulation.Neither the subject nor the interviewer can distinguish between real memories and "pseudomemories" arising from various causes including the two described above. Even after the interview ends the subject remains unable to distinguish between true memories and confabulation. 4. Memory "cementing".The witness becomes much more sure of a vague memory after the session. Often the memory of the witness becomes enhanced by suggestion occurring during the session and the subject then can not distinguish his actual memory from his memory acquired during the session. · He becomes more sure of his recollection because of the enhancement supplied by the session. Zani v. State, at 237-238 of758 S.W.2d. The Zani Court did not discuss the admissibility of the testimony of a witness who has been previously hypnotized in the context of due process but instead analyzed its admissibility in light of a defense objection that "there is no proper basis for permitting such testimony as a matter of scientific reliability". Zani v. State, at 235 of 758 S.W.2d. In light of the foregoing Motion To Suppress Testimony of Child Witness Page 4 \ .;. . ~ recognized uncertainties of posthypnotic testimony the Court fashioned a rule for admissibility to protect the integrity of the fact finding process. The Court held: "We conclude that because of the uncertainties inherent in posthypnotic testimony it is appropriate to require the proponent of such testimony to demonstrate to the satisfaction of the trial court, outside the jury's presence, by clear and convincing evidence, that such testimony is trustworthy." Zani v. State at 243 of758 S.W.2d. The analogy is clear. The danger of secondary gain resulting from improper questioning of a child witness is very much like the outlined dangers associated with hypnotically enhanced testimony. Defendant urges that a similar burden be placed on the State to establish the reliability of the testimony of the child once it has been established that the improper questioning has occurred. In the instant case expert testimony will establish the suggestiveness of the procedures used. WHEREFORE, Defendant prays that upon final hearing of this motion that the Court dismiss the indictment herein or in the Alternative suppress the testimony of the alleged child victim as well as any statements made by , concerning the subject matter of the indictment and instruct the state not to seek to introduce the suppressed evidence in any manner at the trial of this cause. Respectfully submitted, George B. Mackey 101 Summit Avenue, Suite 318 Fort Worth, Tx 76102 Tel: (817) 336-1008 Fax: (817) 336-5437 By: _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ GEORGE B. MACKEY State Bar No. 12779500 Attorney for RICHARD BROWN CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion was hand delivered to the District Attorney of Tarrant County, Texas on this the _ _ day of March, 2012. GEORGE B. MACKEY Motion To Suppress Testimony of Child Witness Page 5 NO. 1250248 THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT § vs. § NUMBER THREE OF § RICHARD BROWN § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS MOTION TO SUPPRESS SANE NURSE TESTIMONY SINCE SUCH EVIDENCE VIOLATES CRAWFORD V. WASHINGTON I MELENDEZ-DIAZ AND VIOLATES KELLY V. STATE FOR RELEVANCE AND RELIABILITY Motion No. TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT: Now comes RICHARD BROWN, Defendant, and files this Motion To Suppress SANE Nurse Testimony Since Such Evidence Violate Crawford V. Washington/Melendez-Diaz And Violates Kelly V. State For Relevance And Reliability, and in support would show: 1. Statements made to medical personnel may be testimonial hearsay depending on the context of the statement. De La Paz v. State,
273 S.W.3d 671, 680 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008). Where a child describes past events during an interview with a forensic interviewer and there is no on-going emergency being addressed in the interview, the resulting statement will be deemed testimonial. 2. The admission of the testimony of the SANE nurse at Cook Children's Hospital as to what the alleged victim said as "medical history" and the nurse's opinion that sexual abuse has occurred after normal results of the physical examination for sexual assault of the alleged child victim is not relevant and reliable under Kelly v. State,
824 S.W.2d 568(Tex.Crim.App. 1991). 3. The opinion from the SANE nurse is not credible or reliable since such evidence is "junk science". Credible evidence would dictate that sexual intercourse would leave indelible signs of sexual activity such as stretching, scarring, and ruptured tissue of the vaginal and anal area. Since the physical examination of the alleged child victim shows no evidence of sexual assault, to allow a witness that it is her opinion that sexual abuse has occurred must necessarily rely solely upon the medical history of sexual abuse having occurred. Such evidence is hearsay and a denial of the Defendant's right to cross-examine and confront the witness since there was no contemporaneous cross-examination at the time the medical history was taken. 4. Since the opinion by the nurse is based on the hearsay statements of the alleged victim taken as medical history for trial purposes, and therefore testimonial under Crawford v. Washington,
124 S. Ct. 1354,
541 U.S. 36(2004), the Defendant's right to confront and cross- examine the witnesses against him under the Sixth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution and Article I, Section 10 Texas Constitution is violated. 5. As an attempt to offer the evidence under an exception to the hearsay rule for medical diagnosis and treatment is analogous to the business records exception when used for the production of evidence at trial. "Documents kept in the regular course of business may ordinarily be admitted at trial despite their hearsay status. Fed. R. Evid. 803(6). But that is not the case if the regularly conducted business activity is the production o[evidence [or use at trial." The SANE nurse is part of the prosecution/law enforcement team whose sole purpose is to obtain evidence of a testimonial nature to be used at trial. 6. In this case the hearsay exception as medical records is for the sole purpose of production of evidence for use at trial and is therefore not admissible. 7. Here the purpose of the creation of the records and alleged medical testimony is solely for trial purposes. "The Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, provides that in all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to be confronted with the witnesses against him. In Crawford v. Washington, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sixth Amendment guarantees a defendant's right to confront those who bear testimony against him. " WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, RlCHARD BROWN prays that the Court grant this motion as requested. Respectfully submitted, George B. Mackey 101 Summit Avenue, Suite 318 Fort Worth, Tx 76102 Tel: (817) 336-1008 Fax: (817) 336-5437 By:_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __ GEORGE B. MACKEY State Bar No. 12779500 Attorney for RlCHARD BROWN CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE This is to certify that on , 2012, a true and correct copy of the above and foregoing document was served on the District Attorney's Office, Tarrant County, Texas, by hand delivery. GEORGE B. MACKEY ORDER FOR A SETTING On , 2012, the Defendant filed a Motion to Exclude SANE . Nurse Opinion of Sexual Abuse. The Court finds that the party is entitled to a hearing on this matter, and it is THEREFORE ORDERED that a hearing on this motion is set for __________________________,2012,m _____ Signed on ________________________, 2012. JUDGE PRESIDING NO. 1250248 THE STATE OF TEXAS § IN CRIMINAL DISTRICT COURT § vs. § NUMBER THREE OF § RICHARD BROWN § TARRANTCOUNTY,TEXAS ORDER On ---------------------- , 2012, came on to be considered RICHARD BROWN's Motion To Exclude SANE Nurse Testimony, and said motion is hereby (Granted) (Denied) JUDGE PRESIDING . FJLED .i TARRANT COUNTY . NO. 1250248D . 201~ JUN 20 PH 12: 59 STATE § IN THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT THOMAS A. WILDER § v. DISTRICT CLERK § COURT NUMBER THREE OF § RICHARD BROWN § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS STATE'S REPLY TO DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through the Criminal District Attorney of Tarrant County, Texas, makes this repiy to tne uefendant's request for appointment of counsel for a post-conviction DNA testing, and in support shows the following: I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE The defendant, RICHARD BROWN ("Defendant"), pled guilty, pursuant to a plea agreement, to the second degree felony offense of indecency with a child by contact on June 20, 2012. See\A.ttachment A: Judgment, No. 1250248D. In accordance with the plea agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven years confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Institutional Division. See Attachment A. Defendant did not appeal his conviction. See Criminal Docket Sheet, No. 1250248D. II. THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO BE TESTED Pursuant to art. 64.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the State denies that evidence exists that might .contain biological material. See Attachment B: Stimpson Affidavit; Attachment C: Arthurs Affidavit. The only evidence collected was Defendant's buccal swab. See Attachment C, p~ 3. -\ ' r-__.. ...1111111' ...... III. BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE TO BE TESTED, THERE IS NO NEED FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL. Defendant filed his request for appointment of counsel on July 16, 2013. 1 Counsel is only required to be appointed "if the person informs the court that the person wishes to submit a motion under this chapter, the court finds reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed, and the court determines that the person is indigent." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c). There is no need to appoint Defendant counsel because there is no evidence, other than Defendant's own buccal swab, to test. See Attachment B; Attachment C. There are no reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed. IV. CONCLUSION AND PRAYER Because there is no evidence to test for DNA, there are no reasonable grounds for a motion for DNA testing. Defendant's request for appointment of counsel should be DENIED. WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State prays the Court DENY Defendant's request for appointment of counsel. Respectfully submitted, JOE SHANNON, JR. Criminal District Attorney Tarrant County, Texas ~~-----~ Andrea Jacobs Assistant District Attorney State Bar No. 24037596 401 West Belknap Fort Worth, TX 76196-02.01 Phone: 817/884-1687 Facsimile: 817/884-1672 1 The State received Defendant's request for counsel on May 23, 2014. 2 3 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true copy of the above reply has been mailed to the defendant, Mr. Richard Brown, TDCJ-ID# 01794390, Lynaugh Unit, 1098 S. Highway 2037, Fort Stockton, Texas 79735 on the 20th day of June, 2014. Andrea Jacobs 3 ,, -7···--·-··- AFFIDAVIT Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared Thomas A. Stimpson, who being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows: . My name is Thomas A. Stimpson, I am of sound mind, capable of making this affidavit, and am personally acquainted with the facts herein stated. I am the property/evidence custodian for . Fort Worth Police Department· Forensic Crime L~_Q. I have thoroughly searched for any property or evidence relating to our Offense Report No. 11-072200- Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child - Defendant: Brown, Richard, which might contain biological evidence and have found the following stated facts to be true and correct: Our records indicate that the Fort Worth Police Department Forensic Crime Lab was never in possession of any evidence relating to the above case/cause number. Further affiant sayeth llaught. ~----- Affiant SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on this the \q-\:i.day of~ ,2014. ~ My commission expires: 8-19-2014 - 1- .! AFFIDAVIT Before me, the undersigned authority, personally appeared--'---- BRUCE ARTHURS, who being by me duly sworn, deposed as follows: . My name is BRUCE ARTHURS , I am of sound mind, capable of making this affidavit, and am personally acquainted with the facts herein stated. I am the property/evidence custodian for Fort. Worth Police Department Property Room. I have thoroughly searched for any property or evidence relating to our Offense Report No. 11-072200 - Aggravated Sexual Assault of a Child - Defendant: Brown, Richard, which might contain biological evidence and have found the following Stated facts to be true and correct: All evidence relating to the above cas~ number was destroyed on ____________ ~~· ... - - Documentation of evidence destruction attached. -~ Documentation of evidence destruction is not available. Our records indicate that our agency .was never in possession of any evidence relating to the above case/cause number. X Evidence or property exists relative to the above case number ·.. that might contain biological evidence. An evidence.. list is attached; -I - c . .. .. . . ~ .. ....; ·... _, .... Our records indicate that our agency is m possessiOn of property or evidence relative to the above case/cause number; however, it cannot be located. Our records indicate all evidence relating to the above case/cause number was released to: ------------------------------ on ________________ Further affiant sayeth naught. Affiant SWORN TO AND SUBSCRIBED before me on this the 27~ay of tna.y. , 201d Pubiic, State of Texas J. P. POLLARD Notary Public STATE OF TEXAS My Comm. Exp. Deo. 22, 2015 My commission expires: /2 ~22-16 -2- . ' CoPY j(J 0 Homicide Dsoo 0 Sexual Assault Q Fraud~Other·:~;c·~-3 Property C"0 Evidenc~ 0 Recovered GJ Pending Seizure CJ Personal Offense/Incident - --- 1 Report# I Supplement: Offense Type: Location: '------~ I 110072200/0002 Agg. Sex. Ass/Child ' Reported Stolen on Report#: ~ency: FWPD Sul:im itted By Officer: · Unit: Date/Time: ~ 18 77 - EZELLE,B CACU 07/26/201111:29 --- ' .,.,---_ Person Summary -~vi ~ Name ~ ~ace Sex 008 v sus I BROWN,ROBERT .5) ' 8 M "----- ~ .-. ·. ·.·. ~~~ .i~--"· ·~':jf~m~s~.§!-!.~!!1!1~!~ . ,:~"'~;,_,;,/},!~:.~.: ._;,.....•... ;"'·. .... ·~. ' .· • ., . ... ."\!!f: ,'· '· .•. :: ·•-:-~···~ ..... ; ,. ~··. ·-·· • Item# lnvl Value Brand Desc./ Model (ARTICLf:S) Serial# Location 1 EVD Buccai taken from Richard_Brown, suspect.-~ ProperJY Room Instructions/Comments About' Evidence i S-uspect's correct name is Richard Brown, a tiiack male date of birth 12.:os-6ci} Stamp ,. •. Property Room .. ·. Receilied By (Name/IDNO): Date/Time: Tag#: 110009211 IOffense #: 11 0072200 ··~ ... 1 CHAIR I s ~· EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR & GENERAL COUNSEL JOAL CANNON SHERIDAN CHRISTINE E. MCKEEMAN VICE CHAIR DEPUTY DIRECTOR/COUNSEL MARVIN W. JONES GAYLE RILEY VICKERS MEMBERS EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT ROBERT A. BLACK JACKIE L. TRUITT DAVIDA. CHAUMETTE THE BOARD OF DISCIPLINARY APPEALS JEANNE C. "CEZY" COLLINS JACK R. CREWS APPOINTED BY THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS RAMON L. ECHEVARRIA II GARY R. GURWITZ ROLAND K. JOHNSON DAVID N. KITNER KATHY]. OWEN November 20, 2014 GEORGE A. TAYLOR Richard Brown #1794390, Lynaugh Unit 1098 S. Hwy. 2037 Fort Stockton, TX 79735 -. RL Disposition of Appeal Notice Richard Brown v. George B. MacKey 20i40SS59; BOLJA case No. 55175 Dear iv'ir. Brown: On November 20, 2014, the Board of Disciplinary Appeals appointed by the Supreme Court of Texas considered your appeal from the dismissal of the above grievance by the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel of the State Bar of Texas. After reviewing the grievance as filed with the State Bar Chief Disciplinary Counsel's office and no other information, the Board grants the appeal, finding that the grievance alleges a poss.ible violation of the following Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct: Rules(s) 1.03; 1.14; 1.15 The Board of Disciplinary Appeals will now return the case to the Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel for investigation and a determination whether there is just cause to believe that the attorney has committed professional misconduct. The Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel will notify both parties of each step of the process, including asking the attorney to respond to the complaint. For information concerning the handling of the case from this point forward, please contact the regional Office of the Chief Disciplinary Counsel in charge of your case. Information concerning the discipline~ry system, the Texas Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct, and the Texas Rules of Disciplinary Procedure are available at www.texasbar.com. The Board's Internal Procedural Rules are available at www.txboda.org. Very truly yours, Christine E. McKeeman Executive Director & General Counsel CEM/jt cc: George B. MacKey Laura Popps State Bar of Texas PO Box 13287 Austin, TX 78711 {512) 427-1350 {877) 953-5535 toll free POST OFFICE BOX 12426 AUSTIN, TEXAS 78711 TEL: (512) 427-1578 FAX: (512) 427-4130 WWW.TXBODA.ORG ··, ':lAME RICHARD BROWN OFFENSE SEXUAL ASLT CHILD (AGG) ADDRESS 4012 EASTOVER ST DATE 7/8/2011 Habitual FORT WORTH TX 76119 J.P. ANN COLEMAN PSEUDONYM RACE B SEX M AGE 50 DOB 12/8/1960 CASE NO. 1250248 DATE FILED .8112/2011 AGENCY Fort Worth PD ' CID NO. 0383978 OFFENSE NO. 11-072200 COURT Criminal District Court No. 3 INDICTMENT NO. 1250248 IN THE NAME AND BY AUTHORITY OF THE STATE OF TEXAS: THE GRAND JURORS OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, duly elected, tried, empaneled, sworn, and charged to inquire of offenses committed in Tarrant County, in the State of Texas, upon their oaths do present in and to the of the said County that RICHARD BROWN, herdnafter called Defendant, in the County of Tarrant and State aforesaid, on or about the 8th day of July 2011, did ......-... --·-·----- , fHEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE ANUS OF ANN COLEMAN (A PSEUDONYM),_A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 14 YEARS OF AGE, TO CONTACT THE PENIS OF THE DEFENDANT, . : COUNT TWO: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8Jl-I_J2A.Y OF JULY, 2011, DID THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE ANUS OF ANN COLEMAN (A PSEUDONYM), A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 14 YEARS OFAGE,TO CONTACT THE PENIS OF THE DEFENDANT, . COUNT THREE: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE g::[-I=J~Y OF JULY, 2011, DID THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE ANUS OF ANN COLEMAN (A PSEUDONYM), A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 14 YEARS OF AGE, TO CONTACT THE PENIS OF THE DEFENDANT, . COUNT FOUR: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, DID THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE AN US OF ANN / COLEMAN (A PSEUDONYM), A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 14 YEARS OF AGE, TO CONTACT THE PENIS OF THE DEFENDANT, COUNT FIVE: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8IH DAY OF JULY, 2011, DID THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE MOUTH OF ANN COLEMAN (A PSEUDONYM), A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 14 YEARS OF AGE, TO CONTACT THE >ENIS OF THE DEFENDANT, ' COUNT SIX: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, DID THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY OR KNOWINGLY CAUSE THE MOUTlfOF'-A.N-N..:COLEMAN (A PSEUDONYM), A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 14 YEARS OF AGE, TO CONTACT THE PENIS OF THE DEFENDANT, 1 ....:..,. 'JAME RICHARD BROWN CASE NO. 1250248 PAGE 2 of 3 COUNT SEVEN: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY, WITH THE INTENT TO AROUSE OR GRATIFY THE SEXUAL DESIRE OF SAID DEFENDANT, ENGAGE IN SEXUAL CONTACT BY TOUCHING THE GENITALS OF ANN COLEMAN PSEUDONYM, A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 17 YEARS, COUNT EIGHT: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFTARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY, WITH THE INTENT TO AROUSE OR GRATIFY THE SEXUAL DESIRE OF SAID DEFENDANT, ENGAGE IN SEXUAL CONTACT BY TOUCHING THE GENITALS OF ANN COLEMAN PSEUDONYM, A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 17 YEARS, COUNT NINE: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY, WITH THE INTENT TO AROUSE OR GRATIFY THE SEXUAL DESIRE OF SAID DEFENDANT, ENGAGE IN SEXUAL CONTACT BY TOUCHING THE GENITALS OF ANN COLEMAN PSEUDONYM, A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 17 YEARS, COUNT TEN: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OFT ARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY, WITH THE INTENT TO AROUSE OR GRATIFY THE SEXUAL ';)ESIRE OF SAID DEFENDANT, ENGAGE IN SEXUAL CONTACT BY TOUCHING THE GENITALS OF · ANN COLEMAN PSEUDONYM, A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 17 YEARS, COUNT ELEVEN: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED IN AND TO SAID COURT THAT THE DEFENDANT IN THE COUNTY OF TARRANT AND STATE AFORESAID ON OR ABOUT THE 8TH DAY OF JULY, 2011, THEN AND THERE INTENTIONALLY EXPOSE HIS PENIS TO ANN COLEMAN PSEUDONYM, A CHILD YOUNGER THAN 17 YEARS, KNOWING SAID CHILD WAS PRESENT, WITH THE INTENT TO AROUSE OR GRATIFY THE SEXUAL DESIRE OF SAID DEFENDANT, HABITUAL OFFENDER NOTICE: AND IT IS FURTHER PRESENTED TO SAID COURT THAT PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OR OFFENSES SET OUT ABOVE, THE DEFENDANT WAS FINALLY CONVICTED OF THE FELONY OFFENSE OF ROBBERY BY .XMRENI'S, IN THE 371ST DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, IN CAUSE NUMBER 0800070A, ON THE 26TH DAY OF NOVEMBER, 211Ql AND, THAT PRIOR TO THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE OR OFFENSES FOR WHICH THE DEFENDANT WAS CONVICTED AS SET OUT ABOVE, THE DEFENDANT WAS FINALLY CONVICTED OF THE FELONY OFFENSE OF BURGI ARY OF A MA-BIT ATION, IN THE 297TH DISTRICT COURT OF TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS, IN CAUSE NUMBER 0744694D, ON THE 25TH DAY OF FEBRUARY, 2000, r~- 1'"' 1 'II . . i f ~J ' {/ . I ~ ! ll IAME RICHARD BROWN 1 CASE NO. 1250248 PAGE 3 of 3 I ) Filed (Clerk's use only) "' AGAINST THE PEACE AND DIGNITY OF THE STATE. Criminal District Attorney Foreman of the Grand Jury Tarrant County, Texas Tl\Tr'ITrT~Ift=l,.TT f"\Dlr!Tl\1 AT F~\LE'D"· TARRAHT COUNTY ·· · · NO. 1250248D 20\~ JUN 20· PM: \t·OO STATE . § IN TliE CRIMINAL DISTRICT THOMAS A. W\LOER § V. 0\STR\CT CLERK ·§ COURT NUMBER THREE OF § RICHARD BROWN § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS STATE'S PROPOSED MEMORANDUM, FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW The State proposes the follo:wing :tyfemQrandum, Findings of Fact .and Conclusions of Law regarding Defendanf~ Motion for Appointment of Counsel. MEMORANDUM The defendant, RICHARD BROWN ("Defendant"), requests appointment of counsel for filing a motion for DNA testing. See Motion for Appointment of Counsel ("Motion"), p. 1. In light of the evidence presented, the Court should consider the following proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law. FINDINGS OF FACT General Facts 1. Defendant pled guilty, pursuant-to a plea agree~ent, to the second degree felony · offense of indecency. with a child by contact on June 20, 2012. See State's Reply, A~---1-,.,....,-- ... ~- _•'T_.-tg·---t ... tl\:-J.t , 1\T.~ .rl..Lta.\..:.:..u..J..l~J..l~ ~~· u~ 1 121;:/V'IAOn. "~'-'· .1 ... u.......,. _~v . ~~ · ·-2. In accordance with the plea ·agreement, the trial court sentenced Defendant to eleven years confinement in. the Texas Department of Criminal -Justice - Institutional Division. See Attachment A. '· 3. Defendant did not appeal his conviction: See Criminal Docket Sheet, No. 1250248D. No Relevant Evidence Exists 4. Pursuant to art. 64.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal procedure, the State denies that evidence exists that might contain relevant biological material. See State's ' ·t Reply, Attachment B: Stimpson Affidavit; State's Reply, Attachment C: Arthurs Affidavit; Tex. Code Crim. Proc. art. 64.02(2)(B). 5. The only evidence that exists is Defendant's buccal swab which contains. biological material but is irrelevant to this offense .. 6. There is no evidence containing relevant biological material to test in this case,. Appointment of Counsel 7. Because there is no relevant evidence to test, there are no reasonable grounds for a motion for DNA testing. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW Appointment of Counsel Defendant filed his request for appointment of counsel on July 16, 2103. See Request, p. 1. 2. Counsel is only required to be appointed "if the person informs the court that the person wishes to submit a motion under this chapter, the court finds reasonable -grounds for a motion to be filed, and the court determines that the person is indigent." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c). 3. Defendant's buccal swab is not evidence that might contain relevant biological evidence to this offense. 4. Because no evidence exists that might contain relevant biological evidence, there are no reasonable grounds for a motion to be filed. 5. No appointment of counsel is required. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 64.01(c). 6. Defendant's Motion for Appointment of Counsel is DENIED. 2 WHEREFORE, the State prays that this Court adopt these Proposed Findings of Fact a.Pd Conclusions of Law and DENY the Defendant's Request for DNA testing. Respectfully submitted, JOE SHANNON, JR. Criminal District Attorney Tarrant County r-----.. Andrea Jacobs Assistant District Attorney State Bar No. 24037596 40 1 West Belknap Fort Worth, TX 76196-0201 Phone: 817/884-1687 Facsimile: 817/884-1672 CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE A true copy of the above has been mailed to Defendant, Mr. Richard Brown, TDCJ-ID# 01794390, Lynaugh Unit, 1098 S. Highway 2037, Fort Stockton, Texas 79735 on or before the 20th day of June, 2014. Andrea Jacobs 3 NO. 1250248D STATE § I~ THE CRIMINAL DISTRICT § v. § COURT NUMBER THREE OF § RICHARD BROWN § TARRANT COUNTY, TEXAS ORDER The Court adopts the State's Memorandum, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and DENIES the Request for Appointment of Counsel ofRICHARD BROWN, because there are no reasonable grounds for a motion for DNA testing as no evidence containing relevant biological material exists in a condition making DNA testing possible. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. arts. 64.01(c); 64.03(a)(1)(A)(West 2011). The Court further orders and directs: The Clerk of this Court to furnish a copy of this Order to Defendant, Mr. Richard Brown, TDCJ-ID# 01794390, Lynaugh Unit, 1098 S. Highway 2037, Fort Stockton, Texas 79735 (or to Defendant's most recent address), and to the appellate section of the District Attorney's Office. SIGNED AND ENTERED this _ _ day of _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ , 2014. JUDGE PRESIDING " I r- ,,..... -... ,.• ·C.JCH.t:~ _r r {S,) ·' IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS FORT WORTH DIVISION RICHARJ:5 BROWN, § Petitioner, § § V. § Civil Action No.4: 14-CV-839-0 § WILLIAM STEPHENS, Director, 1 § Texas Department of Criminal Justice, § Correctional Institutions Division, § · Respondent. § 91~J!J}:R ~~~l'1l1~IlNG~PRGCEED!N'; 1N ~i:HE'.DI~TRICTCOTJR::;~,-., · · " and · · · ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE, NOTICE, AND INSTRUCTIONS TO PARTIES ( ) A filing fee in the amount of $5.00 has been tendered. (X) Petitioner's Application to Proceed In Forma Pauperis pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 is GRANTED. It is therefore ORDERED that the parties shall comply with the followip.g directives and the clerk of Court shall takethe action indicated below: :. You will take notice that a "Petition For a Writ of Habeas Corpus by~~·Per~·an in State Custody," numbered ~-- and styled as above, has been filed in this Court pursuant to the provisions of28 u.·s.c. §§ 2241, et seq. Pleadings and briefs are required or permitted as follows: RESPONDENT'S ANSWER. Pursuant to Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, Respondent is directed to file an answer to this petition within 60 days of the date of this order, answering in _accordance with Rule 5 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts. If Respondent believes the petition is wholly barred by a failure to exhaust state remedies, a procedural bar, !!.9_J?..:I~!I9..'!~!jvit_y,..,g.Uh~:?.t?t.!!lt~_9.f limj_tations, he. ~11~y_ fi~.i!__orel_ip1inary ans\y~..r_~ss~_rting ai_!Y_such baL_Pii_9r to answeri'ii.g on 'tlie :rntJi'ts:' ;, " ; ' . . . . . . . . .. ·~ - .. -- -~c . . :- • ' .- - - REPLY. Pursuant to Rule 5( e) of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, Petitioner may file a reply within 30 days from the date of service of Respondent's answer, motion, or other pleading. BRIEFS. Briefs, as required or permitted by the provisions of this paragraph, should comply with the 25- ~ limitation under Local Rule 7.2(c) and should be submitted on letter size paper and double spaced. Each argument with supporting citations advanced in the brief should clearly specify the specific ground of the motion or numbered paragraph of the pleading it seeks to support or oppose. B1iefs are required or permitted as follows: 1. Respondent's brief. Respondent may file such brief as he may deem appropriate. 2. Reply brief. A reply brief is not required. However, in any case in which Respondent has filed a brief, a reply brief limited to 10 pages may be filed by Petitioner, should he wish to do so, within a period 1 Petitioner misspells RespoQdent Stephens last name as "Stevenson." The clerk of Court is directed to docket and change the last name of Respondent to reflect the correct spelling. .. .. :. of 30 days following service of Respondent's brief. Each paragraph of such reply brief must specify the precise paragraph or part of Respondent's brief to which reply is being made, and must be limited to a reply to Respondent's argument. Under no circumstances will any statement or argument s777et forth in an original or reply brief be considered as a part of the pleadings so as to advance new grounds for relief or to supplement any grounds or supporting facts set out in the petition. In every case a copy of the petition, pending motions, and any orders shall be served on the Attorney General, counsel for the State of Texas, by electronic means. 2 N.D. Tex. L. Civ. R. 5.l(e). In every case a copy of any brief, pleading, motion or order shall be mailed to Petitioner, if pro se, or served electronically on counsel for Petitioner. !d. SO ORDERED on this 3rd day of December, 2014. ~a~ eehcoi'J UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 2 Based upon communication with the Texas Attorney General's Office, this Court will not serve copies of the petition, attachments, pending motions, and orders upon Director Stephens. Instead, copies of the petition, attachments, pending motions and orders will be served electronically upon the Texas Attorney General, counsel for the Director, and will be directed to the attention of Elizabeth Goettert, Assistant Attorney General, Postconviction Litigation Division, P. 0. Box 12548, Austin, TX 7871 i-2548. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5(b )(2)(E). ··. a:ItJJJ.kio l!>iWwJ:J . ~ ·..· ~ ,, .. .. ~~- ·.·~ ~ ' Pi11 'f!Gi.lttl vs. WHlfilffl Sf£ flHENS UHI~f'il)l).Tr NOw C. tii¥ifS /lJCHJ\RO dQ'Vw /.1 HCIL£1..1-!1)({({2 Lfft.O.J)..fO /(; AS Plr:J((ta.tfR. J N 11(( J\I'!.JM tiVJ1fttUL"O /1 tf ,·j ··\'7 I f ·., AioiO '5f'/l iD {.ii')'l rJfl(-5t !-((5 'fH(S PiC LA~ li11bH F'(il~ Et-i~/!r tlf' O(:'A\(.)t.T/ fijf ( oull"l f!lfS A f.l D 12.t-:-ctJP. D.S tlfl2£rli S f1r;fAI TkJ\ f' 7t(e' RfSJlt1J..i0f.'/.i T wA .-; CitiOt £1£.0 G~~ C..WP I ro A~wttlTt.Kt PtT11Ufi.((tl5 WW" ~"<'--':C. 11JIUC.AS' CoPPvs e'f'IIr~ t1'ff·r2J'P5., · , .. -· ~t:~Pt!Ht£Hf Fl'l...£1) F'f!BT rl-1of'J.a~ (vii £ Y(f#I.Tc. t( ·Of TJ!IIf 1 5Al I) t Ylf'llllC.ff fflF rnFI ~-· W.'II'S 7(? lt-ILlUOV·K> rt'U f)NI; 1tlAI2C:t-l b, '201~ 1:.0 ffL£ Rts Po~~s.r:vc PL£Ao.r;.s(1, . J'l1o~f IHOl 11' Dt..VS t1JWftLAPSED 5If.IC( THe Oliff. ~H WtiJtH Rr$foONOt:.t-IT j,VA.5 bUDfllED HI iltsroND 1 1i!t':' i2f'EfloJ.lDfl-lf AS (At:L.ED 10 lft-:15u-tR cr< OTH£il.W!-Sf OfrfNO A') 10 PtTJ7:{t)fi./ft~~~ f(TITJi;~f P2 Pet. 10, ECF No. 1. Petitioner raises six grounds for relief, wherein he claims his plea was coerced and he is actually innocent ofthe offense (grounds one and three); he received ineffective assistance of trial counsel (ground three); the indictment was defective (ground four); there is no evidence to support his conviction (ground five); and the trial court abused its discretion by accepting his plea agreement when there was no evidence ofhis guilt (ground six). Pet. at 6-7, ECF No.1; Pet'r's Mem. 4-24, ECF No. 2. Respondent asserts the petition is time-barred under the federal statute of limitations. II. DISCUSSION Title 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) imposes a one-year statute ofliniitations on federal petitions for writ of habeas corpus filed by state prisoners. Section 2244(d) provides: 'Petitioner's state habeas application is deemed filed when placed in the prison mailing system. Richards v. Thaler,
710 F.3d 573, 578-79 (5th Cir. 2013). The application does not state the date Petitioner placed the document in the prison mailing system, however the "Inmate's Declaration" was signed by Petitioner on October 10, 20 14; thus, the Court deems the application filed on that date. 2 Likewise, a federal habeas petition filed by an inmate is deemed filed when the petition is placed in the prison mail system for mailing. Spotville v. Cain,
149 F.3d 374, 377 (5th Cir. 1998). 2 ( 1) A 1-year period of limitations shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to ~he judgment of a State court. The limitations period shall run from the latest of- (A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review; (B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action; (C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if that right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Comt and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or (D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence. (2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post- convicti9n or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitations under this subsection. 7~ 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(l)-(2). ~· In an apparent attempt to trigger subsection (B) or (D), Petitioner asserts that his efforts to seek postconviction relief were "impeded" by the state's failure to provide him with copies of the state court records and that he obtained "new evidence"-i.e., a copy of the trial court's judgment of conviction-after his state habeas proceeding reflecting that he was convicted of indecency with a child, which is a third-degree felony carrying a range of imprisonment of 2 to 10 years. Pet'r's file:: the stat~:-_c.o.urtrecor4:in a- habeas,corptls .proceedingmor;doe'~~~fi?risoner~lfav·e"'aconstitutional." 3 right to free copies of records or transcripts for the purpose of preparing a collateral attack on his conviction or sentence. Furthermore, the trial court's judgment is not "new evidence." Petitioner pleaded true to a prior felony conviction in cause number 0800070A as part of the plea agreement. With one prior felony conviction, petitioner became classified as a repeat offender, and the range of punishment was increased from that applicable for a third-degree felony to punishment applicable for a second-degree felony. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.§ _12;42(a) (West Supp. 2014). As a repeat offender with one prior felony, the range of imprisonment Petitioner then faced was 2 to 20 years. ld. § 12.42(a) (3). Petitioner only received 11 years' confinement upon his guilty plea, which was within the statutory guidelines. Contrary to Petitioner's contention, the sentence did not exceed the maximum punishment allowed· by law. Because Petitioner fails to invoke subsections (B) or (D) or to raise a claim of newly recognized rights under subsection (C), the general provision under subsection (A) applies to his case. Under subsection (A), the limitations period began to run on the date on which the judgment of conviction became final by the expiration of the time for seeking direct review. For purposes of ·•;:~~--· this provision, the judgment of conviction became final and the one-year limitations period began to run upon expiration of the time Petitioner had for filing a timely notice of appeal on July 20,2012, and closed one year later on Monday, July 22,2013, absent any applicable tolling. 3 TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2; Flanagan v. Johnson,
154 F.3d 196, 200-02 (5th Cir. 1998). t•- Petitioner's state habeas application, filed on May 14, 2014, after limitations had already expired, did not operate to toll the limitations period under the statutory provision. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2); Scott v. Johnson,
227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000). Nor has Petitioner alleged or 3 July 20,2013, was a Saturday. 4 demonstrated rare ,~nd exceptional circumstances that would justify tolling as a matter of equity.; Equitable tolling is permitted only in rare and exceptional circumstances when an extraordinary factor beyond the petitioner's control prevents him from filing in a timely manner or he can make a convincing showing that he is actually innocent of the crime for which he was convicted. McQuiggin v. Perkins, -U.S. - ,
133 S. Ct. 1924, 1928 (2013) (referencing 28 U .S.C. § 2244(d)(1)); Holland v. Florida,
560 U.S. 631, 649 (2010). Petitioner concedes that his petition is untimely but urges that his untimeliness is due to his indigent and pro se status and difficulty obtaining records and to his trial counsel's failure to respond to his request for certain documents. Pet'r's Rebuttal 1-3, ECF No. 15; Pet'r's Mem. of Law, Ex. 6, ECF No. 2. It is well settled, however, that a petitioner's prose status, indigence, lack of knowledge of the law, and difficulty obtaining records, all common problems of inmates who are trying to pursue postconviction habeas relief, do not warrant equitable tolling of the limitations period. Felder v. Johnson,
204 F.3d 168, 171-72 (5th Cir. 2000); Turner v. Johnson, 177 F .3d 390, 391 (5th Cir. 1999). Moreover, Petitioner's claim that counsel did not respond to his request is conclusory, and, even if Petitioner could show that counsel ignored his request, the letter is dated August 13,2014, well after the one- year limitations period had already expired. Finally, a petitioner attempting to overcome the expiration of the statute of limitations by showing actual innocence is required to produce "new reliable evidence-whether it be exculpatory scientific evidence, trustworthy eyewitness accounts, or critical physical evidence"-sufficient to persuade the district court that "no juror, acting reason.ably, would have voted to find him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928(quoting Schup v. Delo,
513 U.S. 298, 329 (1995)). Petitioner argues that, despite his guilty plea, he is actually innocent of the offense 5 because there is no evidence corroborating his plea. Although actual innocence, if proved, can overcome the statute of limitations, Petitioner waived his claim by entering a voluntary and knowing guilty plea to the offense. 4
McQuiggin, 133 S. Ct. at 1928. See also United States v. Vanchaik- Molinar, 195 Fed. Appx. 262,
2006 WL 2474048, at* 1 (5th Cir. 2006) ("A voluntary guilty plea waives all non-jurisdictional defects that occurred prior to the plea and precludes consideration of a claim challenging the sufficiency of the evidence."). As a matter of federal constitutional law, a voluntary and knowing guilty plea is sufficient evidence, standing alone, to support a conviction. Smith v. McCotter,786 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir. 1986). In summary, Petitioner's federal petition was due on or before July 22,2013. Therefore, his petition filed on February 18,2014, was filed beyond the limitations period and is untimely. III. CONCLUSION For the reasons discussed herein, the petition of petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241 is DISMISSED as time-barred. Further, for the reasons discussed herein, a certificate of appealability is DENIED. All motions not previously ruled upon are DENIED. SO ORDERED on this 28th day of July, 2015. ~a~ eeiico~) UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 4 In Petitioner's state habeas application, the state court detennined that Petitioner's guilty plea was knowingly, freely and voluntarily made. Admin. R., SH2 84, ECF No. 12-2. Absent clear and convincing evidence in rebuttal, this Court must defer to the state court's findings in this regard. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(l). 6
Document Info
Docket Number： WR-81,689-02
Filed Date： 9/14/2015
Precedential Status： Precedential
Modified Date： 9/30/2016