River City Care Center, Inc. D/B/A River City Care Center v. Betty Taylor ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
04-14-00078-CV
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
6/30/2015 4:07:08 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
NO. 04-14-00078-CV
FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
06/30/15 4:07:08 PM
FOR THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
KEITH E. HOTTLE
TEXAS AT SAN ANTONIO Clerk
RIVER CITY CARE CENTER, INC. D/B/A RIVER CITY CARE
CENTER,
Appellant,
v.
BETTY TAYLOR,
Appellee.
On Appeal from the 37th Judicial District Court,
Bexar County, Texas, Cause No. 2011-CI-15814
APPELLEE’S MOTION FOR REHEARING AND BRIEF IN
SUPPORT
Paul G. Vick - State Bar No. 20563950
pvicklaw@aol.com
James McDonough - State Bar No.
24007325 lawjmcd@yahoo.com
Law Offices of Paul G. Vick
Law Offices of James C.
McDonough
6243 IH 10 West, Suite 860
San Antonio, Texas 78201
210-735-1794
210-733-7510 fax
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
June 30, 2015
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TO THE HONORABLE FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS:
Comes Now, Appellee Betty Taylor, and pursuant to Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 49, files this Motion for Rehearing, and states as follows:
ISSUE PRESENTED
Appellee, Betty Taylor files this Motion for Rehearing of this Court’s June
17, 2015 Memorandum Opinion on the grounds that the Court improperly reversed
and rendered judgment that Appellee, Betty Taylor take nothing solely with respect
to the issue of the award of attorney fees.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The underlying lawsuit was filed by Taylor against Appellant, River City
Care Center, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as River City) which alleged age
discrimination and related damages. The case was called to trial on September 16,
2013 and the jury returned a verdict in favor of Taylor on the issue of age
discrimination, but found that River City would have taken the same action in the
absence of the impermissible motivating factor. (CR 310-311). The Trial Court
held a hearing on Taylor and River City‘s Motions for Final Judgment and, after
hearing arguments of counsel, entered a Final Judgment against River City which
prohibited River City “from engaging in the unlawful employment practice of age
discrimination…”, and awarded damages and attorney fees to Taylor. (Cr 398).
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River City appealed the Judgment and this Court determined that the Trial Court
had abused its discretion in its award of damages and attorney fees and reversed
and remanded that Taylor take nothing. Taylor brings this Motion for
Reconsideration solely on the issue of attorney’s fees.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
As this Court correctly points out, there are two (2) remedies for the
recovery of attorney fees in an age discrimination case. For purposes of this
motion, Taylor focuses her attention on Section 21.125 of the Texas Labor Code
which in summary grants the trial court the discretion to award attorney fees and
costs demonstrated to be directly attributable to the discriminatory complaint when
there is a finding that age was a motivating factor in the employment decision, and
that the employer would have taken the same action in the absence of the
impermissible motivating factor. See Tex. Labor Code Ann. §21.125 (a), (b). The
award of attorney’s fees generally rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters League, 801 S.W.2d 880, 881 (Tex.1990)
(per curiam).
In the Memorandum Opinion, this Court relies on the premise that when
Taylor failed to obtain a jury finding on attorney’s fees and fees were disputed, any
award of attorney’s fees would be an abuse of discretion, citing Univ. of Tex. v.
Ables, 914 S.W.2d 712 (Tex. App.- Austin 1996, no writ) and Tex. R. Civ. P. 279.
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However, the facts in the Ables case are not analogous to the facts in this case as
they relate to the relevant issues in this appeal, and in particular this motion for
reconsideration. In the Ables case, the trial court excluded attorney testimony about
the reasonableness and necessity of the work and the resulting fees, and the
requesting party in Ables did not submit a question/issue for the jury concerning
attorney fees. Id. at 717. As a result of the express provisions of Rule 279, the
exclusion of such testimony and the failure to submit the question to the jury
resulted in a waiver of the right to recover attorney fees. Id.
In this case, Taylor reiterates that admissible trial testimony concerning
reasonable and necessary attorney fees was provided by counsel (5 RR 8), and the
issue of attorney fees was submitted to the jury on behalf of Taylor (CR 314). As a
result of this evidence and jury charge submission, the requirements of Rule 279
were met and there was no waiver by Taylor of her right to recover attorney’s fees.
The fact that the jury did not answer the submitted jury question is not germane to
the issue because §21.125(b) gives the trial court the discretion to determine and
award reasonable fees in the event of a jury finding that age was a motivating
factor in the decision to terminate Taylor, and the same decision would have been
made absent the impermissible motivating factor.
In the Ables case, the dispute regarding attorney fees involved two (2) fact
issues which were not present with Taylor. First, the plaintiffs failed to submit a
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jury question and thus waived their right to recover. As pointed out, that was not
the case with Taylor; a jury question on attorney fees was submitted (CR 314).
Second, the plaintiffs in Ables failed to establish any legal right or vehicle to
recover attorney fees. Thus the trial court in Ables lacked the authority, and hence
the discretion to award attorney fees. Such is not the case with respect to Taylor.
As this Court pointed out in its memorandum opinion, §21.125(b) of the Texas
Labor Code affords the plaintiff the right to recover attorney’s fees. Unlike in
Ables, the Taylor attorney fee dispute involves a question of the amount of fees
between the trial testimony of counsel for Taylor and the post-trial affidavit
submitted; not that the trial court lacked the authority or discretion to award
attorney’s fees under §21.125(b). However, it is important to point out that
counsel for Taylor testified at trial that the normal hourly rate for work on the case
was $300.00 per hour. This is the same hourly rate used by the Court to determine
the fee award to Taylor. (5 RR 5, 8); (CR 310, 311).
All parties and this Court seem to be in agreement that attorney’s fees may
be awarded under §21.125(b), and that it is a discretionary measure for the trial
court. (Appellant Brief, page 24, FN 8). Therefore, with the burden of Rule 279
met because a question on attorney fees was submitted to the jury, the proper
analysis for this Court is to accord the trial court’s award of fees to the provisions
of §21.125(b) of the Texas Labor Code, which as this Court points out, grants the
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trial court the discretion to award reasonable fees and costs in accordance with the
evidence. As Section 21.125(b) of the Texas Labor Code states:
(b) In a complaint in which the complainant proves a violation under
Subsection (a) and a respondent demonstrates that the respondent would
have taken the same action in the absence of the impermissible motivating
factor, the court may grant declaratory relief, injunctive relief except as
provided by his subsection, and attorney’s fees and costs demonstrated to be
directly attributable only to the pursuit of a complaint under Subsection (a),
but may not award damages or issue an order requiring an admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion , or back pay.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER FOR RELIEF
As previously discussed, the jury found that age was a motivating factor in
the decision to terminate Betty Taylor (fulfilling the requirement of 21.125(a)), and
that the same action would have been taken in the absence of the impermissible
motivating factor. (CR 310, 311). The award of attorney’s fees generally rests
within the sound discretion of the trial court. Ragsdale v. Progressive Voters
League, 801 S.W.2d at 881; EL Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas, 370 S.W.3d 757, 761 (Tex.
2012). Taylor argues that, based upon the above, the proper result of this appeal
with respect to Taylor’s attorney fee award is to affirm the award of attorney fees
by the trial court, or to remand this case back to the trial court for a redetermination
of reasonable and necessary attorney fees should the Court feel that the lodestar
method burden was not met in the trial court testimony. EL Apple I, Ltd. v. Olivas,
370 S.W.3d at 765; City of Laredo v. Montano, 414 S.W.3d 731, 736-37 (Tex.
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2013); Long v. Griffin (Tex. 2014) (per curiam). Again, it is important to note that
the trial court in this case had received testimony during the trial of reasonable and
necessary fees by counsel for Taylor in the amount awarded, and was vested with
the discretion to award fees based upon the evidence presented.
WHEREFORE, Appellee Betty Taylor prays that this Court reconsider its
previous Memorandum Opinion with respect to the award of attorney fees, and
affirm the award of attorney’s fees and costs awarded by the trial court, or
alternatively, remand the question of attorney’s fees back to the trial court for a
redetermination of reasonable and necessary attorney’s fees and for such other
and further relief, at law or in equity, to which Taylor may show herself to be
justly entitled.
Respectfully submitted,
LAW OFFICES OF PAUL G. VICK
First National Bank Building
6243 IH-10 West, Suite 860
San Antonio, Texas 78201
Tel: (210) 735-1794
Fax: (210) 733-7510
THE LAW OFFICES OF JAMES C.
McDONOUGH
First National Bank Building
6243 IH-10 West, Suite 860
San Antonio, Texas 78201
210-736-2843
210-733-7511 (FAX)
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ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE,
BETTY TAYLOR
By: /S/ Paul G. Vick
Paul G. Vick
STATE BAR NO. 20563950
James C. McDonough
STATE BAR NO. 13569015
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that, on the 30th day of June, 2015, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing was served on all counsel of record listed below in
accordance with Rule 9.5(c) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure via
e-mail:
Aldean E. Kainz
akainz@jw.com
Breck Harrison
bharrison@jw.com
Jorge A. Padilla
jpadilla@jw.com
100 Congress, Suite 1100
Austin, TX 78701
(512) 236-2000
(512) 236-2002 – Facsimile
/s/ Paul G. Vick
Paul G. Vick
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