Mikael Judah and Laura Judah v. EMC Mortgage Corporation ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00304-CV
5395094
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
5/22/2015 11:21:57 AM
July 22, 2015 JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
Micah 6:8
22 May 2015
RECEIVED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
Third Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS
209 West 14th Street, Room 101 5/22/2015 11:21:57 AM
Austin, Texas 78701 JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
PO Box 12547
Austin, Texas 78711
RE: Notice of brief affecting cited case within No. 03-14-00304-CV, Judah v. EMC Mortgage
Corporation.
To the Honorable Justices of the Third Court of Appeals,
This notice letter and accompanying attachments directly relate to a critical underlying
question in the appeal pending before this Court, No. 03-14-00304-CV, Mikael and Laura Judah v.
EMC Mortgage Corporation, as well as other cases pending, such as No. 03-14-00135-CV, Burge v.
Ocwen Loan Servicing; No. 03-14-00376-CV, and Stanley v. W.R. Starkey Mortgage, LLC.
Within Appellants’ principal and reply briefs in Judah, the system by which Mortgage
Electronic Registration System (“MERS”), which admittedly has zero ownership interest in any
of the mortgage (i.e., no “stick” in the bundle), is directly challenged with the claim that it runs
contrary to standing law in Texas for more than 160 years and all three editions of TEXAS
JURISPRUDENCE.
Cited to specifically within the reply brief is the case of Montgomery County v. Merscorp, Inc.,
No. 11-CV-6968, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222 (E.D. Penn Jul. 1, 2014). The district court
decision in that case found that the entire concept of MERS ran contrary to the historical, and
well-settled, understandings of property law theory that have existed for decades. See id. (esp. at
554). A courtesy copy of that opinion is attached. That case was appealed by MERS on
interlocutory appeal to the federal Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit.
Important to this appeal, a critical amicus brief was filed by several parties:
1) Law professors:
a. Joseph William Singer, the Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard Law School;
b. David Reiss is a Professor of Law and Research Director at the Center forUrban
Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School;
c. Rebecca Tushnet is a Professor of Law at Georgetown Law School; and
d. Melanie Leslie is Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law at Yeshiva University.
And;
2) The Harvard Law School Legal Services Center.
CASEY LAW OFFICE, P.C. ! 595 Round Rock West Drive, Suite 102 ! Round Rock, Texas 78681
512-257-1324 (phone) ! (512) 853-4098 (fax)
Transforming Lives Through Justice
Page 1 of 2
These professors and this organization are requesting that the Third Circuit completely
uphold the district court’s decision against MERS based, in large part, that the entire concept of
MERS has turned property law on hits head and created a fountainhead of disaster for property
owners. It is alleged in Appellants’ case, and associated cases, that this turn of events has
transpired in Texas, too.
A copy of the amicus brief is attached and this Court is urged to review it as it applies to
critical questions in the case at bar.
A copy of this letter, the Pennsylvania opinion, and the amicus brief, have been sent
certified mail, return receipt requested, to opposing counsel.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Stephen Casey
Enclosures:
1) District Court opinion: Montgomery County v. Merscorp, Inc., No. NO. 11-CV-6968, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 89222 (E.D. Penn Jul. 1, 2014)
2) Amicus Brief in the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit: No. 14-4315,
Montgomery County v. Merscorp, Inc., BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE LEGAL SERVICES
CENTER OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND LAW PROFESSORS IN SUPPORT OF
THE APPELLEE.
Copy to:
Marcie Schout,
Quilling, Selander, Lownds, Winslett & Moser, P.C.
2001 Bryan Street Suite 1800
Dallas, TX 75201
via certified mail, return receipt requested
Page 2 of 2
Montgomery County v. Merscorp, Inc.
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
June 30, 2014, Decided; July 1, 2014, Filed
CIVIL ACTION NO. 11-CV-6968
Reporter
16 F. Supp. 3d 542; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222; 2014 WL 2957494
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, ATTORNEY, MORGAN, LEWIS AND BOCKIUS, Miami
RECORDER OF DEEDS, by and through Nancy J. Becker , FL; ANDREW C. WHITNEY, FRANCO A. CORRADO,
in her official capacity as Recorder of Deeds of Montgomery KRISTOFOR T. HENNING, NICHOLAS C. VANCE,
County, on its own behalf and on behalf of all others MORGAN LEWIS & BOCKIUS LLP, [**2] Philadelphia ,
similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. MERSCORP, INC., and PA; BRIAN M. ERCOLE, MORGAN LEWIS, Miami , FL.
MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION
SYSTEMS, INC., Defendants.
For Community Legal Services, Pennsylvania Legal Aid
Network, Housing Alliance of Pennsylvania, Movants:
Subsequent History: Amended by, Motion granted by, in
JENNIFER R. CLARKE, PUBLIC INTEREST LAW
part, Motion denied by, in part Montgomery County v.
CENTER OF PHILADELPHIA, Philadelphia , PA.
Merscorp, Inc., 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 129096 (E.D. Pa.,
Sept. 8, 2014)
Judges: J. CURTIS JOYNER, J.
Prior History: Montgomery County v. Merscorp, Inc., 904
F. Supp. 2d 436, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151598 (E.D. Pa., Opinion by: J. CURTIS JOYNER
2012)
Opinion
Counsel: [**1] For Montgomery County, Pennsylvania,
Recorder of Deeds, BY AND THROUGH NANCY J.
[*544] MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
BECKER, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY AS THE
RECORDER OF DEEDS OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY, JOYNER, J.
PENNSYLVANIA, ON ITS OWN BEHALF AND ON
BEHALF OF ALL OTHERS SIMILIARLY SITUATED,
This civil action is once again before the Court on
Plaintiff: CHARLES JOSEPH LADUCA, LEAD
cross-motions of Defendants [*545] Merscorp, Inc. and
ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, CUNEO GILBERT &
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (″the MERS
LADUCA LLP, Bethesda , MD; CRAIG W. HILLWIG,
Defendants″ or ″MERS″) and Plaintiff for summary
JOSEPH C. KOHN LEAD ATTORNEYS, ROBERT J.
judgment and partial summary judgment, respectively (Doc.
LAROCCA, WILLIAM E. HOESE, KOHN SWIFT &
GRAF, P.C., Philadelphia , PA; GARY E. MASON, LEAD Nos. 67 and 80). For the reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s
ATTORNEY, JASON S. RATHOD, LEAD ATTORNEY, motion shall be granted in part and Defendants’ motion
PRO HAC VICE, WHITFIELD BRYSON & MASON LLP, denied in its entirety.
Washington , DC; JENNIFER E. KELLY, LEAD
ATTORNEY, PRO HAC VICE, JONATHAN W. CUNEO, Factual Background
LEAD ATTORNEY, CUNEO GILBERT & LADUCA LLP
Washington , DC; JAMES C. SARGENT , JR., LAW As outlined in our previous Memoranda adjudicating the
OFFICES OF LAMB & McERLANE, P.C., West Chester , various motions filed earlier in this matter, Plaintiff, Nancy
PA; MAUREEN M. MCBRIDE, LAW OFFICES OF Becker, is the Recorder of Deeds in and for Montgomery
WINDLE & McERLANE, P.C., West Chester , PA; County, Pennsylvania. She filed this lawsuit on behalf of
WILLIAM H. LAMB, LAMB MCERLANE, P.C., West herself and all other Pennsylvania Recorders of Deeds
Chester , PA. alleging that by creating and maintaining a private,
members-only registry for recording and tracking
For Merscorp, Inc., Mortgage Electronic Registration conveyances of interests in real property, the MERS
Systems, Inc., Defendants: ROBERT M. BROCHIN, LEAD
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *545; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **5
Defendants have violated 21 P.S. §351 [**3] 1 which material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as
requires that such conveyances be publicly recorded in the a matter of law...
county recorder of deeds offices. Specifically, Plaintiff is
challenging the practice by which MERS serves as the In reviewing the record before it for purposes of assessing
mortgagee of record in the public land records as the the propriety of entering summary judgment, the court
″nominee″ for a lender who holds the mortgage note and its should view the facts in the light most favorable to the
successors and assigns and thereby circumvents the need to non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that
record the transfer of the note each time it is sold. party’s favor. Ma v. Westinghouse Electric Co., No. 13-2433,
559 Fed. Appx. 165, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS 5049, *9
As a result of what Plaintiff contends are Defendants’ (March 18, 2014); Burton v. Teleflex, Inc., 707 F.3d 417,
negligent and willful violations of the foregoing statute, 425 (3d Cir. 2013). The initial burden is on the party seeking
Plaintiff seeks both monetary and equitable relief in the summary judgment to point to the evidence ″which it
form of a declaration and/or permanent injunction directing believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of
Defendants to record mortgage assignments as well as an material fact.″ United States v. Donovan, 661 F.3d 174, 185
order quieting title and finding that Defendants were unjustly (3d Cir. 2011)(quoting [**6] Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
enriched. By the motions which are now before us, the U.S. 317, 323, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986)). An
parties ask this Court to enter judgment and partial judgment issue is genuine only if there is a sufficient evidentiary basis
in their favor as a matter of law, asserting that the dispute on which a reasonable jury could find for the non-moving
between them is primarily legal in nature and that there are party, and a factual dispute is material only if it might affect
no material facts in dispute. (See, e.g., MERS Defendants’ the outcome of the suit under governing law. Kaucher v.
Memorandum of Law [**5] in Support of Motion for County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006)(citing
Summary Judgment, p. 8). Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.
Ct. 2505, 91 L. Ed. 2d 202 (1986)).
Standards For Adjudicating Summary Judgment
Motions However, to survive summary judgment, the non-moving
party must present more than a mere scintilla of evidence;
It is Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 which outlines the standards to be there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably
employed by the federal courts in considering motions for find for the non-movant. Jakimas v. Hoffmann-LaRoche,
summary judgment. Subsection(a) of that rule provides the Inc., 485 F.3d 770, 777 (3d Cir. 2007). And, ″if there is a
following in relevant part: chance that a reasonable juror would not accept a moving
party’s necessary propositions of fact,″ summary judgment
A party may move for summary judgment, identifying is inappropriate.″ Burton, supra, (quoting El v. SEPTA, 479
each claim or defense - or the part of each claim or F. 3d 232, 238 (3d Cir. 2007)).
defense - on which summary judgment is [*546]
sought. The court shall grant summary judgment if the The rule is no different where there are cross-motions for
movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any summary judgment. As the Third Circuit Court of Appeals
1
§351. Failure to record conveyance
All deeds, conveyances, contracts, and other instruments of writing wherein it shall be the intention of the parties executing
the same to grant, bargain, sell, and convey any lands, tenements, or hereditaments situate in this Commonwealth, upon
being acknowledged by the parties executing the same or proved in the manner provided by the laws of this
Commonwealth, shall be recorded in the office for the recording of deeds in the county where such lands, tenements, and
hereditaments are situate. Every such deed, conveyance, contract, or other instrument of writing which shall not be
acknowledged or proved and recorded, as aforesaid, shall be adjudged fraudulent and void as to any subsequent bona fide
purchaser or mortgagee or holder of any judgment, duly [**4] entered in the prothonotary’s office of the county in
which the lands, tenements, or hereditaments are situate, without actual or constructive notice unless such deed,
conveyance, contract, or instrument of writing shall be recorded, as aforesaid, before the recording of the deed
or conveyance or the entry of the judgment under which such subsequent purchaser, mortgagee, or judgment
creditor shall claim. Nothing contained in this act shall be construed to repeal or modify any law providing for
the lien of purchase money mortgages.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *546; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **6
has observed: ″cross-motions are no more than a claim by (4) if Section 351 requires the documenting and
each side that it alone is entitled to summary judgment, recording of transfers of secured debt and the
[**7] and the making of such inherently contradictory MERS Defendants are the proper defendants, but
claims does not constitute an agreement that if one is Section 351 creates no private cause of action on
rejected the other is necessarily justified or that the losing behalf of the County Recorder, whether the statute
party waives judicial consideration and determination can be enforced by the Recorder of Deeds by
whether genuine issues of material fact exist.″ Lawrence v. bringing claims for quiet title and unjust enrichment
City of Philadelphia, 527 F.3d 299, 310 (3d Cir. as a means to enforce the statutory requirements
2008)(quoting Rains v. Cascade Industries, Inc., 402 F.2d contained in Section 351; and lastly,
241, 245 (3d Cir. 1968)). And, the mere fact that ″both
(5) if summary judgment is not granted on any of
parties seek summary judgment does not constitute a waiver
the previous four issues, whether Plaintiff has
of a full trial or the right to have the case presented to a
presented the necessary proof to establish the
jury.″ Facenda v. N.F.L. Films, Inc., 542 F.3d 1007, 1023
elements [**9] of her claims for unjust enrichment
(3d Cir. 2008)(quoting 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R.
and to quiet title to land.″
Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure
§2720 (3d ed. 1998), at 330-331).
(Defendants’ Memorandum of Law in Support of Motion
for Summary Judgment, p. 9).
Discussion
According to the MERS Defendants, By her response in opposition and cross-motion for partial
summary judgment, Plaintiff rejoins that the entry of an
″[t]he following five legal questions and issues are Order of Declaratory Judgment finding that Defendants
presented to the Court in this summary judgment have violated and are currently violating 21 P.S. §351 with
motion: the result that they have been unjustly enriched at the
(1) whether Plaintiff has shown that the MERS expense of all of the county recorders of deeds in
Defendants have any mortgage assignments to land Pennsylvania is appropriate. More particularly, Plaintiff
in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania that have submits that because the promissory note and mortgage are
not been recorded pursuant to the mandate in inseparable and an assignment of mortgage constitutes a
Section 351 (as interpreted by this Court) requiring recordable conveyance of title in land, this Court should
the recording of all conveyances of land; reject MERS’ argument that its system is lawful because
there is no legal requirement to publicly record promissory
(2) [**8] whether, in the absence of any such
notes.
written mortgage assignments, Section 351 requires
the transfer of secured debt to first be documented
We begin by noting that Defendants’ Question 4 has already
in a form suitable for recording and then recorded
been effectively answered by our Memorandum of October
in the land records because it creates in the
19, 2012 wherein we found no need to reach the question of
transferee an equitable interest in the mortgage;
whether Section 351 bestowed a private right of action
[*547] (3) if transfers of secured debt must first be because Pa. R. C. P. No. 1061(b)(3) permitted Plaintiff to
documented and then recorded under Section 351, pursue an action to quiet title.2 Thus, inasmuch as this
whether the MERS Defendants have been the finding established the [**10] law of the case, we see no
transferor or transferee of any such secured debt need to discuss it further.3 To appropriately address and
and, if they have not, whether, the MERS answer Defendants’ other questions and the arguments
Defendants are the proper parties who are liable for advanced by Plaintiff, we must confront head-on the model
and subject to the ″mandates contained in Section upon which Defendants’ entire business is built and in so
351; doing determine whether the ″splitting″ of a promissory
2
See also, Memorandum of March 6, 2013 wherein we denied Defendants’ second motion to dismiss the complaint and reiterated that
Pa. R. C. P. 1061 permitted a quiet title action absent an interest in the underlying land at issue.
3
The law of the case doctrine essentially holds that when a court decides upon a rule of law, that decision should continue to govern
the same issues in the subsequent stages in the same case in the absence of extraordinary circumstances such as where the initial decision
was clearly erroneous and would make a manifest injustice. Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp., 486 U.S. 800, 816, 108 S.
Ct. 2166, 2177-2178, 100 L. Ed. 2d 811, 830 (1988); [**11] Benjamin v. Department of Public Welfare of Pennsylvania, 701 F.3d 938,
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *547; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **14
note from the mortgage lien that secures it obviates the As generally described above, the ordinary mortgage consists
recording requirements imposed [*548] under the of two instruments - the note or bond 5 and the mortgage
Pennsylvania statute.4 Underscoring this inquiry are the instrument itself. The mortgage is simply security for the
threshold questions of what is a mortgage under payment of the note, with a right of a lien on the mortgage
Pennsylvania law and what are the purposes of the premises to enforce payment. Philadelphia Federal Credit
Pennsylvania recording laws? Union v. Ankrah, Civ. A. No. 13-3040, 2014 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 21095 at *8 (E.D. Pa. Jan. 30, 2014). [**14] ″A
A. What is a Mortgage? mortgage, unless it contain some express covenant to that
effect, is not of itself an [*549] instrument which imports
any personal liability for the money it secures.″ Baum v.
949 (3d Cir. 2012). The law of the case rules have developed to maintain consistency and avoid reconsideration of matters once decided
during the course of a single continuing lawsuit. Pharmacy Benefit Manages Antitrust Litigation, 582 F.3d 432, 439 (3d Cir. 2009).
4
Indeed, we outlined the process by which MERS functions in our Memorandum Opinion of October 19, 2012 denying the defendants’
motion to dismiss in large part. As we explained:
The typical residential mortgage finance transaction results in two legally operative documents: (1) a promissory note, a
negotiable instrument which represents the borrower’s repayment obligation over the term of the loan; and (2) a mortgage,
representing the security interest in certain property which entitles the holder of the note to foreclose on the property in the
event of default on the note. ... MERS enters a mortgage finance transaction when the lender and the borrower name MERS,
in the mortgage instrument, ″as the mortgagee (as nominee for the lender and its successors and assigns).″ ... The attendant
promissory note is sold on the secondary mortgage market and may, over [**12] its term, have many owners. Sale of
the note onto the secondary mortgage market principally takes two forms. In one, relatively straightforward,
transaction, a lender who retains a note as part of its own loan portfolio transfers the note to another party for
that party to hold for its own account or portfolio. ... In the other, a more complex process called securitization,
the note is transferred, along with many other notes, through several different entities into a special purpose
vehicle, typically a trust; the trust then issues securities backed by the trust corpus, i.e., the notes, to investors.
... Regardless of the secondary market route which the note takes, MERS remains the named mortgagee as
″nominee″ for the subsequent owners of the note as long as the note is held by a MERS member. ...
...
Before the formation of MERS, secondary market investors generally required recorded assignments for most transfers of
prior ownership interests [in security interests, i.e. mortgages.] ... This system entailed substantial administrative burdens
on secondary mortgage market participants. ... As a result, in 1993, the Mortgage Bankers’ Association (″MBA″)
Interagency Technology Task Force [**13] published a ″white paper″ ... that describes an electronic book entry
system for the residential mortgage industry. At the time, among other benefits to the mortgage industry, MERS
proponents claimed that ″once MERS is established as the mortgagee of record, all subsequent transfers of
ownership would be recorded electronically, eliminating the need to physically prepare, deliver, record and
track assignment documents. The estimated cost savings for assignment processing for a single transfer would
be an average of $45.50 per loan. ... So instead of effecting formal assignments of a mortgage when MERS
members transfer the accompanying note between one another, the MERS members simply register the change
in beneficial ownership in the MERS electronic database. ...
See, 904 F. Supp. 2d 436, 439-440, 441 (E.D. Pa. 2012)(internal citations omitted).
5
Historically, mortgages were accompanied by a bond, which was ″a promise to pay a sum of [**15] money according to the terms,
covenants and conditions set forth in the instrument,″ and a warrant of attorney authorizing ″any attorney-at-law to appear for the obligor
and confess judgment against that obligor for the penal sum of the bond.″ Ladner, Conveyancing in Pennsylvania §25.02(a), (b) (5th ed.
2013). ″In modern mortgage practice, promissory notes have supplanted bonds and warrants as the underlying obligation in residential
mortgage transactions and in most commercial transactions as well.″ Id.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *549; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **14
Tomkin, 110 Pa. 569, 572, 1 A. 535, 536, 17 Week. Notes sure, by having a loan secured by both a mortgage and a
Cas. 535, 43 Legal Int. 262, 33 Pitts. Leg. J. 200 (1885). In bond or note, a mortgagee has a choice of remedies - one
Pennsylvania, against [**17] the mortgaged property, the other against the
mortgagor personally. See, Ladner, at §22.05(b). See also,
[a] mortgage may be created as well without as with an Easton Theatres, Inc. v. Wells Fargo Land & Mortgage Co.,
accompanying personal obligation of the mortgagor to 498 Pa. 557, 565, 449 A.2d 1372, 1376 (1982)(Dissenting
pay the debt secured, or attempted to be secured Opinion, Flaherty, J.)(″The effect of executing a bond or
thereby. In the one case the property alone is charged note secured by a mortgage, unless recourse on the bond is
with the lien - is looked to solely by the mortgagee out specifically limited, is to subject all of the real and personal
of which to make his lien; in the other, he has the property of the obligor to execution in the event of default.″).
additional security of the personal obligation of the While these remedies may be pursued concurrently or
mortgagor. A debt chargeable only against certain consecutively, the mortgage may have only one satisfaction.
property is, in effect, simply a debt with limited means Schuylkill Trust Co. v. Sobolewski, 325 Pa. 422, 426-427,
of satisfaction or enforcement; the value of the property 190 A. 919, 922 (1937); Elmwood Federal Savings Bank v.
charged with the indebtedness is the measure of the Parker, 446 Pa. Super. 254, [*550] 666 A.2d 721, 724, n.6
security afforded. (1995).
Hartje’s Estate, 345 Pa. 570, 574, 28 A.2d 908, 910 (1942). Further, inasmuch as an action in mortgage foreclosure is
Accordingly, under Pennsylvania state law, a valid mortgage strictly an in rem proceeding the sole purpose of which is to
can be created without requiring the mortgagor to assume effect a judicial sale of the mortgaged real estate, it may not
personal liability under a note. In re Farris, 194 B.R. 931, include an in personam action to enforce personal liability,
940 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).6 unless the mortgagor waives any objection to the inclusion
of the breach of contract action for a personal judgment in
Typically, a mortgagor’s failure to pay the amounts due and the mortgage foreclosure suit. Newtown Village Partnership
owing under the note constitutes an event of default v. Kimmel, 424 Pa. Super. 53, 55, 621 A.2d 1036, 1037
following which the holder may proceed to enforce the (1993); [**18] Insilco Corp. v. Rayburn, 374 Pa. Super. 362,
terms of the mortgage either through in rem foreclosure 368, 543 A.2d 120, 123 (1988)(citing Pa. R. C. P. 1141 and
proceedings or by obtaining an in personam judgment on Meco Realty Company v. Burns, 414 Pa. 495, 200 A.2d 869
the note and seeking to execute. Amerco Real Estate Co. v. (1964) and First Seneca Bank v. Greenville Distributing
Appalachian Self Storage, LLC, Civ. A. No. 3:11-CV-1166, Company, 367 Pa. Super. 558, 533 A.2d 157 (1987)). To
2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 116997 at *21 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 20, pursue both of these remedies, however, the creditor/
2012)(citing Wilson v. Parisi, 549 F. Supp. 2d 637, 655 mortgagee must possess both the note and the mortgage.
(M.D. Pa. 2008)). See also, PFCU v. Ankrah, supra, (″The See, e.g., U.S. Bank v. Montalvo, Civ. A. No. 3:08-CV-1504,
holder of a bond and mortgage can proceed in rem or in 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 162595 at *8 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 14,
personam to enforce his claim; he may proceed by an action 2013)(where defendant mortgagee signatory to mortgage
of mortgage foreclosure or by an action on the bond which only and not note, plaintiff could not have brought in
the mortgage secures.″ (citing U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Mallory, personam action against him based on any alleged failures
2009 PA Super. 182, 982 A.2d 986, 992 n.3 (Pa. Super. Ct. to pay obligations due under note).
2009); Levitt v. Patrick, 2009 PA Super. 117, 976 A.2d
581(2009) and Bank of Pennsylvania v. G/N Enterprises, Additionally, notes secured by mortgages have been
Inc., 316 Pa. Super. 367, 371, 463 A.2d 4, 6 (1983)). To be determined to be negotiable instruments under the
6
Stated otherwise,
[a] mortgage is a security instrument used by the mortgagee to secure payment of a debt or performance of an obligation.
When properly executed, delivered, accepted and recorded, the mortgage places a lien on the mortgaged premises. If the
mortgagor is unable or unwilling to pay the debt or perform the obligation, the mortgagee has recourse against the property.
That recourse usually is a mortgage foreclosure action in court that results in a judicial sale. Being a secured creditor is
important so that there is something of value that may be sold if the mortgagor defaults. And, in bankruptcy situations,
secured creditors usually have preference over those that are [**16] unsecured.
Ladner, Conveyancing in Pennsylvania, supra, §22.01.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *550; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **19
Pennsylvania Uniform Commercial Code,7 such that the resolve this question, we turn now to an examination of the
holder of such an instrument may be entitled to the purposes and intentions behind the Pennsylvania Recording
protections afforded thereunder to a holder in due course. JP statutes.
Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Murray, 2013 PA Super. 55, 63
A.3d 1258, 1265 (2013); In re Walker, 466 B.R. 271, 282 B. Pennsylvania Recording Law
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2012); Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Company
v. Carmichael, 448 B.R. 690, 694 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2011). Generally speaking, the primary purpose behind enactment
Under the [**19] Code, a note may be negotiated from one of the Pennsylvania statutes governing recording of property
person to another by mere transfer of possession. See, 13 Pa. conveyances was the provision of notice of the identities of
C. S. §§3201, 3203 (governing ″Negotiation,″ and ″Transfer those who held an interest in the real estate at issue,
of instrument; rights acquired by transfer″). From all of this, primarily to protect subsequent bona fide purchasers from
we conclude that Defendants are correct in their assertion injuries caused by secret pledges of property. 6 Summ. Pa.
that Pennsylvania law does indeed recognize a clear legal Jur. 2d Property §§8:112, 9:17 (2d ed.)(2012).8 Indeed as
distinction between a promissory note and a mortgage and early as 1848, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court noted that:
that promissory notes may generally be freely transferred
without the requirement of recording. ″The intention of the acts requiring deeds to be recorded
was to secure subsequent purchasers and mortgagees
This does not end the matter, however. Again, it is the against prior secret conveyances and fraudulent
Defendants’ premise that because the debt transfers at issue encumbrances; and therefore when a person has notice
occur by mere delivery of promissory notes, they are not of a prior conveyance, it is not a secret conveyance by
″written instruments″ subject to [*551] the recording which he can be prejudiced...
requirement of Section 351. Accordingly, the question
which this case presents and with which we are here Mott v. Clark, 9 Pa. 399, 405 (1848). [**22] And, just two
confronted is whether a promissory note that is secured by years later, the Court observed:
a mortgage also falls within the purview and meaning of a
″conveyance,″ ″contract,″ or ″other instrument of writing″ ″The principle runs through the whole system of our
″wherein it shall be the intention of the parties executing the recording acts, that the object is to give public notice in
same to grant, bargain, sell and convey any lands, tenements whom the title resides; so that no one may be defrauded
or hereditaments [**21] situate in th[e] Commonwealth [of by deceptious appearance of title. ... The recording
Pennsylvania].″ 21 P.S. §351. If so, then the mandate of laws, like all other public laws are intended for the
Section 351 is clear: it ″shall be recorded in the office for benefit and security of the people generally.″
the recording of deeds in the county where such lands,
tenements and hereditaments are situate.″ Id. In an effort to Salter v. Reed, 15 Pa. 260, 263-264 (1850). These holdings
7
13 Pa. C. S. §3104 defines negotiable instruments and notes under the Uniform Commercial Code. See generally, 13 Pa. C. S.
§3104(a), (e). Under Subsection (a), ″negotiable instrument,″ ″except as provided in subsections (c) and (d), ... means an unconditional
promise or order to pay a fixed amount of money, with or without interest or other charges described in the promise or order, if it:
(1) is payable to bearer or to order at the time it is issued or first comes into possession of a holder;
(2) is payable on demand or at a definite time; and
(3) does not state any other undertaking or instruction by the person promising or ordering payment to do any act in addition
to the payment of money, but the [**20] promise or order may contain:
(i) an undertaking or power to give, maintain or protect collateral to secure payment;
(ii) an authorization or power to the holder to confess judgment or realize on or dispose of collateral;
(iii) a waiver of the benefit of any law intended for the advantage or protection of an obligor.″
Subsection (e) states that ″[a]n instrument is a ’note’ if it is a promise and is a ’draft’ if it is an order. If an instrument falls within
the definition of both ’note’ and ’draft,’ a person entitled to enforce the instrument may treat it as either.
8
″To qualify as a bona fide purchaser, a subsequent buyer must be without notice of a prior equitable interest.″ Id.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *551; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **24
remain undisturbed despite the passage of more than 150 [**24] actually recorded, all the incidents and force of
years and thus the underlying purpose behind the a public record attach to that record. It is an early and
Pennsylvania recording acts remains clear - to provide well recognized principle that one great object in
notice to the public of the identities of those who hold an spreading an instrument of writing on a public record is
interest in real estate as well as notice of the true nature of to give constructive notice of its contents to all
the transaction on record. See, e.g., U.S. Bank, N.A. v. mankind.″
Mallory, 2009 Pa. Super. 182, 982 A.2d 986, 994, n.6
(2009)(″Mortgages are recorded to provide notice to the Pepper’s Appeal, supra.
world as to whose interest encumbers title.″); Weik v. Estate
Thus, the benefits of recording an interest in land have long
of Brown, 2002 PA Super. 63, 794 A.2d 907, 911 (Pa. Super.
been recognized in Pennsylvania and in 1863, the
Ct. 2002); Roberts v. Estate of Pursley, 718 A.2d 837, 841
Pennsylvania legislature first decreed that such recording
(Pa. Super. Ct. 1998); Mancine v. Concord-Liberty Savings
should be mandatory.9
& Loan Ass’n., 299 Pa. Super. 260, 445 A.2d 744 (1982);
Reiter v. Kille, 143 F. Supp. 590, 592-593 (E.D. Pa.
C. How Pennsylvania Law Treats Mortgages
1956)(holding [**23] that inasmuch as recording is
obligatory in Pennsylvania so as to give public notice in Over the years, however, there was some confusion over
whom title resides, federal tax lien premised on unrecorded how a mortgage should be viewed by the Pennsylvania
deed ineffective as against subsequent purchaser for value); courts - was it a conveyance of title, a lien or cloud on the
Capital Center Equities v. Estate of Gordon, 137 B.R. 600, title of the real estate, or merely security for the payment of
611 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1992)(quoting Jaques v. Weeks, 7 money or performance of some other collateral contract?
Watts 261 (Pa. 1838)). In accord, 1 West’s Pa. Prac. See, e.g., Wilson v. Shoenberger’s Executors, 31 Pa. 295,
§803(14)-1 (3d ed.)(2012): (″The purpose of [the] statutes 299 (1858)(″It is the settled law of the Pennsylvania
[providing for the recording of deeds and mortgages] mortgage, that though in form a conveyance of title, it is in
[*552] is to give notice of who holds interests in the reality, both at law and equity, only a security for the
property, to provide evidence of title in case the original payment of money, or performance of other collateral
documents are lost or unavailable, and to protect the interest contract.″); McIntyre v. Velte, 153 Pa. 350, 25 A. 739
holders from the claims of others.″). And in 1852, it was (1893)(″The mortgage is but a security for the payment of
determined that assignments of mortgages also fell within money with a right of lien upon the mortgaged premises to
the recording acts. Pepper’s Appeal, 77 Pa. 373, 377, 1 enforce payment.″); Bulger v. Wilderman, 101 Pa. Super.
Week. Notes Cas. 437, 7 Legal Gaz. 205, 32 Legal Int. 321, 168 (1931)(″In [**26] form, a mortgage is certainly a
22 Pitts. Leg. J. 182 (1875); Philips v. Bank of Lewistown, conveyance; but it is unquestionably treated at law here, in
18 Pa. 394, 402 (1852). the way it is treated in equity elsewhere, as a bare
incumbrance, and the accessory of a debt. As between the
While the earlier versions of the recording statutes did not
parties it is a conveyance, so far as is necessary to enforce
make recording mandatory, nevertheless,
it as a security: as regards third persons, the mortgagor is the
″[w]hen the election [to record] is made and an owner, even of the legal estate...″)(quoting Presbyterian
instrument authorized by law to be recorded, is Corporation v. Wallace, 3 Rawle 109 (Pa. 1831)).
9
See, Act of April 1, 1863, P.L. 188, §1 repealed in part by 42 Pa. C.S. §20002(a)[414]:
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania in General Assembly met,
and it is hereby enacted by the authority of the same,
That in all cases in which any of the former owners, or any other person, or persons, shall have, in his or their possession,
any bargains of sales, deeds, conveyances, or other instruments in writing, concerning any lands, tenements or
hereditaments in this commonwealth, he, or they, shall, upon six months’ notice being given to him, or them, by the present
owner of such premises, or by any other person, or persons, in any manner interested in any [**25] such bargains of
sales, deeds, conveyances, or other instruments of writing, place the same upon record in the proper county, or
deliver the same into the hands, or possession, of the present owner, if such application be made by him.
(Italics in original)
Thereafter, 21 P.S. §351 was enacted in 1925. See, Act of May 12, 1925, P.L. 613, No. 327, §1.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *552; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **27
In 2004, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court decided Pines v. Pennsylvania who were charged with the duty of collecting
Farrell, 577 Pa. 564, 848 A.2d 94 (2004). Specifically the fees in connection with such transfers. Indeed, the Court
[*553] issue presented in that case was whether certain reasoned:
financial regulations which had been promulgated by the
Court Administrator of Pennsylvania interpreting the What definitively tips the balance in this Court’s view,
definition of ″property transfer″ in 42 Pa. C. S. is that, although a mortgage can be considered both a
§3733(a.1)(1)(v)10 to include mortgage ssignments, mortgage conveyance in form as well as a security interest, for
releases, and mortgage satisfactions were valid and purposes of actions involving recording acts, mortgages
enforceable. The Pines Court began its analysis with this traditionally have been treated as conveyances. ″In all
observation: questions upon the recording acts, the mortgage is
spoken of as a conveyance of land.″ ... Thus, for
″Proper resolution of this question first requires an purposes of determining whether mortgage assignments,
examination of the legal definition of a mortgage; i.e., mortgage satisfactions and mortgage releases are
if a mortgage represents a property transfer, it logically property transfers, we begin with the premise that a
follows that transactions involving mortgages are also mortgage conveys the property subject to the mortgage
property transfers. The ″title theory [**27] of mortgages to the mortgagee until the obligations under [**28] the
deems a mortgage to be a conveyance, while a mortgage are fulfilled.
competing theory, the ″lien theory, suggests that a
mortgage merely represents a security interest.″ Id. at 100 (quoting In re Long’s Appeal, 77 Pa. 151 (1874).
From there, the Court further opined:
Id., 848 A.2d at 99. Recognizing that there was ample
authority for both theories under Pennsylvania common law, Given our conclusion that a mortgage conditionally
the Supreme Court nevertheless found that such actions conveys the subject property, it logically follows that an
were ″property transfers″ which bound the recorders of assignment of the mortgagee’s rights likewise effects a
deeds, clerks of courts and equivalent officials throughout conditional transfer of the subject [*554] property to
10
This statute reads, in pertinent part:
§3733. Deposits into account.
(a) General rule.
(1) Beginning July 1, 1987, and thereafter, the total of all fines, fees and costs collected by any division of the unified
judicial system which are in excess of the amount collected from such sources in the fiscal year 1986-1987 shall be
deposited in the Judicial Computer System Augmentation Account. Any fines, fees or costs which are allocated by law or
otherwise directed to the Pennsylvania Fish and Boat Commission, to the Pennsylvania Game Commission or to counties
and municipalities, to the Crime Victim’s Compensation Board, to the Commission on Crime and Delinquency for
victim-witness services grants under section 477.15(c) of the act of April 9, 1929 ... known as the Administrative Code of
1929, to rape crisis centers, to the Emergency Medical Services [**30] Operating Fund or to domestic violence
shelters shall not be affected by this subchapter.
...
(a.1) Additional fees.
(1) In addition to the court costs and filing fees authorized to be collected by statute:
....
(v) An additional fee of $10 shall be charged and collected by the recorders of deeds and clerks of court, or by any
officials designated to perform similar functions, for each filing of a deed, mortgage or property transfer for which
a fee, charge or cost is now authorized. The Supreme Court shall designate by financial regulations which filings
meet the criteria of this subparagraph.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *554; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **28
the assignee. Additionally, even accepting respondent’s The mortgage can have no separate existence. When the
argument that an assignee’s rights cannot exceed those note is paid the mortgage expires.″ Id. 83 U.S. at 275, 21 L.
of the assignor, a property transfer still exists because Ed at 315. See also, National Live Stock Bank of Chicago
the assignee will receive the rights held by the assignor, v. First National Bank of Geneseo, 203 U.S. 296, 306, 27 S.
i.e., the conveyance of the property subject to the terms Ct. 79, 81, 51 L. Ed. 192 (1906)(same).
of the mortgage. ... Thus, the Court Administrator These principles remain viable and are likewise embodied
correctly defined property transfer to include mortgage in the Restatement (Third) of Property: Mortgages, §5.4
assignments. (1997), which reads as follows:
Id. at 100-101 (citation omitted). The Court reached the §5.4 Transfer of Mortgages [**32] and Obligations
same conclusion with respect to mortgage satisfactions and
Secured by Mortgages
releases. That is, the effect of both a mortgage satisfaction
and a mortgage release was to discharge the lien and release (a) A transfer of an obligation secured by a mortgage
the mortgagor from the obligations under the mortgage and also transfers the mortgage unless the parties to the
to ″reconvey″ the property to the mortgagor. Pines, 848 transfer agree otherwise.
A.2d at 101, 102. See also, First Citizens National Bank v. (b) Except as otherwise required by the Uniform
Sherwood, 583 Pa. 466, 879 A.2d 178, 180, n.2 (2005)(″A Commercial Code, a transfer of a mortgage also transfers
[**29] transfer of title is no insubstantial thing, but rather the obligation the mortgage secures unless the parties to
resembles a right or privilege which is permanent in nature. the transfer agree otherwise.
The fact that at one point, the mortgagor may fulfill the [*555] (c) A mortgage may be enforced only by, or in
obligations of the mortgage, and thereby receive title to the behalf of, a person who is entitled to enforce the
mortgaged property, does not negate the fact that mortgaging obligation the mortgage secures.
the property transfers the title to the mortgagee.″).
Pennsylvania law was and is in accord. See, e.g., In re North
While Pines may not be on all fours with the case at hand City Trust Co., 327 Pa. 356, 361, 194 A. 395, 398 (1937)
inasmuch as we are charged here with interpreting a (″[C]ollateral for a debt follows the obligation into the
different statute, it nonetheless represents a clear statement hands of the assignee thereof.″); Beaver Trust Co. v.
of Pennsylvania law which is equally applicable in this case Morgan, 259 Pa. 567, 103 A. 367, 369 (1918)(″A purchase
particularly in view of its specific reference to the recording of a debt is a purchase of all the securities for it, whether
acts. Hence, inasmuch as ″conveyance″ is defined, inter named or not at the time of the assignment, unless expressly
alia, as ″a. Transfer of title to property from one person to agreed at the time they shall not pass.″); Moore v. Cornell,
another. b. The document by which this transfer is 68 Pa. 320, 322 (1871)(″A [**33] mortgage is discharged by
effected,″11 we likewise find that a mortgage assignment is payment, and an assignment of the debt transfers the right to
a ″conveyance″ subject to the recording mandate of §351. the mortgage itself; for whatever will give the money
secured by the mortgage, will carry the mortgaged premises
D. Severability of Notes and Mortgages along with it.″); 13 Pa. C. S. §9203(g)(″The attachment of a
security interest in a right to payment or performance
In view of this finding, we next consider whether a note
secured by a security interest or other lien on personal or
memorializing debt that is secured by a mortgage stands
real property is also attachment of a security interest in the
alone such that it may be freely transferred by change in
security interest, mortgage or other lien.″). See also, Russell’s
possession or whether it too must be recorded.
Appeal, 15 Pa. 319, 321, 322 (1950)(″Even, although a
Under well-settled, long-held American law, where conveyance be absolute in its terms, if it is intended by the
″mortgaged premises are pledged as security for debt,″... parties to be a mere security for the payment of a debt, it is
″the note and mortgage are inseparable. ...″ Carpenter v. a mortgage. ... An article of agreement for the sale of land,
Longan, 83 U.S. 271, 274, 16 Wall. 271, 21 L. Ed. 313, 315 accompanied by delivery of possession and payment of part
(1872). Thus, ″[a]n assignment of the note carries the of the purchase-money, is much more than a chose in action;
mortgage with it, while an assignment of the latter alone is it is an abiding interest in the land itself.″).
a nullity.″ Id. Indeed, ″[a]ll the authorities agree that the This notion that notes and mortgages are legally inter-woven
debt is the principal thing and the mortgage an accessory. ... is further supported by the language employed by the
11
WEBSTER’S II NEW RIVERSIDE [**31] UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 308 3d ed. 1994)
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *555; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **33
Multistate Fixed Rate Uniform Instrument Note and successors and assigns) and to the successors and
Pennsylvania Mortgage forms 12 which appear to be currently assigns of MERS, the following described property
utilized in most loan settlement transactions in which located in this (County) of which currently has the
MERS is designated [**34] as the mortgagee. Beginning address of (Street), (City), Pennsylvania (Zip
with the Note form, at paragraph 10, the following verbiage Code) (″Property Address″) ...
appears:
TOGETHER WITH all the improvements now or
hereafter erected on the property, and all easements,
... In addition to the protections given to the Note
appurtenances, and fixtures now or hereafter a part of
Holder under this Note, a Mortgage, Deed of Trust, or
the property. All replacements and additions shall also
Security Deed (the ″Security Instrument″), dated the
be covered by this Security Instrument. All of [**36] the
same date as this Note, protects the Note Holder from
foregoing is referred to in this Security Instrument as
possible losses which might result if I do not keep the
the ″Property.″ Borrower understands and agrees that
promises which I make in this Note. That Security
MERS holds only legal title to the interests granted by
Instrument describes how and under what conditions I
the Borrower in this Security Instrument, but if
may be required to make immediate payment in full of
necessary to comply with law or custom, MERS (as
all amounts I owe under this Note. ...
nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and
The Mortgage, in turn, includes the following language in assigns) has the right: to exercise any or all of those
excerpted relevant parts: interests, including, but not limited to, the right to
foreclose and sell the Property; and to take any action
Definitions required of Lender including, but not limited to,
releasing and canceling this Security Instrument.
(C) ″MERS″ is Mortgage Electronic Registration ...
Systems, Inc. MERS is a separate corporation that is
acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s UNIFORM COVENANTS. Borrower and Lender
successors and assigns. MERS is the mortgagee covenant and agree as follows:
[**35] under this Security Instrument. ...
...
...
9. Protection of Lender’s Interest in the Property
(E) ″Note″ means the promissory note signed by
and Rights Under this Security Instrument.
Borrower and dated . ...
If (a) Borrower fails to perform the covenants and
...
agreements contained in this Security Instrument, (b)
(G) ″Loan″ means the debt evidenced by the Note, plus there is a legal proceeding that might significantly
interest, any prepayment charges and late charges due affect Lender’s interest in the Property and/or rights
under [*556] the Note, and all sums due under this under this Security Instrument (such as a proceeding in
Security Instrument, plus interest. bankruptcy, probate, for condemnation or forfeiture, for
enforcement of a lien which may attain priority over
...
this Security Instrument or to enforce laws or
regulations), or (c) Borrower [**37] has abandoned the
Transfer of Rights in the Property
Property, then Lender may do and pay for whatever is
This Security Instrument secures to Lender: (i) the reasonable or appropriate to protect Lender’s interest in
repayment of the Loan, and all renewals, extensions the Property and rights under this Security Instrument,
and modifications of the Note; and (ii) the performance including protecting and/or assessing the value of the
of Borrower’s covenants and agreements under this Property, and securing and/or repairing the Property.
Security Instrument and the Note. For this purpose, Lender’s actions can include, but are not limited to: (a)
Borrower does hereby mortgage, grant and convey to paying any sums secured by a lien which has priority
MERS (solely as nominee for Lender and Lender’s over this Security Instrument; (b) appearing in court;
12
We here refer specifically to Form Nos. 3200 and 3039 containing the further designation ″Single Family - Fannie Mae/Freddie Mac
UNIFORM INSTRUMENT and UNIFORM INSTRUMENT WITH MERS attached as Exhibit ″A1″ to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to
Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Summary Judgment.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *556; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **37
and (c) paying reasonable attorneys’ fees to protect its successor Loan Servicer and are not assumed by the
interest in the Property and/or rights under this Security Note purchaser unless otherwise provided by the Note
Instrument, including its secured position in a purchaser.
bankruptcy proceeding. ... ...
... (Emphasis in original)
20. Sale of Note; Change of Loan Servicer; Notice of It therefore appears obvious from all of the foregoing, that
Grievance. The Note or a partial interest in the Note whether effectuated via a writing or a mere ″transfer of
(together with this Security Instrument) can be sold one possession″ of a note, the result is the same by operation of
or more times without prior notice to Borrower. A sale law - an interest in and/or title to the property which secures
might result in a change in the entity (known as the it has been assigned and conveyed from one party to another
″Loan Servicer″) that collects Periodic Payments due under Pennsylvania law.13 As to the requirement of a
under the Note and this Security Instrument and writing, 21 P.S. §623-1 14 is crystal clear: ″Hereafter no
performs [*557] other mortgage loan servicing assignment of any mortgage shall be entered of record in
obligations under the Note, this Security Instrument, any county of the second class, unless [**39] such
and Applicable Law. There also might be one or more assignment shall be in writing, and acknowledged by the
changes of the Loan Servicer [**38] unrelated to a sale assignor or assignors before an officer or person duly
of the Note. If there is a change of the Loan Servicer, authorized to take such acknowledgments.″ Accordingly, in
Borrower will be given written notice of the change answer to Defendants’ question No. 2 as formulated in its
which will state the name and address of the new Loan motion papers, we now hereby find that the Pennsylvania
Servicer, the address to which payments should be Recording Act does in fact require the transfer of secured
made and any other information RESPA requires in debt to first be documented in a form suitable for recording
connection with a notice of transfer of servicing. If the and then recorded in the land records because it creates in
Note is sold and thereafter the Loan is serviced by a the transferee an equitable interest in the mortgage.15
Loan Servicer other than the purchaser of the Note, the
mortgage loan servicing obligations to Borrower will [*558] We endeavor now to answer Defendants’ first and
remain with the Loan Servicer or be transferred to a third questions and to confront what is perhaps the most
13
This is essentially the same conclusion which the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Kentucky very recently reached in
Higgins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, LP, Civ. A. No. 12-cv-183-KKC, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43274 (E.D. KY March 31, 2014).
While the Higgins case obviously required construction of Kentucky law, specifically, KRS 382.360(3), the similarities between that case
and this one are striking given the direction contained in the Kentucky statute - ″[when a mortgage is assigned to another person, the
assignee shall file the assignment for recording with the county clerk within thirty days of the assignment...″ Thus the Court in Higgins
framed the [**40] issue there presented as ″whether, under Kentucky law, when a MERS member assigns a promissory note to another
MERS member, that note assignment effects an assignment of the mortgage that must be recorded.″ 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS at *7. And,
recognizing that a note assignment may not be a physical document since a note can be assigned simply by delivery to the assignee, the
Court concluded: ″Thus where a secured note is assigned by delivering the note to the assignee, the assigment of the mortgage that occurs
by operation of law should be recorded as provided in Kentucky’s recording statutes.″ 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 43274, at *21-*22.
14
Statutes which apply to the same persons or things or to the same class of persons or things are in pari materia and should be
construed together if possible as one statute. 1 Pa. C.S. §1932(a), (b); Holland v. Marcy, 584 Pa. 195, 206, 883 A.2d 449, 456 (2005).
See also, Roberts v. Estate of Pursley, 1998 PA Super. LEXIS 2869, 718 A.2d 837, 841 (1998)(″we adopt the theory that sections 351
and 444 of Title 21 must be read together.″)
15
We believe this conclusion is further supported by the language of 21 P.S. §444, which provides in relevant part:
All deeds and conveyances, which, [**41] from and after the passage of this act, shall be made and executed within
this commonwealth of or concerning any lands, tenements or hereditaments in this commonwealth, or whereby
the title to the same may be in any way affected in law or equity, shall be acknowledged by the grantor, or grantors,
bargainor or bargainors, or proved by one or more of the subscribing witnesses thereto, before one of the judges of the
supreme court or before one of the judges of the court of common pleas, or recorder of deeds, prothonotary, or clerk of any
court of record, justice of the peace, or notary public of the county wherein said conveyed lands lie, and shall be recorded
in the office for the recording of deeds where such lands, tenements or hereditaments are lying and being, within ninety
days after the execution of such deeds or conveyance... (emphasis supplied).
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *558; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **39
challenging issue in this case: whether the MERS Defendants subsidiary of MERSCORP. MERSCORP operates the
have been the transferor or transferee of unrecorded secured MERS ® system and membership in the MERS ®
debt and if not, whether they are the proper parties who are System and members are governed by the MERS ®
subject to the mandates contained in the recording System Rules of Membership. It is MERS that serves
[**42] statutes. as the mortgagee of record in the public land
records as the ″nominee″ for a lender (noteholder)
E. MERS as ″Nominee″ and its successors and assigns. (Emphasis added)
And, under MERS Rule 8, Section 2(a),16
The MERS Defendants have repeatedly taken the position
that, in commencing the instant action, Plaintiffs sued the [*559] If a Member chooses to conduct foreclosures in
wrong parties because ″MERS has not and does not the name of Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems,
negotiate or transfer promissory notes secured by mortgages Inc., the note must be endorsed in blank and in
recorded in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.″ (MERS’ possession of one of the Member’s MERS certifying
Memorandum of Law in Support of Their Motion for officers. If the investor so allows, then MERS can be
Summary Judgment, at p. 44). More particularly, MERS designated as the note-holder.
argues:
Thus, in apparent contradiction to its argument, MERS at
But there is no circumstance and no amount of wild least initially acknowledges that it in fact is ″involved with
speculation that could lead the Court to conclude that the transfer of the note″ by virtue of its service as the
Section 351 mandates that a person or entity who did mortgagee of record as the nominee for a lender/noteholder
not buy the note, did not sell the note, and was not in and its successors and assigns and that when required to
any way involved with the transfer of the note, either as facilitate a foreclosure, MERS itself can become a
an assignor or as an assignee, is the person or entity that ″note-holder.″
Section 351 mandates is responsible for documenting
and then recording note transfers or other changes in The relationship between the MERS Defendants (″MERS″)
ownership of debt. and its members is more particularly described by William
C. Hultman, the Vice President of [**45] Legislative Affairs
(MERS’ Memo of Law in Support of Motion for Summary for MERSCORP and a former officer of MERS, in his
Judgment at p. 45). Declaration which is attached to Defendants’ Memorandum
of Law in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment as
At first blush, this argument appears compelling. However, Exhibit ″A.″ According to Mr. Hultman,
now that it is clear that transfer of the note by operation of
law also transfers the mortgage, the argument loses much of 6. In regard to the mortgage or security instrument, the
its original luster. What’s more, as recited in the MERS borrower and lender contractually agree to designate
Defendants’ Memorandum [**43] of Law in Support of MERS as the mortgagee (as the nominee for the lender
Their Motion for Summary Judgment at page 10: and the lender’s successors and assigns) such that legal
title to the lender’s (and its successors and assigns)
Defendants are MERSCORP Holdings, Inc. secured interests in the property are held by MERS on
(″MERSCORP″) and Mortgage Electronic Registration behalf of subsequent transferees of the promissory note.
Systems, Inc. (″MERS″). MERS is a wholly owned MERS serves as the mortgagee of record on a mortgage,
16
Attached [**44] as Exhibit ″A15″ to Plaintiff’s Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment and in
Support of Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment. See also, Exhibit ″A16″ to Plaintiff’s Memorandum, Deposition
testimony of R.K. Arnold, in Trent v. MERS, Case No. 3:06CV-374-J-32HTS in the U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Florida,
Jacksonville Division, at p. 67, 76-77, 81-82, 112-113 on 9/25/06; Plaintiff’s Exhibit ″A17,″ Deposition testimony of William C. Hultman
in Henderson v. MERS, Case No. CV 2008-900805 in the Circuit Court of Montgomery County, AL, dated 11/11/09, pp. 62-63, 108,
109-112, 114-116). It does appear, however, that in March 2013 these rules were altered such that under the current procedure governing
foreclosures, an assignment from MERS to the foreclosing party or whoever will be foreclosing must first be recorded in the public land
records. MERS no longer undertakes foreclosure proceedings in its own name. (Hultman Deposition, Plaintiff’s Memorandum, Exhibit
″A13,″ at pp. 62-65).
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *559; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **45
as the nominee (i.e., agent) for the lender and for the We likewise reject the proposition that MERS is not subject
lender’s successors and assigns, who are members of to liability because it is only an agent for its member-lenders.
the MERS ® System. Indeed, as a general matter, an ″agent″ is a ″person
authorized by another (principal) to act for or in place of
...
him; one intrusted with another’s business.″ BLACK’S
9. From time to time, MERS assigns the MERS LAW DICTIONARY 63 (6th ed. 1990). An agent holds the
Mortgages. In such instances, MERS is the assignor of power to alter the legal relations between the principal and
the MERS Mortgage, and it is a MERS Signing Officer third persons. Tribune-Review Publishing Co. v.
who signs the assignment of the MERS Mortgage Westmoreland County Housing Authority, 574 Pa. 661, 675,
(″MERS Assignment of Mortgage″). Once the MERS 833 A.2d 112, 120 (2003). An agency relationship arises
Assignment of Mortgage is duly executed and delivered, when the following basic elements coalesce: there is a
the MERS Assignment of Mortgage is, as required by manifestation by the principal that the agent shall act for
the MERS ® System rules, recorded in the public, local him, the agent accepts the undertaking, and the parties
land records, [**46] and any fees imposed for recording understand that the principal [**48] is to be in control of the
the MERS Assignment of Mortgage are paid. undertaking. V-Tech Services, Inc. v. Street, 2013 PA Super.
166, 72 A.3d 270, 278 (2013)(quoting Walton v. Robert
... Wood Johnson University Hospital, 2013 Pa. Super. 108, 66
11. ... MERS’s only role is and was to serve as the A.3d 782 (2013)). The party asserting the existence of an
mortgagee on the mortgage - as the nominee (or in the agency relationship bears the burden of proving it by a fair
stead) of the lender and the lender’s successors and preponderance of the evidence. Id. (quoting Id.).
assigns, who are members of the MERS ® System. It is a basic tenet of agency law that an individual acting as
an agent for a disclosed principal is not personally liable on
... a contract between the principal and a third party unless the
agent specifically agrees to assume liability.
14. When the transfer or sale of the debt or promissory
Azarchi-Steinhauser v. Protective Life Insurance Co., 629 F.
note involves a MERS ® System member, MERS
Supp. 2d 495, 499-500 (E.D. Pa. 2009)(quoting Vernon D.
remains as the mortgagee of record and continues to act
Cox & Co. v. Giles, 267 Pa. Super. 411, 406 A.2d 1107,
as the mortgagee as the nominee for the purchaser (who
1110 (1979). Instead, the principal is liable for and bound by
is the beneficial owner of the debt or note), who is then
any acts that the agent performs with actual or implied
the lender’s successor or assign. The MERS Mortgage
authority from the principal that are within the scope of the
is not assigned because MERS remains the mortgagee
agent’s employment. Id. However, an authorized agent who
as the nominee for purchaser.
enters into a contract on behalf of a principal without
(Hultman Declaration, Exhibit ″A,″ at pp. 3-4, 5). See also, disclosing that it is acting for the principal, is personally
Deposition of William C. Hultman of October 18, 2013, at liable on the contract. Burton v. Boland, 339 Pa. Super. 444,
p. 65-66, annexed to Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Law in 446, 489 A.2d 243, 245 (1985)(citing [**49] Revere Press,
Opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment Inc. v. Blumberg, 431 Pa. 370, 246 A.2d 407 (1968) and
and in Support of Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment as Dwyer v. Rothman, 288 Pa. Super. 256, 431 A.2d 1035
Exhibit ″A13″). (1981)). See also, Strawbridge & Clothier v. Garment
Manufacturers, Inc., 189 Pa. Super. 43, 46, 149 A.2d 471,
[*560] Therefore according also to Mr. Hultman, MERS is 472 (1959)(″An agent for undisclosed principals bears the
both named as the mortgagee and acts as agent for the legal consequences of assuming liability for those
lenders - not only the lender which originates the loan to the undertakings which his principals would have undertaken,
borrower, but also those lenders to whom the note is had he made a disclosure.″); Pennsylvania Railway Co. v.
[**47] ultimately sold and transferred. It is MERS that Rothstein, 116 Pa. Super. 156, 161, 176 A. 861 (1935)(″It is
″from time to time″ will assign and record the mortgages an elemental principle of agency that to relieve himself from
over which it has charge in the public local land records and liability, an agent in dealing with a third party must not only
ensure that any associated fees therefor are paid. See also, disclose the fact of the agency, but also the name of his
Plaintiff’s Exhibit ″A10,″ MERS’ System Rules of principal.″).
Membership, Section 10, p. 45). Clearly then, MERS is As per Mr. Hultman,
involved with the transfer of the note and mortgage and we 3. MERSCORP maintains a database of the loans
find, is an appropriate party to this action. registered on the MERS ® System. The information on
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *560; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **49
the database tracks the beneficial interests in, and the responsible as an undisclosed agent of the lenders for whom
servicing rights to, the loans registered on and by the it was acting as ″nominee.″ Accordingly, we now hold that
members of the [*561] MERS ® System. It is the the MERS Defendants are proper parties who may be liable
MERS ® System members who are responsible for and for and subject to the mandates of the Pennsylvania
who report the transactions regarding the registered Recording Statutes in general and Section 351 in particular.
loans by inputting the data regarding the beneficial Defendants’ motion for summary judgment is therefore
interests in, and servicing rights to, the members’ denied as to Count I of the Complaint.
particular [**50] loans registered on the MERS ®
System. For example, if there is a transfer of the F. Plaintiff’s Claims for Unjust Enrichment and Quiet Title
beneficial interests of a loan as a result of a promissory
note being transferred, it is the MERS ® System Defendants also move for summary judgment in their favor
member (or the MERS ® System member who is the on Plaintiff’s [**52] causes of action for unjust enrichment
servicer of the loan for the transferee of those beneficial and to quiet title,17 asserting as the reasons therefor that
interests) that reports the transfer of beneficial interests Plaintiff has failed to prove the essential elements of each.
by inputting the data reflecting the transfer onto the We note at the outset that to survive a summary judgment
MERS ® System database. motion, the non-moving party is not required to prove its
Neither MERS nor MERSCORP is involved in any way case, although it must present sufficient evidence on which
in the transfer, sale, or purchase of any promissory a jury could reasonably find in its favor. See, e.g., Jakimas,
notes, and neither MERS nor MERSCORP is involved and Kaucher, both supra. [*562] After reviewing the
in reporting the transfer, sale, or purchase of any evidentiary materials in the record of this matter in the light
promissory notes by a MERS ® System member to most favorable to the plaintiff, we find that it has indeed
another MERS ® System member, or by a MERS ® mustered sufficient evidence to proceed to trial.
System member to one who is not a MERS ® System
Pursuant to Pa. R. C. P. 1061(b)(3), an action to quiet title
member.
may be brought to compel an adverse party to file, record,
cancel, surrender or satisfy [**53] of record, or admit the
(Hultman Declaration, at pp. 3-4).
validity, invalidity or discharge of, any document, obligation
Hence as Mr. Hultman’s declaration attests, the identities of or deed affecting any right, lien, title or interest in land.
the lenders for whom MERS is acting as agent are only Kean v. Forman, 2000 PA Super. 141, 752 A.2d 906, 908
revealed to other MERS members by MERS members, as (2000), appeal denied, 564 Pa. 712, 764 A.2d 1070 (2000).
″neither MERS nor MERSCORP is involved in reporting Rule 1061 was intended to be liberally construed. Brennan
the transfer, sale or purchase of any promissory notes″ by v. Shore Brothers, Inc., 380 Pa. 283, 286, 110 A.2d 401, 402
one member to another nor to anyone who is not a member. (1955).
(See also, Exhibit ″A20″ to Plaintiff’s Memorandum
[**51] of Law in Opposition to Defendant’s Motion for In our Memorandum Opinion of October 19, 2012, we held
Summary Judgment and in Support of Cross Motion for that Plaintiff had sufficiently pled a quiet title claim by
Summary Judgment, Deposition Testimony of R.K. Arnold alleging that she was a ″party in any manner interested in
in Henderson v. MERS, Case No. CV 2008-900805 in the the assignment - i.e. conveyance of mortgages recorded in
Circuit Court of Montgomery County, AL, dated 9/25/09, at the name of MERS as nominee,″ and that she had pled ″a
p. 112, lines 10-12: ″The members utilize the [MERS] pecuniary interest which is affected by whether the mortgage
system to track the note.″). That the identities of the assignments which MERS tracks are recorded.″ See, 904 F.
lenders/note holders for whom MERS is ostensibly acting as Supp. 2d at 451. The evidentiary materials produced by
agent are likewise inaccessible to licensed title agents and Plaintiff in opposition to Defendants’ Motion for Summary
consumers has also been attested. (See, Plaintiff’s Exhibits Judgment include, among other things, a statewide summary
″B,″ p.5, ″G,″ pp. 6-7 and ″H,″ p. 6). from the Pennsylvania Department of Revenue showing the
From this we conclude that ample evidence exists to support total number of instruments (deeds, mortgages and other
the argument that MERS may alternatively be held writs) recorded in each county Recorder of Deeds office and
17
We note that Defendants re-raise their previously-addressed claim that there is no private right of action to enforce §351 and again
challenge the appropriateness of permitting Plaintiff to proceed under a quiet title theory. In the absence of a showing of extraordinary
circumstances and in view of our previous rulings on this point, we reiterate that we see no need to reconsider those rulings as per the
rule of the case doctrine.
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *562; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **53
the amounts collected in recording fees for the 2011 Plaintiff Becker herself also testified that it is the obligation
calendar [**54] year and a survey prepared by the of the Recorders of Deeds to make sure that the chain of title
Philadelphia Department of Records for the period between of properties in their county is clear and complete. (See,
2000 and 2012 of the number of MERS and non-MERS Plaintiff’s Exhibit ″A9,″ Deposition of Nancy Becker dated
recorded documents, as well as a number of Affidavits from July 17, 2013, p. 48). Indeed, the Pennsylvania Superior
attorneys and former attorneys from Community Legal Court has found that ″the primary duty of the recorder of
Services, the Pennsylvania Legal Aid Network, and the deeds is to serve the public by receiving and duly recording
Housing Alliance of Pennsylvania. (See, Plaintiff’s Exhibits any recordable instruments as to serve the future necessities
″B,″ ″C,″ ″D,″ ″E″ and ″F″). As these Exhibits demonstrate, of the law,″ and that ″as the custodian of the county deed
over the last twelve years, the number of documents books, the recorder of deeds is obligated to protect the
recorded by MERS has steadily increased, while the number public in preserving the integrity of the official records of
of documents recorded by others has steadily decreased. his or her office.″ Schaeffer v. Frey, 403 Pa. Super. 560,
There has, in turn, been a corresponding decrease in the 567-568, 589 A.2d 752, 756 (1991)(internal citations
amount of recording fees collected by the county Recorders omitted). However, over the past several years, a number of
of Deeds. Inasmuch as Community Legal Services, the residents who were facing foreclosure didn’t know who
Legal Aid Network and the Housing Alliance receive much owned their mortgage or to whom they should be making
of their funding and financial support from the collection of, their [**57] mortgage payments. (Id., 66). Plaintiff attributes
inter alia, fees paid to the Recorders of Deeds offices, they this to the fact that MERS is not recording all of the note
too have suffered monetary injury. assignments with the result that not only is there a loss in
revenue, but also the land title records are incomplete to the
In addition, Plaintiff has produced reports from two of its public. (Id., 65-68, 176-177).
proposed expert witnesses with experience in forensic
Finally, Plaintiff also testified that based on a forensic audit
analysis of chain of title issues and real estate law - Marie
which revealed that a MERS-affiliated mortgage was
T. McDonnell and Charles W. Proctor, III. Ms. McDonnell
transferred on average between 4 and 12 times, she
[**55] reported on her analysis of a MERS mortgage for a
conservatively estimates that Montgomery County alone
residential property in Montgomery County which was
has lost $15.7 million in recording fees. (Id., 178-180).
originated with Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. in June,
Because we find that all of this evidence is sufficient to
2005, was securitized in late August, 2005, sold at least
demonstrate that a genuine issue of material fact exists with
three times and foreclosed in March, 2013. (See, Plaintiff’s
respect to Plaintiff’s entitlement to quiet title relief,
Exhibit ″G,″ pp. 3-5). Throughout the process, Ms.
Defendants’ motion for the entry of judgment in their favor
McDonnell found that there were five missing assignments
as a matter of law on this claim is also denied.
that should have been recorded with the Montgomery
We reach the same conclusion with regard to Plaintiff’s
County Recorder of Deeds, that the MERS Milestones data
was incomplete and in contradiction to the securitization unjust enrichment claim. A cause of action for unjust
deal documents, and that title to the property had been enrichment is a claim by which the plaintiff seeks restitution
corrupted by MERS’ failure to record a complete chain of for benefits conferred on and retained by a defendant who
title. (Exhibit ″G,″ p.7). offered no compensation in circumstances where
compensation was reasonably expected. White v. Conestoga
In his Declaration, Mr. Proctor attests that licensed title Title Insurance Co., 617 Pa. 498, 504, 53 A.3d 720, 723
agents have no access to the information in the bar codes (2012). [**58] A showing of unjust enrichment requires a
which MERS adds to every document that it records or to demonstration that: (1) a benefit was conferred on the
the MERS data base of exchanges, sales and assignments defendant; (2) appreciation of such benefits by defendant;
that [*563] MERS facilitates for the benefit of its and (3) acceptance and retention of such benefits under
customers/members. This means that title searchers and circumstances that it would be inequitable for defendant to
consumers are denied the ability to ascertain who currently retain the benefit without payment to the plaintiff. EBC, Inc.
owns the note secured by a MERS mortgage and that neither v. Clark Building Systems, Inc., 618 F.3d 253, 273 (3d Cir.
the mortgagor nor the courts can ascertain the chain of 2010); Durst v. Milroy General Contracting, 2012 PA Super.
events or [**56] the validity of a transaction. This results, 179, 52 A.3d 357, 360 (2012). Here, Plaintiff proffers the
according to Mr. Proctor, in an erosion of Pennsylvania’s videotaped deposition testimony of its former President and
land records and the inability to evaluate the marketability CEO, R.K. Arnold in Henderson v. Merscorp, Inc., et. al., a
of title and credit worthiness of the consumer. (See, similar action before the Circuit Court for Montgomery
Plaintiff’s Exhibit ″H,″ pp. 6-7). County, Alabama:
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *563; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **58
Q. ... Is it your company’s intention to supplement or declaration, whether or not further relief is or could be
assist the public land records of the several states with sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and
the MERS system to make it more clear about who effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be
owns what? reviewable as such.
A. No.
This language has been said to ″place a remedial arrow in
[*564] Q. Is it your company’s intent to supplant the the district court’s quiver,″ and to confer ″a unique and
mortgage land records of various states with its system? substantial discretion on federal courts to determine whether
to declare litigants’ rights.″ Reifer v. Westport Insurance
A. No. We layer it on top is the way to think of it.
Corp., No. 13-2880, 751 F.3d 129, 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS
Q. When you say layer it on top, explain that, please. 8014 *24 (3d Cir. Apr. 29, 2014) (quoting Wilton v. Seven
Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 286, 288, 115 S. Ct. 2137, 132 L.
A. Well, the MERS system couldn’t exist if the recording Ed. 2d 214 (1995)). Generally, the judgment in a suit for
system didn’t exist. declaratory judgment must be responsive to the pleadings
Q. But the recording system can exist [**59] without and issues presented. Westport Insurance Corp. v. Bayer,
MERS? 284 F.3d 489, 499 (3d Cir. 2002). [**61] Indeed, ″[w]hen all
is said and done,″ the Supreme Court has concluded, ″the
A. Certainly. So we are the mortgagee of record, and propriety of declaratory relief in a particular case will
there has to be a place for us to establish that. And then depend upon a circumspect sense of its fitness informed by
we track the servicer. the teachings and experience concerning the functions and
extent of federal judicial power.″ Wilton, 515 U.S. at 287,
(See, Plaintiff’s Exhibit ″A20,″ 111-112). This testimony is, 115 S. Ct. at 2143. A declaratory judgment action is
we find, essentially tantamount to an admission that by appropriate when the declaration will settle the question
maintaining the recording system in Pennsylvania, the presented and terminate the entire controversy - courts are
county recorders of deeds confer a benefit upon defendants to avoid using declaratory judgment to make abstract
which is in fact appreciated by defendants. Because determinations or to try the controversy in piecemeal
Defendants do not pay any fees when a note is transferred fashion. Pennsylvania Video Operators v. United States, 731
between its membership fee-paying members, we find that F. Supp. 717, 719 (W.D. Pa. 1990), aff’d w/o opinion,
a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether it would [*565] 919 F.2d 136 (3d Cir. 1990)(citing Maryland
be unjust to allow Defendants to retain the benefits conferred Casualty Co. v. Rosen, 445 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1971) and
on them without paying Plaintiff and the class whom she Rowland v. Tarr, 378 F. Supp. 766, 769 (E.D. Pa. 1974)).
represents therefor. Consequently, Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment as to Count III of the Complaint is also Over the years, the Third Circuit has enumerated the
denied. following factors for district courts to consider when
exercising Declaratory Judgment Act discretion. These are:
G. Plaintiff’s Cross Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(1) the likelihood that a federal court declaration will
In addition to opposing Defendants’ Motion for Summary
resolve the uncertainty of obligation which gave rise to
Judgment, Plaintiff also seeks the entry of partial judgment
the controversy;
in her favor as a matter of law pursuant to Count IV of her
Complaint and asserts that this Court should now enter an (2) the convenience of the parties;
order declaring that Defendants’ past and present failures to
(3) the [**62] public interest in settlement of the
[**60] record note assignments among its members
uncertainty of the obligation; and
constitutes a violation of Section 351 and that Defendants
have been unjustly enriched by their actions. (4) the availability and relative convenience of other
remedies.
Under the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §2201,
Reifer v. Westport Insurance Co., 2014 U.S. App. LEXIS at
(a) In a case of actual controversy within its jurisdiction, *28 (citing United States v. Pa. Dep’t of Envtl. Res., 923
... any court of the United States, upon the filing of an F.2d 1071, 1075 (3d Cir. 1991), Terra Nova Ins. Co. v. 900
appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and other Bar, Inc., 887 F.2d 1213, 1224 (3d Cir. 1989) and Bituminous
legal relations of any interested party seeking such Coal Operators’ Assoc. v. Int’l Union, United Mine Workers
16 F. Supp. 3d 542, *565; 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89222, **62
of America, 585 F.2d 586, 596 (3d Cir. 1975), abrogated on entirety and the Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial Summary
other grounds by Carbon Fuel Co. v. United Mine Workers Judgment shall be granted in part. An appropriate order
of Am., 444 U.S. 212, 100 S. Ct. 410, 62 L. Ed. 2d 394 follows.
(1979)).
ORDER
In this matter and in light of the rationale outlined in the
preceding sections of this opinion, we must concur with AND NOW, this 30th Day of June, 2014, upon
Plaintiff’s assertion that declaratory judgment is now [**65] consideration of the Motion for Summary Judgment
properly entered in her favor with regard to Count I of the of Defendants, Merscorp, Inc. and Mortgage Electronic
Complaint such that we now formally declare that the Registration Systems, Inc. (collectively ″MERS Defendants″)
assignment or transfer of a promissory note secured by a (Doc. No. 66) and Plaintiff’s Cross-Motion for Partial
mortgage on real estate is, in Pennsylvania, equivalent to a Summary Judgment (Doc. No. 80) and the parties’ further
mortgage assignment. We further declare that Defendants’ Memoranda of Law in Support and in Opposition, it is
failure to create and record documents evincing the transfers hereby ORDERED that Defendants’ Motion is DENIED in
of promissory notes secured by mortgages on real estate in its entirety and Plaintiff’s Motion is GRANTED IN PART
the Commonwealth [**63] of Pennsylvania is, was and will as outlined in the preceding Memorandum Opinion.
in the future be, in violation of the Pennsylvania Recording
law - most particularly 21 P.S. §§351.18 Plaintiff’s motion IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Declaratory Judgment is
for partial summary judgment is therefore granted as to hereby entered in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendants
Defendants’ liability under Count I with the issue of the such that Defendants’ are declared to be obligated to create
extent of the damages as a consequence of these violations and record written documents memorializing the transfers
to be addressed at the trial of this matter. of debt/promissory notes which are secured by real estate
mortgages in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania for all
We must decline to enter summary judgment in Plaintiff’s such debt transfers past, present and future in the Office for
favor as to Count III however. To be sure, while there the Recording of Deeds in the County where such property
clearly is evidence that Defendants may have been unjustly is situate.
enriched as a result of the conduct complained of, we do not
find the record to have been sufficiently developed on this IT IS STILL FURTHER ORDERED AND DECLARED
claim to allow the entry of judgment as a matter of law or that inasmuch as such debt/mortgage note transfers are
to make an award of damages at this time. Therefore, we conveyances within the meaning of Pennsylvania law, the
leave this claim to be further and finally thrashed out at trial. failure to so document and record is violative of the
So saying, Plaintiff’s motion for partial summary judgment Pennsylvania Recording Statute(s).
shall be granted in part.19
BY THE [**66] COURT:
Conclusion /s/ J. Curtis Joyner
For all of the reasons set forth above, the Defendants’ J. CURTIS JOYNER, J.
Motion for Summary [*566] Judgment shall be denied in its
18
Although not specifically pled in Plaintiff’s complaint, for the reasons given previously in this Memorandum Opinion, Sections 444,
621 and 623-1 appear to also have been violated.
19
While it is not entirely clear from the briefing whether Plaintiff is likewise seeking [**64] the entry of summary judgment in the
form of permanent injunctive relief, we would deny that relief as well. A plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a
four-factor test before a court may grant such relief. Ebay Inc. v. Mercexchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839, 164
L. Ed. 2d 641 (2006). Specifically, a plaintiff must demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available
at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that considering the balance of hardships between
the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not disserved by a permanent
injunction. Id. Indeed, among the remedies sought by Plaintiff is an award of monetary damages. So saying, we cannot find that judgment
would be properly now entered in her favor on this equitable claim.
Case: 14-4315 Document: 003111912092 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/23/2015
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_________________________________________
No. 14-4315
_________________________________________
MONTGOMERY COUNTY, PENNSYLVANIA, RECORDER OF DEEDS, by
and through NANCY J. BECKER, in her official capacity as the Recorder of
Deeds of Montgomery County, Pennsylvania,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MERSCORP, INC., and MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC
REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.
Defendants-Appellants.
_________________________________________
Appeal from the July 11, 2014 decision of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania Civil Action No. 11-CV-06968
(Honorable Curtis Joyner) certified for interlocutory appeal on
September 8, 2014
_________________________________________
BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE THE LEGAL SERVICES CENTER
OF HARVARD LAW SCHOOL AND LAW PROFESSORS
IN SUPPORT OF THE APPELLEE
_________________________________________
MAX WEINSTEIN
CHARLES CARRIERE
K-SUE PARK
LEGAL SERVICES CENTER OF
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL
120 Boylston Street
Jamaica Plain, MA
(617) 390-2694
March 16, 2015
i
Case: 14-4315 Document: 003111912092 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/23/2015
CORPORATE DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
The Legal Services Center is a program of Harvard Law School at Harvard
University, a 501(c)(3) non-profit organization. No party, party’s counsel, nor any
person other than the amicus curiae authored any part of the brief, nor contributed
money intended to fund preparing or submitting the brief.
ii
Case: 14-4315 Document: 003111912092 Page: 3 Date Filed: 03/23/2015
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT OF INTEREST………………………………………………........... 1
ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED………………………………………………………. 1
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT…………………………………………………….. 1
ARGUMENT………………………………………………...................................... 4
I. MERS is a departure from and disruption of the traditional recording
practices, upon which it relies…………………………............................. 4
A. Prior to MERS, records of real property interests were public,
transparent, and provided a secure foundation upon which the
American economy could grow……………………………………. 4
B. MERS was created to reduce costs for sellers of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS)………………………………………................... 6
C. The MERS structure substitutes the MERS name for that of the
mortgage lender in the county registry……………………............. 8
D. MERS privatized and made the documentation of transfers of
mortgage notes optional, discouraging the mortgage industry from
maintaining complete records of actual holders of interests in real
property……………………………………….................................. 10
E. MERS interferes with Pennsylvania’s requirement that purported
assignees prove their relationship to the original lender in order to
foreclose……………………………………………………………. 12
F. MERS lacks legal authority and public accountability…................. 12
G. MERS acts as a placeholder in the traditional recording system,
and cannot function without that system ……………………......... 17
II. MERS helped precipitate the foreclosure crisis and left homeowners
without recourse to protect their property
rights……………………………... 18
A. MERS facilitated the securitization of subprime loans……………..18
B. MERS increased the costs of enforcing property rights and left
homeowners without recourse to challenge wrongful
foreclosures....................................................................................... 21
C. Surveys, audits and public media have exposed the inaccuracy of
records in the MERS database……………………………………... 22
D. Court proceedings and federal agency investigations have exposed
the inaccuracy of records in the MERS database………..………….24
E. MERS’s inaccuracy affects not only the properties for which it
is named as mortgagee, but all properties adjoining those
properties……………………………………………………………26
iii
Case: 14-4315 Document: 003111912092 Page: 4 Date Filed: 03/23/2015
CONCLUSION……………………………………………………………………... 26
CERTIFICATES ………………………………………………………………........ 28
iv
Case: 14-4315 Document: 003111912092 Page: 5 Date Filed: 03/23/2015
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Scholarly Authorities Page(s)
Ann M. Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. Rev. 249 (1999)……………….. 7
M. Mark Heekin, Modernizing Mortgage Foreclosure Law: A Call for
Transparency and an End to the Payment Rule,
33 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 165 (2014)………………………………………. 5-6, 21-22
Adam J. Levitin, The Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the
Uncertainty of Mortgage Title,
63 Duke L.J. 637 (2013)………………………………………………..... 14, 15, 21
Gloria J. Liddell and Pearson Liddell, Jr., Robo Signers: The Legal Quagmire of
Invalid Residential Foreclosure Proceedings and the Resultant Potential Impact
Upon Stakeholders, 16 Chap. L. Rev. 367 (2012) ……...……………………….. 21
Tanya Marsh, Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording
System, 111 Colum. L. Rev. 19 (Sidebar) (2011)……… ………………………. 21
Grant S. Nelson and Dale A. Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law (5th ed.
2007)………………………………………………………………………………. 5
Joyce D. Patton and Carroll G. Palomar, Patton and Palomar on Land Titles (3d ed.
2003)………………………………………………………...…………………….. 6
Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces: Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic
System’s Land Title Theory,
53 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 111 (2011)…………………….…………9, 11, 18, 24, 26
Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime Mortgage Lending, and the
Mortgage Electronic Registration System,
78 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1359 (2010)……………………………………..4, 5-6, 8, 17-21
Powell on Real Property (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2007)…………………………5
Joseph Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality,
46 Conn .L. Rev. 497 (2013)……………………………………………………...14
v
Case: 14-4315 Document: 003111912092 Page: 6 Date Filed: 03/23/2015
Laura A. Steven, MERS and the Mortgage Crisis: Obfuscating Loan Ownership
and the Need for Clarity, 7 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 251 (2012)………... 15
Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States
(1833)……………………………………………………………………………… 4
Herbert T. Tiffany and Basil Jones, Tiffany on Real Property
(1939)........................................................................................................................ 5
Alan M. White, Losing the Paper- Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and
Consumer Protection,
24 Loy. Consumer L. Rev. 468 (2012)……………………………………........... 23
David Woolley and Lisa Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects of Lost Chain of
Title on Real Property Owners,
8 Hastings Bus. L J. 365 (2012)……………………………………………… 26-27
Caryl A. Yzenbaard, Residential Real Estate Transactions
(1991). ……………………………………………..……………………………… 5
Public Media and Industry Literature
R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS,
11-Aug. Prob. & Prop. 32 (1997). …………………………………………...8-9, 17
R.K. Arnold, Viewpoint,
INSIDE MERS 1 (Jan. Feb. 2004).……………………………………………….20
Arnold Deposition 176-80 (September 25, 2009), on file with the author and
available at …………..…………………………………….11
R.K. Arnold (prepared statement), Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation,
and Other Issues in Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on
Housing and Comty. Opportunity of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs.,
111th Cong. 103-04 (2010) ……………….. …………………………………...…10
Kate Berry, Foreclosures Turn Up Heat on MERS,
Am. Banker 1 (July 10, 2007). …………………………………………………...20
vi
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Worth Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed
Shop, Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, Wall St. J. Online, available at
(last
visited March 13, 2015) ………………………………………... 24
Memorandum from Covington & Burling to R.K. Arnold, President and CEO,
MERSCORP, Inc. (Sept. 1, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law Journal)…………14
Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and Office of Thrift
Supervision, Interagency Review of Foreclosure Policies and Practices 10-11
(2011)…………………………………………………………………………….. 26
Failed Bank List, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), available at

(last visited March 13, 2015)......………………………………………………… 24
Mike McIntire, Tracking Loans Through a Firm that Holds Millions,
N.Y. Times, April 23, 2009, at B1. …………………………………………....... 21
MERS Registers 10 Million Loans, Inside MERS 1 (Nov./Dec. 2002)…….….... 20
MERS Registers 20 Million Loans, Inside MERS 1 (Jan./Feb. 2004)………..…. 20
MERS Procedures Manual (v. 27.0), available at .………...………… 9, 12-13
MERS Rules of Membership, available at ……………………..… 13
Moody’s Investors Service, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc.
(MERS): Its Impact on the Credit Quality of First-Mortgage Jumbo MBS
Transactions, Structured Finance Special (April 30, 1999)…………………...…..19
Carson Mullen, MERS: Tracking Loans Electronically,
60:8 Mortgage Banking 62 (May 31, 2000). …………………………………19, 20
Michael Powell and Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your
Loan, N.Y. Times, March 6, 2011, at BU1. ………………………………..... 24-25
Property deed ready for book entry,
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19.3 National Mortgage News 20 (Oct. 17, 1994)……………….……………….14
Phyllis K. Slesinger and Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration
System, 31 Idaho L. Rev. 805 (1995)………………………………………7-8, 13
Cases
Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services of Nebraska,
826 F.Supp 2d 352 (D. Mass 2011).………………………………………………12
Escher v. Decision One Mortgage Co.,
369 B.R. 862 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007). ………………………………………..16
HSBC Bank USA v. Eslava,
No. 1-2008-CA-055313 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2010).……………………………..25
Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler,
40 Kan. App. 2d 325 (2008).……………………………………………………...16
Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler,
216 P.3d 158, 165–66 (2009) …………………………………………………….17
Statutes
21 Penn. Stat. § 351……………………………………………………………... 6
Pa. R. C. P. 1147 (a)(1) ………………………………………………………….. 12
U.C.C. § 8 (1994). ………………………………………………………………. 16
U.C.C. § 9 (1994).……………………………………………………………….. 14
15 U.S.C. § 78 (2010).…………………………………………………………… 16
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STATEMENT OF INTEREST
All parties have consented to the filing of this brief.
The Legal Services Center (LSC), part of Harvard Law School’s clinical
program, is a legal services office staffed by Harvard Law School faculty. LSC’s
clinical faculty offer courses on a range of consumer law topics, including
mortgage law, consumer bankruptcy, and student loan law. Instructors also
supervise students as part of a client services clinic, and many of LSC’s cases
involve representation of homeowners facing foreclosure on the basis of MERS
loans. LSC’s academic role and direct experience with MERS informs its views on
MERS practices.
Rebecca Tushnet is a Professor of Law at Georgetown Law. She teaches
property law and she has written extensively about consumer protection issues.
Joseph William Singer is Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard Law School.
He writes scholarly articles on property law theory, including an analysis of the
ways the MERS system conflicts with the traditional legal infrastructure of the
American private property system.
David Reiss is a Professor of Law and Research Director at the Center for
Urban Business Entrepreneurship at Brooklyn Law School. He writes scholarly
articles on real estate finance and consumer financial services.
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Melanie Leslie is Vice Dean and Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law at Yeshiva University. She teaches property, trusts and estates, and
nonprofit law.
The above parties submit this brief supporting the Appellee and respectfully
request that the District Court’s Declaratory Judgment be upheld.
ISSUE TO BE ADDRESSED
Is MERS an appropriate and reliable substitute for county-based recording
systems, such as exists in Montgomery County through Appellee’s Office of the
Recorder of Deeds, which have traditionally served as a public basis for
ascertaining, enforcing and ensuring the orderly transfer of rights in real property?
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
MERS represents a major departure from and grave disruption of recording
practices in counties such as Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, that have
traditionally ensured the orderly transfer of real property across the country. Prior
to MERS, records of real property interests were public, transparent, and provided
a secure foundation upon which the American economy could grow. MERS is a
privately run recording system created to reduce costs for large investment banks,
the “sell-side” of the mortgage industry, which is largely inaccessible to the public.
MERS is recorded as the mortgage holder in traditional county records, as a
“nominee” for the holder of the mortgage note. Meanwhile, the promissory note
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secured by the mortgage is pooled, securitized, and transferred multiple times, but
MERS does not require that its members enter these transfers into its database.
MERS is a system that is “grafted” onto the traditional recording system and could
not exist without it, but it usurps the function of county recorders and eviscerates
the system recorders are charged with maintaining.
The MERS system was modeled after the Depository Trust Company
(DTC), an institution created to hold corporate and municipal securities, but, unlike
the DTC, MERS has no statutory basis, nor is it regulated by the SEC. MERS’s
lack of statutory grounding and oversight means that it has neither legal authority
nor public accountability. By allowing its members to transfer mortgages from
MERS to themselves without any evidence of ownership, MERS dispensed with
the traditional requirement that purported assignees prove their relationship to the
mortgagee of record with a complete chain of mortgage assignments, in order to
foreclose. MERS thereby eliminated the rules that protected the rights of mortgage
holders and homeowners. Surveys, government audits, reporting by public media,
and court cases from across the country have revealed that MERS’s records are
inaccurate, incomplete, and unreliable. Moreover, because MERS does not allow
public access to its records, the full extent of its system’s destruction of chains of
title and the clarity of entitlements to real property is not yet known.
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Electronic and paper recording systems alike can contain errors and
inconsistencies. Electronic systems have the potential to increase the accessibility
and accuracy of public records, but MERS has not done this. Rather, by making
recording of mortgage assignments voluntary, and cloaking its system in secrecy, it
has introduced unprecedented and perhaps irreparable levels of opacity,
inaccuracy, and incompleteness, wreaking havoc on the local title recording
systems that have existed in America since colonial times.
ARGUMENT
I. MERS is a departure from and disruption of the traditional recording
practices upon which it relies.
A. Prior to MERS, records of real property interests were public,
transparent, and provided a secure foundation upon which the
American economy could grow.
The land title records system has ensured the orderly transfer of American
property entitlements and provided a secure platform for private commerce since
colonial times. Since the earliest period of British settlement in America, land
secured the loans upon which the American economy flourished. Joseph Story,
Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States § 182, 164 (1833). The
objective of recording laws was then, as it is now, to prevent disputes over
property rights, to facilitate the enforcement of property rights and the resolution of
disputes that nonetheless arise. Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime
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Mortgage Lending, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. Cin.
L. Rev. 1359, 1364-65 (2010) [hereinafter Foreclosure].
For over three hundred years, mortgage records were held as part of the
public land title records in the county where mortgaged land was located. M. Mark
Heekin, Modernizing Mortgage Foreclosure Law: A Call for Transparency and an
End to the Payment Rule, 33 Quinnipiac L. Rev. 165, 193 (2014). As early as
1639, the Connecticut General Court insisted that “all bargaines or mortgages of
land whatsoever shall be accounted of no value until they be recorded.” 14 Powell
on Real Property § 82.01[1][b] (Michael Allen Wolf ed., 2007) (sic). By the time
of the Revolution, mortgagees that failed to record their mortgages or assignments
risked losing the ability to enforce the terms of their loans. Herbert T. Tiffany and
Basil Jones, Tiffany on Real Property § 1457 (1939); Caryl A. Yzenbaard,
Residential Real Estate Transactions § 5:7 (1991); Grant S. Nelson and Dale A.
Whitman, Real Estate Finance Law § 5.34 (5th ed. 2007). A transparent public
record of entitlements in real property has provided certainty in private bargains
and a collective reference point that protects communities from commercial chaos
after disasters like floods, earthquakes, fire, and hurricanes. Peterson, Foreclosure,
supra 4 at 1365. The establishment of a public recording act in each state has
thereby long protected all parties holding or dealing in interests in land, and
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constituted “[t]he cornerstone of America’s legal tradition of transparency of
landholding interests.” Id.
Accordingly, since 1717, Pennsylvania law has mandated that “[a]ll deeds,
conveyances, contracts, and other instruments of writing wherein it shall be the
intention of the parties executing the same to grant, bargain, sell, and convey any
lands, tenements, or hereditaments situate in this Commonwealth … shall be
recorded in the office for the recording of deeds in the county where such lands,
tenements, and hereditaments are situate.” 21 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 351 (West). 1 Joyce
D. Patton and Carroll G. Palomar, Patton and Palomar on Land Titles § 4, n. 7 (3d
ed. 2003). Prior to MERS, the public recording system, maintained by County
Recorders such as Appellee Nancy Becker, provided a public forum in which
parties recorded legally operative documents pertaining to transfers of interests in
real property. Through the simple but essential service of recording the name of a
person or entity that originated a mortgage loan, any party that subsequently sought
to purchase a mortgage note could ascertain that a seller possessed the interest he
claimed by verifying that his chain of title was complete and derived from the
original lender. Heekin, supra 5 at 190. The burden lay upon a party seeking to
foreclose to confirm the interest it claimed to hold by showing that same unbroken
chain of title.
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B. MERS was created to reduce costs for sellers of mortgage-backed
securities (MBS).
From its planning stages, MERS was conceived as a way of reducing costs
for sellers of mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In 1970, the Federal National
Mortgage Association (Fannie Mae), the Federal Home Loan Mortgage
Corporation (Freddie Mac), and the Government National Mortgage Association
(Ginnie Mae), radically changed mortgage lending relationships by originating the
creation and sale of mortgage backed securities (MBS)—pools of mortgages, or
bonds secured by such pools, for which they sold fractional interests. Ann M.
Burkhart, Lenders and Land, 64 Mo. L. Rev. 249 (1999). By the mid-1990s, more
than three-quarters of new single-family residential mortgages were being
securitized, and Fannie Mae had become the largest corporation in the United
States, with assets exceeding $351 billion. Id.
As trade in MBS burgeoned and the costs of securitization increased, the
industry sought a means of escaping the “terribly cumbersome” and “costly”
process of executing and recording mortgage assignments. Phyllis K. Slesinger and
Daniel McLaughlin, Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 31 Idaho L. Rev.
805, 808 (1995). The MERS concept originated in October, 1993, when an
industry group comprised of representatives from Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac,
Ginnie Mae, and the Mortgage Bankers’ Association of America (MBA),
published a “white paper” proposing the MERS concept to solicit comments from
7
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the real estate finance industry. Id. at 810-11. In June 1994, these parties formed a
Steering Committee and commissioned a study by Ernst & Young, LLP. Mortgage
banking companies made initial capital contributions to incorporate MERS, Inc.
Peterson, Foreclosure, supra 4 at n.61.
In 1995, MBA executives who led the establishment of MERS wrote that
MERS would apply “information technology to reduce processing costs.”
Slesinger and McLaughlin, supra 7 at 807. At the time, standard investor
guidelines required that the industry record assignments from the originating
lender to a wholesaler, from the wholesaler to the Seller, and from the Seller to the
Buyer. Meanwhile, an average lender/buyer was “acquiring a $550 million
portfolio of servicing through a bulk purchase of mortgages with an average loan
balance [of] $125,000.” Id. at 809. Estimating the recordation costs for portfolios
this size, MBA executives calculate at the time that “[a]ssuming that the portfolio
has 4,400 loans and that recordation is $10 for each loan… the cost of the three
recordations alone would be $132,000.” Id. at 810. Furthermore, because investors
would have to pay to prepare documents, track the return of recorded assignments
and possibly rerecord, to correct errors, they concluded that “[o]ver the life of a
loan, the current environment is very costly to the industry.” Id. In 1997, then-CEO
of MERS, Inc. R.K. Arnold wrote, “[e]stimates are that MERS will save the
mortgage industry $200 million a year by eliminating the need for many
8
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assignments.” R.K. Arnold, Yes, There is Life on MERS, 11 Prob. & Prop. 33, 35
(1997).
C. The MERS structure substitutes the MERS name for the mortgage
lender in the county registry.
After originating a mortgage loan, a lender registers the mortgage under the
MERS name in the county recorder’s office. Christopher L. Peterson, Two Faces:
Demystifying the Mortgage Electronic System’s Land Title Theory, 53 Wm. &
Mary L. Rev. 111, 116 (2011) [hereinafter Two Faces]. MERS, who is named
“solely as nominee,” remains the mortgagee even after subsequent transfers of the
mortgage note. Id. These subsequent transfers are not recorded in the public
registry. Rather, MERS operates a private database and mortgage servicers may
voluntarily report changes in “beneficial interests” and servicing rights for
individual mortgages. See MERS Procedures Manual (v. 27) at 88-91.1
Consequently, MERS removes the incentives for its members to retain and
aggregate the legal documentation pertaining to such transfers for any given piece
of property, astronomically increasing both the likelihood of broken chains of title
and the difficulty of detecting fraudulent claims in the absence of documentation
showing the legitimacy of prior transfers.
1
Available at .
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When a subsequent holder of the note wishes to foreclose, MERS ostensibly
transfers the mortgage to that party. However, in actuality, that party assumes the
MERS identity to transfer the mortgage to itself. MERS operates by allowing
employees of mortgage servicers, originators, debt collectors, and foreclosure law
firms to enter their own names on a webpage that certifies them as assistant
secretaries or vice-presidents of MERS for a low fee. Peterson, Two Faces, supra
p. 9, at 120; Robo-Signing, Chain of Title, Loss Mitigation, and Other Issues in
Mortgage Servicing: Hearing Before the Subcommittee on Housing and Comty.
Opportunity of the H. Comm. On Fin. Servs., 111th Cong. 103-04 (2010) (prepared
statement of R.K. Arnold, MERSCORP Inc. President and Chief Executive
Officer). MERS itself has under fifty employees, but over 20,000 such secretaries
and vice presidents, who are not employees of MERS, and do not know simple
facts about the company, such as where it is located or who its president is. Id.
D. MERS privatized and made the documentation of transfers of
mortgage notes optional, discouraging the mortgage industry from
maintaining complete records of actual holders of interests in real
property.
The planners of MERS heralded MERS as an electronic system that would
more accurately and efficiently record information about successive interests in
property. See Slesinger and McLaughlin, supra p. 9, at 806 (“Advanced technology
has come to the residential mortgage industry… mortgage lending is being
reengineered to reduce costs and deliver a better product”); Arnold, Life on MERS,
10
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supra p. 8, at 33 (“MERS is the result of an industry effort to reduce the need for
mortgage assignments in the residential mortgage market and thus increase
efficiency and reduce costs”). They also emphasized the need for careful recording
while they sought to garner support for the project: before MERS was launched,
the Senior Director and Director of Technology Initiatives of the MBA wrote that
“[c]learinghouse rules will have to be carefully developed to assure the protection
of the mortgage rights of participants.” Slesinger and McLaughlin, supra 7 at 808.
However, MERS did not develop reliable clearinghouse rules to provide
such protection. Rather, it has introduced unprecedented opacity and
incompleteness to the record of interests in real estate. First, MERS makes it
possible to keep transfers of a mortgage note private once a mortgage is recorded
under its name in a county registry, because access to MERS is restricted to its
members. The public has no way of identifying the actual owner of a lien on a
property and therefore, of holding lenders and investors accountable for errors or
fraud.
Moreover, MERS enables incomplete record-keeping by making it voluntary
for its members to update information on the MERS database. It does not compel
financial institutions to record changes in ownership rights of mortgages, or
penalize them for failures to do so. Arnold Deposition 176-80 (September 25,
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2009).2 MERS does not keep digital or hard copies of documents embodying
agreements through which the beneficial ownership interest in a loan changes
hands. Id.; Peterson, Two Faces, supra 8 at 126. Nothing binds MERS members to
keep accurate records concerning the beneficial ownership interests of loans, on
the MERS database or independently. Moreover, MERS makes no representations
or warranties regarding the accuracy or reliability of its database. See generally
MERS Procedures Manual, supra p. 12. Simply put, “MERS is the Wikipedia of
land registration systems.” Culhane v. Aurora Loan Services. 826 F. Supp. 2d 352
(D. Mass. 2011) aff'd, 708 F.3d 282 (1st Cir. 2013).
E. MERS interferes with Pennsylvania’s requirement that purported
assignees prove their relationship to the original lender in order to
foreclose.
MERS has also obstructed foreclosing plaintiffs’ ability to comply with the
requirements for initiating a foreclosure action under Pennsylvania law. The
Pennsylvania Rules of Civil Procedure require a foreclosure plaintiff to set forth in
its complaint “the parties to and the date of the mortgage, and of any assignments,
and a statement of the place of record of the mortgage and assignments.” Pa. R. C.
P. 1147 (a)(1) (emphasis added). However, in direct contravention of these
requirements, MERS never requests or possesses proof that one of its members in
fact holds the mortgage note or is the agent of the note holder when that member
2
Available at https://www.dropbox.com/s/hzrzapyxa7bogw5/MERS-DEPO-OF-CEO-RK-
Arnold-2009.pdf?dl=0.
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seeks to foreclose. Rather, it allows its member’s certifying officer to assign the
mortgage at will, without reviewing the records to confirm that the party receiving
the transfer is entitled to enforce the mortgage. MERS Rules of Membership 29-
34;4 MERS Procedures 124-25.5 MERS possesses no legal authority to create
special rules that absolve its members of the Pennsylvania state requirement, which
non-MERS institutions continue to observe, that entities seeking to foreclose must
plead and prove a recorded full chain of title.
F. MERS lacks legal authority and public accountability.
The creators of MERS did not lobby Congress for a uniform, electronic
mortgage system that could have retained the public recording system’s
transparency and reduced costs. Rather, without judicially or statutorily recognized
legal authority, they independently launched MERS as a private system, and
created legal theories to legitimate the system post facto. In Professor Joseph
Singer’s words, MERS allowed banks “to be prolific about securitizing those
mortgages but complacent about formalizing mortgage assignments. The result
was that the banks made many, many mistakes in keeping track of these
transactions. Formal records of mortgage transfers are often incomplete or
incorrect; the chain of title for many properties appears to be irretrievably broken.”
4
Available at .
5
Available at .
13
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Joseph Singer, Foreclosure and the Failures of Formality, 46 Conn. L. Rev. 497,
503-04 (2013).
MERS stands on agency-law principles, which, as Professor Adam Levitin
of Georgetown Law notes, raise numerous questions in the context of mortgage
loans. No provisions specifying the bounds of agency law exist in state mortgage
recordation statutes, as for security interests in personalty.6 Adam J. Levitin, The
Paper Chase: Securitization, Foreclosure, and the Uncertainty of Mortgage Title,
63 Duke L.J. 637, 680 (2013).
From its earliest stages, the creators of MERS were aware that differences in
states’ real-property law would affect MERS’s validity. Daniel McLaughlin,
director of technology for MBA, acknowledged in 1994 that the mortgage industry
“faced unique problems that the securities industry did not have,” namely that
“[w]e have fifty states with their own systems and laws that we have to comply
with.” Property Deed Ready for Book Entry, 19.3 Nat’l Mortgage News 20 (Oct.
17, 1994). Nevertheless, MERS conducted no fifty-state analysis of the potential
impact of its operations. Memorandum from Covington & Burling to R.K. Arnold,
President and CEO, MERSCORP, Inc. (Sept. 1, 1997) (on file with the Duke Law
Journal). MERS’s attempt to establish “facts on the ground supporting its existence
6
The U.C.C. expressly permits the recording of financing statements for security interests in
personalty in the name of a “representative of the secured party”; failure to indicate this
representative capacity does not affect the U.C.C. financing statement’s validity. U.C.C. §§ 9-
502, 9-503.
14
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therefore does not deserve deference, and in practice has not worked. State laws
have unsurprisingly taken disparate positions with respect to numerous aspects of
MERS, and borrowers are now impacted in vastly different ways based on their
jurisdiction. Laura A. Steven, MERS and the Mortgage Crisis: Obfuscating Loan
Ownership and the Need for Clarity,” 7 Brook. J. Corp. Fin. & Com. L. 251, 256-
57 (2012).
In design, MERS was meant to mimic the structure of the Depository
Trading Company (DTC), and similarly replaces the lender as the mortgagee in
local land records to immobilize legal title to mortgages. The DTC is a common
agency structure for securities trades that was created to resolve the “Wall Street
Paperwork Crisis” of the 1960s, when the volume of daily trades made the then
requisite delivery of physical stock certificates and bonds from sellers to buyers
impractical.7 However, the DTC does not legitimize the MERS structure as
precedent, because no equivalent statutory or regulatory framework exists for
MERS as for the DTC; MERS’s lack of legal foundation and oversight is radically
new.
The DTC operates within a statutory framework as a “securities
intermediary” under U.C.C. Article 8. The law makes clear that the DTC holds but
7
Instead of listing individual investors as registered securities’ owners with various firms,
corporate-securities registrations now list the DTC as a common nominee, and the DTC tracks
ownership of the securities in its books and holds physical securities in its vaults. The DTC
immobilizes between 85-90% of all equities, corporate, and municipal bonds issued in paper
form in the United States. Levitin, supra p. 14 at 680-81.
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does not own physical securities, which remain the property of investors. U.C.C.
§§ 8-102, 8-502. Further, the statute sets out investors’ rights vis-à-vis third
parties, and the DTC has legal duties to comply with investors’ instructions.
U.C.C. §§ 8-502, 8-506, 8-507, 8-510, 8-511. Finally, the SEC regulates the DTC
as a registered clearing agency, and must approve DTC rules. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78s,
78q(1).
Again, MERS lacks any comparable statutory authority and regulation. Its
lack of legal foundation means that it has been able pursue arguments most
favorable to its growth in any given situation, even when those arguments
contradict each other in different jurisdictions. For example, when MERS has
brought foreclosure actions, it has argued that it was an actual mortgagee or
assignee. See, e.g., Landmark National Bank v. Kesler, 40 Kan. App. 2d 325, 327
(2008) (“MERS claims that it holds the title to the second mortgage… MERS
objects to its characterization as an agent.”). However, when faced with suits
alleging fraud, deceptive practices, or when it wished to avoid license and
registration requirements, it argued that it was merely an agent without exposure to
liability, and did not have the same power as a mortgage owner. See, e.g., Escher
v. Decision One Mortgage Co., 369 B.R. 862 n.8 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007)
(“MERS’s role as nominee leads the Court to conclude that it cannot be liable on
any of the Plaintiff’s [Truth in Lending or Pennsylvania consumer protection]
16
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claims. A nominee is understood to be an agent for another.”). See also Peterson,
Foreclosure, supra p. 4, at 1376. MERS’s adoption of inconsistent positions across
jurisdictions to obtain favorable outcomes in litigation underscores its fundamental
lack of legal authority. See also Landmark Nat'l Bank v. Kesler, 289 Kan. 528, 216
P.3d 158, 165–66 (2009) (stating that MERS defines its role “in much the same
way that the blind men of Indian legend described an elephant—their description
depended on which part they were touching at any given time”).
MERS’s contradictory claims to be both agent of a mortgagee and also the
actual mortgagee are especially alarming since MERS professes that its strongest
claim to legal authority lies in the principles of agency law. Without legal
foundation, MERS has exploited its lack of legal oversight to usurp the function of
the state’s County Recorders, and trample on the long-tended records of interests in
land, to reduce recording costs for mortgage bankers.
G. MERS acts as a placeholder in the traditional recording system, and
cannot function without that system.
MERS inserts a placeholder in the public record. It thereby grafts itself onto
systems for recording interests in land, while rendering that recording meaningless.
By resting its system on the placeholder record of its name, it allows all subsequent
activity related to the mortgage loan to ensue without internal or external
regulation. MERS therefore consists of private contractual arrangements that
derive what questionable legality they possess by “grafting” the MERS system
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onto local land-recording offices, a preexisting public legal structure. As R.K.
Arnold, CEO of MERS until 2011, noted, “because MERS is premised on an
assignment recorded in the public land records, MERS cannot work without county
recorders.” Arnold, Life on MERS, supra p. 8, at 703.
MERS has therefore privatized the majority of mortgage records in the
country while undermining the value of county public records. Peterson, Two
Faces, supra p. 9, at 132 (2011). MERS purports to simplify the process of trading
mortgage-backed securities, because it has taken the liberty of eliminating
requirements for documenting changes to the beneficial ownership interests in real
property. MERS, in effect, creates a lacuna in the record, and makes meaningless
the record onto which it is grafted. As Professor Christopher Peterson writes,
“Recording mortgages in MERS’s name and subsequent refusal to record
assignments is not a technological innovation. On the contrary, it is an example of
atrophy of the mortgage market’s information infrastructure and the rule of law.”
Peterson, Foreclosure, supra p. 4, at 1404.
II. MERS helped precipitate the foreclosure crisis and left homeowners
without recourse to protect their property rights.
A. MERS facilitated the securitization of subprime loans.
MERS’s impact on homeownership and the mortgage industry has had broad
national consequences, including but not limited to the foreclosure crisis of 2008.
These consequences have caused significant and continuing distress for
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Pennsylvania’s cities and homeowners, which Pennsylvania’s recording statute
was meant to protect.
Since MERS increased the speed and the volume at which mortgage-backed
securities could be traded while reducing recording costs, the mortgage finance
industry quickly embraced recording and foreclosing its mortgage loans in
MERS’s name, rather than the actual parties in interest. Industry players did not
embrace MERS based on the passage of legislation or a landmark court ruling,
since none legitimized the creation of MERS. Rather, mortgage industry insiders
reported that the key development that led them to use MERS was its endorsement
by credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard and Poor’s, and Fitch
Investment. Peterson, Foreclosure, supra p. 4, at 1373; Carson Mullen, MERS:
Tracking Loans Electronically, 60:8 Mortgage Banking 62, 65 (May 31, 2000). In
particular, Moody’s published an opinion approving of MERS despite its
acknowledgment that the system’s legality in every state was uncertain. Moody’s
Investors Service, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS): Its
Impact on the Credit Quality of First-Mortgage Jumbo MBS Transactions at 3,
Structured Finance Special (April 30, 1999) (“Although in many states the
assignment of mortgage does not have to be recorded when the note is transferred,
there are some states that require the assignment of mortgage to be recorded so that
the buyer of the loan is protected against subsequent transferees and creditors of
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the seller of the mortgage. There are also some states where the law is uncertain as
to the protection afforded loan buyers against subsequent transferees and creditors
of the loan seller.”).
Although they were on notice that MERS would legally conflict with the
laws in some states, mortgage industry insiders, including Moody’s, pursued or
encouraged the pursuit of the immediate financial opportunities the system
presented, rather than seek structural adjustments that would respect the rights that
conflicting state laws protected. By 1999, private label subprime mortgage
securitizers had begun using MERS. Peterson, Foreclosure, supra p. 4 at 1370;
Mullen, supra p. 19, at 64. In the early 2000s, the use of MERS exploded, and by
late 2002 MERS had recorded its name in place of actual assignees and mortgagees
in ten million residential home mortgages. MERS Registers 10 Million Loans,
Inside MERS 1 (Nov./Dec. 2002). As the subprime mortgage refinancing industry
boomed, MERS registered 21,000 loans on its system each day on average. A year
later, the number of loans recorded in MERS’s name doubled to twenty million.
MERS Registers 20 Million Loans, Inside MERS 1 (Jan./Feb. 2004). MERS’s then
CEO R.K. Arnold proclaimed that MERS’s mission was to “capture every
mortgage in the country.” R.K. Arnold, Viewpoint, Inside MERS 1 (Jan. Feb.
2004). By May of 2007, it had tripled again to sixty million mortgage loans. Kate
Berry, Foreclosures Turn Up Heat on MERS, Am. Banker 1 (July 10, 2007).
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Subsequently, MERS, as Christopher Peterson has written, “was an
important cog in the machine that churned out the millions of unsuitable, poorly
underwritten, and incompletely documented mortgages that were destined for
foreclosure” in the recent mortgage crisis. Peterson, Foreclosure, supra 4 at 1407.
As Wake Forest Law School Professor Tanya Marsh observed in 2011, many
scholars and policymakers found that MERS’s lack of transparency, along with the
increasing complexity of transactions, contributed to the recent financial crisis.
Foreclosures and the Failure of the American Land Title Recording System, 111
Colum. R. Rev. 19 (2011) (Sidebar). The New York Times reported in 2009 that
MERS had “played an integral, if unsung, role in the proliferation of mortgage-
backed securities that fueled the housing boom.” Mike McIntire, Tracking Loans
Through a Firm that Holds Millions, April 23, 2009, at B1.
B. MERS increased the costs of enforcing property rights and left
homeowners without recourse to challenge wrongful foreclosures.
MERS’s up-front savings for financial institutions that securitized mortgages
came at the expense of certainty and enforceability of property rights. When the
mortgage backed securities market crashed, MERS frequently could not identify
and locate the holders of the mortgage notes that had been bundled. Heekin, supra
p. 5 at 191; Gloria J. Liddell and Pearson Liddell, Jr., Robo Signers: The Legal
Quagmire of Invalid Residential Foreclosure Proceedings and the Resultant
Potential Impact Upon Stakeholders, 16 Chap. L. Rev. 367 (2012). The principal
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issue that has caused foreclosures to be set aside has been the inability of many
foreclosing lenders to produce the original mortgage note when called upon to do
so. Heekin, supra 4-5 at 171.
However, such foreclosures are only ever set aside after protracted,
expensive foreclosure litigation. The reduced ability to clearly ascertain property
rights has thus led to tremendous costs in the enforcement of property rights. As
Professor Levitin observes, the rise of foreclosures and foreclosure litigation in
2007 revealed how MERS, and its alterations to the processes of mortgage transfer,
“shifted costs from deal formation to deal enforcement.” Levitin, supra at 649.
When one compares these costs to the costs of record-keeping that the industry
targeted for elimination, $10 per recordation, amounting to around $30 per loan,
seems a small amount to pay to protect a family’s interest in the ability to discover
who owns their loan, who would execute a foreclosure proceeding against them,
and to challenge a party attempting to do so on the basis of mistake or fraud. The
costs of recordation that the industry now “saves” constitutes only a very small
fraction of each $125,000 loan, and has come at the loss of the security of
someone’s home. Furthermore, MERS has shifted the costs of resolving the
problems caused by MERS’s poor documentation practices to courts of the same
cities, now suffering as a result of the foreclosure crisis, at the expense of whom
large investment banks “saved” those initial costs in recording fees.
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C. Surveys, audits and public media have exposed the inaccuracy of
records in the MERS database.
It is practically impossible to track errors or detect fraud through the MERS
system both because MERS does not require that its members record the necessary
documentation and because MERS does not make its records available to the
public. Because MERS records are shrouded in secrecy, it is also impossible to
know just how incomplete or inaccurate MERS records are. However, surveys and
reporting by public media have suggested that the MERS database is alarmingly
inaccurate.
One survey of 396 foreclosure cases in six judicial foreclosure states found
that “the plaintiff asserting the right to foreclose matched the identified ‘investor’
in MERS database only twenty percent of the time.” Alan M. White, Losing the
Paper-Mortgage Assignments, Note Transfers and Consumer Protection, 24 Loy.
Consumer L. Rev. 468, 486 (2012). An audit in California, a non-judicial
foreclosure state, found that the beneficiary on the foreclosure sale deed only
matched MERS’s “investor” field forty-two percent of the time. Id. at 487 (citing
Aequitas Compliance Solutions, Inc., Foreclosure in California: A Crisis of
Compliance 7 (2012)). This figure excluded cases where MERS did not disclose an
investor. Id.
In 2011, the New York Times reported that MERS and its member banks
“apparently lost or mistakenly destroyed loan documents” in thousands of cases,
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and often confused and misrepresented which entities owned mortgage notes.
Michael Powell and Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your
Loan, N.Y. Times, March 6, 2011, at BU1. Homeowners were left to try to contact
mortgage servicing and origination companies, or federally insured banks, which
often did not have accurate records of their own, and which collapsed during the
foreclosure crisis by the hundreds. Peterson, Two Faces, supra p. 9, at 126; Worth
Civils & Mark Gongloff, Subprime Shakeout: Lenders that Have Closed Shop,
Been Acquired or Stopped Loans, Wall St. J. Online;8 Failed Bank List, Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).9
D. Court proceedings and federal agency investigations have further
exposed the inaccuracy of records in the MERS database.
Mortgage servicing companies, banks, courts and government agencies have
all expressed astonishment at the extent to which MERS database is inaccurate. In
2009, a Florida mortgage origination and servicing company called Diversified
Mortgage (Diversified) sued MERS over the uncertainty in ownership of Florida
mortgages registered on MERS. Diversified complained that MERS may have
allowed Diversified’s trading partners to list themselves as owners of Diversified’s
loans without permission from Diversified. Peterson, Two Faces, supra p. 9, at
8
Available at (last visited March 13, 2015).
9
Available at (last visited March 13,
2015).
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131. Diversified claimed that when asked to produce a list of all its trading partners
that may have made this claim, MERS could not or refused to do so, eventually
became “confusing and hostile,” and “demanded that Diversified not attempt
further contact with MERS.” Id. at 132. Diversified then learned that other third-
party financial institutions had initiated foreclosure proceedings on mortgages that
Diversified believed it owned. Id. at 132-33.
In another Florida case, Judge Jennifer Bailey, a circuit court judge in Miami
stated of 60,000 foreclosures filed in 2009 in her court, “[A]lmost every single one
of them… represents a situation where the bank’s position is constantly shifting
and changing because they don’t know what the Sam Hill is going on in their
files.” Transcript of Hearing on Order to Show Cause at 5, HSBC Bank USA v.
Eslava, No. 1-2008-CA-055313 (Fla. Cir. Ct. May 6, 2010). Janis Smith, a
spokeswoman for Fannie Mae, admitted Fannie Mae kept its own records and that
“We would never rely on it [MERS] to find ownership.” Powell and Morgenson,
supra p. 32.
In 2011, the Federal Reserve, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
and the Office of Thrift Supervision conducted an on-site review of MERSCORP
and MERS. They found, as they wrote in an Interagency Report on their review of
foreclosure policies and practices, significant weaknesses in MERS’s oversight,
management supervision and corporate governance that merited bringing formal
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enforcement action against MERS under the Bank Service Company Act and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Act. Federal Reserve, Office of the Comptroller of the
Currency, and Office of Thrift Supervision, Interagency Review of Foreclosure
Policies and Practices 10-11 (2011). Additionally, the Interagency Report found
that servicers had failed in conducting appropriate due diligence assessments of
and quality control processes pertaining to MERS, by failing to monitor, evaluate,
and appropriately manage the MERS contractual relationship, assess internal
control processes at MERS, ensure the accuracy of servicing transfers, and ensure
that servicers’ records matched MERS records. Id.
E. MERS’s inaccuracy affects not only the properties for which it is
named as mortgagee, but all properties adjoining those properties.
Not only is it difficult and sometimes impossible to track down who is the
beneficial owner of the borrower’s obligation, but MERS clouds or renders
unmarketable properties of neighbors to a foreclosed property in other respects. As
David Woolley, a California Licensed Land Surveyor and Certified Fraud
Examiner with over two decades of experience, has noted, MERS does not comply
with first in time (race) or constructive or actual notice statutes, so senior/junior
property rights cannot be determined when discrepancies arise in property
boundary lines. David Woolley and Lisa Herzog, MERS: The Unreported Effects
of Lost Chain of Title on Real Property Owners, 8 Hastings Bus. L. J. 365, 366
(2012). Thus, MERS destroys adjoining property rights and records of
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homeowners who never defaulted on mortgages and are now forced to litigate
boundary disputes. Id.
CONCLUSION
MERS has largely replaced the formerly transparent public record of
mortgage interests with a partial, inaccurate and inaccessible private registry that
greatly increased the likelihood of fraud and litigation. For the first time in the
history of the nation, there is no longer an authoritative public record of interests in
land in each county. For the above reasons, to uphold Pennsylvania law, and to
allow Montgomery County to begin to reconstitute the damage to the record
MERS has wrought, the Order on Appeal should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Max Weinstein
Max Weinstein
Charles Carriere
K-Sue Park
Legal Services Center of
Harvard Law School
120 Boylston Street
Jamaica Plain, MA
(617) 390-2694
/s/ Rebecca Tushnet
Rebecca Tushnet
Professor of Law at Georgetown Law
/s/ Joseph William Singer
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Joseph William Singer
Bussey Professor of Law at Harvard Law School
/s/ David Reiss
David Reiss
Professor of Law and Research Director at the
Center for Urban Business Entrepreneurship
/s/ Melanie Leslie
Melanie Leslie, Vice Dean and Professor of Law at
Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law
Dated: March 23, 2015
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CERTIFICATES
I, Max Weinstein, hereby certify that:
1. I caused a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of Amicus Curiae
to be served upon all counsel of record via the Court’s ECF system, in
accordance with L.A.R. Misc. 113.4, on this the 23rd day of March,
2015.
2. The Brief of Amicus Curiae was filed with the Court via the Court’s ECF
system, and by Fedex, postage prepaid, in accordance with Rule
25(a)(2)(B) of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.
3. I am admitted to the bar of the Third Circuit.
4. This Brief complies with the type-volume limitation of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(7)(B) because this brief contains 5,924 words, excluding the parts
of the brief exempted by Fed. R. App. P. 32(a)(7)(B).
5. This Brief further complies with the typeface requirements of Fed. R.
App. P. 32(a)(5) and the type style requirements of Fed. R. App. P.
32(a)(6) because this brief has been prepared in a proportionally spaced
typeface using Microsoft Word 2010 in 14-Times New Roman.
6. In addition, I certify that the Brief filed electronically is identical to the
Brief that is being filed in paper form. I also certify that the document
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was subject to a virus check pursuant to the Center’s virus check system,
Microsoft Endpoint Protection, and no virus was detected.
/s/ Max Weinstein
Amicus Curiae
30