Jessica Briggle v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                                  ACCEPTED
    06-15-00041-CR
    SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
    TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    6/16/2015 10:57:09 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    CLERK
    ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
    FILED IN
    6th COURT OF APPEALS
    CAUSE NO. 06-15-00041-CR             TEXARKANA, TEXAS
    6/16/2015 10:57:09 AM
    DEBBIE AUTREY
    IN THE                           Clerk
    COURT OF APPEALS
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
    ____________________________________________________________
    JESSICA MARIE BRIGGLE, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    ____________________________________________________________
    ON APPEAL FROM THE 6TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    LAMAR COUNTY, TEXAS; TRIAL COURT NO. 23274;
    HONORABLE ERIC CLIFFORD, JUDGE
    ____________________________________________________________
    APPELLEE’S (STATE’S) BRIEF
    ____________________________________________________________
    Gary D. Young
    Lamar County and District Attorney
    Lamar County Courthouse
    119 North Main
    Paris, Texas 75460
    (903) 737-2470
    (903) 737-2455 (fax)
    ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
    Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A), the list of parties and
    counsel is not required to supplement or correct the appellant’s list.
    -i-
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    PAGE NO.:
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                           i
    TABLE OF CONTENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                          ii
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                              iii
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                               iv
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT . . . . . . .                                                     vi
    ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                              viii
    INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                     1
    STATEMENT OF FACTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                           2
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                                      4
    ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
    SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY: THE TRIAL
    COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
    REVOKING THE APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY
    SUPERVISION BECAUSE UNOBJECTED-TO HEARSAY
    CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
    OF AN ORDER REVOKING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION,
    AND THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE REASONABLY
    FOUND FROM STATE’S EXHIBIT 1 THAT BRIGGLE
    VIOLATED A CONDITION OF HER COMMUNITY
    SUPERVISION. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
    PRAYER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           9
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    PAGE NO.:
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                10
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          10
    -iii-
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    CASES:                                                                                   PAGE:
    Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1984) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          6
    Ex parte Brown, 
    875 S.W.2d 756
    , 761 (Tex. App.--Fort
    Worth 1994, orig. proceeding) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                    6
    Fernandez v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 451
    , 455-56, 457 n. 1 (Tex.
    Crim. App.1991) (Baird, J., concurring) . . . . . . . . . . .                           7
    Frazier v. State, 
    600 S.W.2d 271
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1979). . .                                 7
    Garcia v. State, 
    880 S.W.2d 497
    , 500 (Tex. App.--Corpus
    Christi 1994, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             7
    In re T.R.S., 
    115 S.W.3d 318
    , 320 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
    2003, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .    5,6,8
    Jones v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 266
    , 269 (Tex. App.--Corpus
    Christi 2003, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .            7
    Lively v. State, 
    338 S.W.3d 140
    , 143 (Tex. App.--
    Texarkana 2011, no pet.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             5,6,8
    Marsh v. State, 
    343 S.W.3d 475
    , 479 (Tex. App.--Texarkana
    2011, pet. ref’d) (Justice Moseley) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .                     6
    Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App.
    [Panel Op.] 1980) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .             6
    Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763, 764 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2006) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .      5,6,8
    Scamardo v. State, 
    517 S.W.2d 293
    , 298 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1974) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .          6
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    STATUTES:                                                                           PAGE:
    TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(a) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .     4,8
    TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .           i
    -v-
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    This is a revocation case.
    After the trial court placed Briggle on community supervision for four
    counts of forgery of a financial instrument (CR, pgs. 30-31), the State moved
    for an adjudication of guilt. See CR, pgs. 57-58. Upon the conclusion of a
    revocation hearing, the trial court revoked Briggle’s community supervision
    and found her guilty of forgery of a financial instrument, Counts 1, 2, 3 and
    4. See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66. The trial court then sentenced Briggle to 24
    months confinement in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice but
    suspended that sentence “to place her on probation.” See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66.
    The trial court required Briggle “to attend and successfully complete the
    SAFP program and any aftercare that is required.” See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66.
    From the trial court’s separate judgments adjudicating guilt as to each
    count (CR, pgs. 74-75, 76-77, 78-79, 80-81), Briggle timely filed her notice
    of appeal. See CR, pg. 73. By this appeal, Briggle brought a single issue.
    -vi-
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    The State of Texas will waive oral argument. See Tex. R. App. P.
    38.1(e), 38.2(a)(1).
    -vii-
    SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY
    SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY: THE TRIAL COURT DID
    NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING THE APPELLANT’S
    COMMUNITY SUPERVISION BECAUSE UNOBJECTED-TO
    HEARSAY CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
    OF AN ORDER REVOKING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, AND
    THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE REASONABLY FOUND FROM
    STATE’S EXHIBIT 1 THAT BRIGGLE VIOLATED A CONDITION
    OF HER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.
    -viii-
    CAUSE NO. 06-15-00041-CR
    IN THE
    COURT OF APPEALS
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT TEXARKANA
    ____________________________________________________________
    JESSICA MARIE BRIGGLE, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    ____________________________________________________________
    ON APPEAL FROM THE 6TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
    LAMAR COUNTY, TEXAS; TRIAL COURT NO. 23274;
    HONORABLE ERIC CLIFFORD, JUDGE
    ____________________________________________________________
    APPELLEE’S (STATE’S) BRIEF
    ____________________________________________________________
    TO HONORABLE SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS:
    COMES NOW, the State of Texas, by and through its Lamar County
    and District Attorney’s Office, files this its Appellee’s Brief under Rule 38.2
    of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    Unless otherwise indicated, Jessica Marie Briggle will be referred to
    as “Briggle” or “the appellant.” The State of Texas will be referred to as
    “the State” or “appellee.”
    -1-
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    Indictment for Forgery of a Financial Instrument, and Plea.
    On July 20, 2009, a grand jury in Lamar County return an original
    indictment that charged Biggle with a state-jail-felony offense of forgery of
    a financial instrument. See CR, pgs. 5-8. The original indictment included
    several counts for separate financial instruments (i.e. checks) on separate
    dates. See CR, pgs. 5-8.
    Subsequently, Biggle agreed to a plea bargain agreement. See CR,
    pgs. 18-28. As part of that agreement, Briggle entered a plea of “guilty”
    (RR, Vol. 2, pg. 7), and the trial court placed Biggle on deferred community
    supervision for three (3) years with standard terms and conditions of
    community supervision. See CR, pgs. 30-31. On February 19, 2010, the
    trial court signed its four orders of deferred adjudication for each of the
    counts, as alleged in the indictment. See CR, pgs. 33-34, 35-36, 37-38, 39-
    40.
    Motion to Proceed with Adjudication and Hearing.
    In due course, the State filed a motion to proceed with an adjudication
    of guilt on December 19, 2014. See CR, pgs. 57-58. On February 17, 2015,
    the trial court presided over a revocation hearing. See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 1.
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    During the hearing, Briggle entered a plea of “not true” to all of the State’s
    allegations. See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 7.
    As its first witness, the State called Kelly Thrasher, a community
    supervision officer for Lamar County that was familiar with Briggle. See
    RR, Vol. 3, pgs. 7-8. During her testimony, the State offered State’s Exhibit
    1, which the trial court admitted over “No objection, Your Honor.” See RR,
    Vol. 3, pg. 13.
    Upon the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court revoked the
    appellant’s community supervision and found Briggle guilty of forgery of a
    financial instrument, Counts 1, 2, 3 and 4. See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66. The trial
    court then sentenced Briggle to 24 months confinement in the Texas
    Department of Criminal Justice, but the trial court suspended that sentence
    “to place her on probation.” See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66. The trial court required
    Briggle “to attend and successfully complete the SAFP program and any
    aftercare that is required.” See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66. In open court, Briggle
    was “going to present my notice of appeal.” See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 66.
    Trial Court’s Judgments Adjudicating Guilt and Notice of
    Appeal.
    On February 17, 2015, the trial court signed its judgments
    adjudicating guilt, as to each count. See CR, pgs. 74-75, 76-77, 78-79, 80-
    -3-
    81. Briggle timely filed her notice of appeal. See CR, pg. 73.
    Proceedings in this Court.
    On or about February 20, 2015, the appellant filed her notice of appeal
    in this Court. On or about April 15, 2015, the district clerk of Lamar County
    filed the Clerk’s Record. The official court reporter filed the Reporter’s
    Record on or about May 4, 2015.
    The appellant filed her brief on or about May 18, 2015. The State
    filed, or will be filing, its brief on or before June 17, 2015.
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The appellant’s sole issue on appeal should be overruled. This Court
    should affirm the trial court’s final judgments of conviction because
    unobjected-to hearsay testimony from Kelly Thrasher, a community
    supervision officer for Lamar County, constituted sufficient evidence in
    support of the trial court’s judgments adjudicating guilt. See CR, pgs. 74-75,
    76-77, 78-79, 80-81.
    Even if the trial court erred in considering unobjected-to hearsay
    evidence, the trial court admitted State’s Exhibit 1 over “No objection, Your
    Honor” (RR, Vol. 3, pg. 13); and thus, Briggle waived any objection to the
    admission of State’s Exhibit 1. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). From State’s
    -4-
    Exhibit 1, the trial court could have found, by a preponderance of the
    evidence, that Briggle violated a condition of her community supervision
    (i.e. condition 23). Therefore, the trial court’s error, if any, in considering
    unobjected-to hearsay evidence was harmless.
    ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
    SOLE ISSUE PRESENTED IN REPLY: THE TRIAL COURT DID
    NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REVOKING THE APPELLANT’S
    COMMUNITY SUPERVISION BECAUSE UNOBJECTED-TO
    HEARSAY CONSTITUTED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT
    OF AN ORDER REVOKING COMMUNITY SUPERVISION, AND
    THE TRIAL COURT COULD HAVE REASONABLY FOUND FROM
    STATE’S EXHIBIT 1 THAT BRIGGLE VIOLATED A CONDITION
    OF HER COMMUNITY SUPERVISION.
    A.     Standard of Review: Abuse of Discretion.
    This Court will review the trial court’s decision to revoke community
    supervision for an abuse of discretion. See Lively v. State, 
    338 S.W.3d 140
    ,
    143 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2011, no pet.) (citing Rickels v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 759
    , 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006); In re T.R.S., 
    115 S.W.3d 318
    , 320
    (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2003, no pet.)). The trial court does not abuse its
    discretion if the order revoking community supervision is supported by a
    preponderance of the evidence; in other words, the greater weight of the
    credible evidence would create a reasonable belief that the defendant has
    violated a condition of his or her community supervision. See Lively, 338
    -5-
    S.W.3d at 143 (citing 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64
    ; 
    T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 320
    ).
    “The State is required to sustain the burden of proving the allegations
    of the motion to revoke probation.” See Scamardo v. State, 
    517 S.W.2d 293
    ,
    298 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). In conducting the review, this Court must view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. See
    
    Lively, 338 S.W.3d at 143
    (citing Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1984)).
    “[I]f the trial court’s ruling can be sustained on an independent ground
    the appellant must challenge all of the grounds on appeal.” See Marsh v.
    State, 
    343 S.W.3d 475
    , 479 (Tex. App.--Texarkana 2011, pet. ref’d) (Justice
    Moseley) (citing Moore v. State, 
    605 S.W.2d 924
    , 926 (Tex. Crim. App.
    [Panel Op.] 1980) (defendant must challenge each ground on which the trial
    court relies on to rule against the defendant because one sufficient ground
    supports trial court’s order)). “Proof of any single alleged violation of a
    condition of probation is sufficient to support revocation.” See Ex parte
    Brown, 
    875 S.W.2d 756
    , 761 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth 1994, orig.
    proceeding).
    -6-
    B.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Revoking
    Briggle’s Community Supervision.
    1.     Unobjected-to Hearsay Constituted Sufficient Evidence in
    Support of an Order Revoking Probation.
    In her brief, Briggle essentially argued that unobjected-to hearsay
    could not be the basis of a probation revocation. See Appellant’s Brief, pg. 7
    (citing Frazier v. State, 
    600 S.W.2d 271
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1979)). However,
    the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has recognized the probative value of
    inadmissible hearsay in probation revocation proceedings. See Fernandez,
    
    805 S.W.2d 451
    , 457 n. 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (Baird, J., concurring).
    Since Frazier, “[t]he trial court may consider unobjected-to hearsay
    testimony no differently than other testimony that the fact finder may either
    accept or reject.” See Jones v. State, 
    112 S.W.3d 266
    , 269 (Tex. App.--
    Corpus Christi 2003, no pet.) (citing Fernandez v. State, 
    805 S.W.2d 451
    ,
    455-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Garcia v. State, 
    880 S.W.2d 497
    , 500 (Tex.
    App.--Corpus Christi 1994, no pet.)).
    2.    The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion in Revoking
    Briggle’s Community Supervision.
    Because the fact finder could either accept or reject unobjected-to
    hearsay testimony from Kelly Thrasher, see id, the trial court could have
    found, by the greater weight of the credible evidence, that Briggle had
    -7-
    violated the conditions of her community supervision.         See 
    Lively, 338 S.W.3d at 143
    (citing 
    Rickels, 202 S.W.3d at 763-64
    ; 
    T.R.S., 115 S.W.3d at 320
    ). Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
    Briggle’s community supervision. See 
    Lively, 338 S.W.3d at 143
    .
    Even assuming the trial court could not rely on the hearsay testimony
    of Kelly Thrasher, the trial court still did not abuse its discretion because it
    could have found that Briggle had violated the conditions of her community
    supervision from State’s Exhibit 1 solely. During the revocation hearing,
    the State offered Exhibit 1 into evidence and Briggle stated, “No objection,
    Your Honor.” See RR, Vol. 3, pg. 13. See Tex. R. App. P. 33.1(a). By
    stating “no objection,” the trial court properly admitted State’s Exhibit 1
    (ORDER FOR DRUG TEST), which Briggle signed. See State’s Exhibit 1.
    By a check mark dated July 4, 2014, Briggle acknowledged that she had
    “used illegal drugs in the last 3 weeks” and she listed “Meth 2 wks ago.”
    See State’s Exhibit 1.
    From State’s Exhibit 1 only, which was admitted over no objection,
    the trial court could could have found that Briggle had violated the
    conditions of her community supervision. Even if the trial court erred in
    relying on unobjected-to hearsay testimony from Kelly Thrasher, Briggle
    -8-
    could not show any harm because the trial court had properly-admitted
    evidence that would have sufficiently supported its revocation order.
    Accordingly, the appellant’s sole issue on appeal should be overruled, and
    the final judgment of the trial court should be affirmed.
    PRAYER
    WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State of Texas prays
    that upon final submission of the above-styled and numbered causes without
    oral argument, this Court affirm the trial court’s final judgment of conviction
    in all respects; adjudge court costs against the appellant; and for such other
    and further relief, both at law and in equity, to which it may be justly and
    legally entitled.
    Respectfully submitted,
    Gary D. Young
    Lamar County & District Attorney
    Lamar County Courthouse
    119 North Main
    Paris, Texas 75460
    (903) 737-2470
    (903) 737-2455 (fax)
    By:________________________________
    Gary D. Young, County Attorney
    SBN# 00785298
    gyoung@co.lamar.tx.us
    ATTORNEYS FOR THE STATE OF TEXAS
    -9-
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    Pursuant to Rule 9.4(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure,
    the “Appellee’s (State’s) Brief” was a computer-generated document and
    contained 2475 words--not including the Appendix, if any. The undersigned
    attorney certified that he relied on the word count of the computer program,
    which was used to prepare this document.
    ______________________________
    GARY D. YOUNG
    gyoung@co.lamar.tx.us
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    This is to certify that in accordance with Tex. R. App. P. 9.5, a true
    copy of the Appellee’s (State’s) Brief has been served on the 16th day of
    June, 2015 upon the following:
    Charles England Perry
    1101 Main Street
    P.O. Box 720
    Commerce, TX 75429
    ______________________________
    GARY D. YOUNG
    gyoung@co.lamar.tx.us
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