Gerald Allen Graham v. State ( 2016 )


Menu:
  •                                      In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-16-00060-CR
    ____________________
    GERALD ALLEN GRAHAM, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
    Montgomery County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 14-302572
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant Gerald Allen Graham appeals his conviction for criminal
    mischief. In his sole issue on appeal, Graham complains the trial court erred by
    denying his request to provide a jury instruction pursuant to article 38.23 of the
    Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.23
    (West 2005). Graham argues that because there is an issue of fact concerning
    whether he was driving recklessly, the trial court should have included an article
    38.23 instruction informing the jury that it must disregard the evidence concerning
    1
    criminal mischief if it has a reasonable doubt that Graham was driving recklessly.
    We overrule Graham’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Background
    On April 12, 2013, Texas Ranger Wesley Dolittle was driving to work when
    he observed a vehicle being driven in a reckless manner. Dolittle testified that he
    felt obligated to stop the vehicle so that it would not cause an accident. During the
    stop, Graham told Dolittle that he was on the way to the hospital, and he gave
    Dolittle the name of the person he was going to see. When Dolittle checked to see
    if there had been any accidents, he learned that no person by that name had gone
    by ambulance to the emergency room. At that point, Dolittle observed Graham’s
    behavior, and he explained that Graham appeared to be yelling something at him
    and was pacing back and forth. Dolittle felt that Graham might flee, so he re-
    approached and placed Graham under arrest for reckless driving. Dolittle
    handcuffed Graham, placed him in the front passenger seat of his truck, and went
    to speak with Graham’s passenger, Karen Graham.
    While speaking with Karen, Dolittle observed that Graham was fidgeting in
    the truck. Dolittle checked on Graham and noticed that Graham had turned his
    wrists in the handcuffs, so Dolittle re-secured the handcuffs. Dolittle also turned on
    a pocket audio recorder to document his contact with Graham because Graham was
    2
    angry and yelling at him. Dolittle went back to speak with Karen, and upon
    returning to his truck, Dolittle observed that his department issued radio had been
    dislodged from the dashboard and was in the floorboard hanging from the wires. In
    addition to the reckless driving charge, Dolittle charged Graham with felony
    criminal mischief.
    Graham entered a plea of guilty to the reckless driving charge, but proceeded
    to trial on a misdemeanor criminal mischief charge. During the trial, Karen
    testified that she was Graham’s wife and she was with Graham when Dolittle
    pulled him over and arrested him for speeding. According to Karen, they were on
    their way to the hospital and Graham was speeding, but she did not recall Graham
    making any quick lane changes or nearly sideswiping a car. Karen testified that a
    vehicle had cut in front of them, causing Graham to slow down, but Graham did
    not have to slam on the brakes. Karen testified that Dolittle approached their
    vehicle and Graham calmly handed Dolittle his driver’s license and information.
    According to Karen, when Dolittle returned, he told Graham to get out of the car
    because he was under arrest. Karen stated that Dolittle was very aggressive
    towards Graham, and after being arrested, Graham became very angry.
    During the jury charge conference, Graham’s counsel requested that the trial
    court include an article 38.23 instruction on reckless driving in the jury charge,
    3
    because Karen’s testimony brought up some evidence that Graham was not driving
    recklessly. Graham’s counsel argued that because the State had failed to properly
    rebut Karen’s testimony, the State could not bring up the reckless driving
    conviction because it was not in evidence. The trial court denied Graham’s article
    38.23 request, noting that Graham had pleaded guilty to reckless driving. The jury
    found Graham guilty of criminal mischief and sentenced Graham to 180 days in
    jail and assessed a $2000 fine. Graham appealed.
    Analysis
    Graham argues that the trial court erred by denying his request to provide an
    article 38.23 instruction because Karen’s testimony created a fact issue as to
    whether there was probable cause to arrest Graham for reckless driving. The State
    argues that article 38.23 does not apply because Graham committed the offense of
    criminal mischief after he was stopped and arrested for reckless driving. In
    reviewing jury charge error, we must undertake a two-step review: first, we must
    determine whether error actually exists in the charge; and second, if error exists,
    we must determine whether sufficient harm resulted from the error to require
    reversal. Abdnor v. State, 
    871 S.W.2d 726
    , 731-32 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994).
    We note that the phrase “obtained in violation of the law,” as used in Article
    38.23, “contemplates that a crime has been committed; that evidence of that crime
    4
    exists; and that officers violated the law in attempting to obtain evidence of the
    previously committed crime.” State v. Iduarte, 
    268 S.W.3d 544
    , 550 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2008) (quoting State v. Mayorga, 
    901 S.W.2d 943
    , 945-46 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1995)). To trigger the application of article 38.23, “the officers must act illegally in
    obtaining existing evidence of an offense.” 
    Id.
     Several Texas courts have held that
    the exclusionary rule is not applicable when a police officer’s alleged violation of
    the law precedes the commission of an offense by the defendant. See id. at 551
    (exclusionary rule held inapplicable when officer’s alleged illegal entry preceded
    offense of assault on a public servant); Bryant v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 810
    , 812-13
    (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d) (exclusionary rule held inapplicable when
    alleged illegal detention preceded offense of tampering with physical evidence);
    Donoho v. State, 
    39 S.W.3d 324
    , 327 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref’d)
    (exclusionary rule held inapplicable when alleged illegal arrest preceded offense of
    assault on a public servant). Here, because Dolittle’s alleged violation of the law
    occurred prior to Graham committing the offense of criminal mischief, the article
    38.23 exclusionary rule did not apply.
    We conclude that the trial court did not err by denying Graham’s request for
    a jury charge instruction under Article 38.23(a). We overrule Graham’s sole issue
    and affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    5
    AFFIRMED.
    ______________________________
    STEVE McKEITHEN
    Chief Justice
    Submitted on November 21, 2016
    Opinion Delivered December 14, 2016
    Do Not Publish
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Horton, JJ.
    6