Stone Haynes, as Sole Manager of Vair Resources, LLC v. Maurice Haire and Lisa Haire ( 2014 )

In The
Court of Appeals
Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
____________________
NO. 09-14-00011-CV
____________________
STONE HAYNES, AS SOLE MANAGER OF VAIR RESOURCES, LLC,
Appellant
V.
MAURICE HAIRE AND LISA HAIRE, Appellees
_________________________________ ______________________
On Appeal from the 163rd District Court
Orange County, Texas
Trial Cause No. B-120278-C
____________________________________________ ____________
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Stone Haynes, as sole manager of Vair Resources, LLC (“Vair”), filed an
action to quiet title against Maurice Haire and Lisa Haire. The Haires filed a
counterclaim for declaratory judgment and improper redemption. After a bench
trial, the trial court signed a judgment in favor of the Haires. In three appellate
issues, Haynes challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence, the trial
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court’s attorney’s fees award, and the parties to the judgment. We affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Background
Haynes owns Vair. He and Donald Kreymer owned Texas Regional
Acceptance Corp. Kreymer told Haynes that Texas Regional’s real property was
going to be auctioned at a tax sale. On November 1, 2011, Texas Regional
conveyed the property to Vair. That same day, Haynes bid on the property and
won. Because Haynes’s funds were not timely available, the property went to the
next highest bidder, the Haires. The Haires purchased the property for $53,000 and
filed their deed on December 11.
Haynes testified that he tendered a redemption check to Maurice on January
31, 2012, but Maurice rejected the check. Maurice testified that he told Haynes to
take the check to the Haires’ attorney. Haynes testified that he then took a check to
the county tax office. Haynes signed an affidavit, as president of Vair, stating that
Vair owned the property, the redemption period had not expired, and the purchaser
had refused payment and refused to give Vair a deed. The county tax assessor-
collector issued a receipt stating that Haynes had tendered $66,250, the purchase
price plus twenty-five percent of the aggregate total, to redeem the property. This
receipt was filed on March 28. On May 22, Vair’s counsel sent a letter to the
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Haires advising them that the property had been redeemed and they must vacate
the property or be evicted. Haynes testified that he never received a response to
this letter. Maurice did not recall ever seeing the letter.
Haynes testified that he obtained liability and title insurance on the property.
According to Haynes, he also bought liens that were on the property. Barrett Bush
testified that Haynes indicated that Bush’s lien was worthless and paid Bush
$3,500 of the $80,000 owed. Haynes sought compensation for large oak trees,
shrubbery, and a storage building the Haires had removed from the property.
Maurice described the property as a “big garbage dump.” He testified to
cutting down an oak tree that was hazardous, removing some shrubbery that
inhibited visibility, and tearing down a rotted storage building. According to the
Haires, they had incurred $8,055.03 in costs, including $269.94 for garbage,
$823.55 for water, $2,550 for the property manager’s salary, $3,298.59 in clean-up
costs, $331.03 for water lines, $50 for a permit, and $731.92 for insurance.
Maurice testified that the cleanup and labor costs were incurred at the direction of
city officials. Maurice also testified that he had received some rent from the
property. After the trial court ruled in favor of the Haires, Haynes went to the tax
office, retrieved the redemption check, and left no funds in its place.
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Legal and Factual Sufficiency
In issue one, Haynes contends that the evidence is legally and factually
insufficient to support the judgment. Haynes argues that: (1) Vair had the right to
redeem the property, timely redeemed the property, and used the redemption
method authorized by section 34.21(f) of the Texas Tax Code; and (2) Vair
substantially complied with section 34.21, tendered the redemption payment, and
any deficiency in the redemption payment was de minimis. Under legal sufficiency
review, we consider whether the evidence “would enable reasonable and fair-
minded people to reach the verdict under review.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168
S.W.3d 802, 827 (Tex. 2005). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the verdict, credit favorable evidence if a reasonable factfinder could, and
disregard contrary evidence unless a reasonable factfinder could not. Del Lago
Ptnrs., Inc. v. Smith, 307 S.W.3d 762, 770 (Tex. 2010). Under factual sufficiency
review, we consider and weigh all the evidence, and will set aside the verdict only
if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong and unjust. Dow Chem. Co.
v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001).
Section 34.21 of the Tax Code provides, in pertinent part, that the owner of
real property sold at a tax sale may redeem the property not later than the 180th
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day following the date on which the purchaser’s deed is filed for record by paying
the purchaser (1) the amount the purchaser bid for the property, (2) the amount of
the deed recording fee, (3) the amount paid as taxes, penalties, interest, and costs
on the property, and (4) a redemption premium that may not exceed twenty-five
percent of the aggregate total. Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 34.21(a), (e) (West Supp.
2014). The property owner may redeem the property by paying the required
amount to the county tax assessor-collector, if the property owner makes an
affidavit stating that: (1) the redemption period has not expired; and (2) the owner
and the purchaser cannot agree on the amount of redemption money due. Id. §
34.21(f). The assessor-collector shall accept the assertions set out in the affidavit as
true and correct and give the owner a signed receipt witnessed by two persons. Id.
§ 34.21(f-1). Once the receipt is recorded, it is notice to all persons that the
property described has been redeemed. Id. The assessor-collector shall, on demand,
pay the money received to the purchaser. Id.
Section 34.21 is liberally construed in favor of the right of redemption.
Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied).
An owner seeking to redeem property need only substantially comply with section
34.21. Id. The doctrine of de minimis non curat lex excuses negligible deviations
from the law, such as when the redemption funds are less than the statutory amount
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by a small sum of money. See Mekhail v. Duncan-Jackson Mortuary, Inc., 369
S.W.3d 482, 485 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, no pet.).
Assuming, without deciding, that Vair had the capacity to redeem the
property and followed redemption procedures, we conclude that the redemption
payment did not substantially comply with section 34.21. The redemption payment
that Haynes tendered did not include the Haires’ costs. “Costs” include the following
pertinent items:
(A) the amount reasonably spent by the purchaser for maintaining,
preserving, and safekeeping the property, including the cost of:
(i) property insurance;
(ii) repairs or improvements required by a local ordinance or
building code or by a lease of the property in effect on the date
of the sale;
...
(v) impact or standby fees imposed under the Local
Government Code or Water Code and paid to a political
subdivision[.]
Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 34.21(g)(2)(A)(i), (ii), (v) (West Supp. 2014). The owner
may request that the purchaser provide a written itemization of all amounts spent
by the purchaser as costs on the property. Id. § 34.21(i).
On appeal, Haynes argues that costs of $269.94 for garbage, $823.55 for
water, $2,550 for the park manager’s wages, $331.03 for water line repairs, $50 for
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a permit, and $3298.59 for cleanup expenses were not recoverable. The record
does not indicate that Haynes requested an itemization of the Haires’ costs. At trial,
Haynes stipulated to the following costs: (1) $269.94 for garbage; (2) $1,194.80 for
water; (3) $1,800 for clean up; (4) $1,795.70 for equipment and tools; (5) $384.01
for water line repairs; and (6) $50 for permitting. He cannot challenge on appeal
those costs to which he stipulated. See Cooper v. Cochran, 288 S.W.3d 522, 535-
36 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2009, no pet.). Haynes also stipulated to the fact that the
Haires paid $731.92 for insurance; however, Haynes testified that he did not
believe it was reasonable for the Haires to obtain insurance on the property when
he had already insured the property. Haynes admitted that he never told the Haires
that the property was insured. Regardless, the statute expressly includes insurance
as a recoverable cost. See Tex. Tax Code Ann. § 34.21(g)(2)(A)(i). The record
does not demonstrate that $731.92 is an unreasonable amount to spend for
maintaining, preserving, and safekeeping the property.
Accordingly, the evidence supports recoverable costs of $6,226.37. Using
this amount, the redemption payment should have included the $53,000 purchase
price, $6,226.37 in costs, and 25 percent of the aggregate for a total of $74,032.96.
The tendered redemption payment was $7,782.96 short. This amount is not so
insignificant a sum that it may be considered de minimis. See Mekhail, 369 S.W.3d
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at 485; see also Black’s Law Dictionary 464 (8th ed. 2004) (Defining “de minimis”
to mean “[t]rifling; minimal[;]” “so insignificant that a court may overlook it in
deciding an issue[.]”). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s judgment, we conclude that the trial court could reasonably find that Vair
failed to tender the required redemption payment and, consequently, Vair failed to
substantially comply with section 34.21. See Smith, 307 S.W.3d at 770; see also
City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 827. The evidence is not so weak, nor so against the
great weight and preponderance of the evidence, as to render the judgment clearly
wrong and unjust. See Dow Chem. Co., 46 S.W.3d at 242. We overrule issue one
and need not address issue two, which challenges the attorney’s fees award on the
grounds that Haynes should have been the prevailing party in the trial court. See
Tex. R. App. P. 47.1.
Judgment Against Haynes Individually
In issue three, Haynes argues that the trial court improperly entered
judgment against him in his individual capacity. The record indicates that Haynes
was before the trial court in his official capacity as sole manager of Vair. In its
judgment, the trial court stated, “all relief requested by Plaintiffs/Counter-
Defendants Stone Haynes and Vair Resources, LLC, shall be DENIED” and that
“Stone Haynes and Vair Resources, LLC have no property rights” in the property.
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As sole manager of Vair, Haynes had no personal interest in the property
owned by Vair. See Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 101.106(b) (West 2012).
Moreover, even as sole manager of Vair, a limited liability company, Haynes is
bound by the judgment against Vair. See Gator Licensing, LLC v. Mack, Nos. 04-
10-00610-CV & 04-10-00611-CV, 2011 Tex. App. LEXIS 6201, at *9 (Tex.
App.—San Antonio Aug. 10, 2011, no pet.) (mem. op.). Because Haynes was not
before the trial court in his individual capacity, has no rights in the property, and is
bound by the judgment in his official capacity, we cannot say that the judgment
binds Haynes individually or that Haynes would suffer any harm from the manner
in which the judgment is phrased. See Leonard v. Eskew, 731 S.W.2d 124, 129
(Tex. App.—Austin 1987, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (When passing upon the validity of a
judgment, an appellate court must construe its provisions, if it can be done without
violence to the language used, as to sustain the same.). We overrule issue three and
affirm the trial court’s judgment.
AFFIRMED.
_________________________
STEVE McKEITHEN
Chief Justice
Submitted on September 29, 2014
Opinion Delivered October 23, 2014
Before McKeithen, C.J., Horton and Johnson, JJ.
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