Tello, Araceli ( 2015 )


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  •                                                     ORIGINAL
    CMC K o      10-13-                    C2.
    :——       ——RECEIVED \U
    '         -    COURT OF CRIMINAL. APPEALS
    .     JUL 27 2015
    \£LL£l        AbeSAcoste.Ctes
    COURT OH CRIMINAL APPEALS
    JUL 27 20iS
    dL_£         ^ya-s               Abel Acosta, Clerk
    #
    Craig M. Greaves
    [    Attorney at Law
    118B South Main Street
    Bryan, Texas 77803                                                                                                   office: 979-779-9388
    craig@greaveslaw.com                    "      '          f<        -                                                  Fax:979-779-9387
    ,;                                                         www.greaveslaw.com
    Barbie Bohler - Legal Assistant                        ; !'
    barbie@greaveslaw.com                                    ,                                              Marion Blalock - Office Manager
    '                                                     marion@greaveslaw.com
    'April 28,2015
    ,. „,„                               (LegalCorrespondence)
    AracehTello                                  . ji
    TDCJ# 01855166                                  II
    Texas Department of Corrections
    Hobby Unit
    742 FM 712              " "          "" ' ' \        ••-•--            -                ...     _ _...._                  . __
    Marlin, TX 76661                          i |:
    RE:       Opinion and Judgement       \
    Araceli,
    thP »„JI/T enCIv°Sed aC°^y °fthC °pini°n a"d judgment issued ^ ^ ^ Co"rt ofAppeals in regards to
    XTiST g8raVated RObbCry C°nViCti0n- Unfortu»ate'y' ^e Tenth Court ofAppeals did noueverse
    rrimina.YA°U T^ r^ht l°u ^ aPr° SC Petiti&n for Discretionary Review asking the Texas Court of
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    Appeals within thujr (30) days from the date that the 10* Court ofAppeals issued its ruhng byourTale in
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    Appeals no^Z^Z11           f°: DisCretionary
    later tha"v"is.                 **"
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    your conv.ct,on wasnof^nlo^(one ofthe appellatejudges felt that the trial court did error in thfZ it
    handled your case), Iwould recommend that you file apro se Petition for Discretionary Review. To aSyou
    ^toM^T^?™*™'68                                   °f^ " RUI6S °fApP6llate Pr°Ce^re Which online mye
    steps to tiling a Petition for Discretionary Review.
    j;                         Sincerely,
    Enc:       Opinion and Judgement ofthe 10th Court ofAppeals (21 Pages)
    Rule 68,"Texas Rules ofAppellate Prdceduie (3 Pages) ""
    ^      CASE NO. 10-13-00160-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE TENTH DISTRICT
    AT WACO, TEXAS
    ARACELI TELLO
    VS.
    STATE OF TEXAS
    Appeal from the
    272nd Judicial District ofBrazos County, Texas
    Cause No. 12-02891-CRF-272
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT
    Attorney for Appellant:                           Attorney for Appellee:
    Craig M. Greaves
    Jarvis J. Parsons
    LawOffice of Craig M. Greaves                    Brazos County District Attorney
    118 B South Main Street
    300 East 26th Street, Ste. 310
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/779-9388 Telephone                           979/361-4320 Telephone
    979/779-9387 Facsimile
    979/361-4368 Facsimile
    ORAL ARGUMENTS REQUESTED
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Appellant requests oral argument as the factual issues as related in Point ofError Number
    One and Point ofError Number Two have not previously been litigated in an Appellate Court in
    Texas.
    IDENTITY OF PARTIES
    Appellant:                                Araceli Tello
    TDCJ#: 01855166
    William P. Hobby Unit
    742 FM 712
    Marlin, Texas 76661
    Appellant's Appellate Counsel:           Craig M. Greaves
    State Bar #: 24025392
    118 B South Main Street
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/779-9388 Telephone
    979/779-9387 Facsimile
    Appellant's Trial Counsel:               Craig M. Greaves
    State Bar #: 24025392
    118 B South Main Street
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/779-9388 Telephone
    979/779-9387 Facsimile
    Appellee's Trial Counsel:                 Misty D. Swan,
    Assistant Brazos County District Attorney
    State Bar #: 24056399
    Ryan C. Calvert,
    Assistant Brazos County District Attorney
    State Bar #.-24036308
    Office ofthe Brazos County District Attorney
    300 East 26,h Street, Ste. 310
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/361-4320 Telephone
    979/361-4368 Facsimile
    Appellee's Appellate Counsel:            Jarvis J. Parsons,
    Brazos County District Attorney
    State Bar #: 24032934
    Office ofthe Brazos County District Attorney
    300East 26Ih Street, Ste. 310
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/361-4320 Telephone
    979/361-4368 Facsimile
    u
    k
    Trial Court:        Hon. Travis B. Bryan, III
    272nd Judicial District ofBrazos County
    300 East 26* Street, Ste. 204
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/361-4220 Telephone
    979/361-4517 Facsimile
    in
    Statement Regarding Oral Argument
    i
    Identity of Parties
    ,              ii
    Listof Authorities
    v
    Statement of the Case
    vi
    Issues Presented
    vii
    Statement of Facts
    viii
    Summary of Argument
    iv
    Argument
    1-11
    Point of Error Number One:
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT COT IT F» not
    QUESTION THE VICTIM'S SPOUSE AS TO WI^S^SS"T
    THE VICTIM HAD PREVIOUSLY WITH HIS WIFE REGARMNG THE FAOT
    SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY                       8
    Point of Error Number Two:
    THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S STXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT RY
    DENYING THE APPELLANT THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN ^S^S^
    INFORMATION OF AMATERIAL WITNESS IN ORDER TO COMPEL TON
    WITNESS' ATTENDANCE TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL     .                   10
    Conclusion and Relief Requested
    Certificate of Service
    11
    iv
    Cases-
    Coleman v. State.
    
    996 S.W.2d 525
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1998)                10
    Diehl v. State.
    
    698 S.W.2d 712
    (Tex. App. Houston- Is' Dist. 1985)   8
    Irvan v. State.
    
    2006 WL 1545484
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)             9
    United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal
    
    458 U.S. 858
    (1998)
    Weaver v. State.
    
    855 S.W.2d 116
    (Tex. App. Houston- 14* Dist. 1993)   8
    Statues/Rules-
    TEX.R.CRIM.EVID. 504 (a)
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    On or about May 4, 2012, Appellant allegedly committed the offense ofAggravated
    Robbery. CR Vol 1Pg 1. On or about May 17, 2012, Appellant was arrested for said offense.
    CR Vol 1Pg 2. On or about April 2, 2013, ajury trial commenced in Appellant's case. RR Vol
    2Pg 1. On or about April 4, 2013, Appellant was found guilty ofthe offense ofAggravated
    Robbery. RR Vol 4Pg 78 (18-24). On or about April 4, 2013, Appellant was sentenced to a
    term ofthirty-five years confinement in the Texas Department ofCriminal Justice- Institutional
    Division by the Trial Court. RR Vol 5Pg 39 (18-21). On or about May 3, 2013, aNotice of
    Appeal was filed. CR Vol 1 Pg 77-78.
    vi
    ISSUES PRESENTED
    Point of Error Number One
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT QUESTION
    THE VICTIM'S SPOUSE AS TO WHAT COMMUNICATIONS THAT THE VICTIM HAD
    PREVIOUSLY WITH HIS WIFE REGARDING THE FACTS SURROUNDING THE
    ALLEGED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
    Point of Error Number Two
    THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT BY
    DENYING THE APPELLANT THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN ANY IDENTIFYING
    INFORMATION OF AMATERIAL WITNESS IN ORDER TO COMPEL THIS WITNESS'
    ATTENDANCE TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL.
    vu
    The Statement ofFacts is deferred and included in the Point ofErrors urged.
    vm
    SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
    In Appellant's first Point ofError she complains in this Court that the Trial Court erred   m
    finding that communications made by one spouse to another were still protected by the
    "Confidential Communication Privilege" in spite ofthe fact that one spouse had previously
    disclosed the contents ofthese communications while testifying on behalf ofthe State.
    In Appellant's second Point ofError she complains in this Court that the Trial Court
    violated her Sixth Amendment right by preventing Appellant from being able to obtain any
    identifying information necessary in order to compel awitness to testify at trial. The testimony
    ofthis witness was material to Appellant's defense in that it would have seriously eroded the
    credibility ofthe State's main witness against Appellant.
    IX
    CASE NO. 10-13-00160-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE TENTH DISTRICT
    AT WACO, TEXAS
    ARACELI TELLO
    VS.
    STATE OF TEXAS
    Appeal from the
    272nd Judicial District ofBrazos County, Texas
    Cause No. 12-02891 -CRF-272
    BRIEF OF APPELLANT
    Appellant in the above referenced cause number, files this Briefsetting forth herpoint of
    error committed in the Trial Court and would show the Court the following:
    During the State's direct examination, Leobardo Flores (Flores) testified thatat the time he
    was allegedly robbed at gunpoint that he and his wife were having martial problems. RRVol 3 Pg
    139 (9). He stated that these problems stemmed from his wife's infidelity. RR Vol 3 Pg 139 (9-
    -1-
    10). In response to his wife's unfaithfulness, Flores decided that he would cheat on her. RR Vol 3
    Pg 139 (10-12). To accomplish his goal, Flores sought the services ofaprostitute and was
    eventually introduced to Appellant. RR Vol 3Pg 142 (4-12). Flores and Appellant attempted to
    have sex during their initial encounter, but Flores was unable to perform. RR Vol 3Pg 143 (9-
    12).
    Approximately two weeks after Flores' failed attempt to cheat, Appellant allegedly
    contacted him to inform him that she wanted to introduce him to another prostitute that might
    better serve his needs. RR Vol 3Pg 144. Flores was open to this idea and eventually met up with
    Appellant and this other prostitute. RR Vol 3Pg 144 (11-13). There was not enough time for
    Flores and this prostitute to have sexual intercourse during this meeting, but Flores paid this
    prostitute $100.00 in the beliefthat he would see her again in the near future. RR Vol 3Pg 144
    (18-25) & Pg 145 (1-12).
    Approximately aweek later, Appellant allegedly contacted Flores to arrange asecond
    meeting between him and this other prostitute. RR Vol 3Pg 146 (9-20). Flores agreed to do so
    and plans were made for all three to meet at alocal convenience store. RR Vol 3Pg 146 (23-25)
    &Pg 147 (1). But when Flores arrived at this store, only Appellant was present. RR Vol 3Pg
    147 (2-4) When Flores asked where the other prostitute was, Appellant allegedly replied that the
    other prostitute had left todrop offher child and that they would meet her at another location
    shortly. RRVol 3 Pg 147 (5-7) Appellant then got into Flores' vehicle and directed him to the
    location that they were to meet the other prostitute. RR Vol 3Pg 147 (8-9) Upon arriving at this
    location, Appellant and amale accomplice allegedly robbed Flores, taking Flores' wallet
    containing $1000.00 and his cell phone. RRVol 3 Pg 155 (16-25) &Pg 156 (1-23)
    During cross examination, Flores was asked for the name ofhis wife. RR Vol 3Pg 163
    (15). The State objected on the grounds ofrelevance; however, said objection was overruled by
    the Trial Court. RR Vol 3Pg 163 (16-18). In response, the State then asked to approach the
    bench where the following exchange occurred:
    Ms. Swan:
    Judge, I think the concern is that Mr. Flores is concerned about
    retaliation because his wife works at agas station; and he is
    informed that the co-defendant, Robert Sierra, might actually
    come to that gas station. So, Ithink he is uncomfortable giving
    the name ofone ofhis loved ones in fear ofretaliation RR Vol
    3 Pg 164 (8-13)
    Mr. Greaves:
    Judge, Idon't know anything about Robert Sierra going to agas
    station, Number 1.1 don't know ifhe stopped there to get gas
    But she could be avery key witness as to what he might have
    told her about this situation. So, for that reason-1 mean, Idon't
    know who she is. I might need to subpoena her RR Vol 3 Pe
    164 (14-19)                                                     8
    The Court:
    You want to subpoena her up here? RR Vol 3Pg 164 (20-21)
    Mr. Greaves:     Well, I'll have to see how his testimony goes. RR Vol 3Pe 164
    (22-23)
    The Court:
    What has been said about her to this point? RR Vol 3Pg 164
    (24-25)                                                  B
    Mr. Greaves:    Well, she's been brought up that he's married. RR Vol 3Ps
    165 (3-4)                                                    8
    The Court:
    And I think somebody said that he almost broke up with her-
    RR Vol 3 Pg 165 (5-6)
    Mr. Greaves:     That she was cheating. RR Vol 3Pg 165 (7)
    The Court:
    She was cheating; so, he decided to cheat on her; and now, he'
    gone back with her. RR Vol 3Pg 165 (8-9)
    -3-
    The Court:
    So, do you think that he might have talked to her"? RR Vol 3 Pp
    165 (14-15)                                                   B
    Mr. Greaves:     Well, Judge, that seems logical that they would discuss this
    And this deal about her cheating on him is the reason for their
    broken up, that's the first time I've ever heard that RRVol 3 Pe
    165 (16-19)                                                         s
    The Court:       I mjust trying to think through it all. So, ifhe gives you the
    name, you're going tosubpoena her up here, right'? RR Vol 3
    Pg 165 (20-22)
    Mr. Greaves:      I'm going to have to ask the address after that, but Ican do that
    off the record, Iguess. Imean, there's agood possibility RR
    Vol 3 Pg 165 (23-25)
    Mr. Calvert:     But, Imean, we're talking about awitness that has absolutely no
    personal knowledge about the facts of what happened. The only
    potential knowledge she could have is, you know, ifhe relayed
    to her what happened. But he's talked to - now, we've already
    gotin what he told the9-1-1 operator, what he told the
    detective. We're going to play the recording ofwhat he told the
    detective. He talked to two more detectives at alater date; and
    now, he's testified here in court; and, you know, we're going to
    go fishing for -he's always told the same story but maybe he
    told his wife something different on - .... RR Vol 3 Pe 167
    (7-18)                                                *
    Mr. Calvert:     I guess, the basis ofour objection, Judge, the test under 401 is
    does the evidence - does the question that's on the table have a
    tendency to make the existence ofa fact ofconsequence in
    the case more or less likely. And applying that standard,
    which is the 401 standard, to what's your wife's name, i'
    don't see where that makes any fact ofconsequence in this
    aggravated robbery prosecution of this Defendant more or
    less likely. RRVol 3 Pg 168 (15-23)
    The Court:
    What can you articulate for the record as to why you need this
    name? RR Vol 3 Pg 170 (14-15)
    Mr. Greaves:     Well, Judge, I mean, ithas been mentioned by the State and
    brought forth the fact that he has - in the initial tapes of
    -4-
    Fleming and during their conversation, Fleming testified, about
    his being married and in the process ofdivorce, not wanting her
    to find out about this - I'm trying to recall everything he said to
    Fleming. At that point, there was also testimony brought
    through Mr. Flores by Ms. Swan as to she had cheated onhim.
    He had cheated on her now, doing this cheat on her, that they're
    back together and these kind ofthings. And, Judge, the part
    about her cheating on him, Ihad never heard that. It's not in any
    other statements, anything like that. Iwant to potentially talk to
    her atleast - be able to talk to her and - RR Vol 3 Pg 170 (16-
    25) & Pg 171 (1-6)
    The Court:      Do you have any other way offinding her and talking to her*?
    RRVol3Pgl71(7-8)
    Mr. Greaves:    No, sir. Imean, Idon't know her name. I think everything I
    received from the State did nothave an address for him RR
    Vol 3 Pg 171 (9-11)
    The Court:      So, you don't know where she's living? RRVol3 Pg 171 (12-
    13)
    Mr. Greaves:    No, sir, never have. Ifthey want to bring her up here, I don't
    have to serve herorwhatever; and I can sitdown and talk to
    her. That's fine. RR Vol 3 Pg 171 (14-17)
    Mr. Calvert:   We're talking about a completely collateral issue thathas
    nothing to do with this case,.... The only other way that - kind
    ofgetting to what hewas taking about earlier, that the wife
    could even potentially play arole in this, is ifthere were any
    kind ofprior inconsistent statements. But in order to get in
    anything that he told her about this offense as a prior
    inconsistent statement, two things have to happen. He first has
    to give the witness an opportunity to explain or deny making
    that statement before wecanbring in thewife and have
    extrinsic evidence ofit. No such impeachment has happened,
    nor will there be any because there's no evidence whatsoever
    that any such prior inconsistent statement was made.... And so,
    absent any evidence that he ever made any prior inconsistent
    statements and absent any questions to the witness offering him
    an opportunity to explain or deny anypriorinconsistent
    statements, it didn't come inthere either. And so, now, we're
    back to the relevance issue; and that's the basis ofour objection
    RRVol 3 Pg 171 (20-25) &Pg 172 (1-25) &Pg 173 (1-9)
    -5-
    Mr. Greaves:        Judge, look, Idon't want to tell my defense; but, Iguess, I'm
    forced to. I'm going to have to do that. Imean, my defense
    basically here is aguy, according to everything Ihad up to this
    point, was that is heis...My deal basically is there's some talk
    about this cash, large amount ofcash. He's got that. He loses his
    cash somehow that night, be it paying prostitutes or somebody
    steals it, don't know. But then, you know, it's something to it.
    Like Iwas getting at before, ifyou sit there and say, "Look, I
    couldn't perform or whatever. I lost my money," the cop's not
    going to get itback for you. Ifyou say, "Somebody stole itfrom
    me," he's going to get itback for you. And explaining to the
    wife as to why I don't have this money, and that's -1 want to
    see what this discussion goes on with her. RR Vol 3 Pg 173
    (10-25) & Pg 174 (3-14)
    The Court:
    So, what is your response to that argument, impeachment on a
    collateral matter? RR Vol3 Pg 175 (5-6)
    Mr. Greaves:        I mean, as to that, that's not my main concern orwhat I tried to
    do. I want to get to what - how did he explain this to his wife.
    Because there is -1 mean, defensive theory that he called the
    cops and yelled robbery because he wanted his money back
    RRVol3Pgl75(7-ll)
    The Court:          Has anyone on the behalfofthe State, to your knowledge,
    received any inkling ofinformation about what this wife might
    say that could be considered exculpatory by any argument?
    RRVol3Pgl78(8-ll)
    Mr. Calvert:        No, sir. We have never spoken to her. I don't believe that law
    enforcement ever spoke to.: her. Our investigator has not spoken
    to her. Our victim coordinator has not spoken to her. She -
    from the State's perspective, law enforcement perspective, the
    wife has absolutely no role inthis investigation orin
    this case whatsoever. RR Vol 3 Pg 178 (12-18)
    After further debate, the Trial Court eventually ruled:
    "I'm going to interview the witness in-camera, and I'm
    going totake a list ofquestions from you. And it will be on
    the record, sealed in the record; and I'm going to find out
    what you want to know without you knowing who she is or
    her address or phone number:; Ifshe has exculpatory
    information, I'm going to grant your request to talk to her."
    -6-
    RR Vol 3 Pg 180 (19-25).
    The Appellant was then allowed to continue with her cross-examination ofFlores. RR
    Vol 3Pg 183 (10). During said cross-examination, Flores admitted that the $1,000.00 allegedly
    stolen from him was money which would have been used to support his household. RR Vol 3
    Pg 221. He further admitted that if, for any reason, he was not able to provide his paycheck to
    support his household that it would have caused further problems in his already strained
    marriage. RR Vol 3Pg 222 (3-6). But when asked about what he told his wife as to the
    whereabouts ofthe missing $1,000.00, Flores initially testified that he has never told his wife
    about the allegedly robbery. RR Vol 3Pg 222 (14-22). However, Flores's later testified that his
    wife learned ofthe facts surrounding the alleged robbery from anewspaper article that had been
    posted on Facebook. RR Vol 3Pg 233 (1-5). Upon being confronted by his wife about the facts
    contained in the newspaper article, Flores claimed that the article was alie and that he was never
    in avehicle with Appellant. RR Vol 3Pg 234 (13-22).
    At the conclusion ofFlores' testimony, the State re-urged its argument against the Trial
    Court's previous decision to conduct an in-camera interview ofFlores' wife. RR Vol 3Pg 236
    (20-25) &Pg 237 (1-3). The Trial Court informed the parties that it still planned on proceeding
    with the in-camera interview ofFlores' wife and then recessed court for the day. RR Vol 3Pg
    238 (8-11).
    The following morning, the State urged anew objection to the Trial Court conducting an
    in-camera interview ofFlores' wife. RR Vol 4Pg 7(19-25). The State claimed that any
    discussions Flores had with his wife regarding the facts surrounding the alleged robbery were
    marital communications and were therefore privileged from disclosure. RR Vol 4Pg 8(2-25) &
    -7-
    Pg 9(1-7). The Trial Court sustained the State's objection, but allowed Appellant to read into
    the record the contents ofanewspaper article which Appellant believed was the same article
    that the wife had previously confronted Flores with. RR Vol 4Pg 33 (8-9) &Pg 38 (1-25) &Pg
    39 (1-14). Appellant also submitted for purposes ofthe record acopy ofthe questions that the
    Trial Court had previously asked her to prepare in anticipation ofthe in-camera interview of
    Flores' wife. See Court's Ex 1.
    POINT OF ERROR NIIMRFR OTtfF
    THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT APPELLANT COULD NOT
    QUESTION THE VICTIM'S SPOUSE AS TO WHAT COMMUNICATIONS THE
    VICTIM HAD PREVIOUSLY HAD WITH HIS WIFE REGARDING THE FACTS
    SURROUNDING THE ALLEGED AGGRAVATED ROBBERY.
    The "Confidential Communication Privilege" as set out in TEX.R.CRIM.EVH). 504(a)
    is not absolute. In Weaver, the 14* Court ofAppeals held that any confidential communication
    privilege that might exist at the time the declaring spouse initially communicates with his/her
    spouse is waived when the declaring spouse, "informed third parties ofthe contents ofthose
    communications." See Weaver v. State, 
    855 S.W.2d 116
    , 121 (Tex. App. Houston- 14* Dist.
    1993); see al^ DJehlKState, 
    698 S.W.2d 712
    , 719 (Tex. App. Houston- 1st Dist. 1985) ("A
    party who acquiesces in the admission oftestimony concerning these communications waives
    his privilege to exclude them.)
    During cross examination by Appellant, Flores was questioned about what
    communications he had with his wife about the facts surrounding the alleged robbery. At no
    time during this questioning did the State object that contents ofthese communications were
    privileged. Furthermore, Appellant sought and was granted the expressed approval ofthe Trial
    -8-
    Court prior to question Flores regarding these communications. RR Vol 3Pg 181 (18-20). It
    was not until after Flores had finished testifying, that the State finally claimed that any further
    attempt at questioning Flores or his wife about their discussions would be improper under the
    theory that these communications were in some way protected. RR Vol 4Pg 8(2-4). In doing
    so, the State brought to the Trial Court's attention,
    "And Ididn't have awhole lot oftime to do awhole bunch of research
    on this specific issue, but there is acase - it's Irvan, I-R-V-A-N v
    State. It's out of- what is this out of? Oh, this is Court of
    Criminal Appeals from 2006. And this was amurder case where the
    spouse was actually the defendant. Butthis case outlines and
    delineates the fact that 504 does create two separate privileges the
    communication privilege and the testimony privilege. And one'of the
    things that was asked ofthe spouse in this case over the - actually
    the proper action in this case, was what the - what the husband had
    told his wife about his whereabouts and what he was doing at the time
    ofthe offense - in this case, itwas amurder. And the Court of
    Criminal Appeals in that case said that absolutely that was covered
    under 504(a), under marital communication. That was error to admit
    that testimony. And that'sIrvan v. State"
    However, the State failed to mention to the Trial Court that Irvan is an unpublished opinion.
    See Irvan v. State, 
    2006 WL 1545484
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). Additionally, Irvan in no way
    addresses the issue ofwaiving the confidential communications privilege.
    It is apparent that when Flores volunteered the contents of the communications that he
    had with his spouse about the alleged robbery he waived any possible privilege that he held in
    regards to these communications. Furthermore, ifthe State held any ability to preserve this
    privilege on behalfofFlores it failed to timely object to the disclosure ofthese communications.
    Therefore, the Trial Court erred in not allowing Flores' wife to answer the questions that had
    been prepared byAppellant.
    -9-
    POINT OF ERROR NUMBER TWO
    THE TRIAL COURT VIOLATED APPELLANT'S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT BY
    DENYING THE APPELLANT THE ABILITY TO OBTAIN ANY IDENTIFYING
    INFORMATION OF AMATERIAL WITNESS IN ORDER TO COMPEL THIS
    WITNESS' ATTENDANCE TO TESTIFY ATTRIAL.
    The Sixth Amendment right to compulsory process, "is in plain terms the right to present
    adefense, the right to present the defendant's version ofthe facts as well as the prosecution's to
    the jury so it may decide where the truth lies." Coleman v. Stato 
    996 S.W.2d 525
    , 527 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1998). To be able to exercise one's right to compulsory process, "the defendant must
    make aplausible showing to the trial court, "that the witness' testimony would be both material
    and favorable to the defense." 
    Coleman, 996 S.W.2d at 527
    . In asituation where adefendant has
    not had aprevious opportunity to interview awitness, "it is ofcourse not possible to make any
    avowal ofhow awitness may testify. But the events to which awitness might testify, and the
    relevance ofthose events to the crime charged, may well demonstrate either the presence of
    absence ofthe required materiality." United States v. Valenzuela-TWn.i 
    458 U.S. 858
    , 871
    (1998).
    Prior to trial, Appellant had access to no identifying information as it related to Flores'
    wife. Without such information, there was not any way to interview this woman before the
    commencement ofAppellant's jury trial. At trial, Appellant attempted to illicit from Flores the
    name and physical location ofhis wife. This information was sought by Appellant where a
    subpoena could be issued to compel the wife's attendance to testify before the jury about Flores'
    previous statements to her that he was never in the company ofAppellant at the time ofthe
    alleged robbery. Despite the apparent favorable and material nature ofthe wife's predicted
    -10-
    testimony, the Trial Court denied Appellant's ability to obtain any ofthe necessary information
    to compel this woman's presence at trial.
    CONCLUSION AND RELIEF RFOTTFSTFTi
    Appellant requests this Court to reverse the jury verdict in present case and remand for a
    new trial.
    Respectfully Submitted,
    Craig M. Greaves
    118 B South Main Street
    Bryan, Texas 77803
    979/779-9388 Telephone
    979/779-9380 Facsimile
    craig@greaveslaw.com
    SBN: 24025392
    CERTIFICATE OF SFRVTrir
    «f ^fJuf^
    ofrecord               *ate-mail
    listed below via   atmeonandthisCOrTect COpydayofthe
    the 19*            foregoing 2014.
    of September;  was served upon the counsel
    Doug Howell,
    Assistant Brazos County District Attorney
    Dhowell@brazoscountytx.gov
    Jessica Escue
    Assistant Brazos County District Attorney
    JEscue@brazoscountytx.gov
    Craig M. Greaves
    -11-
    i   IN THE
    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
    No.j 10-13-00160-CR
    ARACELI TELLO,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                  i
    Appellee
    From the 272nd District Court
    Brazos County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 12-02891-CRF-272
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Ajury found Appellant Araceli Tello guilty of aggravated robbery, and the trial
    court assessed her punishment, enhanced by prior felony convictions, at thirty-five
    years' imprisonment. This appeal ensfied.
    The relevant facts are as follows: Leobardo Flores, the alleged victim, testified
    that he and his wife were together as acouple at the time of trial but that in May 2012,
    he "thought to cheat on her" because she had cheated on him. On May 4, he received
    several phone calls from Tello, whom he had known for about fifteen or twenty days as
    aprostitute named Juanita. He agreed to meet up with Tello so that he could get
    together with Tello's friend. When ije arrived at the store where they were supposed to
    meet, Tello came to his car and got inside. He asked where her friend was, and Tello
    told him that she had gone to take her child to the babysitter but that she would come
    and get together with them He thenpked Tello where to go, and she directed him to a
    place bythe railroad tracks to wait. |j
    Flores stated that he had afeeling that something was wrong. Acar approached
    and parked behind them. He told Tello that it was not her friend, but Tello assured him
    that it was. He started the car and tried to pull away, but Tello told him to wait. Aman
    then approached Tello's window, wnich was open, and pointed agun at Flores. The
    man told him to give him his wallet and phone, which he did. He had gotten paid that
    day and had about $1,000 in his wallet. The man told him not to call the police or he
    would kill him. Tello left with the rnan. Flores then went back to the store where he
    had met Tello and called the police.
    During cross-examination, Tello's counsel asked Flores what the name of his wife
    is. The State made arelevance objection that the trial court overruled. The following
    exchange then occurred outside the presence of the jury:
    [Prosecutor]: ... So, I think he is uncomfortable giving the
    name of one of his loved ones in fear of retaliation.
    [Defense Counsel]: ... But she could be a very key witness
    as to what he might have told her about this situation. So for that reason
    -1 mean, Idon't know who she is. Imight need to subpoena her.
    THE COURT: You want to subpoena her up here?
    Tello v. State
    Page 2
    [Defense Counsel]: Well, I'll have to see how his testimony
    goes.
    THE COURT: What has been said about her to this point?
    [Defense Counsel]: Nothing.
    THE.COURT: Yeah, she's been brought up.
    [Defense Counsel]: Well, she's been brought up that he's
    married.
    THE COURT: And I think somebody said that he almost
    broke up with her —              !
    i
    [Defense Counsel]: That she was cheating.
    THE COURT: She was cheating; so, he decided to cheat on
    her; and now, he's gonebackwith her.
    [Prosecutor]: And I don't care if he wants to get into the
    relationship or what - anything like that. It's just I think he's concerned
    about giving up a family member's name.
    THE COURT: So^ do you think he might have talked to her?
    [Defense Counsel]: Well, Judge, that seems logical that they
    would discuss this. And this deal about her cheating on him is the reason
    for their broken up, that's the first time I've ever heard that.
    THE COURT: I'mjust trying to think through it all. So, ifhe
    gives you the name, you're going to subpoena her up here, right?
    [Defense Counsel]: I'm going to have to ask the address
    after that, but Ican do that off the record, Iguess. I mean, there's agood
    possibility.                      '
    [Defense Counsel]: I understand all that. But, I mean,
    getting ahold of a witness. That deal when he said something about,
    "Well, she had cheated on me," I had never heard that before. Never
    heard that.
    Tello v. State
    ;                                            Page 3
    [Prosecutor]: Well, the thing about cheating went to his
    motive to engage in prostitution. It has nothing to do with the robbery,
    other than that's how he came to be there that night.
    [Defense Counsel]: It potentially could.
    [Prosecutor]: But, I mean, we're talking about a witness that
    has absolutely no personal knowledge about the facts of what happened.
    The only potential knowledge she could have is, you know, if he relayed
    to her what happened. But he's talked to - now, we've already got in
    what he told the 9-1-1 operator, what he told the detective. We're going to
    play the recording of what he told the detective. He talked to two more
    detectives at a later date; and' now, he's testified here in court; and, you
    know, we're going to go fishing for - he's always told the same story but
    maybe hetold his wife something different on ....
    [Prosecutor]: I guess, the basis of our objection, Judge, the
    test under 401 is does the evidence - does the question that's on the table
    have a tendency to make the existence of a fact of consequence in the case
    more or less likely.    And applying that standard, which is the 401
    standard, to what's your wife's name, I don't see where that makes any
    fact of consequence in this aggravated robbery prosecution of this
    Defendant more or less likely.
    THE COURT: What can you articulate for the record as to
    why you need this name?
    [Defense Counsel]:       Well, Judge, I mean, it has been
    mentioned by the State and brought forth the fact that he has - in the
    initial tapes of [Detective] Fleming and during their conversation, Fleming
    testified, about his being married and in the process of divorce, not
    wanting her to find out about this - I'm trying to recall everything he said
    to Fleming.                       ,
    At that point, there was also testimony brought through Mr.
    Flores by [Prosecutor] as to she had cheated on him. He had cheated on
    her now, doing this cheat on her, that they're back together and these kind
    of things.
    Tellov. State                             !'                                           „
    Page 4
    And, Judge, thejpart about her cheating on him, I had never
    heard that. It's not in any other statements, anything like that. I want to
    potentially talk toher at least f be able totalk to her and -
    THE COURT: Do you have any other way of finding her
    and talking to her?            r
    [Defense Counsel]: No, sir. I mean, I don't know her name.
    I think everything I received from the State did not have an address for
    him.
    THE COURT: So, you don't know where he's living?
    [Defense Counsel]: No, sir, never have. If they want to
    bring her up here, I don't have to serve her or whatever; and I can sit
    down and talk to her. That's fine.
    [Prosecutor]: May I respond to his argument?
    THE COURT: Y4,sir.
    [Prosecutor]: We're talking about a completely coUateral
    issue that has nothing to do with this case, other than that was why he
    was looking to get with a prostitute, was because of the situationwith his
    wife. But as far as the offense that's alleged, whether - what he's wanting
    to go into is whether or not, in fact, his wife cheated on him. That is - I
    mean, that's what you've said several times now. That issue is completely
    collateral to this case.        *
    And so, that would be my response as to our relevance
    objection, is you're talking about testimony on an issue that is completely
    collateral to and has no bearing on the facts of this case.
    The only other way that - kind of getting to what he was
    taking [sic] about earlier, that the wife could even potentially play arole in
    this, is if there were any kind; of prior inconsistent statements. But in
    order to get in anything that {he told her about this offense as a prior
    inconsistent statement, two things have to happen. He first has to give the
    witness an opportunity to explain or deny making that statement before
    we can bring in the wife and] have extrinsic evidence of it. No such
    impeachment has happened, nor will there be any because there's no
    evidence whatsoever that any such prior inconsistent statement was
    made.
    And the prior inconsistent statement rules are not a license -
    are not a fishing license. You cannot go, "Well, I now want - I now, in
    Tello v. State                                                                            „    _
    I                                                Page 5
    trial, want the information, the names and addresses of every person that
    you may have ever talked to, ever to see if there is a prior inconsistent
    statement." That's not what that's for.
    And so, absent any evidence that he ever made any prior
    inconsistent statements and absent any questions to the witness offering
    him an opportunity to explain or deny any prior inconsistent statements,
    it didn't come in there either.
    And so, now, we're back to the relevance issue; and that's
    the basis of our objection.
    [Defense Counsel]: Up to this point, you've listened to
    Fleming's tape as well as theirItestimony. He says that he's going through
    a divorce, buthe'strying to fixj.it. And, I mean, I think -
    THE COURT: He's going through adivorce and trying to fix
    it?
    [Defense Counsel]: He's told Fleming they're trying - he's
    trying to fix it, trying to get back with her when this happens.
    THE COURT: Okay.
    [Defense Counsel]: All right. My deal basically is there's
    some talk about this cash, large amount of cash. He's got that. He loses
    his cash somehow that night, be it paying prostitutes or somebody steals
    it, don't know. But then, you know, it's something to it. Like I was
    getting at before, if you sit there and say, "Look, I couldn't perform or
    whatever. Ilost my money," the cop's not going to get it back for you.
    If you say, "Somebody stole it from me," he's going to get it
    back for you. And explaining to the wife as to why I don't have this
    money, and that's -1 want to see what this discussion goes on with her.
    THE COURT: So,he's trying to make himself look better by
    saying "she's cheating on me;" so, you could interrogate her and find out,
    you know, if that's true or not. Bring her up to say, "No, Iwasn't cheating
    on him. He's lying about that.": But as the Prosecutor said, that appears to
    be a collateral matter and you're not entitled to impeach on a collateral
    matter.
    Tello v. State                               r
    i!                                         Page 6
    So, what is your .response to that argument, impeachment on
    a collateral matter?           :;
    [Defense Counsel]: I mean, as to that, that's not my main
    concern or what Itried to do. !l want to get to what - how did he explain
    this to his wife. Because there;;is ~Imean, defensive theory that he called
    the cops and yelled robbery because he wanted his money back.
    THE COURT: Has anyone on the behalf of the State, to your
    knowledge, received any inkling of information about what this wife
    might say that could be considered exculpatory by any argument?
    [Prosecutor]: No; sir. We have never spoken to her. I don't
    believe that law enforcement ever spoke to her. Our investigator has not
    spoken to her. Our victim coordinator has not spoken to her. She - from
    the State's perspective, law | enforcement perspective, the wife has
    absolutely no role in this investigation or in this case whatsoever.
    THE COURT: I'm going to interview the witness in-camera,
    and I'm going to take alist of Questions from you. And it will be on the
    record, sealed in the record; arid I'm going to find out what you want to
    know without you knowing who she is or her address or phone number.
    If she has exculpatory information, I'm going to grant your request to talk
    to her.                          »
    THE COURT: So> for now, I'm denying - I'm taking your
    request under advisement until I interview the witness. So, right now,
    you can't ask what her name is. i-
    [Defense Counsel]^ Or address or -
    THE COURT: Not yet.
    [Defense Counsel]: But I can ask as to what he told his wife
    about this and all.
    THE COURT: Yeah, you can ask him that.
    Tello v. State                            ••
    Page 7
    Tello's counsel then continued his cross-examination of Flores, which included
    the following exchange:                 '
    Q.    [(By Defense Counsel] And you're still living with your wife
    at this time, correct?          \
    'I
    A.    That is right.
    Q.     Okay. Did you tell your wife you were going to do
    something else or going to be f you wouldn'tbe home for awhile?
    A.     That's right.     :.
    Q. Okay. And you had told your wife that you had - you were
    just going to leave your home and go step out some[ ]place for awhile,
    correct?
    A.     No.
    Q.     What did you - 1think you testified earlier that's' what you
    did. You left your home?         •'
    A.     No.
    Q.    Okay.
    A.    No.
    Q.    Okay. So, where were you coming from?
    THE INTERPRETER: I'm sorry?
    [Defense Counsel]: Where were you coming from?
    THE WITNESS: From having my hair done - cut.
    Q.    (By [Defense Counsel]) And so, had you told your wife your
    whereabouts, where you were going to beat thattime?
    Tello v. State                            r                                            n    Q
    i                        .                   Page 8
    A.      Regularly, I come out from work. I come out latefrom work.
    When I call my wife that Iwas going to come back late from work, but not
    too late.
    Q.      Okay. So, you're telling her that you're still at work?
    i'
    A.      That's right.
    Q. You don't recall earlier in your testimony where you told       me
    that you told her you just had to go run an errand basically?
    A.      No.              ,:
    Q.      Okay. So, she thinks you're still at work; and you're out
    trying to meet this prostitute? ;<
    A.      That's right.    ;:
    Q.     Okay. And, I mean, she knows - your wife knows you got
    paid that day, on Friday?
    A.      That's right.
    Q.      No, I guess my question is: Did you tell your wife - yes or
    no - tell her aboutyou getting robbed?
    i
    A.      No.
    Q.      She knows nothing of this?
    A.      After the time she began getting to know it.
    Q.      So, how - did you tell her about it; or did somebody else tell
    her about it?
    A. The letters that I received at home, they say that I was
    involved in a robbery; so, she started asking me questions about what
    happened that day.
    Q.      Okay. And you told her that someone held you up at
    gunpoint?
    Tello v. State                             ;
    Page 9
    A.       No.                 ;•
    Q.      Okay. You told;'her that you were there waiting to meet a
    prostitute?
    A.      No.                  ';
    Q.      Okay. But she has asked you on other occasions about what
    these letters are and all that, correct?
    A.      That's right.        ji
    Q. Okay. Okay. ..[ I'm going to ask you this question: You
    stated that you had not told your wife about what happened, the facts of
    this case, correct, the facts of this case?
    A.       Correct, not the details.
    Q-       She came to you and said, "What are these letters about you
    being robbed," correct?
    A.      That's right.
    Q.      What did you tell her?
    A.      I told her a story.
    Q.      Well, tell us what story you told her.
    A.      Yes, I tried to get away from telling her that I was going to
    go meet with a prostitute.
    Q.      Whatstory did you tellher?
    A.      I told her that since I had been robbed earlier or before I was
    working with the police officer to try to catch the people that had robbed
    me.
    Q.      So, you had been robbed before this?
    Tello v. State                                 i
    i;                                          Page 10
    A.     That's right.    ;
    Q. You said you were working with the police to ~ based on an
    incident that happened befofeithis, right? Is that what you told us?
    A.    That's right.     j-
    Q.    So, you told her that this was about the cell phone?
    A.    That's right.     [
    Q.    And that's all you have ever told her about this case is that
    this case - the reason why you're getting the letters is because of this
    about the cell phone that was stolen from you prior to this incident?
    A.    No.
    Q.     Okay. What else have you told her?
    A.     She found - sher found out about what had happened on
    Facebook.
    Q.    On Facebook?
    A.    That's right.
    Q.    Someone put on Facebook about this incident? Are you
    talking about like a newspaper article sheread?
    A.    That's right. His picture was there; and so, that's the reason
    why she knows that he goes to the store whereshe works.
    Q.    No, my question is this: Imean, did you describe to her any
    ofthe events ofthat night?
    A.    In time she started learning about it, and Ihad to start telling
    her.
    Q.    So, yes, you have told her details of events of that night?
    A.    She asked me, and I look at her -
    Tello v. State
    Page 11
    THE INTERPRETER: Oh, correction. She asked me, and I
    deny it.                        ;.
    Q.    (By [Defense Counsel]) ... [T]his is a simple question. Have
    you at any point in time discussed with your wife the incident and the
    details of the incident?        !;
    A.    No.
    Q.    And when she finds it on the newspaper article about it and
    confronts you about it, you told her that's a lie?
    A.     That's right.
    Q.     What part? I mean, that it was a lie that it's in the
    newspaper or a liethat you wererobbed; or what part did you tell her was
    a lie?                           !:
    A.     That I was going to go meet with two prostitutes.
    J;
    Q.    You just - you deny that part to her, and you said that part's
    a lie? That's the onlypart that's a lie?
    A.    That's right.
    Q.    But if I recall that newspaper article, it described you as
    being in the vehicle with another woman, correct?
    A.    I didn't read the newspaper article. My wife explained that
    to me, and I believe so.
    Q. All right. So, you have denied that you were anywhere
    around that - that part of this story that has been in the newspaper, you
    told your wife - denied the fact that you were around any women that
    night?
    A.    That's right.
    Q-    So, you told your wife it's a lie when it comes to the fact that
    there's women involved in this case?
    A.    That's right.
    Tello v. State
    Page 12
    At the conclusion of Flores's testimony, Tello's counsel again brought up
    questioning Flores's wife, and the State re-urged its relevance complaint. At that point,
    the trial court informed the partie? that it planned to proceed with the in-camera
    hearing and adjourned for the day. [
    The next morning, the State objected to any further questions by anybody
    regarding what communication wasjmade between Flores and his wife, arguing that
    such communication was protected %the marital-communications privilege. The trial
    court sustained the State's objection. The trial court then told defense counsel to put his
    objection on the record, whichhe did as follows:
    [Defense Counsel]: Well, I mean, as to this case, just for the
    purpose of the record, that the {victim - alleged victim has testified that he
    at first did not tell his wife about this occurrence. Then, when some
    paperwork came from the D.A.'s office and she questioned him about
    that, he told her something, Which I kind of followed yesterday about
    some cell phone that was stolen by somebody else prior to that. Then she
    confronted him with anewspaper article, which according to him, it was a
    Facebook or newspaper article thatdescribed this incident.
    [Defense Counsel]: Per the Court's ruling yesterday that
    was going to allow the in-camera questioning of her, I was asked to
    submit some ~ thequestions that I wanted, which ~
    THE COURT: I've changed my mind. I'm not going to do
    that.
    [Defense Counsel]: I understand that; but for purposes of
    the record, I'm going to read them into it.
    THE COURT: Yes, sir. Go right ahead.
    Tello v. State                            li
    ;i                                          Page 13
    /
    [Defense Counsel]: I sent an e-mail to the Court as well as
    [Prosecutors] at -
    THE COURT: Why don't you just introduce a copy of them,
    and that will be marked Court's Exhibit Number 1for purposes of appeal,
    copies of your —
    [Defense Counsel]: My problem is there's notan attachment
    ofthe newspaper article on thi£ that I sent the Court. I'll have to read that
    into the record.                 !
    THE COURT: You can read that.
    [Defense Counsel]: But hetestified up here onthe stand that
    he was - she confronted him about some newspaper article, which I
    searched and searched; and the only one I could find does not have his
    name on it. So, I don't know how she ever came to that conclusion that
    was him.
    But he stated that at that point that ~ mentioned about
    prostitutes and stuff, he said - told her it was a lie.
    And I had him - of course, I don't know what newspaper
    article she's referring to because I can't askher what article it was. I don't
    know what part he's saying is a! lieand not a lie.
    And, Judge, I mean, as to his credibility, as to basically his
    word stating that this happened, he is flimflamming around up here about
    what he told his wife about it, trying to explain it. I think that he has
    waived his - any kind of marital privilege that the State asserts he has by
    making the statement.              '
    The State did not object to it. It's not the Court's duty to
    object to it. It's the State's. They're the ones ~Imean, same as, you know,
    if Iallowed hearsay in, Imean, by some witness that's not my client. Well,
    it's not the Court's duty to say, 'Well, you can't say that because it's
    hearsay."
    I think this is a violation of my Defendant's right to due
    process and compulsory process. The witness - as outlined in Coleman,
    966 S.W.2d, the Defendant's entitled to the Sixth Amendment to present a
    defense, the right to present the Defendant's version of the facts and as
    well as the Prosecutor has that, right so the jury may decide where the
    truth lies.
    And if the Defendant can make a plausible showing to the
    trial court, even though if he's hot had the opportunity to interview the
    witness, which I have not. I'm being denied that because I can't get a
    telephone number, location, anything.
    Tello v. State                              !'                                         „
    Page 14
    You know, I'm going to establish matters that that witness
    might testify to. She might testify that he told me it was all a farce. He
    told me, "Nothing ever happened," which obviously would be - hold
    great weight with the jury.   j;
    Hemight have tc?ld her, "Well, yeah, I did. I was unfaithful.
    I was ~ you know, I had consensual sex with these people. They didn't
    rob me." Idon't know what he's going to say.
    But I, also, on one thing, the spousal communication protects
    communications, if it does ap|>ly in this situation. It doesn't protect acts.
    And as to her testifying if ;she was unfaithful to him, that's not a
    communication. That's an act.;
    And his testimony up here was the first time I heard it, that,
    "Well, Iwas dealing with her being unfaithful to me." It sheds a light on
    him that it's okay what he's doing; and I think that that has - the
    Defendant has a right to go into that; and the Court is denying me that as
    well.
    And so, under due process, Sixth Amendment, as well as I
    believe the Court is wrong asj to Rule 505 [sic]. I believe the State has
    waived that and this case - tie Bruni case that I presented to the Court
    clearly states that that's not something you can go back and later claim
    after the testimony has beenout there.
    THE COURT: All right. That will be your objection for the
    record.
    [Defense Counsel]: And I need to read in thearticle.
    THECOURT: All right.
    [DefenseCounsel]: ....
    The attachment which I need ~ I'll put the e-mail in here.
    The attachment to the e-mail -I; there was two attachments. One of them
    being an article from "The Eagle" on May 18th, 2012, entitled "Man
    Duped by Prostitute and her Friend Report States."
    It says: Bryan man recently told police that he wondered if
    he was set up by apossible prostitute trying to find him a, quote, unquote,
    date led him to a parking lot Where he was robbed at gunpoint. The
    incident happened just before ,9:00 p.m., May 4th, in the 2900 block of
    West 28th Street, when the manisaid he madea deal with the woman after
    rejecting her offer for services, •the court document states. She climbed
    into his car and told him she could set him up with another woman, but
    Tello v. State                           I                                             n   1C
    Page 15
    once a few blocks away, all the driver saw was a car with another man
    approaching, the document states.
    "Later the driver told police that he thought something was
    strange, but itwasn't until he was waiting for the police that it occurred to
    him that he was likely setup. \The woman, who twice put the car in park
    when the driver tried to leave the lot, rolled down her window as the
    second man approached and \ordered the driver to give his wallet with
    $1,000 initand his cell phone, Jthe police report states.
    "The driver complied and the man, along with the
    prostitute, jumped into the car: and sped away, the police said. The victim
    quickly called police from a nearby store.
    "It was at the convenience store that detectives reviewed
    surveillance video and through abrief investigation learned the identity of
    . the woman and the man. Warrants were issued for the arrest of Robert
    Guzman Sierra, 26, and Araceli Tello, 36. Both were taken into custody
    Wednesday on charges of aggravated robbery which is a first degree
    felony."                        ;
    Which as that article ~ there's a lack of any Leobardo Flores,
    even though Mr. Flores said thatthat was ~ his wife confronted him about
    an article, and my understanding was he said a newspaper article, so -
    THE COURT: All right. Are you going to introduce a copy
    of your questions?              :
    [Defense Counsel]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: And that will be marked Court's Exhibit 1 for
    purposes of appeal.
    (Court's Exhibit No. 1 offered and admitted.)
    Court's Exhibit No. 1 provided the following questions to be propounded to Flores's
    wife:                                     '
    1. Do you recall ever receiving in the mail any documents in which your
    husband was referenced as being an alleged victim of Aggravated
    Robbery?
    a) Ifso, when doyou recall receiving such documents inthe mail?
    b) If so, did you at anytime question your husband as to why he was
    receiving such documents in the mail?
    Tello v. State                                                                        „
    Page 16
    c) Ifso, what was your husband's response?
    2. Have you at anytime readik newspaper article, Facebook post, etc. that
    you believe described anincident in which your husband was the alleged
    victim of Aggravated Robbery?
    a) If so, when do you recall reading this newspaper article, Facebook post,
    etc.?                          i;
    b) If so, did this newspaper article, Facebook post, etc. specifically identify
    your husband by name as«: being an alleged victim of Aggravated
    Robbery?                       f
    c) If so, was what you read the same or similar to the article that was
    published on May 18, 2012 in the Bryan/College Station Eagle
    Newspaper? See "Police: Maripkely Duped By Prostitute" attached hereto.
    d) If so, did you at anytime confront your husband concerning the
    information you had read inthis newspaper article, Facebook post, etc.?
    e) If so, what was his response to your questioning of him about the
    information you had read in trtis newspaper article, Facebook post, etc.[?]
    d) [sic] In responding, did your husband specifically deny having contact
    with any female (prostitute or, otherwise), as described in the newspaper
    article, Facebook post you read?
    e) [sic] In responding, what amount of money did your husband claim
    was stolen from him?
    3. Prior to May 4, 2012, had your husband ever accused you/discussed
    with you allegations that you had been unfaithful to him?
    In herfirst issue, Tello contends thatthe trial court erred in ruling that she could
    not question Flores's wife as to what communications he had with his wife regarding
    the facts surrounding the alleged aggravated robbery. Tello argues that Flores waived
    any possible privilege that he held regarding these communications when he testified
    about what communications he had with his wife regarding the facts surrounding the
    Tello v. State                            ;                                             Page 17
    alleged aggravated robbery without objecting that the communications were privileged.
    Similarly, in her second issue, Tello contends that the trial court violated her Sixth
    Amendment right by denying her the ability to obtain any identifying information of a
    material witness (Flores's wife) in order to compel the witness's attendance to testify at
    i.
    trial. Even if the trial court erred, however, Tello was not harmed by such error. See
    Tex. R. App. P. 44.2.                    i
    Based on Court's Exhibit No.; 1, Tello first wanted to ask Flores's wife to what
    extent she had confronted Flores abcjut the alleged aggravated robbery and about what
    he had told her in response. Before;introducing Court's Exhibit No. 1, Tello explained:
    You know, I'm going to establish matters that that witness
    might testify to. She might testify that he told me it was all a farce. He
    told me, "Nothing ever happened," which obviously would be - hold
    great weight with the jury.      \
    He might have told her, "Well, yeah, I did. I was unfaithful.
    I was - you know, I had consensual sex with these people. They didn't
    rob me."                         '
    Any testimony by Flores's wife about what Flores told her about the robbery would,
    however, have been inadmissible hearsay. See Tex. R. Evid. 801, 802.
    Furthermore, any testimony byFlores's wife about what Rores told her about the
    alleged aggravated robbery would not have been admissible for impeachment purposes
    as aprior inconsistent statement under Rule of Evidence 613(a). Rule 613(a) provides:
    In examining awitness concerning aprior inconsistent statement made by
    the witness, whether oral or written, and before further cross-examination
    concerning, or extrinsic evidence of, such statement may be allowed, the
    witness must be told the contents of such statement and the time and
    place and the person to whom it was made, and must be afforded an
    opportunity to explain or deny such-statement....            If the witness
    Tello v. State                                                                         „
    i;                                         Page 18
    tmequivocally admits having;: made such statement, extrinsic evidence of
    same shall not be admitted.   ?
    Tex. R. Evid. 613(a). Here, Rores padily admitted that what he told his wife was
    inconsistent with his testimony off what happened during the alleged aggravated
    robbery. Flores testified that he lied |o his wife about the alleged aggravated robbery to
    hide the fact that he was soliciting aprostitute at the time he was robbed.
    Rnally, based on Court's Exhibit No. 1, Tello also wanted to ask Flores's wife if
    Flores had accused her or discussed with her allegations that she had been unfaithful to
    him. But any testimony by Rores's jtvife about such communication would have been
    irrelevant. See Tex. R. Evid. 401,402. [
    Therefore, as stated above, everi if the trial court erred, Tello was not harmed by
    such error. See Tex. R. App. P. 44.2. B(|th of her issues are overruled, and the trial court's
    judgment is affirmed.
    REX D. DAVIS
    Justice
    Before ChiefJustice Gray,
    Justice Davis, and
    Justice Scoggins
    (Chief Justice Gray dissenting with a note)*
    Affirmed
    Opinion delivered and filed April 23,2015
    Do not publish
    [CRPM]
    (Chief Justice Gray dissents. A separate opinion will not issue. He notes
    however that this case turned on the; credibility of Flores, the alleged victim. While
    testifying on cross examination Rores admitted he had lied to his wife about the events
    Tello v. State                           '
    j.                                           Page 19
    resulting in the defendant's arrest and trial. The extent and scope of what Flores told
    eTLtivp,
    effectively"T
    askedif?!"1
    to believe""     *l0r6Swhat
    Flores about    WaSliesWlUin§
    Flores t0hadadmit
    told his^wifedefendant  was
    and to believe
    what he was testifying to was the whole truth at trial including what he had previously
    hed about when telling his wife. This calls to mind Professor Matt Dawson's (Baylor
    Law School sPractice Court Professor) famous cross examination question: Were you
    lying then or are you lying now? As argued by the defendant, for all we know Rores
    could have made up the story he was telling the police to continue to cover the lies he
    subpoena Flores swife, the defendant was denied the ability to effectively investigate
    and pursue a defense directly involving Rores's credibility about the events at
    ssue. What could be amore relevant source of material information to impeach the
    testimony of the State s star witness; the alleged victim, than the person to whom he
    told an entirely different story about the events. The trial court erred in refusing to
    require disclosure of the identifying information for Rores's wife.)
    *< OF „^fe
    "Wfli'fSjttV.VP'
    Tello v. State
    Page 20
    OFFICIAL NOTICE FROM COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS
    - PO BOX 12308 CAPIIOL STATION AUSTIN TEXAS 78711 ..
    it
    'VTPun^Arir..                 T ~          "      -      COACaseNo.10:i3:00160:CR
    X        'T                Tr. Ct. No. 12-02891-CRF-272                     PD-0610-15
    OnJhjsjJay this Court has granted the Appellant's Pro Se motion for an extension
    of time in which to file the Petition for Discretionary Review. The time toltethe*
    S. .'°ScacSK!?™XtenC,ed t0 Fr|day;julv24.2015. NO FURTHER EXTENSIONS
    ht^ ^ NIE^AINED" NOTE: Petition For Discretionary Review must be filed
    with The Court of Criminal Appeals.
    Abel Acosta, Clerk
    ARACELI TELLO
    TDC# 1855166
    HOBBY UNIT
    742 FM 712
    MARLIN.TX 76661
    •1fc.BH3B   ,'o££i                  ll,M,lf'Ml'lllhlllllf!|»'HH'hHMhlrMlWlHl
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Document Info

Docket Number: PD-0610-15

Filed Date: 7/27/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021