Juana Mendez Valdez, Et Vir Juan Valdez v. Melody Mueller Moerbe ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-14-00731-CV
5084966
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
4/29/2015 2:42:24 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRD DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT AUSTIN FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
4/29/2015 2:42:24 PM
NO. 03-14-00731-CV JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
JUANA MENDEZ VALDEZ
ET VIR JUAN VALDEZ, Appellants
V.
MELODY MUELLER MOERBE, Appellee
APPELLEE’S REJOINDER TO APPELLANTS’ REPLY BRIEF
On Appeal from the 155th District Court of Fayette County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2013V-052
GATES, STEIN, GILLESPIE &
TREFNY
MICHAEL T. TREFNY
TBN 20207650
P. O. Box 458
Columbus, Texas 78934
Telephone: (979) 732-2301
Facsimile: (979) 732-2303
Email: mtrefny@gsgtlawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE,
MELODY MUELLER MOERBE
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page(s)
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………………………. iii
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES ……………………………………………. 1
PRAYER ………………………………………………………………………..... 5
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE …………………………………………...... 5
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE …………………………………………………... 6
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
(Tex. App. – El Paso, 2007, pet dism) ..........................................................................................................2
Falcon v. Ensigna, 976 S.W.2d 336, 338 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1998, now pet.) ............................2
Heard v. State, 146 Tex. 139, 146, 204 S.W.2d 344, 348 (1947) ...............................................................1
Mapco v. Marek, 797 S.W.2d 700, 702, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 303 (Tex. 1990) ............................................2
Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, at 171, (1884) .......................................................................................1
Sparkman v. State, 968 S.W.2d 373, 377-78 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1997, pet. Ref’d) ...................................2
Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.], 2004, pet. denied).......................2
Rules
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(c) .......................................................................................................3
Code
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.025 and 16.026..........................................................3
Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.025 or 16.026 ............................................................1
Texas Property Code Chapter 24 ..................................................................................................................1
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Appellee, Melody Mueller Moerbe, files this her Rejoinder to the Reply
Brief of Appellants.
ARGUMENT AND AUTHORITIES
This Rejoinder is intended to address only those arguments and authorities
raised in Appellants’ Reply Brief. There are three simple points. First, Appellants
have wholly failed to point this Court to any case which holds that filing suit in
Justice Court to recover possession of real property under the Texas Property Code
Chapter 24, commonly called an eviction case, is not sufficient to toll limitations
under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.025 or 16.026.
Secondly, Appellants argue that just because the testimony of Appellant Juana
Mendez Valdez was full of inconsistencies and outright lies on some issues, she
should still be believed on other issues. Third, Appellants urge that lack of
exercise of control over the property by Ms. Moerbe somehow lowers Appellants’
burden to show that they exercised sufficient use and control over the property to
establish the requisite possession and control over the property, to-wit:
“visible, continuous, notorious, distinct, hostile (i.e., adverse), and of such a
character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive
ownership in the occupant.”
Satterwhite v. Rosser, 61 Tex. 166, at 171, (1884). Cited with approval in Heard v.
State, 146 Tex. 139, 146, 204 S.W.2d 344, 348 (1947).
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Regarding the first point, Appellants have now cited the Court to two cases
which really do them no good, and in fact help establish that filing suit in Justice
Court is sufficient. In Padilla v. NCJ Dev., Inc. 218 S.W.3d 811 (Tex. App. – El
Paso, 2007, pet dism), the Eighth District Court of Appeals clearly held that
“Specific evidence of a title dispute is required to raise an issue of a justice court’s
jurisdiction.” Id. at 815. HN 4. Citing with approval, Falcon v. Ensigna, 976 S.W.
2d 336, 338 (Tex. App. – Corpus Christi 1998, now pet.) and Sparkman v. State,
968 S.W.2d 373, 377-78 (Tex. App. – Tyler 1997, pet. Ref’d). In this case, no
issue of title was raised in the Justice Court and the Justice Court suit was a suit to
recover real property tolling limitation. The tolling of limitations never ceased as
the suit in District Court below was filed while the appeal to the County Court was
pending. The second case, Villalon v. Bank One, 176 S.W.3d 66 (Tex. App. –
Houston [1st Dist.], 2004, pet. denied), merely recites that “A judgment is void only
when it is apparent that the court rendering the judgement had no jurisdiction of
the parties, no jurisdiction of the subject matter, no jurisdiction to enter the
judgment, or no capacity to act as a court.” Id. at 69. Citing Mapco v. Marek, 797
S.W.2d 700, 702, 33 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 303 (Tex. 1990). Under Villalon and
Mapco, the Justice Court had jurisdiction until an issue of title was raised, which it
was not until after the appeal to County Court. The filing of the suit clearly was a
suit to recover property, if just possession, which tolled limitations under Texas
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Civil Practice and Remedies Code Section 16.025 and 16.026. Appellants have yet
to cite any case to the contrary.
On the issue of credibility of Appellant Juana Mendez Valdez, Appellants’
only witness on their possession and use of the property, Appellants are now
admitting that she testified falsely, but offer the excuse that such testimony was not
relevant and that her testimony was clear, direct and positive when it counted. See
Reply Brief at Page 3, Paragraph 2. However, the standard which Appellants must
prove is that her testimony, where there is no opposing evidence, also is:
“clear, direct, and positive and otherwise credible and free from
contradiction and inconsistencies and could have readily been controverted.”
Texas Rules of Civil Procedure 166a(c). What Mrs. Valdez heard from Ms.
Gordon or did with the property early on could not be “readily controverted.” Ms.
Gordon is dead. Mr. and Mrs. Valdez are admittedly the only people who were
paying attention to the use of the property in 2000. However, Mrs. Valdez’
evidence is not clear and there is a lot of testimony tending to discredit or impeach
such testimony. Mrs. Valdez repeatedly contradicted her testimony given in direct
and upon cross, and on extremely material issues such as what use she made of the
property. In direct she said she and her husband cleared the land when they
purchased it. Under cross examination, she admitted that the brush was thick and
they only cleared enough to get the trailers in as they built them. The evidence of
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the contradictions and lies by Mrs. Valdez was overwhelming. See Appellee’s
Brief Pages 9-15 which detail many of the most clearly established lies.
Notwithstanding Mrs. Valdez’ various testimony, she clearly admitted that
the Seeberger tract was all grown up in brush and they did not clear it right away.
(RR Vol. 3, P. 29, LL 24-P. 30, LL 10) Appellants did not clear the entire property
when they first took possession in 2000, but rather only cleared a little area for the
first trailer in 2000 (RR Vol. 3, P. 32, LL 10-21), which is situated very close to
the edge of the Seeberger tract along an area of unknown ownership, and only
partially on the Seeberger tract. (RR Vol. 3, P. 65, LL 5-14) As such, even if all
of her other testimony was credible, by her own admissions adequate evidence
exists to support the jury’s finding that Appellants’ possession was not so “visible,
continuous, notorious, distinct, hostile (i.e., adverse), and of such a character as to
indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the
occupant.” It is on this issue the jury properly considered not only the lack of
credibility of Mrs. Valdez, but also the self-defeating testimony of her limited use.
Without the benefit of the presumption of use of the entire tract, which is
allowed under Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code 16.025, Appellants had the
burden under the ten (10) year statute, Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code
16.026, of establishing that their use to the above standard applied not only to
some corner, but to the entirety of the tract. Mrs. Valdez’ own testimony shows
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that Appellants did not do so, and would compel such a finding even if the jury had
not so found.
PRAYER
Appellee, Melody Mueller Moerbe, prays that for the foregoing reasons,
Appellants’ appeal should be in all things denied.
Respectfully submitted,
GATES, STEIN, GILLESPIE &
TREFNY
By /s/ Michael T. Trefny
MICHAEL T. TREFNY
SBN 20207650
P. O. Box 458
Columbus, Texas 78934
Telephone: (979) 732-2301
Facsimile: (979) 732-2303
Email: mtrefny@gsgtlawfirm.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE,
MELODY MUELLER MOERBE
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 9.4(i)(3), I hereby
certify that Appellee’s Rejoinder to Appellants’ Reply Brief contains 1,071 words,
as computed by the word processing program Microsoft Word, commencing with
the Argument and Authorities and, except for footnotes, is in Times New Roman
font text, 14-point typeface.
/s/ Michael T. Trefny
MICHAEL T. TREFNY
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing instrument has
been served on Appellants, pursuant to the TEXAS RULES OF APPELLATE
PROCEDURE on this 29th day of April, 2015, as follows:
E-filing through Pro-Doc, on OF JONES III, at ofjones360@gmail.com.
/s/ Michael T. Trefny
MICHAEL T. TREFNY
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