Ceasar Lakendrick Russi v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
14-14-00397-CR
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
5/13/2015 3:47:21 PM
No. 14-14-00397-CR CHRISTOPHER PRINE
No. 14-14-00398-CR CLERK
In the
Court of Appeals
For the FILED IN
14th COURT OF APPEALS
Fourteenth District of Texas HOUSTON, TEXAS
At Houston 5/13/2015 3:47:21 PM
 CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
Nos. 1307885 & 1307886
In the 178th District Court
Of Harris County, Texas

CEASAR LAKENDRICK RUSSI
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee

STATE’S APPELLATE BRIEF

DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
JESSICA AKINS
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
State Bar Number: 24029415
akins_jessica@dao.hctx.net
ANA MARTINEZ
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
H. C. Criminal Justice Center
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone: 713.755.5826
Fax Number: 713.755.5809
ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(g) and TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1, the State waives
oral argument since it was not requested by appellant.
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A), a complete list of the names of all
interested parties is provided below.
Victims:
Zoila Quintanilla & Isaias Quintanilla
Counsel for the State:
Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County
Jessica Akins  Assistant District Attorney on appeal
Ana Martinez  Assistant District Attorney at trial
David Abrams  Assistant District Attorney at trial
Appellant or criminal defendant:
Ceasar Lakendrick Russi
Counsel for Appellant:
Thomas A. Martin  Counsel on appeal
Major L. Adams  Counsel at trial
Rhonda McLeod Chargois  Counsel at trial
Connie B. Williams  Counsel at motion for new trial
Trial Judge:
Honorable David Mendoza  Presiding Judge
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT .......................................................... i
IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ................................................................................ i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ................................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ................................................................................................. 1
STATEMENT OF FACTS ........................................................................................................ 1
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ..................................................................................... 3
Appellant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
either at the trial or punishment phase of trial. He failed to preserve the issue
of whether the trial court’s response to a jury note was improper.
Nonetheless, he has not shown the judge abused its discretion.
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S THIRD ISSUE ......................................................................... 4
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND ISSUE ..................................................................... 7
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST ISSUE ........................................................................... 9
CONCLUSION .........................................................................................................................12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ............................................................................................... 13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .................................................................................... 13
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Alexander v. State,
282 S.W.3d 701 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d) ........................................................................... 12
Dannhaus v. State,
928 S.W.2d 81 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.]1996, pet. ref’d) ............................................................................... 6
Ex parte McFarland,
163 S.W.3d 743 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) .......................................................................... 5
Gordon v. State,
633 S.W.2d 872 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982) .......................................................................... 9
Hawkins v. State,
660 S.W.2d 65 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) ......................................................................... 11
Holden v. State,
201 S.W.3d 761 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) .......................................................................... 9
Kupchynsky v. Nardiello,
230 S.W.3d 685 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 2007, pet. denied) ................................................................................................. 8
Lewis v. State,
911 S.W.2d 1 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) ............................................................................... 9
Lyle v. State,
418 S.W.3d 901 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2013, no pet.) ................................................................................. 8
Marinos v. State,
186 S.W.3d. 167 (Tex. App.—
Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) .................................................................................................. 11
Pryor v. State,
719 S.W.2d 628 (Tex. App.—
Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d) ...................................................................................................... 6
Quinn v. State,
958 S.W.2d 395 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) .......................................................................... 9
iii
Resendez v. State,
160 S.W.3d 181 (Tex. App.—
Corpus Christi 2005, no pet.).......................................................................................... 9
San Saba Energy, L.P. v. Crawford,
171 S.W.3d 323 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, no pet.) ................................................................................ 8
Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1984) ................................................................................................... 4, 10
Thompson v. State,
9 S.W.3d 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ......................................................................... 4, 6
Unkart v. State,
400 S.W.3d 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) ........................................................................... 8
Valdes-Fuerte v. State,
892 S.W.2d 103 (Tex. App.—
San Antonio 1994, no pet.) .............................................................................................. 5
STATUTES
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN.
art. 38.05 (West 2013) ..................................................................................................... 8
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.
§3.03(a) (West 2013) ....................................................................................................... 7
RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 ............................................................................................................... 8
TEX. R. APP. P. 38.2(a)(1)(A) ................................................................................................. i
TEX. R. APP. P. 39.1 ................................................................................................................ i
TEX. R. APP. P. 9.4(g) ............................................................................................................ i
iv
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant was charged by indictment with the felony offenses of aggravated
robbery and aggravated assault. (CR I 72; CR II 631). The jury found appellant
guilty of both offenses as charged in the indictments. (CR I 158; CR II 145; RR VI
6). The jury sentenced appellant to 60 years confinement for the aggravated
robbery and 20 years confinement for the aggravated assault, both to be served in
the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. (CR I 173,
176; CR II 156, 159). They also assessed a $10,000 fine. (CR II 156; RR VI 58-61).

STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the early hours of May 25, 2011, Zoila Quintanilla was inside her car when
appellant approached her, holding a pistol in his hand. (RR III 22-26). Appellant
opened the door of the Suburban and told her to get out of the car; they struggled
when she did not immediately get out of the car. (RR III 26-28, 103). Appellant
forced Zoila out of the car, and she ran up to her house yelling for her husband or
brother to assist her. (RR III 28-30, 48).
1
CR I refers to the clerk’s record in cause number 1307885 (aggravated robbery) and CR II refers
to the clerk’s record in cause number 1307886 (aggravated assault).
Zoila’s brother, Isaias Quintanilla, her husband Pedro German and her son
Sergio Zacarias, all came outside to assist Zoila after hearing her scream. (RR III
49-50, 71-73). When Pedro got to the Suburban, he could not find Zolia, but saw
appellant attempting to drive off in the Suburban. (RR V 73-77). Pedro struggled
with appellant inside the car, and appellant fell to the ground and then ran away.
(RR V 75-77). The three men got into the car and followed appellant, believing
appellant had stolen Zoila’s purse. (RR III 52-54, 77).
Down the street, they found appellant hiding in some bushes and when
appellant realized he had been found, he approached the car and starting shooting.
(RR III 54-57; RR V 78-79). Isaias was on the passenger side of the car, with the
window rolled down, and tried to push appellant away. (RR III 55-58). But he
was unsuccessful; appellant shot Isaias in the head and fled the scene. (RR III 58-
59, 81; RR V 79-82, 89). Isaias was transported to the hospital, severely injured.
(RR V 90-95).
HPD Sergeant Harvey spoke to the victims and several witnesses to obtain a
description of appellant and had them meet with a sketch artist. (RR III 165-172;
RR V 90-91). Harvey and other officers canvassed the neighborhood near the
scene of the crime to show the sketch; he received an anonymous tip regarding
appellant’s identity and his vehicle. (RR III 173-175, 200; RR V 9-10). Appellant’s
photograph was obtained and shown to the parties in this case. (RR III 176-199).
2
Both Zoila and Pedro positively identified appellant in a photo array; they
were certain he was the assailant. (RR III 187-193, 196-199; RR V 83). Sergio made
a tentative identification of appellant, indicating appellant’s photograph was the
closest to the man he saw shoot his uncle. (RR III 193-195). Two days after the
shooting, Sergeant Harvey went to appellant’s apartment, five blocks from the
crime scene. (RR III 199-200). He obtained consent to search the apartment and
found a Glock gun case with appellant’s fingerprint on it. (RR III 204-206; RR V
42-45, 52-53, 62-63; State’s Exhibit Number 120).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Appellant’s three issues on appeal focus on the punishment phase of trial
and the motion for new trial. The State has responded to appellant’s issues out of
order, but in a fashion that is chronological with the proceedings.
Appellant has not shown that he received ineffective assistance of counsel,
either at the trial or punishment phase of trial. He failed to preserve the issue of
whether the trial court’s response to a jury note was improper. Nonetheless, he
has not shown the judge abused its discretion.

3
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S THIRD ISSUE
In his third issue on appeal, appellant claims he received ineffective
assistance because his trial counsel failed to cross-examine the State’s witnesses
during the punishment phase of trial.
The adequacy of an attorney’s performance is reviewed under the standard
articulated in Strickland. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984);
Thompson v. State, 9 S.W.3d 808, 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In order to prevail on a
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a defendant must show: 1) defense
counsel’s performance was deficient; and 2) the deficient performance prejudiced
the defense to such a degree that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. Id.
The first prong of the Strickland standard requires the defendant to show
that counsel’s performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812. With regard to the second prong, the defendant must
show a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the
result of the proceeding would have been different. Id. Failure to make the
required showing of either deficient performance or sufficient prejudice defeats
the ineffectiveness claim. Id. at 813.
In reviewing counsel’s performance, this Court looks at the totality of the
representation to determine the effectiveness of counsel, indulging a strong
presumption that the attorney’s performance falls within the wide range of
4
reasonable professional assistance or trial strategy. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813. A
claim of ineffective assistance must be firmly supported in the record. Id.
The State presented three witnesses during the punishment phase: Zoila
Quintanilla, Sergio Zacarias and the wife of Isaias Quintanilla, Daisy Escobar. (RR
VI 7-27). Zoila explained how the robbery affected her; she testified she continues
to have nightmares and is in fear of being robbed again. (RR VI 8-13). Daisy
testified about the hardships Isaias has endured. (RR VI 21-27). She testified his
mental and physical life has diminished: he can no longer walk or speak and
remains in pain from the shooting. (RR VI 10-11, 17, 21-27). Sergio testified about
his mother and uncle’s difficulties since the incident and how the family dynamics
have changed. (RR VI 15-17). Appellant’s trial counsel did not cross-examine
these witnesses. (RR VI 13, 20, 27).
The decision of whether to cross-examine a witness is a matter of trial
strategy. Valdes-Fuerte v. State, 892 S.W.2d 103, 111 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1994,
no pet.). Cross-examination is inherently risky, and a decision not to cross-
examine a witness is often the result of wisdom acquired by experience in the
combat of trial. Ex parte McFarland, 163 S.W.3d 743, 756 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). It
is frequently a sound trial strategy not to attack a sympathetic witness without
very strong impeachment. Dannhaus v. State, 928 S.W.2d 81, 88 (Tex. App.—
5
Houston [14th Dist.]1996, pet. ref’d). Ineffective cross-examination could bolster
the credibility of the witness and, therefore, backfire on counsel. Id.
The record in this case does not indicate why appellant’s trial counsel did
not cross-examine these witnesses. Although appellant points to an area of
possible cross-examination, suggesting trial counsel should have inquired about
medical records to support the family’s claims, he ignores the fact that questioning
very sympathetic witnesses holds a large amount of risk. Appellant has not
overcome the strong presumption of counsel’s competence and strategy. Thompson,
9 S.W.3d at 813.
Further, appellant has failed to demonstrate prejudice resulting from the
lack of cross-examination. He has not shown what evidence would have come
before the jury as a result of such inquiries, whether that evidence would have
affected the credibility of those witnesses, or that the punishment result would
have been different. Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 812; Pryor v. State, 719 S.W.2d 628, 634
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1986, pet. ref’d) (recognizing the common practice among
competent defense lawyers not to cross-examine victims, due to fear of jury’s
reaction).
Appellant’s third issue should be overruled.

6
REPLY TO APPELLANT’S SECOND ISSUE
In his second issue on appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred by
responding to a jury note during the punishment phase that constituted a
comment on the weight of the evidence in violation of Article 38.05.
During punishment deliberations, the jury sent out two notes. (RR VI 52-
53). The second jury note asked the trial judge to explain concurrent sentencing.
(RR VI 53; CR I 161). The judge spoke to the prosecutor and defense counsel
about formulating a response. (RR VI 54-56). He explained to them that he
would provide the applicable law from Section 3.03 of the Texas Penal Code. TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. §3.03(a) (West 2013) (when the accused is found guilty of more
than one offense arising out of the same criminal episode prosecuted in a single
criminal action, a sentence for each offense for which he has been found guilty
shall be pronounced; the sentences shall run concurrently). The judge asked for
input from the prosecutor and defense attorney, whether they had any objections
or suggestions. (RR VI 54-57). Neither did and the trial court’s response was
presented to the jury. (RR VI 57; CR I 161).
Appellant claims the trial court’s response violated Article 38.05: In ruling
upon the admissibility of evidence, the judge shall not discuss or comment upon
the weight of the same or its bearing in the case, but shall simply decide whether
or not it is admissible; nor shall he, at any stage of the proceeding previous to the
7
return of the verdict, make any remark calculated to convey to the jury his opinion
of the case. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.05 (West 2013).
The issue is not properly before this Court. First, this issue is inadequately
briefed. Appellant acknowledges the trial court’s response on the law regarding
concurrent sentencing was legally correct, but seems to argue, without any
authority or analysis, the response suggested to the jury that they should give a
higher sentence. (Appellant’s brief 13-14). This assertion is not supported by the
law or record. See Kupchynsky v. Nardiello, 230 S.W.3d 685, 692 (Tex. App.—Dallas
2007, pet. denied) (issue inadequately briefed when party gave general cite to case
stating elements of cause of action but provided no argument or analysis); San Saba
Energy, L.P. v. Crawford, 171 S.W.3d 323, 337–38 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2005, no pet.) (holding issue inadequately briefed when parties failed to make any
specific argument or engage in any analysis showing how the record and the law
supports their contentions).
Second, defense counsel twice stated he had no objection to the trial court’s
response; thus, his complaint is not preserved for this Court’s review. (RR VI 54-
56). See TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Unkart v. State, 400 S.W.3d 94, 99 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013) (ordinarily, a complaint regarding an improper judicial comment must be
preserved at trial); Lyle v. State, 418 S.W.3d 901, 904 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (defendant failed to preserve for appellate review his claim
8
that trial court improperly communicated its opinion concerning weight of the
evidence); Resendez v. State, 160 S.W.3d 181, 189-190 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi
2005, no pet.) (same).
Appellant’s second issue should be overruled.2

REPLY TO APPELLANT’S FIRST ISSUE
In his first issue on appeal, appellant claims the trial court erred by denying
his motion for new trial based upon his trial counsel’s failure to call alibi witnesses
at trial.
This Court reviews the denial of a motion for new trial for an abuse of
discretion. Lewis v. State, 911 S.W.2d 1, 7 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995). The evidence
should be reviewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. Quinn v.
State, 958 S.W.2d 395, 402 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Only when no reasonable view
of the record could support the trial court’s ruling should this Court conclude the
trial court abused its discretion by denying the motion for new trial. Holden v. State,
201 S.W.3d 761, 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).
2
Even assuming appellant properly objected to the trial court’s response, the Court of Criminal
Appeals has held the fact that sentences for two offenses were to run concurrently was
appropriate for jury consideration during punishment phase, in response to a jury note on
concurrent sentencing where the defendant objected to the court’s response. See Gordon v. State,
633 S.W.2d 872, 878-8879 (Tex. Crim. App. 1982).
9
Appellant filed a motion for new trial alleging ineffective assistance for his
trial counsel’s failure to present testimony from alibi witnesses. (CR I 186-189).
Appellant filed several affidavits in support of his motion; the State responded and
provided an affidavit from appellant’s trial counsel. (CR I 193-195, 197-202). After
a hearing on the affidavits, the trial court denied appellant’s motion. (RR VIII 19;
CR I 190).
As previously discussed, the adequacy of an attorney’s performance is
reviewed under the standard articulated in Strickland; to prevail on a claim, a
defendant must show his counsel’s performance was deficient to such a degree
that the defendant was deprived of a fair trial. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 686.
Appellant asserts his trial counsel’s failure to present alibi witnesses at trial
was deficient performance. In support of his motion for new trial, he presented
four affidavits from the following people: Lisa Jones (appellant’s mother), Porshea
Polk (girlfriend of appellant’s brother), LeSadia Harden (appellant’s girlfriend)
and Carlesha Rossi (appellant’s sister). (CR I 203-207). Appellant contends all
four of these affidavits support his alibi claim, but that is not true. The affidavit of
Lisa Jones pertains to an identify issue and the affidavit of Porshea Polk pertains to
the search of the apartment. (CR I 203-204, 205). Neither of these issues is
contested on appeal.
10
Both LeSadie Harden and Carlesha Rosso stated in their affidavits that they
were physically with appellant at the time of the robbery and assault, so he could
not have committed the offenses. (CR I 206, 207). The details in these affidavits
are sparse. The women simply relayed they were with appellant the night before
and morning of the robbery, but there is no reference to a specific date, time or
place. (CR I 206, 207).
Appellant’s trial counsel presented an affidavit and explained he was aware
of the testimony that LeSadie Harden and Carlesha Rosso could offer. (CR I 197-
198). He stated his decision not to call them as witnesses was strategic. First,
their recollection of the event in question was inconsistent. (CR I 197-198).
Second, after polling the jury from the first trial, he learned they did not find the
alibi evidence credible, and considered it a weak link in his case. (CR I 197). This
decision falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance and trial
strategy. See Thompson, 9 S.W.3d at 813; Marinos v. State, 186 S.W.3d. 167, 181 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2006, pet. ref’d) (recognizing valid trial strategy of not calling
defendant’s family members as witnesses where there was concern for a backlash
from the jury). And the fact that appellate counsel may have pursued a different
strategy does not necessarily indicate ineffective assistance by appellant’s trial
counsel. See Hawkins v. State, 660 S.W.2d 65, 75 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983).
11
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the ruling, the trial
court’s finding that appellant’s trial counsel was not deficient was not an abuse of
discretion. See Alexander v. State, 282 S.W.3d 701, 709 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2009, pet. ref’d). The motion for new trial was properly denied.
Appellant’s first issue should be overruled.

CONCLUSION
It is respectfully submitted that all things are regular and that the
convictions should be affirmed.
DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
/s/ Jessica Akins
JESSICA AKINS
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
akins_jessica@dao.hctx.net
State Bar Number: 24029415
12
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
This is to certify that a copy of the foregoing instrument has been sent to
appellant’s attorney at the following email address on May 13, 2015:
Thomas A. Martin
Attorney at Law
1018 Preston, Suite 500
Houston, Texas 77002
tmartin@justice.com
/s/ Jessica Akins
JESSICA AKINS
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
akins_jessica@dao.hctx.net
State Bar Number: 24029415
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
This is to certify that this computer-generated document has a word count
of 3282 words, based upon the representation provided by the word processing
program that was used to create the document.
/s/ Jessica Akins
JESSICA AKINS
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
13