in the Interest of L.D.J. III, A.Y.J., W.F.J., and C.J., Children ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
13-15-00099-CV
THIRTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
7/21/2015 10:10:42 AM
CECILE FOY GSANGER
CLERK
FILED IN
13th COURT OF APPEALS
Cause No. 13-15-00099-CV
CORPUS CHRISTI/EDINBURG, TEXAS
7/21/2015 10:10:42 AM
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS CECILE FOY GSANGER
FOR THE THIRTEENTH SUPREME JUDICIAL DISTRICT Clerk
CORPUS CHRISTI, TEXAS
_____________________________________________________
IN THE INTEREST OF
L.D.J. III, A.Y.J., W.F.J. and C.J.,
CHILDREN
_____________________________________________________
Appealed from the 206th Judicial District Court of
Hidalgo County, Texas
Hon. Rose Guerra Reyna, Presiding
___________________________________________
APPELLANT’S BRIEF ON THE MERITS
___________________________________________
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES
PETITIONER/APPELLANT: COUNSEL:
Blanca E. Jones Francisco Guerrero, II
SBN 24047588
PENA GARCIA GUERRERO PLLC
900 Kerria Avenue
McAllen, TX 78501
t: 956.948.2221
f: 888.422.6821
fg@pgglex.com
Counter-Petitioner/APPELLEE: COUNSEL:
Helen M. Jones Roel “Robie” Flores
The Firm of Roel “Robie” Flores
3331 N. Ware Rd
Mc Allen, Texas 78501
t: 956.631.7188
f: 956.631.7268
robiefloreslaw@att.net
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF THE PARTIES…………………………………..……. 2
TABLE OF CONTENTS……………………………………… ……..… 3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES…………………………………………... 4
RECORD REFERENCES…………………………………………..….. 5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE……………………………………….... 6
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ………………….. 7
ISSUES PRESENTED………………………………………………….. 8
STATEMENT OF FACTS…………………………………….............. 9
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT………………………………...… 13
ARGUMENT………………………………………………….………... 16
PRAYER……………………………………………………………..… 39
APPENDIX…………………………………………………………..… 41
3
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
STATE CASES
Brigham v. Brigham,
863 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.App.- Dallas, 1993)………………………… 35
Chavez v. Chavez,
148 S.W.3d 449 (Tex.App.-El Paso, no pet.)……………………… 31, 34
Critz v. Critz,
297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 2009, no pet.)…. 17, 18, 24, 25, 29, 34
Danet v. Bhan,
436 S.W.3d 793 (Tex. 2014)………………………..…………….. 34
Gray v. Shook,
329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010)…………… 30, 31, 36, 37, 38
In re S.A.H,
420 S.W.3d 911 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th] Dist., 2014)………….. 19, 22, 26
In re S.M.D,
329 S.W.3d 8 (Tex.App.-San Antonio, 2010)(reh’g overruled, rev. dism’d)…34
Lewelling v. Lewelling,
796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex.1990)……………………………………….. 29, 35, 37
May v. May,
829 S.W.2d 373 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied)……. 30, 36, 37
Shook v. Gray,
381 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2012) ………………………………………. 36, 37
STATE STATUTES
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.002…………………………………….. 36
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.131……………………………………...23, 28, 34, 37
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.373………………………………………18, 19, 27
4
RECORD REFERENCES
CR_ Clerk’s Record
1 RR_ Volume one of Recorder’s Record
2 RR_ Volume two of Recorder’s Record
3 RR_ Volume three of Recorder’s Record
Ex. P-_ Petitioner/Appellant’s exhibit to the Recorder’s Record
Ex. CP-_ Counter-Petitioner/Appellee’s exhibit to the Recorder’s Record
5
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal is taken from a final order rendered in the 206th Judicial District
Court of Hidalgo County in an action filed as a Suit Affecting Parent Child
Relationship. (CR p.110). The final order in this matter was rendered after a bench
trial held on December 17th and 18th, 2014. The Court signed Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law on January 28, 2015. (CR p.108). Appellant filed her Notice
of Appeal on February 17, 2015. (CR p.132).
6
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
This case involves the conservatorship of four children. The trial court
appointed paternal grandmother as sole managing conservator of these children,
instead of their biological mother.
The mother of these children challenges, in this appeal, that the trial court
abused its discretion because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
support the trial court’s judgment as to rebuttal of the statutory presumptions in
Tex. Fam. Code §§151.131 and 151.373. Appellee failed to prove that Appellant
had 1.) voluntarily relinquished actual care, control and possession of the children
to Appellee for a period of one year or more; and/or 2.) that it would not be in the
children’s best interest to have their mother appointed sole managing conservator
because such appointment would significantly impair their physical health and
emotional development.
Since neither the Family Code nor case law provide bright-line definitions of
the term “voluntarily relinquishment” or the term “significant impairment”,
resolution of cases such as these is fact intensive analysis. Due to the Appellant’s
challenge of the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence in this matter, oral
argument would be most beneficial for a clear presentation of the facts and to the
court’s understanding of the facts in this case.
7
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The trial court abused its discretion in appointing Appellee as the sole managing
conservator of the children and Appellant the possessory conservator.
I. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the court’s
Finding of Fact No. 2.
III. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the court’s
Finding of Fact No. 4.
III. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the court’s
Finding of Fact No. 5 that Appellee rebutted the statutory parental
presumption in Tex. Fam. Code §153.131.
IV. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the court’s
Finding of Fact No. 5 that Appellee rebutted the statutory parental
presumption in Tex. Fam. Code§153.373.
V. The court erred in its Conclusion of Law – Conservatorship because the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the conclusion that
Appellee be appointed sole managing conservator of the children and
Appellee should be appointed possessory conservator.
8
STATEMENT OF FACTS
a. Appellant was married to Appellee’s son, Larry Dean Jones, Jr.(hereinafter
“Dean” or “Appellant’s husband”), on April 29, 2011. Prior to their marriage, three
children were born to Appellant and Dean. (2RR p.102, line 19-23). The children
lived with Appellant prior to her marriage to Dean. (2RR pp.94-102). On or about
December 2012, Appellant left the United States for Mexico to complete the
immigration process which she and her husband had initiated. (CR p.15; 2RR
p.111; Ex. P-4).
b. On or about January 2013, Appellant was denied re-entry into the United
States and had to remain in Mexico pending a new visa appointment, because the
proper documentation regarding her pregnancy with the child C.J. had not been
submitted. (CR p.15; 2RR p.111; Ex. P-4). The youngest child, C.J., was born
while Appellant resided in Mexico awaiting a subsequent visa appointment. (2RR
p.119). Meanwhile, her husband remained in the United States managing their
affairs in her absence. (2RR pp.38-39 and 46; Ex. P-4).
c. On or about December 21, 2012, Appellee took possession of three of the
children the subject of this suit. (3RR p.35). Appellee had possession of the
children for the time period that Appellant was to be outside the United States
awaiting subsequent visa interview for her and C.J.. (2RR p.104, line 7-25 and
9
3RR p.37, line 9-25). On or about March 2014, Appellant lawfully re-entered the
United States with her youngest child, C.J. (2RR p.119; Ex. P-3).
d. Immediately upon her return, Appellant and Dean made plans to retrieve
their children from Fredericksburg, Texas where the children were living with
Appellee. (2RR p.119;). On or about April 2014, Appellant and Dean traveled to
Fredericksburg, Texas to reunite the family and return with the children to
McAllen, Texas. (2RR p.p. 120-121). Appellant, Dean, and Appellee subsequently
entered into an agreement to allow the children L.D.J. III and W.F.J. to spend time
with their grandmother, Appellee, until the end of the school year. (2RR p.p. 121)
The agreement called for the children to return to McAllen, Texas so they could
live with Appellant, her husband, and the other children A.Y.J and C.J
permanently. (2RR p.121).
e. On or about June 2014, Dean disappeared for approximately two weeks
while on an alleged business trip. (2RR pp.122- 124). During Dean’s two-week
absence, Appellant attempted to regain possession of her children, but Appellee
refused to return the children to Appellant, in breach of their agreement. (2RR
p.126; 3RR p.p. 93-94; Ex. CP-1). Subsequently, Appellant filed for divorce in
Hidalgo County, Texas. (2RR p.125). In response to Appellant’s divorce action,
Dean filed a divorce action in Kendall County in Cause No. 14-283-CCL, styled In
the Matter of the Marriage of Larry D. Jones, Jr. and Blanca Estella Jones and In
10
the Interest of L.D.J, III, A.Y.J, W.F.J. and C.J., Minor Children (herein “Dean’s
divorce action”). (3RR p.p. 95-101; Ex. P-5). The Appellee intervened in Dean’s
divorce action. (3RR p.p. 95-101; Ex. P-5)
f. Appellant and Dean began to reconcile their marriage in the latter part of
June 2014. (2RR p. 134; Ex. P-8). Appellant and Dean eventually travelled to
Fredericksburg, Texas to regain possession of the two remaining children, L.D.J,
III and W. F. J., in an attempt to work on their marriage. (2RR p. 134). On July 3,
2014, Dean’s father drove Appellant with all her four children down to McAllen,
Texas. (2RR p. 135).
g. On or about July 3, 2014, Appellant’s husband committed suicide in
Fredericksburg, Texas. (2RR p. 134, line 16-19). On July 11, 2014 Appellee
sought and obtained a Writ of Attachment for all four children from the Kendall
County Court at Law pursuant to her intervention in Dean’s divorce action. (3RR
p.p. 95-101; Ex. P-5). On or about July 11, 2014, Appellee travelled from Kendall
County to McAllen, Texas and had the Writ of Attachment for all the children
executed by Hidalgo County Sheriff’s officers. (3RR p. 100, line 21-25 and p.
102).
h. On July 16, 2015, Appellant filed the instant Suit Affecting Parent Child
Relationship, in Hidalgo County, Texas. (CR p.15). On July 25, 2014, the Kendall
County Court at Law dismissed all of Appellee’s and Dean’s actions pending
11
before it for lack of jurisdiction due to Dean’s death on July 3, 2014. (Ex. P-5).
Appellee, subsequently, filed a counter-petition in the instant Suit Affecting Parent
Child Relationship. (CR p. 36).
i. On December 17th and 18th, 2014 a bench trial was held on the parties’ Suits
Affecting Parent Child Relationship. The issues before the court were:
(1) whether appointment of Appellant, the natural parent of the children, as
sole managing conservator of the children would not be in the best interest of the
children because the appointment would significantly impair the children’s
physical health or emotional development; and
(2) whether Appellant voluntarily relinquished actual care, control and
possession of the children to Appellee, a nonparent, for a period of one year or
more; of which time period was not more than 90 days prior to Appellee filing suit
in the instant case.
The final judgment of the trial court appointed Appellee as the sole managing
conservator of all children made the subject of this Suit Affecting Parent Child
Relationship, and Appellant was appointed possessory conservator of her
biological children. (CR p.110)
j. The trial court signed findings of fact and conclusions of law on January 12,
2015. (CR p.108). Appellant appeals from this final judgment. (CR p.110 and
132).
12
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Appellee, a non-parent, challenged the Appellant’s, right to be
appointed sole managing conservator of the children. To succeed in her challenge,
the Appellee had to rebut the presumption that the best interest of the children
would be best served by appointing Appellant, the natural parent, as managing
conservator. This placed a heavy burden on the Appellee, as this parental
presumption is deeply embedded in Texas law. This parental presumption is
codified in Sections 153.131 and 153.373 of the Texas Family Code.
The Appellant’s first argument is that in order for Appellee to rebut the
parental presumption in set out in Tex. Fam. Code §153.373, the Appellee had the
burden of proving, by a preponderance of the evidence, that 1) the Appellant had
voluntarily relinquished actual care, control, and possession of the children to the
Appellee for a period of one year or more; and 2) that the appointment of the
Appellee as conservator of the children is in the best interest of the children. When
Appellant went to Mexico for processing her visa to obtain residency in the United
States, she left the children with her husband, Dean, not with the Appellee. During
her involuntary stay in Mexico, the Appellant maintained telephone contact with
the children through her husband, but had little, if any, contact with Appellee.
Further, Appellee testified that she obtained possession of the children from her
son, Appellant’s husband, not from Appellant. Additionally, Appellee further
13
testified that she had no evidence that Appellant had voluntarily relinquished the
children to her.
Appellee failed to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
appointment of the Appellee as sole managing conservator of the children on
voluntary relinquishment grounds would be in the children’s best interest. Thus,
the evidence is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment awarding
conservatorship to Appellee on voluntary relinquishment grounds. Alternatively,
and without waiving the legal sufficiency challenge, the evidence is factually
insufficient to show that Appellee voluntarily relinquished care, control and
possession of the children for one year or more and appointment of the Appellee as
sole managing conservator of the children would be in the children’s best interest.
The court abused its discretion in appointing Appellee as the sole managing
conservator of the children, and the court’s judgment should be reversed and
judgment rendered that Appellee be appointed the sole managing conservator of
the children. Alternatively, should the court find the evidence factually insufficient,
the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial
court for a new trial and further fact-finding.
The Appellant’s second argument is that in order for the Appellee to rebut
the parental presumption set out in Tex. Fam. Code §153.131, the Appellee had the
burden of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that appointment of the
14
Appellant as sole managing conservator of the children would not be in the
children’s best interest because the appointment would significantly impair the
children's physical health or emotional development. At trial, the Appellant offered
little more than her contentions that she would be a better custodian of the children
or that she has a strong and on-going relationship with the children.
To discharge her burden of rebutting this parental presumption to prevent
Appellee from being appointed sole managing conservator of the children, the
Appellee was required to offer evidence of specific actions or omissions of the
Appellant that demonstrate that appointing Appellant as conservator would result
in physical or emotional harm to the children. Neither the Appellee nor the
witnesses she called to testify offered any evidence that Appellant was presently
engaged in some detrimental immoral or criminal conduct of the type that this and
other Texas courts have found to pose a real, rather than a speculative, harm to a
child’s physical health or emotional development, e.g. illegal drug use, alcohol
abuse, family violence against her spouse or the children, drug dealing, neglect of a
child or other criminal activity.
Appellee failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
appointment of the Appellant as sole managing conservator of the children would
not be in the children’s best interest because the appointment would significantly
impair the children's physical health or emotional development. Thus, the evidence
15
is legally insufficient to support the trial court’s judgment awarding
conservatorship to Appellee on impairment grounds. Alternatively, and without
waiving the legally sufficiency challenge, the evidence is factually insufficient to
show that appointment of the Appellant as sole managing conservator of the
children would not be in the children’s best interest because the appointment
would significantly impair the children's physical health or emotional
development.
Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the trial
court’s Finding of Fact Nos. 2, 4 and 5, and the court abused its discretion in
appointing Appellee as sole managing conservator of the children on voluntary
relinquishment grounds.
ARGUMENT
The following issues and sub-issues are joined in this part of the argument
because they are related to the trial court’s finding of facts that Appellee rebutted
the statutory parental presumption in Tex. Fam. Code §153.373.
Issue No. 1. The trial court abused its discretion in appointing Appellee
as the sole managing conservator and Appellant possessory conservator
of the children.
Issue No. 2. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the court’s Finding of Fact No. 2.
16
Issue No. 3. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the court’s Finding of Fact No. 4.
Issue No. 4. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the court’s finding of fact No. 5 that the Appellee had rebutted the
statutory parental presumption in Tex. Fam. Code §153.373.
Issue No. 5. The court erred in its Conclusion of Law – Conservatorship
because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
conclusion that Appellee be appointed sole managing conservator of the
children and Appellee should be appointed possessory conservator.
Arguments & Authorities
A. Standard of Review
A trial court’s decision regarding the conservatorship of a child is reviewed
under an abuse of discretion standard. Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464, 469 (Tex.
App.--Fort Worth, 2009). In an abuse of discretion review, legal and factual
insufficiency are not independent grounds for asserting error, but are merely
relevant factors in assessing whether a trial court abused its discretion. Id. at 473.
In applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court in a family law case
must apply a two-prong analysis: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient evidence
17
upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) whether the trial court erred in
applying its discretion. Id.
B. Voluntary Relinquishment of the Children for One Year or More.
In order for Appellee to rebut the parental presumption set out in TEX. FAM.
CODE §153.3731, the Appellee had the burden of showing, by a preponderance of
the evidence, that 1) the Appellant had voluntarily relinquished actual care,
control, and possession of the children to the Appellee for a period of one year or
more; and 2) that the appointment of the Appellee as conservator of the children is
in the best interest of the children. Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464, 470 (Tex. App.--
Fort Worth, 2009).
The trial court found that Appellant had voluntarily relinquished the actual
care, control and possession of the children to the Appellee for a period of six
months or more. (CR pp. 108, Finding of Fact Nos. 2). The evidence is legally
and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding of fact that Appellee
rebutted the parental presumption in TEX. FAM. CODE §153.373 on grounds that
Appellant had voluntarily relinquished the actual care, control and possession of
1
Sec. 153.373. VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF POSSESSION REBUTS PARENTAL PRESUMPTION. The
presumption that a parent should be appointed or retained as managing conservator of the child is rebutted if the
court finds that:
(1) the parent has voluntarily relinquished actual care, control, and possession of the child to a nonparent,
licensed child-placing agency, or authorized agency for a period of one year or more, a portion of which was
within 90 days preceding the date of intervention in or filing of the suit; and
(2) the appointment of the nonparent or agency as managing conservator is in the best interest of the child.
18
the children to the Appellee for a year or more. See (CR pp. 108-109, Finding of
Fact Nos. 2, 4, 5). Although, the evidence shows that the children were in
Appellee’s possession, the Appellant contends that such possession was not the
result of her having voluntarily relinquished the actual care, control and possession
of her children to the Appellee.
What is Voluntary Relinquishment?
The Family Code does not define “voluntarily relinquish” as that term is
used in section 153.373. However, at least one court has recently construed
“voluntary relinquishment” as meaning “to give up by one’s own free will.” See In
re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d 911, 922 (Tex. App. --Houston [14th ] Dist., 2014). To
prove voluntary relinquishment, Appellee carries the burden of proving that
Appellant placed L.D.J. III, A.Y.J., W.F.J. and C.J. into Appellee’s care and
possession during on or after December 2012 of her own free will “without any
legal obligation or other external compulsion to do so.” In re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d
911, 923 (Tex. App. –Houston [14th ] Dist., 2014).
Evidence of Voluntary Relinquishment Offered at Trial:
At trial, Appellee sought to prove that Appellant had relinquished actual
care, control and possession of her biological children, L.D.J, III, A.Y.J, and
19
W.F.J, on December 21, 2012. Appellee avers in her sworn petition that Appellant
had “voluntarily relinquished” the children to her on December 21, 2012. (CR
p.36). Yet, at trial, Appellee testified that it was, actually, her son, Dean
(Appellant’s husband) who had delivered possession of L.D.J, III, A.Y.J, and
W.F.J to her on December 21, 2012 (3RR pp. 35-37).
Appellee testified that she was doing what her son wished her to do. (3RR
pp. 34-37) In connection with this testimony, Appellee referred to her son’s will
and a power of attorney that he had executed as his wishes for her to remain the
conservator of his children after his death. (3RR pp. 35-37; Ex. P-7; Ex. CP-7).
Yet, these instruments are only evidence that Appellant’s husband - the person to
whom Appellant had entrusted her children2 and the person from whom Appellee
received possession of the children3 – was still exercising control and care of the
children by planning for their future. Dean’s will and power of attorney were not
an immediate granting of rights to the children to Appellee, as Appellee contended
at trial, but rather a conditional grant of rights in the future.
Appellant entrusted the care, control, and possession of the children to her
husband when she departed to Mexico, and she also sought to exercise some care
2
(2RR p. 38, line 12-25, p. 39-44, and p.46, line 5-19).
3
(3RR pp. 35-37).
20
and control of children, while she was involuntarily outside the United States, by
requesting that Dean bring the children to visit her in Mexico. (2RR p.28, line 18-
23, p.32, line 19, p.37, line 23-25, pp. 39-44, p.46). Appellant’s requests to have
her children travel into Mexico to visit her were denied by her husband because he
feared for the children’s safety. (2RR pp.117, line 5-25 and 118, line 1-11).
Appellant’s husband controlled the line of communication between Appellant and
the children, and he exercised control over the children in Appellant’s absence.
(2RR p. 32, line 19). The Appellant communicated with the children via telephone,
in two ways: 1) Dean would call her from Fredericksburg and put the children on
the phone to talk the Appellant ; and 2) when Dean visited her in Mexico, he would
call the Appellee and ask that the children be put on the phone so they could talk
with Appellant. (2RR pp.39-44). This is further evidence of the control that Dean
maintained over their children while Appellant was unable to lawfully enter the
United States. (2RR p. 92, line 1-22, pp. 107-109; 3RR pp. 36-37; Ex. P-4, page
15). It is also evidence that Appellant was exercising parental care and control
over the children. This also begs a very pivotal question: if in fact, Appellant had
voluntarily relinquished the care, control, and possession of the children to
Appellee, wouldn’t she have been contacting Appellee, rather than Dean, to have
the children visit her in Mexico?
21
The will and power of attorney executed by Appellant’s husband, without
Appellant’s knowledge and consent, were the memorialization of the control over
their children he maintained throughout the time Appellant was outside the United
States. These documents prove how he maintained control over their children’s
future, if upon leaving the United States he was not to return during this
immigration process due to an occurrence outside his control. (3RR pp. 36-37)
On cross-examination, Appellee testified that she had no direct evidence that
proved Appellant had voluntarily relinquished the children to her other than her
assumption that the preparation of the children’s bags by Appellant for their
departure with Appellee in December 2012 was evidence of Appellant’s intent to
voluntarily relinquish actual care, control and possession of the children to her.
(3RR pp. 77-79). Appellee admits that the possession she enjoyed during the time
Appellant was to be outside the country was temporary pending Appellant’s return
to the United States. (3RR p. 37, line 9-25). There is no evidence of any agreement
between Appellant and Appellee, either oral or written, whereby Appellee
relinquished voluntary care, control, and possession of the children to Appellee4.
See, e.g., In re S.A.H., 420 S.W.3d 911, 914 and 924 (2014) (mother’s granting of
4
Even assuming, arguendo, that any agreement made by Dean with Appellee could be imputed to Appellant, the
evidence militates against even Dean having voluntarily relinquished care, control, and possession of the children to
Appellee, as the evidence reveals an indicia of parenting on his part with respect to the children.
22
power of attorney over child to great aunt evidenced voluntary relinquishment).
The evidence shows that Appellant and Appellee had little to no communication
with one another before and after Appellant left the United States. (2RR pp. 39-44,
p.46, line 5-19, p.102, line 13-18, p.118, line 1-25; 3RR pp. 84-87). The only
evidence in the record that can be directly attributed to Appellant having agreed to
Appellee having possession of the children is when Appellee “begged” for the
children to stay with her after Appellant and Dean travelled to Fredericksburg in
April of 2014 to retrieve the children. (3RR p. 45, line 11-25), and Appellant and
Dean agreed to the children staying with Appellee until the end of the school year.
(2RR p.p. 121).
No Evidence of Voluntary Relinquishment
Thus, while Appellant may have been physically apart from L.D.J. III,
W.F.J., and A.Y.J. for all of 2014, there is no evidence that she gave up, by her
own free will, the care, custody, and possession of the children to the Appellee. In
particular, there is no evidence that Appellee ever had possession of C.J., prior to
this suit being filed. She did not obtain possession of C.J. until she obtained such
possession through the Writ of Attachment issued by the Kendall County Court.
See TEX. FAM. CODE §153.131.
Assuming, arguendo, that Appellant had made some agreement with
Appellee to have Appellee care for the children while Appellant went to Mexico to
23
take care of her visa matter, this case would be analogous to Critz v. Critz, 297
S.W.3d 464 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). In Critz v. Critz, the
grandparents of a child were awarded joint managing conservatorship of a child
that they alleged had been voluntarily relinquished to them by the biological
mother of the child for one year or more. Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464(Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.). The Critz Court determined that even in light
of some evidence of separation from the child on the part of the mother for over a
period of one year, there still lacked the relinquishment of control of the child
given her periodic contact with him. Critz, 297 S.W.3d at 474.
In the instant case, Appellant was involuntarily prevented from returning to
the United States which caused her to be away from the children that she had left
in her husband’s care. (2RR p.28, line 18-23, p.32, line 19, p.37, line 23-25, pp.
39-44, p.46). Yet, she periodically spoke with her children and discussed their
well-being with her husband, the children’s parent with access to them while she
resided in Mexico. (2RR pp.39-44). Appellant’s husband limited her access to the
children further by denying her requests to have her children brought to her while
she resided outside the United States. (2RR pp. 39-44, p.46, line 5-19, p.102, line
13-18, p.118, line 1-25; 3RR pp. 84-87). Additionally, Appellant requested her
children be returned to her in April 2014 when she and her husband travelled to
24
Fredericksburg, Texas to retrieve the children from Appellee; which was
acknowledged by Appellee. (2RR pp.120-121; 3RR p. 45, line 11-25).
As in Critz, the evidence of voluntary relinquishment of the children is not
present in this case. Appellant maintained as much contact with her children as she
had been accustomed to given the great efforts her husband undertook in caring for
their children in her absence, and the impossibility of her physical presence within
the United States given the fragile nature of her immigration status. (2RR p.28, line
18-23, p.32, line 19, p.37, line 23-25, pp. 39-44, p.46). In Critz, the Court found
sufficient contact with the child by the mother and that she had requested return of
her child. Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d at 474 & n.39 (voluntary relinquishment
ended when mother filed answer to conservatorship petition). Assuming, arguendo,
that Appellant had delivered possession of the children to Appellee rather than to
her husband, Dean, when she left for Mexico, such act could not be deemed an act
of free will. Appellant’s inability to physically take possession of her children and
care for them as she had done prior to her departure was not a completely
voluntary decision by her but rather a product of an external compulsion, i.e.,
having to leave to take care of her visa matter. This should be considered when
determining whether Appellee’s physical possession of the children was truly an
act of voluntary relinquishment by Appellant of her children. (2RR p.28, line 18-
23, p.32, line 19, p.37, line 23-25, pp. 39-44, p.46; Ex. P-). See In re S.A.H., 420
25
S.W.3d 911, 922 (Tex. App. --Houston [14th ] Dist., 2014)(relinquishment must be
an act of free will done without any legal obligation or other external compulsion
to do so). To require Appellant to have unlawfully entered the United States to visit
and care for the children in order to be able to defeat Appellee’s conservatorship
action would be unreasonable because for her to do so would jeopardize her ability
to lawfully reside within the United States in accordance with federal law. This
would assure that Appellee could now use this unlawful act against the Appellant
to rebut the parental presumption in Tex. Fam. Code §153.131.
Further, there is no evidence that Appellee ever had possession of the
youngest child, C.J., at any time prior to July 11, 2014 when she sought and
obtained a Writ of Attachment for all four children from a Kendall County court.
(3RR pp. 95-101; Ex. P-5). Nor did Appellee proffer any evidence that she had
filed any action to assert her rights to the children prior to Appellant and her
husband travelling to Fredericksburg, Texas to pick up their children. Additionally,
there was no evidence proffered by Appellee that she had any relationship with the
child, C.J., after she was born in Mexico. In fact, Appellee provided no evidence
that she sent gifts, cards, care packages or the like to her new granddaughter
outside the United States. There was no evidence she ever inquired as to the health
or well-being of this child. The record is devoid of any evidence that she had the
possibility to assert any claim of conservatorship to this child, due to fact that she
26
did not possess the child the requisite time period prior to the institution of the
instant cause. (CR p. 59) See Tex. Fam. Code §153. 373.
Appellee failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
appointment of the Appellant as sole managing conservator of the children on this
relinquishment ground would be in the children’s best interest, thus the evidence is
legally insufficient to support the trial court’s Finding of Fact Nos. 2, 4, and 5 (CR,
pp. 108-109). Alternatively, the evidence is factually insufficient, as the great
weight of the evidence is against any voluntary action or omission on Appellant’s
part in voluntarily relinquishing actual care, control and possession to any other
person aside from her husband. (2RR p.28, line 18-23, p.30, line 22-24, p. 31, line
8-10, p.32 line 19, p.38, line 12-25 and p.46, line 5-19).
The trial court abused its discretion in appointing Appellee as sole managing
conservator of the children on grounds of voluntary relinquishment because the
evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that Appellant had
voluntarily relinquished the care, control, and possession of the children to
Appellee.
Therefore, the court abused its discretion in appointing Appellee as the sole
managing conservator of the children, and the court’s judgment should be reversed
and judgment rendered that Appellee be appointed the sole managing conservator
of the children. Alternatively, should the court find the evidence factually
27
insufficient, the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial and further fact-finding.
ARGUMENT (cont’d)
The following issues and sub-issues are joined in this part of the argument
because they are related to the trial court’s finding of facts that Appellee rebutted
the statutory parental presumption in TEX. FAM. CODE §153.131.
Issue No. 6. The trial court abused its discretion in appointing Appellee
as the sole managing conservator and Appellant possessory conservator
of the children.
Issue No. 7. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
court’s Finding of Fact No. 2.
Issue No. 8. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the court’s Finding of Fact No. 4.
Issue No. 9. The evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the court’s finding of fact No. 5 that Appellee rebutted the statutory
parental presumption in Tex. Fam. Code §153.131.
Issue No. 10. The court erred in its Conclusion of Law – Conservatorship
because the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
conclusion that Appellee be appointed sole managing conservator of the
children and Appellee should be appointed possessory conservator.
28
Arguments & Authorities
A. Standard of Review
A trial court trial court’s decision regarding the conservatorship of a child is
reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard. Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464,
469 (Tex. App.--Fort Worth, 2009). In an abuse of discretion review, legal and
factual insufficiency are not independent grounds for asserting error, but are
merely relevant factors in assessing whether a trial court abused its discretion. Id.
at 473. In applying the abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court in a family
law case must apply a two-prong analysis: (1) whether the trial court had sufficient
evidence upon which to exercise its discretion; and (2) whether the trial court erred
in applying its discretion. Id.
B. Impairment of Children’s Physical Health or Emotional Development
“The presumption that the best interest of a child is served by awarding
custody to a natural parent is deeply embedded in Texas law.” Lewelling v.
Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166 (Tex.1990). Therefore, section 153.1315 of the
5
Sec. 153.131. PRESUMPTION THAT PARENT TO BE APPOINTED MANAGING CONSERVATOR.
(a) Subject to the prohibition in Section 153.004, unless the court finds that appointment of the parent or
parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the appointment would significantly impair the
child's physical health or emotional development, a parent shall be appointed sole managing conservator or
both parents shall be appointed as joint managing conservators of the child.
(b) It is a rebuttable presumption that the appointment of the parents of a child as joint managing
conservators is in the best interest of the child. A finding of a history of family violence involving the
parents of a child removes the presumption under this subsection.
29
Texas Family Code requires that the parent be appointed sole managing
conservator or both parents be appointed joint managing conservators unless the
nonparent proves by a preponderance of the credible evidence that “appointment of
the parent or parents would not be in the best interest of the child because the
appointment would significantly impair the child's physical health or emotional
development....” Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131 (Vernon 2008); Gray v. Shook,
329 S.W.3d 186, 196 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010). The Family Code's
presumption in favor of parental custody places a “heavy burden on a nonparent
seeking custody.” May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi
1992, writ denied). To rebut the presumption, “the evidence must support a logical
inference that some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct of the parent will
probably cause significant physical or emotional harm to the child.” Id. at 377.
Any “close call” must be resolved in favor of the parent over the nonparent. Gray
v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d at 196 (citing Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 459
(Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.)).
Evidence of Impairment of Children’s Physical Health or Emotional
Development Offered at Trial:
In addition to her testimony, Appellee called two witnesses in an attempt to
prove that Appellant was an unfit parent. The first witness that Appellee called to
30
testify about the Appellant was Evelia Salinas. Ms. Salinas’ testified about events
that had occurred about 3 or 4 years prior to the trial date, and had little to no
bearing on Appellant’s ability to care for her children. (2RR p. 153, line 6-10). Ms.
Salinas’ testimony can be summarized, as follows: 1) that she had been around
Appellant and her children approximately four or five times in the year 2011. (2RR
p. 153, line 6-10); 2) that she believed her brother in law acted inappropriately
with Appellant at a party; and 3) that she believed Appellant was a devil
worshipper because of some ring that Appellant was wearing symbolizing a cult
religion commonly referred to as “La Santa Muerte”. (2RR pp.153-177).
However, Ms. Salinas’ testimony did not encompass Appellant having any
problems with alcohol, drugs, criminal convictions or a known history of family
violence. (2RR pp.153-177). On cross-examination, Ms. Salinas admitted not
having any personal knowledge about Appellant’s current abilities to care for her
children or religious beliefs at the time of trial. (2RR pp.171-177). Most
importantly, Ms. Salinas’ testimony offered no evidence of any specific,
identifiable behavior, conduct or omissions of the parent that would, to a
reasonable degree of certainty, probably cause significant impairment to the
children’s physical or emotional development. (2RR pp.153-177); See Gray v.
Shook, 329 S.W.3d at 196 (evidence of harm must rise above mere speculation and
be attributable to a specific, identifiable act or omission of the parent).
31
The second witness called by the Appellee was Herminia Martinez. Ms.
Martinez offered less evidence than Ms. Salinas of any harm that would come to
the children if Appellant would be appointed their sole managing conservator.
(3RR pp.5-19). Mrs. Martinez testified to knowing Appellee for over twenty years
and knew her both personally and professionally. (3RR p.5-10). Yet, Mrs.
Martinez had no personal knowledge of Appellant’s parenting abilities nor did she
ever witness Appellant around Appellant’s children. (3RR p. 17, line 15-20). She
testified that her personal knowledge was limited to Appellee’s interaction with the
children and served to simply bolster Appellee’s capability of being a good
caretaker of the children. (3RR p. 17, line 5-20). Mrs. Martinez’ confirmed the
lack of communication Appellee had with Appellant before and after she left the
United States, and that Appellant’s husband communicated with Appellee
regarding the children. (3RR pp.15-16). Mrs. Martinez offered no evidence of
Appellant’s use or abuse of alcohol or drugs, no evidence of a criminal history, and
no evidence of any history of family violence. (3RR pp.5-19). Ms. Martinez
testimony about Appellee being a capable caretaker of the children does nothing to
rebut the parental presumption requiring that Appellant be appointed the sole
managing conservator of the children. The Appellee, as non-parent, has the burden
to show that appointment of the Appellant parent as managing conservator would
significantly impair the child, either physically or emotionally, is not met by
32
evidence that shows she would be a better custodian of the child or that she has a
strong and on-going relationship with the child; further, evidence of past
misconduct alone is insufficient. In re S.M.D. 329 S.W.3d 8 (Tex. App. – San
Antonio, 2010)(reh’g overruled, rev. dism’d).
Appellee testified but offered no evidence that proved that Appellant’s
appointment as sole managing conservator of the children would have significantly
impaired the children’s physical health or emotional development. (3RR pp. 20-
122). Appellee testified that she had no evidence of Appellant directly
relinquishing the children to her. (3RR pp.77-79, p.117, line 22-25 and p. 118).
Appellee’s testimony provides no evidence that Appellant used or abused alcohol
or drugs, whether she had a criminal record, and/or a history of family violence.
(3RR p.65). Appellee’s testimony does nothing more than solidify that her only
motive in this suit was to prevent Appellant from having sole managing
conservatorship of her children because of an unsubstantiated belief that Appellant
had a hand in her son’s death and is an unfit mother, generally. (3RR pp. 66-67,
pp.70-71, pp. 93-95, pp.105-107, pp. 110-113, pp. 115-118, p.121). Yet, Appellee
could not provide direct evidence of the source of her misguided opinion, nor did
she provide any evidence that these beliefs were a legitimate concern for the trial
court. Appellee did not meet the legally or factually sufficient threshold of
evidence required to prove by a preponderance of such evidence that Appellant’s
33
appointment as sole managing conservator of her biological children would
significantly impair the physical health or emotional development of these
children. Danet v. Bhan, 436 S.W.3d 793, 796 (Tex. 2014), Critz v. Critz, 297
S.W.3d 464, 470 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2009, no pet.), Chavez v. Chavez, 148
S.W.3d 449, 459-60 (Tex.App.-El Paso, no pet.), See, also, Tex. Fam. Code Ann.
§153.131.
The only evidence of Appellant’s capability of caring for her children and
being an active caretaker was provided by the witness, Rose Lerma. (3RR p.129)
Ms. Lerma helped Appellant from April 2014 until July 2014 with her children and
the general day to day task of keep her home in order. (3RR p.131-132). Ms.
Lerma testified the Appellant was a great mother and was a great caretaker of her
children. (3RR pp.133-135). Ms. Lerma also testified that she never witnessed any
violence on the part of Appellant, nor did she witness any use of drugs or alcohol
the entire time she worked for her. (3RR pp. 133-135). Ms. Lerma also testified
that Appellant had stayed a considerable amount of time with her family in Mexico
and knew her to be a good person. (3RR p.130). The reason she ceased her
employment with Appellant was due to the children being removed from
Appellant’s home on July 11, 2014 by Appellee. (3RR p.133). This witness
provided the most insight as to Appellant’s ability as a parent and a mother to the
children in this suit in relation to the time period that these issues were being
34
litigated. The testimony of all Appellee’s witnesses was diminished with the honest
and unbiased testimony offered by Ms. Lerma. She clearly and unequivocally
voiced her opinion of Appellant as a capable mother that loved her children. (3RR
pp.129-136).
To discharge her burden of rebutting this parental presumption to prevent
Appellant from being appointed sole managing conservator of the children, the
Appellee was required to offer evidence of specific actions or omissions of the
Appellant that demonstrate that appointing Appellant as conservator would result
in physical or emotional harm to the children. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d
164 (Tex. 1990); Brigham v. Brigham 863 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.App.- Dallas,
1993)(citing Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990)).
The Appellee offered no evidence that Appellant was presently engaged in
some detrimental immoral or criminal conduct that this and other Texas courts
have found to pose a real, rather than a speculative, harm to a child’s physical
health or emotional development, e.g. illegal drug use, alcohol abuse, family
violence against her spouse or the children, drug dealing, or other criminal activity.
May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 376 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied;
see, e.g. Compton v. Pfannenstiel, 428 S.W.3d 881 (Tex. App.--Houston [1st Dist.]
2014)(mother’s drug-dealing, neglect and physical abuse of children would result
in physical or emotional harm to children). The trial court erred in finding that
35
Appellant’s appointment as sole managing conservator was not in the children’s
best interest, particularly in light of the legally and factually insufficient evidence
at trial on this issue. Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540 (Tex. 2012), See, TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. §153.002.
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186, (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010) should set
the standard for deciding whether appointing Appellant as sole managing
conservator will impair the children’s physical or emotional development. In Gray,
this honorable court reversed the trial court on the grounds that the trial court had
abused its discretion in appointing a grandmother sole managing conservator of the
child made the subject of the underlying suit in that case, in light of the absence of
a preponderance of the evidence that father’s appointment as managing
conservator of the child would significantly impair the child’s physical health or
emotional development. Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186, 197 (Tex.App.-Corpus
Christi 2010, rev’d). This Court found that the potential for future harm and the
lack of present harm were insufficient to substantiate a finding of fact or
conclusion of law that the parent’s appointment as sole managing conservator
would significantly impair the child’s physical health or emotional development,
when that speculative harm was simply “uprooting” the child from their present
residence. Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186, 197 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010,
rev’d)(citing May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 376-77 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi
36
1992, writ denied), See also, Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 (Tex.
1990). This court quoted the Texas Supreme Court’s holding in Lewelling v.
Lewelling that “specific acts or omissions of the parent that demonstrate an award
of custody to the parent would result in physical or emotional harm to the child”
would be required to be established by a preponderance of the evidence by the
nonparent to meet the standard of proof under TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §153.131. Id.
The Supreme Court in Shook affirmed the holding by this court regarding the lack
of legally and factually sufficient evidence proffered at trial by the nonparent.
Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 543 (Tex. 2012). The Supreme Court agreed with
this court’s analysis of the evidence and agreed with remanding the case back to
the trial court for a hearing on conservatorship. Id. In the instant case, the record is
devoid of any evidence that Appellant posed an actual danger to her children or
that future harm would be a concern, if Appellant were to be appointed sole
managing conservator of her children. (3RR p.117, line 22-25 and p. 118). This
court should find as it did in Gray that the trial court abused its discretion in
appointing Appellee sole managing conservator of all four children, without legally
and factually sufficient evidence to support its Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 4 and 5.
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186, 197 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 2010, rev’d).
Thus, Appellee failed to show by a preponderance of the evidence that
appointment of the Appellant as sole managing conservator of the children would
37
not be in the children’s best interest because the appointment would significantly
impair the children's physical health or emotional development. Alternatively, and
without waiving the legally sufficiency challenge, the evidence is factually
insufficient to show that appointment of the Appellant as sole managing
conservator of the children would not be in the children’s best interest because the
appointment would significantly impair the children's physical health or emotional
development.
Therefore, the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s Finding of Fact Nos. 2, 4 and 5, and the court abused its discretion in
appointing Appellee as sole managing conservator of the children on voluntary
relinquishment grounds. The court erred in not making findings of facts which
demonstrated Appellant’s voluntary relinquishment that would support these
Findings of Fact Nos. 2, 4 and 5.
The evidence presented by the Appellee to rebut the parental presumption
through either voluntary relinquishment or significant impairment grounds is
legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s findings of fact. Thus,
the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and judgment rendered for Appellant.
Alternatively, should the court find the evidence factually insufficient, the trial
court’s judgment should be reversed and the case remanded to the trial court for a
new trial and further fact-finding.
38
PRAYER
Appellant requests this Court consider the issues presented for review
and that upon such consideration that the trial court’s judgment should be reversed
and judgment rendered for Appellant. Alternatively, should the court find the
evidence factually insufficient, the trial court’s judgment should be reversed and
the case remanded to the trial court for a new trial and further fact-finding.
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), I hereby certify
that this brief contains 7,542 words (excluding the caption, table of contents, table
of authorities, signature, proof of service, certification and certificate of
compliance). This is a computer-generated document created in Microsoft Word,
using 14-point typeface for all text, except for footnoted which are 12-point
typeface. In making this certificate of compliance, I am relying on the word count
provided by the software used to prepare the document.
39
Respectfully submitted,
PEÑA GARCIA GUERRERO PLLC
900 Kerria Avenue
McAllen, TX 78501
t: 956.948.2221
f: 888.422.6821
By: /s/ Francisco Guerrero II
Francisco Guerrero, II
SBN 24047588
fg@pgglex.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I, Francisco Guerrero II, certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing
APPELLANT’S BRIEF was served on opposing counsel in accordance with the
Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure 9.5 on the 21th day of July 2015
VIA FAX
The Firm of Roel "Robie" Flores
3331 N. Ware Rd
Mc Allen, Texas 78501
Ph. (956) 631-7188
Fx. (956) 631-7268
robiefloreslaw@att.net
/s/ Francisco Guerrero II
Francisco Guerrero II
40
APPENDIX
Tab No. 1 – Trial court’s final judgment
Tab No. 2 – Trial court’s findings of fact and conclusions of law
Tab No. 3 – Critz v. Critz
Tab No. 4 – Gray v. Shook
Tab No. 5 – Shook v. Gray
41
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
297 S.W.3d 464Shelley Durrell Haines CRITZ and Roger Allen Critz, Appellant/Cross-Appellant,
v.
Roger Allen CRITZ, Joseph C. Critz, and Sharon A. Critz and Shelley Durrell Haines Critz,
Appellees/Cross-Appellee.
No. 2-08-015-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas, Fort Worth.
September 17, 2009.
[297 S.W.3d 467]
Jacquelyn A. Flynt, Monique Lopez-Hinkley, Leagl Aid of Northwest Texas, Fort Worth, TX,
for Shelley Durrell Haines Critz.
Jeremy C. Martin, Dallas, TX, for Roger C. Critz.
Georganna L. Simpson, Law Offices of Georganna L. Simpson, Dallas, TX, Sarraine S.
Krause, Law Office of Sarraine S. Krause, Fort Worth, TX, for Joseph C. Critz, Sharon A. Critz.
Panel: CAYCE, C.J.; LIVINGSTON and GARDNER, JJ.
OPINION
JOHN CAYCE, Chief Justice.
Appellant Shelley Durrell Haines Critz remainder of 2004, Shelley was hospitalized due
complains of the trial court's final decree of to complications from her pregnancy. She saw
divorce appointing appellees Joseph C. Critz and Ryder one day in September, two days in
Sharon A. Critz as joint managing conservators October, no days in November, and three days in
of Ryder Critz. We reverse and remand. December. She also kept in contact with him by
phone. During Christmas, she drove to the
I. Background Grandparents' house to see Ryder but she
became sick on the return trip and miscarried.
Roger and Shelley Critz met while they
were both working at a nightclub in the early On January 27, 2005, Roger filed an
1990s. In February 1998, Shelley gave birth to original petition for divorce requesting that he be
their only child, Ryder, and in September of that appointed primary joint managing conservator of
year, Shelley and Roger married. Ryder. The same day, the Grandparents filed a
petition intervening into the divorce suit seeking
In February 2003, after an argument about primary joint managing conservatorship on the
Roger's alleged drug use, Roger moved out of grounds that Roger and Shelley had voluntarily
their house. Shelley remained in the house with abandoned Ryder, and that appointing Roger or
Ryder for another six months before she learned Shelley as a primary conservator would
that it was being foreclosed. significantly impair Ryder's physical health or
Both Shelley and Ryder eventually moved emotional development.
in with Roger's parents, Joseph and Sharon Critz Shelley filed answers to the petitions, along
(the Grandparents). While Shelley and Ryder with a counterpetition for divorce
were living with the Grandparents, Shelley met
and began dating Chris Martinez. In January of [297 S.W.3d 468]
2004, she began staying with Chris and away
from the Grandparents' house on weekends. In requesting that she be appointed sole managing
May 2004, Shelley became pregnant with conservator, and contending that appointment of
Chris's child. the Grandparents or Roger as joint managing
conservators would not be in Ryder's best
In June 2004, Shelley moved in with Chris interests.
and his parents while Ryder continued to stay
with his Grandparents. During much of the
-1-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
On May 12, 2005, the trial court issued insufficient to support the trial court's
temporary orders that gave the Grandparents conservatorship decision, and she requested the
primary custody of Ryder, and delineated court to issue findings of fact and conclusions of
specific times when Shelley and Roger had law related to its decree.3 The Grandparents
rights to possession. responded to the motion for new trial and
submitted proposed findings of fact and
In November 2006, Todd Maslow, a conclusions of law, which the trial court
caseworker for Family Court Services, adopted. In the court's findings of fact, the court
submitted a social study report recommending found that the Grandparents "rebutted the
that Ryder should continue to reside with the parental presumption" and that it was in Ryder's
Grandparents, but that he should continue to see best interest that the Grandparents, Shelley, and
Shelley as much as possible. Roger be appointed joint managing
conservators. This appeal and cross-appeal
In March 2007, the Grandparents filed a followed.
"parenting plan" for Ryder, which intended to
"establish guidelines," "state the importance of II. Issues on Appeal
[Ryder's] well being," and "establish goals for
emotional support, education, and discipline." Shelley complains of the trial court's order
The parenting plan described their intentions for appointing the Grandparents as joint managing
Ryder's education (including plans related to his conservators of Ryder. She contends that the
ADHD),1 his after-school care, his medical trial court erred in failing to make specific
needs (including a list of health care providers findings of fact identifying the basis for its
he would use), and Roger's and Shelley's conclusion that the
proposed roles. The plan proposed that they,
Shelley, and Roger all be appointed as joint [297 S.W.3d 469]
managing conservators, that the Grandparents
should establish his primary residence, and that parental presumption was rebutted by the
Shelley and Roger should have designated times Grandparents. She further contends that the
of possession, including times during the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to
summer and on holidays. prove that she relinquished control of Ryder for
more than one year and that she would
The issues regarding Ryder's custody were significantly impair Ryder's physical or
tried before the trial court in March 2007. After emotional well-being. Roger complains of the
the parties rested and counsel made closing trial court's failure to specify his periods of
arguments, on March 30, 2007, the trial court possession and access.
appointed the Grandparents, Shelley, and Roger
as joint managing conservators of Ryder, with A. Standard of Review
the Grandparents having primary possession and A trial court's decision regarding the
the authority to establish his permanent conservatorship of a child is reviewed under an
residence. The trial court set particular dates and abuse of discretion standard.4 To determine
times for Shelley to have access to Ryder, but whether a trial court abused its discretion, we
stated that Roger would have such access only must decide whether the trial court acted without
"at such times as is agreed upon" between him reference to any guiding rules or principles; in
and his parents. In October 2007, the trial judge other words, we must decide whether the act was
signed a final decree of divorce that incorporated arbitrary or unreasonable.5 Merely because a
these decisions.2 trial court may decide a matter within its
In November 2007, Shelley filed a motion discretion in a different manner than an appellate
for new trial, asserting that the evidence court would in a similar circumstance does not
presented at trial was legally and factually
-2-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
demonstrate that an abuse of discretion has [t]he presumption that a parent
occurred.6 should be appointed or retained
as managing conservator of the
An abuse of discretion does not occur child is rebutted if the court
where the trial court bases its decision on finds that:
conflicting evidence.7 Furthermore, an abuse of
discretion does not occur as long as some (1) the parent has voluntarily
evidence of substantive and probative character relinquished actual care, control,
exists to support the trial court's decision.8 and possession of the child to a
nonparent, licensed child-
B. The Parental Presumption placing agency, or authorized
agency for a period of one year
In her first issue, Shelley contends that the or more, a portion of which was
trial court abused its discretion when it within 90 days preceding the
appointed the Grandparents as joint managing date of intervention in or filing
conservators of Ryder without making specific of the suit; and
findings related to the parental presumption
described by sections 153.131 and 153.373 of (2) the appointment of the
the family code.9 Section 153.131 provides: nonparent or agency as
managing conservator is in the
(a) Subject to the prohibition in best interest of the child.12
Section 153.004,10 unless the
court finds that appointment of Collectively, these statutes provide that it is
the parent or parents would not presumed that the appointment of "the parents of
be in the best interest of the a child" as joint managing conservators is in the
child because the appointment best interest of the child.13 To overcome this
would significantly impair the presumption, a court must find that (1)
child's physical health or appointment of the parents would significantly
emotional development, a impair the child's physical health or emotional
parent shall be appointed sole development, (2) the parents have exhibited a
managing conservator or both history of family violence, or (3) the parents
parents shall be appointed as voluntarily relinquished care, control, and
joint managing conservators of possession of the child to a non-parent for a year
the child. or more.14 A trial court's conclusion that the
parental presumption has been rebutted must be
(b) It is a rebuttable supported by specific findings of fact identifying
presumption that the the factual basis for the finding, and the failure
appointment of the parents of a to make such findings constitutes error.15
child as joint managing
conservators is in the best Shelley contends that the trial court was
interest of the child. A finding required to specifically make one of these three
of a history of family violence findings to appoint the Grandparents as joint
involving the parents of a child managing conservators. Relying on a Texas
removes the presumption Supreme Court opinion construing a former
version of the family code, the Grandparents
[297 S.W.3d 470] assert that the presumption does not apply and,
under this subsection.11 therefore, no findings were required because
Shelley and Roger were also made joint
Section 153.373 states that managing conservators.
-3-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
In Brook v. Brook,16 the supreme court the appointment would be in the child's best
construed former family code section 14.01, interest.20 This is no longer the law.21
which provided, in pertinent part, as follows:
Under current section 153.131, it is now
(a) In any suit affecting the presumed that the appointment of both parents
parent-child relationship, the as joint managing conservators is in the child's
court may appoint a sole best interest.22 This substantive change in the
managing conservator or may parental presumption law is not addressed by the
appoint joint managing dissent. When Brook was decided, there was no
conservators. A managing rebuttable presumption that both parents be
conservator must be a suitable, appointed joint managing conservators. Thus,
competent adult, or a parent, or under former law, so long as one parent was
an authorized agency. If the appointed a joint managing conservator, as was
court finds that the parents are the case in Brook, the parental presumption was
or will be separated, the court satisfied. Under section 153.131, however, a
shall appoint at least one non-parent may not be appointed a joint
managing conservator. managing conservator without overcoming the
presumption as to both parents.23 The plain
(b) A parent shall be appointed wording of the statute makes clear that this
sole managing conservator or presumption applies when a non-parent seeks
both parents shall be appointed managing conservatorship in lieu of or in
as joint managing conservators addition to both parents. There is no language in
of the child unless: section 153.131 that indicates that the
presumption is inapplicable to the appointment
(1) the court finds that of non-parents as joint managing conservators
appointment of the parent or when the trial court also appoints one or both
parents would not be in the best parents. Nor does Brook compel this result.
interest of the child because the
appointment would significantly [297 S.W.3d 472]
impair the child's physical
health or emotional The dissent suggests that we have departed
development.17 from binding precedent of the supreme court and
of this court. We clearly have not. Brook, and
[297 S.W.3d 471] this court's nearly twenty-year-old decision
following it,24 interpreted and applied a former
The supreme court held that section 14.01 statute that did not contain a parental
authorized a trial court to appoint a non-parent presumption requiring that both parents be
as a joint managing conservator without proof appointed joint managing conservators unless
that appointment of a parent or the parents rebutted. Because Brook construed a repealed
would significantly impair the child's health or statute that is substantively different than the
development, so long as the non-parent shares statute at issue here, we are, of course, not
custody with a parent.18 bound under the doctrine of stare decisis by the
Unlike current section 153.131, former Brook court's interpretation of the repealed
section 14.01 contained no rebuttable statute.25
presumption that appointment of both parents as The dissent takes the novel position that the
joint managing conservators is in the child's best presumption does not apply to the appointment
interest.19 At the time Brook was decided, a trial of the joint managing conservators in this case,
court was authorized to appoint parents as joint but that it does apply to which joint managing
managing conservators only upon finding that conservator should determine the child's
-4-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
permanent residence. As written by the In an abuse of discretion review, legal and
legislature, however, section 153.131 contains factual insufficiency are not independent
no language that indicates a legislative intent grounds for asserting error, but are merely
that a parental presumption applies to the issue relevant factors in assessing whether a trial court
of primary custody apart from the determination abused its discretion.33 Thus, in applying the
of joint managing conservatorship. The title to abuse of discretion standard, an appellate court
section 153.131 is "Presumption That Parent to in a family law case must apply a two-prong
be Appointed Managing Conservator."26 analysis: (1) whether the trial court had
Moreover, the statute expressly refers to a sufficient evidence upon which to exercise its
presumption that a parent should be appointed discretion; and (2) whether the trial court erred
"sole managing conservator," or that both in applying its discretion.34
parents should be appointed "joint managing
conservators"—it makes no reference to a We may sustain a legal sufficiency
separate presumption for determining which challenge only when (1) the record discloses a
joint managing conservator chooses the child's complete absence of evidence of a vital fact, (2)
permanent residence.27 To reach the result that the court is barred by rules of law or of evidence
the dissent advocates, we would be required to from giving weight to the only evidence offered
legislate from the bench and convert the to prove a vital fact, (3) the evidence offered to
managing conservator presumption into a prove a vital fact is no more than a mere
"primary custody" presumption with no statutory scintilla, or (4) the evidence establishes
authority for doing so. We are not inclined to do conclusively the opposite of a vital fact.35 In
this.28 determining whether there is legally sufficient
evidence to support the finding under review, we
We hold that the trial court correctly must consider evidence favorable to the finding
followed express provisions of the family code if a reasonable factfinder could and disregard
by applying the parental presumption to the evidence contrary to the finding unless a
appointment of the Grandparents as joint reasonable factfinder could not.36
managing conservators in this case. Upon
finding that the parental presumption was When reviewing an assertion that the
rebutted, however, the trial court failed to make evidence is factually insufficient to support a
findings specifically stating how the finding, we set aside the finding only if, after
presumption was rebutted.29 The failure to make considering and weighing all of the evidence in
such findings is error.30 This error was waived, the record pertinent to that finding, we
however, because Shelley did not timely request determine that the evidence supporting the
additional findings of fact.31 Shelley's first issue finding is so weak, or so contrary to the
is overruled. overwhelming weight of all the evidence, that
the answer should be set aside and a new trial
[297 S.W.3d 473] ordered.37
C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence to 2. Voluntary Relinquishment of Ryder
Overcome the Parental Presumption for a Period of One Year or More
We now turn to Shelley's contention in her The Grandparents contend that Shelley's
second issue that insufficient evidence was sparse contact with Ryder from January 2004 to
presented by the Grandparents to rebut the January 2005 proves that she voluntarily
presumption through either voluntary relinquished actual care, control, and possession
relinquishment or significant impairment of Ryder to them. We disagree.
grounds.32
Between January and April of 2004,
1. Standards of Review Shelley maintained her permanent residence
-5-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
with Ryder and saw him on a majority of days. finding of significant impairment, we agree with
While she was absent from Ryder on several Shelley that the evidence is factually insufficient
occasions during that time period, there is no to support such a finding.
evidence that she intended to surrender the care
of Ryder. Impairment must be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence indicating that
[297 S.W.3d 474] some specific, identifiable behavior or conduct
of the parent, demonstrated by specific acts or
After Shelley moved out of the omissions of the parent, will probably cause that
Grandparents' residence in June 2004, the time harm.41 This is a heavy burden that is not
she spent with Ryder decreased.38 But, the satisfied by merely
testimony of both Shelley and Sharon shows
that, although Shelley was often physically [297 S.W.3d 475]
separated from Ryder in the latter part of 2004,
she did not intend to relinquish control of him. showing that the non-parent would be a better
custodian of the child.42 "Close calls" should be
Shelley testified that she had agreed with decided in favor of the parent.43
the Grandparents that Ryder would stay with
them long enough to complete his school year, Evidence of past misconduct is not alone
and that she would change Ryder's school and sufficient to show present unfitness.44 "If the
have him live with her the following year. parent is presently a suitable person to have
Shelley stated that she talked with the custody, the fact that there was a time in the past
Grandparents about this plan "[w]eekly from the when the parent would not have been a proper
moment that [she] didn't stay at their house" and person to have such custody is not controlling."45
that she was "made to believe" that the change
was going to happen. Sharon testified that she The evidence offered at trial was as
was aware of these plans when Shelley moved follows:
out of her house, and that she knew that Diane Booth, a licensed social worker who
Shelley's intention was to take Ryder back. She conducted another study in 2006 after Maslow
also admitted that even when Shelley moved issued his report, testified that Joseph and
away, she was "still involved in decisions Sharon were "great grandparents" and that
regarding Ryder" and, most importantly, that Shelley was a good mom who never put Ryder
Shelley "never actually, really relinquished ... in any danger and was generally doing a good
control completely." job parenting him. She also reported that Roger
Thus, while Shelley may have been had drug addiction problems, that he described
physically apart from Ryder for a substantial himself as a "practicing alcoholic," and that he
part of 2004, there is no evidence that she seemed to be angry over the fact that he had
voluntarily relinquished actual care, custody, been adopted, but that he had steady work and
and control of him to the Grandparents.39 that he "loved being around Ryder." She further
explained that when she met with Ryder, he was
3. Significant Impairment of Ryder's happy, but he was also confused about his living
Physical Health or Emotional Development situation regarding the various people who had
requested custody of him. She also testified that
Shelley also contends that the evidence is she received a letter from Ryder stating that he
legally and factually insufficient to establish that wanted to live with Shelley.
appointing her and Roger as joint managing
conservators would significantly impair Ryder's Booth recommended that Ryder be placed
physical health or emotional development.40 with Shelley and opined that it would be in
Although there is some evidence to support a Ryder's best interest if the Grandparents fulfilled
-6-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
a secondary role in a more typical grandparent but he does not have the ability to be Ryder's
relationship with Ryder. primary managing conservator.
Barbara Martinez, Chris's mother, testified Roger testified that he resided with his
that Shelley was a good mother who took good parents for three years preceding the trial, that he
care of Ryder when he was at her house. was currently employed in the information
According to Mrs. Martinez, Shelley bathed technology field, and that he had previously
Ryder, did his laundry, disciplined him, and been employed as a bartender at several
helped him with his homework. Kyra Anderson, locations. He stated that two years had passed
Ryder's first grade teacher during 2004 and from the last time he used illegal drugs and that
2005, testified that the Grandparents were very he drank alcohol about once a week at the time
involved in his school activities and in the of trial, becoming drunk occasionally. He
progress Ryder was making in the classroom, expressed a desire to be a good father and also
that Ryder "fully enjoyed being with" them, and gave his opinion that Ryder should continue to
that Shelley was not involved with his reside with the Grandparents because he felt
schooling.46 Ryder needed more "structure and support," but
that Shelley should have equal time with Ryder
Dee Henderson, who had custody of and that she "loves [Ryder] very much."
Shelley's daughter Lexi, testified that she had However, Roger also testified that in January
concerns about Shelley's ability as a parent 2005 Shelley threatened to take Ryder away so
because Shelley was unreliable and had only that he and the Grandparents would never see
limited contact with Lexi.47 She also testified, Ryder again.48 He further said that when he first
however, that she had no concerns that Lexi separated from Shelley he was concerned for
would be physically harmed while with Shelley, Ryder's safety because he believed Shelley did
that she had no concerns about Lexi's safety at not take care of Ryder's physical needs.
the Martinezes' house, and that she had never
seen Shelley be physically or verbally abusive to Sharon testified that she and Joseph first
Lexi or Ryder. began to keep Ryder at their home every other
weekend when he was born, and then they
Cathy Baczynski, a licensed professional progressed to keeping him every weekend and
counselor, testified that, during counseling, part of the summer before Shelley and Ryder
Roger discussed identity issues related to moved in with them in 2003. She also contended
that Shelley was not very involved in Ryder's
[297 S.W.3d 476] early education and that she often returned
his adoption as well as his substance abuse Ryder late from her Wednesday visits with him.
history, his need to overcome his ADHD, his Sharon explained that upon picking up Ryder
frustration about living with his parents, and his from one of his visits to the Martinezes' house,
lack of communication with Shelley. Baczynski she became concerned about broken glass
also explained that she met with Ryder and surrounding a trampoline, a murky swimming
gained the impression from him that Roger pool, and an open flame on the stove, which
needed to be much more involved in Ryder's Shelley stated was used for heating. She was
life. She also stated that Ryder seemed to be also concerned that Shelley had taken Ryder to
happy living with his Grandparents and that his the nightclub during a poker tournament that
needs were well met in their home, but that he was hosted there.
would like to spend more time with Shelley and Sharon said that she saw Shelley slap Ryder
that, as a general rule, it is always best for a one time, that Shelley told her that she spanks
child's parents to have custody if possible. She Ryder, and that after returning from visits with
concluded that Roger has made positive strides, Shelley, Ryder had behavioral problems. She
conceded, however, that Ryder missed Shelley
-7-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
and that he and Shelley loved each other. She Xanax—filled within the previous six months.
requested that the court allow her and Joseph to No evidence was presented indicating that
keep Ryder during school weeks and split the Shelley was still taking high dosages of
rest of Ryder's access equally between Roger prescription medications at the time of or
and Shelley. recently before trial; in fact, a "prescription
profile" exhibit submitted into evidence by the
Joseph testified that he was concerned that Grandparents listed no prescriptions for Shelley
Shelley could not provide a stable financial after 2005. Thus, while Shelley's drug use may
environment for Ryder because she did not have have affected her fitness as a mother in the past,
a paying job, did not have a car in her name, and there was no evidence presented of any current
did not have her own place to live. Joseph drug use that would cause significant
described that Roger had taken a more active impairment to Ryder's physical health or
role in Ryder's life, had obtained a respectable emotional development in the present.
job, had provided health insurance for Ryder,
and had sought help from a therapist to deal with With regard to Shelley's living and
Roger's emotional problems. financial conditions, the evidence shows that, at
the time of trial, Shelley and Chris, who also has
Todd Maslow (who submitted the original a history of drug abuse, were living together at
social study report) testified that, despite his his parents' home. Chris, however, offered
recommendation that Ryder uncontroverted testimony that he had not used
illegal drugs in at least the four years preceding
[297 S.W.3d 477] trial. Also, the evidence established that at the
should remain with his Grandparents, he would Martinezes' five bedroom, two story house,
not have concerns about Ryder's safety if he Ryder had his own room and that Shelley's work
stayed with Shelley and did not believe that at the nightclub on weekends could allow her to
Ryder living with Shelley would significantly be a stay-at-home mom for Ryder during
impair Ryder's physical health or emotional weekdays.52 Shelley's residence at the
development.49 He also testified that when he Martinezes' house seemed to be stable. Mrs.
talked to Ryder when completing his initial Martinez testified that Shelley had become like a
study, Ryder told him he wanted to live with daughter
Shelley. [297 S.W.3d 478]
The Grandparents also rely on evidence of to her and that if Chris's and her relationship
Shelley's history of drug use and her living and became estranged, Shelley could continue to live
financial conditions as proof that Ryder's at her house with Ryder. Although, as the
physical and emotional health would be Grandparents point out, Shelley does not own or
impaired by the appointment of Shelley and lease a vehicle, carry health insurance, or
Roger as joint managing conservators. At the maintain paid employment, Mrs. Martinez
time of trial, however, Shelley was not taking testified that Shelley has access to four vehicles
any medications. While she admitted that she at her house and that she is "free to take them
had previously been dependent on drugs anytime," Roger carries insurance for Ryder, and
prescribed for her multiple sclerosis,50 and Shelley's lack of paid employment is "no
evidence established that she had taken high evidence" of a potential for significant
dosages of several types of prescription impairment to Ryder.53
medications that sometimes negatively affected
her,51 she testified that at the time of trial, she Finally, the Grandparents cite evidence in
was not taking any prescription medications, she the record related to certain conditions at the
had no current symptoms from her multiple Martinezes' house that they believe could cause
sclerosis, and she only had one prescription—for harm to Ryder. For example, they note that the
-8-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
Martinezes' backyard had a murky pool that was January 2004 and January 2005, and remand the
filled with leaves and a trampoline that had case for a new trial on the issue of whether the
broken glass underneath it. Mrs. Martinez, on appointment of Shelley and Roger as joint
the other hand, testified that Ryder was never managing conservators would not be in the best
allowed unattended outside, that an alarm interest of Ryder because such an appointment
sounded if any door in the house was opened, would significantly impair his physical health or
and that if the trial judge was concerned about emotional development.54
the safety of the pool, she would remedy those
concerns. Sharon testified that she had learned LIVINGSTON, J., filed a dissenting and
that the broken glass was from a patio table that concurring opinion.
had blown into the pool during a windstorm;
there was no evidence in the record as to how ---------------
recently the windstorm had occurred. Sharon Notes:
was also concerned at trial about an open flame
used to heat the Martinezes' house, but she 1. Ryder was diagnosed with ADHD while in the
admitted that Ryder had been taught about fire second grade.
hazards and that he was unlikely to attempt to
2. Specifically, the decree granted Shelley possession
play with the flame.
of Ryder on three weekends per month, Thursday
Viewing the entire record under the legal evenings, spring breaks, some of the time during
Ryder's Christmas break, Mother's Day, some other
and factual sufficiency standards of review
holidays, and forty-two days during the summer, but
articulated above, we conclude that, while there gave possession to the Grandparents at "all other
is some evidence that placing Ryder under the times not specifically designated."
joint managing conservatorship of Shelley and
Roger might significantly impair the physical 3. See Tex.R. Civ. P. 296.
health and emotional development of Ryder, the
evidence is factually insufficient to support a 4. See In re M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 2008, no pet.); Earvin v. Dep't of Family &
finding of such impairment.
Protective Servs., 229 S.W.3d 345, 350 (Tex.App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.).
III. Conclusion
5. Downer v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701
We hold that the trial court abused its S.W.2d 238, 241-42 (Tex. 1985), cert. denied, 476
discretion by appointing the Grandparents as U.S. 1159, 106 S. Ct. 2279, 90 L. Ed. 2d 721 (1986).
joint managing conservators because the
evidence is insufficient to support the trial 6. Id.
court's finding that the parental presumption was
rebutted. There is no evidence that Shelley 7. In re Barber, 982 S.W.2d 364, 366 (Tex. 1998)
voluntarily relinquished actual care, custody, (orig. proceeding).
and control of Ryder for one year or more, and 8. See Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198,
the evidence is factually insufficient to prove 211 (Tex.2002).
that the appointment of Ryder's parents as joint
managing conservators would significantly 9. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 153.131, .373 (Vernon
impair Ryder's physical health or emotional 2008).
development. We, therefore, reverse the
10. Section 153.004 states, in part, that in
provisions of the decree pertaining to joint
determining conservatorship, a court shall consider
managing conservatorship, render judgment that evidence of the intentional use of abusive physical
a non-parent shall not be appointed joint force and that a court may not "appoint joint
managing conservator based on Shelley's alleged managing conservators if credible evidence is
voluntary relinquishment of Ryder's care, presented of a history or pattern of past or present
custody, and control for the period between child neglect, or physical or sexual abuse by one
-9-
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
parent directed against the other parent, a spouse, or a 22. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a) ("both
child ... that results in the other parent becoming parents shall be appointed as joint managing
pregnant with the child." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. § conservators of the child") (emphasis added), §
153.004(a)-(b) (Vernon 2008); see In re R.T.H., 175 153.131(b) ("It is a rebuttable presumption that the
S.W.3d 519, 521 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2005, no appointment of the parents of a child as joint
pet.). managing conservators is in the best interest of the
child.") (emphasis added).
11. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131.
23. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a) ("both
12. Id. § 153.373. parents shall be appointed as joint managing
conservators of the child") (emphasis added), §
13. Id. §§ 153.131(a),(b), .373. 153.131(b) ("It is a rebuttable presumption that the
appointment of the parents of a child as joint
14. Id. §§ 153.131(a),(b), .373; see In re N.J.G., 980 managing conservators is in the best interest of the
S.W.2d 764, 766 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, child.") (emphasis added). The dissent contends that
no pet.). the presumption does not apply to the grandparents
because both parents were appointed as joint
15. Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 459-60
managing conservators. But section 153.131 clearly
(Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.); see Tex. Fam.Code
requires that the presumption favoring the
Ann. §§ 153.004, .131, .373.
appointment of both parents as joint managing
16. 881 S.W.2d 297 (Tex. 1994). conservators be rebutted by any non-parent seeking a
joint managing conservatorship appointment in lieu
17. Act of May 29, 1993, 73rd Leg., R.S., ch. 766, § of or in addition to both parents.
1, sec. 14.01(a), 1993 Tex. Gen. Laws 2989, 2989,
repealed by Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 24. See Connors v. Connors, 796 S.W.2d 233, 239
20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 282, 282; Act of May (Tex.App.Fort Worth 1990, writ denied).
28, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 370, § 1, sec.
25. See Lal v. Harris Methodist Fort Worth, 230
14.01(b)(1), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1461, 1461,
S.W.3d 468, 473-74 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2007, no
repealed by Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.
pet.) (rejecting argument that statute that was
20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 282, 282.
substantively amended should be construed as if it
18. Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 300. had not been amended).
19. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(b), Historical 26. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131 (emphasis
and Statutory Notes ("Acts 1995, 74th Leg., ch. 751 added).
... added subsec. (b)," which provides for "rebuttable
27. Id.
presumption that the appointment of the parents of a
child as joint managing conservators is in the best 28. Moreover, the two El Paso Court of Appeals
interest of the child"). opinions on which the dissent relies actually support
the conclusion that the parental presumption only
20. See Act of May 14, 1991, 72nd Leg., R.S., ch.
applies to primary custody in the context of
161, § 2, 1991 Tex. Gen. Laws 771, 771, repealed by
determining joint managing conservatorship between
Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch. 20, § 2,
a parent and non-parent. See Sotelo v. Gonzales, 170
1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 282, 282; see also Brook, 881
S.W.3d 783, 788 (Tex.App.El Paso 2005, no pet.); In
S.W.2d at 298.
re De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d 521, 534-35 (Tex.App.El
21. While we have found no legislative history Paso 1999, no pet.).
beyond the changes made to the current statute after
29. The trial court also offered no explanation for
section 14.01 was repealed that expressly indicates
why he appointed Shelley and Roger joint managing
that the legislature intended to overrule or nullify
conservators of Ryder after concluding that the
Brook when it repealed section 14.01, it is clear from
presumption was rebutted, i.e., that it would not be in
a comparison of the two statutes that the post-Brook
Ryder's best interest to appoint his parents as joint
changes to the statutes were substantive.
managing conservators.
- 10 -
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
30. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d at 459-60. 1997, writ denied) (suggesting that voluntary
relinquishment ends when temporary restrictions are
31. Tex.R. Civ. P. 297, 299; Chavez, 148 S.W.3d at ordered).
459-60.
40. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a); Sotelo,
32. Joseph and Sharon have not contended on appeal 170 S.W.3d at 788.
that the evidence supported a finding that Shelley
exhibited a history of family violence, so we will not 41. Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167
analyze this ground for rebutting the parental (Tex. 1990); Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d
presumption. See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(b). 616, 623 (Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.) (stating that the "link between the parent's
33. M.P.B., 257 S.W.3d at 811-12; In re M.C.F., 121 conduct and harm to the child may not be based on
S.W.3d 891, 895, 899 (Tex.App.-Fort Worth 2003, evidence which merely raises a surmise or
no pet.). speculation"); see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 105.005
(Vernon 2008) (stating that findings in family law
34. M.C.F., 121 S.W.3d at 895. cases must generally be proved by the preponderance
standard).
35. Uniroyal Goodrich Tire Co. v. Martinez, 977
S.W.2d 328, 334 (Tex. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 42. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167.
1040, 119 S. Ct. 1336, 143 L. Ed. 2d 500 (1999);
Robert W. Calvert, "No Evidence" and "Insufficient 43. Id. at 168.
Evidence" Points of Error, 38 Tex. L. Rev. 361, 362-
63 (1960). 44. Id.
36. Cent. Ready Mix Concrete Co. v. Islas, 228 45. May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373, 377 (Tex. App.-
S.W.3d 649, 651 (Tex.2007); City of Keller v. Corpus Christi 1992, writ denied) (op. on reh'g); see
Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 807, 827 (Tex.2005). S.W.H., 72 S.W.3d at 777-78 (holding that the
mother's past severe drug addiction and past
37. Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715 S.W.2d 629, 635 incarcerations related to drug use did not create a
(Tex. 1986) (op. on reh'g); Garza v. Alviar, 395 present likelihood of significant impairment to her
S.W.2d 821, 823 (Tex. 1965); In re King's Estate, child).
150 Tex. 662, 664-65, 244 S.W.2d 660, 661 (1951).
46. At trial, Shelley testified that she visited Ryder's
38. According to Sharon's calendar, Shelley saw school two days a week and that she went to his
Ryder only twenty times from June through school-related activities.
December 2004.
47. Shelley has had six pregnancies. Among these,
39. Even if we were to conclude that some evidence she had a daughter in 1994 named Lexi whom she
of relinquishment existed beginning in June 2004, lived with for only six months and shared access to at
when Shelley moved out of the Grandparents' home, the time of trial, and she also had a baby with Chris
she filed answers to Roger's petition and the after her miscarriage, who was six months old when
Grandparent's petition in intervention in February the trial began.
2005 and, therefore, ended any period of voluntary
relinquishment approximately seven months after 48. Sharon's testimony confirmed the threat.
leaving the Grandparents' house to leave Ryder with
his grandparents. See In re S.W.H., 72 S.W.3d 772, 49. Specifically, Maslow stated that the move to live
777 (Tex.App.Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). Moreover, with Shelley "could affect [Ryder's] emotional
in May 2005, the trial court entered a temporary adjustment; but seriously impair, no." He did,
order restricting Shelley's access to Ryder. In light of however, testify that he believed the Grandparents
such an order, any relinquishment by Shelley that and Roger were providing Ryder with security in his
occurred while the order was in effect was current placement, that Ryder should remain with
involuntary. Id. (concluding that a temporary them, and that he retained some concerns about some
restraining order entered against a parent ended the of Shelley's circumstances and her truthfulness on
parent's period of voluntary relinquishment); see also some of the responses she gave to him in his initial
In re M.W., 959 S.W.2d 661, 668 (Tex.App.-Tyler survey.
- 11 -
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
50. Shelley had taken many prescription medications, majority departs from Texas Supreme Court
including Suboxone, Seroquel, Hydrocodone, precedent and our own precedent in its holding.
Ambien, Lunesta, Lamictal, and Xanax at various
times before trial. These medications sometimes The Collective Appointment of the
made her dizzy or drowsy with slurred speech. Grandparents and the Parents as Ryder's
Sharon testified that in 2003, Shelley often left Joint Managing Conservators
medication out in places that Ryder had access to,
and that in 2005, during one of Shelley's scheduled Shelley's argument in her second issue that
visits with Ryder, the medication caused Shelley to the trial court abused its discretion when it
sleep for a prolonged period on Ryder's bedroom
appointed the Grandparents as Ryder's joint
floor.
managing conservators along with the Parents in
51. A pharmacist called by Roger's attorney that same role presupposes that the Grandparents
described the medications Shelley had taken and were required to overcome the statutory parental
opined that the dosages were high, but admitted that presumption to gain the appointment. That
she had limited knowledge of multiple sclerosis and supposition (and the majority's holding that
the reasons why Shelley's doctors may have been follows the supposition) is erroneous.
prescribing the types and amounts of medication she
was taking. Sections 153.131 and 153.373 of the family
code establish that to overcome the presumption
52. Shelley helped manage a nightclub that she,
Chris, and Chris's parents jointly owned, although she
that a parent must be appointed as a managing
received room and board in lieu of salary. Chris's conservator of a child, a court must find that (1)
mother watched Ryder when Shelley worked. appointment of the parent would significantly
impair the child's physical health or emotional
53. See Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d at 167. development, (2) the parent has exhibited a
history of family violence, or (3) the parent
54. Because we have reversed and remanded the voluntarily relinquished care, control, and
issues related to conservatorship and possession, we
possession of the child to a nonparent for a year
need not address Roger's sole issue in which he
contends that the trial court abused its discretion by or more. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §§ 153.131, .373
rendering a custody order that, although naming him (Vernon 2008); see In re N.J.G., 980 S.W.2d
a joint managing conservator of Ryder, did not 764, 766 n. 1 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1998, no
designate his periods of possession and access. See pet.) (citing sections 153.131 and 153.373 in a
Tex.R.App. P. 47.1. discussion of the parental presumption). But
these findings are not required when both
--------------- parents are named managing conservators.
[297 S.W.3d 479] Section 153.372 authorizes a trial court to
appoint parents and nonparents together as joint
TERRIE LIVINGSTON, Justice, dissenting
managing conservators. Tex. Fam.Code Ann. §
and concurring.
153.372(a) (Vernon 2008). And Texas Supreme
The majority holds that the trial court could Court precedent holds that the mere appointment
not appoint Joseph and Sharon (the of grandparents as joint managing conservators
Grandparents) together with Shelley and Roger alongside parents in that same role does not
(the Parents) as Ryder's joint managing require a trial court to apply the parental
conservators without applying the statutory presumption to exclude the grandparents; rather,
parental presumption and determining that the the trial court may make such an appointment if
Parents voluntarily relinquished care, custody, or it deems the appointment to be in the best
control of Ryder or that the Parents' appointment interest of the child. Brook v. Brook, 881 S.W.2d
as managing conservators would significantly 297, 299-300 (Tex.1994).
impair Ryder's physical health or emotional
development. See Majority op. at 470-72. The
- 12 -
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
In Brook, the court reviewed the collective Brook) are named joint managing conservators,
appointment of the mother and the mother's that possible modification would have no effect
parents as joint managing conservators to the on Brook's relation to this case because here the
exclusion of the father and unanimously trial court did name both of the Parents as joint
reasoned that the statutory parental presumption managing conservators, and thus completely
"contemplates a situation in which neither of the complied with subsection (b). Thus, for section
parents are awarded" managing conservatorship. 153.131(b) to achieve the precedent-altering
Id. at 298-99. The court explained that the result that the majority holds it does under the
parental presumption applies "only to those facts of this case, it would need to go beyond
situations in which a nonparent seeks custody in stating that "[i]t is a rebuttable presumption that
lieu of a natural parent." Id. at 299 (emphasis the appointment of the parents of a child as joint
added). Finally, the court noted that "[t]he managing conservators is in the best interest of
purpose of the statute, to codify the preference the child" to say something similar to "it is a
for giving custody to a parent, has been met in rebuttable presumption that the appointment of
the present case. The fact that a nonparent shares parents of a child as joint managing conservators
custody does not detract from the fact that one of to the exclusion of all other parties seeking
the child's parents does have custody." Id. at custody is in the best interest of the child." It
300. We have expressly held the same. Connors does not do so.2
v. Connors, 796 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex.App.-
Fort Worth 1990, writ denied) (holding that the [297 S.W.3d 481]
presumption "does not preclude the appointment
It is "fundamental to the very structure of
[297 S.W.3d 480] our appellate system that [the Texas Supreme
Court's] decisions be binding on the lower
of a parent to serve jointly with a non-parent" courts." Dallas Area Rapid Transit v.
and that it applies only if "appointment is to be Amalgamated Transit Union Local No. 1338,
denied to both parents"). 273 S.W.3d 659, 666 (Tex. 2008), cert. denied,
___ U.S. ___, 129 S. Ct. 2767, 174 L. Ed. 2d 284While Brook cited a previous version of the (2009); see Lubbock County v. Trammel's
family code, the language analyzed in the Lubbock Bail Bonds, 80 S.W.3d 580, 585
decision is almost exactly the same as the (Tex.2002) (explaining that it "is not the
language that now appears in subsection (a) of function of a court of appeals to abrogate or
section 153.131.1 Brook, 881 S.W.2d at 298-99. modify established precedent"). Under the
The only addition to the presumption statute that established precedent of the supreme court in
amounts to anything beyond rearranging words Brook and of our own court in Connors, the
is subsection (b) of section 153.131, which states Grandparents did not have to overcome the
that it is "a rebuttable presumption that the parental presumption for their appointment as
appointment of the parents of a child as joint joint managing conservators, and I would hold
managing conservators is in the best interest of that their appointment as such is in Ryder's best
the child." interest under the factors listed in Holley v.
Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 372 (Tex.1976). Thus,
The majority solely relies on subsection (b) I would affirm the trial court's conservatorship
as having precedent-overruling importance. See appointment, and I dissent to the portion of the
Majority op. at 470-72. But while it is possible majority's opinion reversing the appointment.
(although not supported by any specific
authority or legislative history in the majority's Primary Possession
opinion beyond the statutory amendment itself)
that subsection (b) could have modified Brook to Although Brook's application supports
the extent that the presumption applies unless affirming the Grandparents' appointment as
both parents (rather than a single parent, like in managing conservators along with the Parents, it
- 13 -
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
does not extend to their award of Ryder's in order to reach the result in De La Pena." Id.
primary possession, as challenged by Shelley.
Section 153.134(b)(1) of the family code states I agree with and would adopt the El Paso
that in rendering an order appointing joint Court's position, applying the same reasoning as
managing conservators, a court shall designate expressed in Sotelo and De La Pena. In De La
which conservator has the exclusive right to Pena, the child's aunt sought managing
determine the primary residence of the child. conservatorship to the exclusion of both parents
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.134(b)(1) (Vernon in that same role. De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d at
2008). 524-25. Because she sought complete exclusion
of the parents, the El Paso Court properly
In Sotelo v. Gonzales, the El Paso Court of applied the statutory presumption (as interpreted
Appeals decided that in an original custody by Brook) that "the best interest of a child is
determination, the parental presumption "applies served if a natural parent is appointed as a
when a non-parent and parent are appointed joint managing conservator." Id. at 527. Then, in
managing conservators of a child but the non- applying the presumption to the primary
parent is given primary custody." 170 S.W.3d possession issue, the El Paso Court held and
783, 788 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2005, no pet.) explained that
(citing In re De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d 521, 534-
35 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.)). The court as between a parent and
reasoned that to "hold otherwise would permit nonparent, unless the court finds
the court to apply the presumption in appointing that appointment of the parent
the parent a joint managing conservator but would not be in the best interest
nevertheless choose the primary residence of the of the child because it would
child on the basis of a heads-up best interest test, significantly impair the child's
with the court determining which of the parties physical health or emotional
is the `better' choice." Id. This would, according development, the parent shall be
to the El Paso Court, result in the "appointment appointed sole managing
of a parent as a managing conservator in name conservator or the parent and
only, a paper title which eviscerates the purpose nonparent shall be appointed
of the statute." De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d at 535. joint managing conservators. If
the court chooses the latter, the
In contrast, the San Antonio Court of parent shall be awarded
Appeals held in Gardner v. Gardner that the primary possession unless such
parental presumption does not apply to the issue an order would not be in the
of primary possession between parent and best interest of the child because
nonparent joint managing conservators. 229 it would significantly impair the
S.W.3d 747, 752 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 2007, child's physical health or
no pet.). In Gardner, the parties agreed to joint emotional development.[3]
managing conservatorship of the children at
issue, and the only remaining custody issue was Id. at 534-35 (emphasis added).
which joint managing conservator was going to
be awarded the right to determine the primary Our precedent establishes that the basis of
residence. Id. The court reasoned that because the "deeply embedded" statutory parental
the "plain words of [section 153.131] do not presumption is to protect the "natural affection
address or contemplate application of the usually flowing between parent and child." In re
[parental] presumption to the issue of primary M.N.G., 113 S.W.3d 27, 35 (Tex.App.-Fort
possession, [it] would have to rewrite the statute Worth 2003, no pet.). Also, a parent's rights to
"the companionship, care, custody, and
[297 S.W.3d 482] management" of his or her children are
constitutional interests "far more precious than
- 14 -
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
any property right." Santosky v. Kramer, 455 2008). Another section of the code states that
U.S. 745, 758-59, 102 S. Ct. 1388, 1397, 71 "[i]t is the policy of this state to ... optimize the
L.Ed.2d 599 (1982). Implicit in these rights is development of a close and continuing
the right to decide where one's child is to reside. relationship between each parent and child." Id.
§ 153.251(b) (Vernon 2008).
The majority says that applying the parental
presumption to which joint managing I would hold that erasing the parental
conservator has the right to determine a child's presumption in an original suit on custody when
primary residence would require us to "legislate a court appoints multiple parties as managing
from the bench."4 Majority op. at 472. But the conservators but gives primary possession to a
family code supports the application of the nonparent would weaken these constitutional
presumption even when nonparents are and statutory interests and would create an
designated as joint managing conservators unintended result by placing the parent and
without applying the presumption under nonparent on equal ground for the trial court's
circumstances like those in Brook. As the El real custody determination. Thus, because I
Paso Court explained, "Section 153.372(b) [of agree with the majority that the evidence in this
the family code] provides that the procedural case is insufficient to support the trial court's
and substantive standards regarding a court- finding that the Grandparents rebutted the
ordered joint managing conservatorship parental presumption, I would reverse the
provided by Subchapter C of the Family Code provisions of the trial court's order pertaining to
apply to a nonparent joint managing conservator. the Grandparents' right to determine Ryder's
The very first section of Subchapter C contains primary residence and remand this case for
the parental presumption." De La Pena, 999 further proceedings related to those provisions. I
S.W.2d at 534; see Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § would also sustain Roger's sole issue and reverse
153.372(b) (Vernon 2008). the portion of the order limiting Roger's access
to and possession of Ryder because as all parties
Other sections of the family code also have agreed, there is no evidence in the record
support presuming that parents should supporting that limitation.
[297 S.W.3d 483] Conclusion
maintain the right to designate a child's primary For these reasons, I respectfully dissent to
residence, which, as our supreme court has the portion of the majority's opinion and
explained, is a crucial component of managing judgment reversing the trial court's appointment
conservatorship. See Phillips v. Beaber, 995 of the Grandparents and Parents together as
S.W.2d 655, 660-61 (Tex. 1999) (equating the Ryder's joint managing conservators, but I
right of primary possession with "custody" and concur with the majority's remand of the case for
adding that primary possession and establishing further proceedings.
a child's residence are "core rights of managing
conservatorship"); see also Troxel v. Granville, ---------------
530 U.S. 57, 65, 120 S. Ct. 2054, 2060, 147
L. Ed. 2d 49 (2000) (explaining that "the interest Notes:
of parents in the care, custody, and control of 1. Subsection (a) of section 153.131 currently
their children ... is perhaps the oldest of the provides,
fundamental liberty interests"). For instance, the
very first section of the conservatorship chapter [U]nless the court finds that
of the family code relates that the state's public appointment of the parent or
policy is to "assure that children will have parents would not be in the best
frequent and continuing contact with parents." interest of the child because the
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.001(a)(1) (Vernon appointment would significantly
- 15 -
Critz v. Critz, 297 S.W.3d 464 (Tex. App., 2009)
impair the child's physical health or parents shall be appointed as joint managing
emotional development, a parent conservators of the child."
shall be appointed sole managing
conservator or both parents shall be 2. The majority states, "There is no language in
appointed as joint managing section 153.131 that indicates that the presumption is
conservators of the child. inapplicable to the appointment of non-parents as
joint managing conservators when the trial court also
Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131(a). At the time appoints one or both parents." Majority op. at 471.
of the Brook decision, the former section of the But there was likewise no such language in the
family code relating to the presumption stated, version of the statute analyzed in Brook. Brook, 881
S.W.2d at 298-99. The majority also argues that the
A parent shall be appointed sole Brook and Connors opinions regarded "a former
managing conservator or both statute that did not contain a parental presumption
parents shall be appointed as joint requiring that both parents be appointed joint
managing conservators of the child managing conservators unless rebutted." Majority op.
unless: at 472. But again, that change to the former statute is
irrelevant to this case because the trial court did
1) the court finds that appointment appoint both Parents as joint managing conservators.
of the parent or parents would not
be in the best interest of the child 3. This language signals the El Paso Court's opinion
because the appointment would that where a court does not find significant
significantly impair the child's impairment under the parental presumption,
physical health or emotional appointment of parents alongside nonparents as joint
development. managing conservators is still proper because in such
a situation, the parents have not been excluded from
Act of May 28, 1989, 71st Leg., R.S., ch. 370, § managing conservatorship. Id.; see Brook, 881
1, sec. 14.01(b)(1), 1989 Tex. Gen. Laws 1461, 1461, S.W.2d at 299-300.
repealed by Act of April 6, 1995, 74th Leg., R.S., ch.
20, § 2, 1995 Tex. Gen. Laws 282, 282; see Brook, 4. The majority uses the "legislate from the bench"
881 S.W.2d at 298. In essence, the legislature pejorative phrase in an attempt to show why it would
amended the family code to switch the order of the not apply the parental presumption to the right to
words existing in both provisions; it moved the words determine Ryder's primary residence, but it does not
"the court finds that appointment of the parent or explain why that same phrase would not apply to its
parents would not be in the best interest of the child own expansive interpretation of section 153.131
because the appointment would significantly impair when that section applies to the appointment of both
the child's physical health or emotional development" parents as a child's managing conservators.
from behind to in front of the words "[a] parent shall
be appointed sole managing conservator or both ---------------
- 16 -
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
329 S.W.3d 186David GRAY, Appellant,
v.
Ann Wood SHOOK, Appellee.
No. 13-09-00255-CV.
Court of Appeals of Texas,
Corpus Christi-Edinburg.
Nov. 30, 2010.
Rehearing Overruled Jan. 13, 2011.
[329 S.W.3d 187] stating, "The best interest of [G.W.] will be
served by the appointment of [Lucy] as joint
William A. Dudley, Corpus Christi, for managing conservator [of G.W.] with the
Appellant. exclusive right to designate the primary
residence of the child...." Gray also requested
Jack W. Marr, Marr, Meier & Bradicich, that "appropriate orders be made for access to
Victoria, for Appellee. the child and the allocation of the rights and
Before Justices YAÑEZ, BENAVIDES, duties of the conservators." On January 23,
and VELA. 2008, Ann Wood Shook, G.W.'s maternal
grandmother, filed a petition in intervention
OPINION stating that she "would show that it is in the best
interest of [G.W.] that Intervenor and
Opinion by Justice BENAVIDES. Respondent [Lucy] be appointed joint managing
conservators of [G.W.]." Shook further
Appellant, David Gray, appeals the trial requested that she "be granted the exclusive
court's appointment of appellee, Ann Wood right to establish the primary legal residence of
Shook, as sole managing conservator of his the child" and that Gray be appointed possessory
daughter, G.W. By one issue, Gray contends that conservator of G.W. Gray then amended his
the trial court abused its discretion because (1) petition requesting that he be appointed joint
Shook did not offer sufficient evidence of harm managing conservator with the exclusive right to
to overcome the parental presumption; (2) if the designate the primary residence of G.W.
parental presumption was overcome, Shook did
not establish harm by a preponderance of the [329 S.W.3d 188]
evidence; and (3) Shook offered no evidence of
any specific acts or omissions by Gray that On June 30, 2008, a bench trial was held at
would significantly impair the physical health or which Shook, Gray, Lucy, and Cheryl Green
emotional development of G.W. We reverse and testified.
remand.
Shook stated that G.W. has lived in her
I. Background home in Victoria, Texas since she was born and
that when Lucy moved out of Shook's home
David Gray and Lucy Wood are the approximately two years earlier, G.W. continued
biological parents of G.W., who was born on living with Shook and her husband. Shook
July 9, 2003. On January 30, 2007, Gray filed a testified that she and her husband have been
suit affecting the parent-child relationship "raising" G.W. for "about a year-and-a-half."
-1-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
According to Shook, she has filled the role of to Seattle, Washington. Shook said that when
co-parent with Lucy, and since G.W. was born, G.W. was born, Lucy moved into Shook's home
Shook and her husband have "taken part in all and that for a short time, Gray took an "active
aspects of raising [G.W.] together" because role" and visited G.W. at least every other
Lucy "didn't know how much part [Gray] would weekend; however, the visits soon became
be in her life." Shook testified that G.W. spends "sporadic."
more time with her than with Lucy and that
presently, she and her husband are primarily Shook testified that G.W. has started pre-
responsible for raising G.W. Shook school and that G.W. attends gymnastics, dance
acknowledged, however, that Lucy was still class, and play groups with her friends.
providing care for G.W. and asked that Lucy be According to Shook, Lucy usually spends the
appointed joint managing conservator. night at Shook's house and does not take G.W.
away for overnight visits because they do not
Shook stated that it was in G.W.'s best want to "jerk [G.W.] back and forth." Shook
interest for Gray to be appointed possessory stated that she does not intend to move away
conservator and that it would significantly from Victoria.
impair G.W.'s physical health if the trial court
appointed Gray managing conservator. Shook Shook testified that Gray did not
testified that she wanted to be appointed acknowledge G.W. as his child while Lucy was
managing conservator with the right to pregnant, but after G.W. was born, a paternity
determine the residence of the child. According test was performed. Shook stated that when
to Shook, if she were not appointed managing Gray was transferred to New Jersey, he did not
conservator, it would significantly impair G.W.'s visit G.W. "real often" and that during that time,
physical health because G.W. bonded with Shook and Lucy; Shook
explained that bonding means "creating a safe
[i]f [G.W.] were to be taken place—a place in the relationship where a child
away from her residence, the feels safe, unquestionably taken care of." Shook
only home she's ever known, did not believe that G.W. bonded with Gray
and moved across the country during the first year of her life. She stated that
where she has no family, no after approximately two years in New Jersey,
support system, I feel—and as Gray moved to Denver; during that time, he
an educator and with a degree in visited
counseling, I feel that it would
be—and her grandmother, I feel [329 S.W.3d 189]
that it would be harmful to her
because she has a lot of G.W. two to three times per year. According to
insecurities now. Shook, while Gray has lived in Seattle, he has
visited G.W. three to four times per year and that
On cross-examination, Shook stated that in the last year, Gray had seen G.W. "[a] little
Gray "arrived" after G.W.'s birth and that he did more regularly." When asked, "And if you were
not participate during the pregnancy and did not to define her world of comfort, who are the
pay for the medical expenses related to G.W's people that are involved in her world of comfort
birth. According to Shook, from the time of right now," Shook replied, "My husband,
G.W.'s birth until the time of trial, Gray had not myself[,] ... her mother[,] and her [maternal]
had contact with G.W. on a monthly basis. aunt and her [maternal] uncle." Shook claimed
Shook stated that Gray has had approximately that Gray had not contacted G.W. by telephone
three to four visits with G.W. per year in the last on a regular basis and that to her knowledge,
five years. Shook testified that Gray lived in Gray had only called G.W. once since she was
Houston when G.W. was born; he then moved to four years old. When asked what the impact on
New Jersey, then to Denver, Colorado, and then G.W. would be if she were removed from
-2-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
Shook's home and moved to Seattle, Shook [c]ounselors other than myself,
stated: child counselors that [G.W.] has
visited with that [sic] has told
It would be devastating at this me this and is willing to testify
point in her life. Her world as a here today. It's not just my
five-year-old revolves around opinion, it's ... Any adolescent
her safety and her security. And child psychology book that you
she already worries and read, when you take a child's
obsesses over things because of world away from them, the only
the insecurity of her dad in and world that they know, and put
out of her life. The only thing them in another world has
constant in her life since birth harmful effects.... [And G.W.]
has been my husband and I and would not have family support
her mother has been there as a [if she moved to Seattle]....
presence. [Gray] has not one relative that
lives in Seattle. [G.W.] in
Shook stated that her "position is [Gray] Victoria has a wide family
should see [G.W.] more often, that he needs to support system and that is the
build a relationship and be a full part of her life, most important thing in her life.
not just visit occasionally" and that it would be
"devastating to [G.W.]" if Gray were allowed to The trial court asked Shook several questions
transport G.W. to Seattle because she had "never regarding Lucy's parental involvement. In her
been more than a night or two without [Lucy], answers, Shook acknowledged that Lucy does
[Shook,] or [Shook's] husband." According to not visit G.W. every day, does not pay any child
Shook, no relationship exists between G.W. and support to Shook, and that Shook still provides
Gray; therefore, Gray's visitation should be financial support to Lucy. When asked why
increased gradually "until [G.W.] feels safe and Shook had possession of G.W., Shook replied:
comfortable with him at [the Shooks'] home in
Victoria or other places." [329 S.W.3d 190]
On re-direct examination, Shook stated that Lucy suffers from depression,
although Gray has been interested in visiting which she is being treated for
with G.W., "[t]he desire for seeing her more and sees a doctor and is trying
than he has been is sudden as of the last to get help. She maintains a job
hearing." Shook believed that if G.W. were fulltime and she struggles to
transported to Seattle, she could suffer physical provide a place where [G.W.]
harm, such as "stomach [aches], throwing up, can come. She struggles to
grinding her teeth." Shook testified that the trial provide a car. She's having a
court had ordered Gray to visit G.W. three times hard time. And she wants to be
before the end of the year 2007 because Gray a fulltime mother but she
had only visited G.W. once that year and that feels—and we've always
Gray had complied with the order. discussed [G.W.] openly
between ourselves—and we feel
Shook denied that she and Lucy "resisted" together that it's better not to
allowing Gray any visitation time with G.W. and drag [G.W.] from one place to
that they had "always encouraged [Gray] to be the other. Lucy visits her at our
part of her life." When asked to substantiate her home and she may financially
opinion that G.W. would suffer from physical have to move back into our
and emotional harm if she were removed from home with [G.W.].
Shook's home, Shook stated that:
-3-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
Shook stated that she believes that G.W. is safer could occur if Gray maintained regular
living with her rather than living with Lucy and communication. Green stated:
that she and her husband have been the "only
consistent thing" in G.W.'s life. You know, from what I
understand, the only time
Green, a licensed clinical social worker,1 [G.W.] interacts with [Gray] is
testified that she had been counseling G.W. for when he's here. There's no
two months prior to the trial due to G.W.'s phone calls, there's no letters,
separation anxiety. Green stated that: there's no little pictures sent in
the mail, none of those things
[G.W.] has had several that would be appropriate
instabilities in her life to date. communication with a four-
She's been back and forth with year-old, which is frequent
her biological mother and is when parents are geographically
currently residing primarily with distanced, they make the effort
her biological grandmother and to have regular weekly phone
step grandfather. There's been contact or some kind of
inconsistencies due to the interaction with a child.
mother's difficulties, which have
led to some anxieties in this According to Green, G.W. considers Shook
child's life. She has some her "primary parent" and she feels "safe" in
separation anxiety, she doesn't Shook's home environment. Green testified that
like to be alone, she's very because of G.W.'s separation anxiety, a situation
controlling, she's very needy, that causes more stress, such as allowing her to
needs lots of attention. She leave her home, could cause long-term problems
won't sleep alone in a room.
[329 S.W.3d 191]
According to Green, stability and
consistency are very important to a child such as "[p]oor performance in school, poor
experiencing anxiety. Green explained that a socialization, difficulty in relationships" and
child G.W.'s age is not able to bond with a more serious problems such as depression and
person who visits every three to four months and the risk of drug use. Green explained that
that for bonding to occur, more frequent contact extended periods of visitation with Gray in
is necessary. When asked whether it is Seattle could cause G.W. to "regress, she could
detrimental to a relationship between a child and become increasingly more anxious and more
a parent for there to be infrequent or large gaps clingy." Green stated, "I understand that when
between visits, Green replied that it would not she's gone on visits in the past with the father
affect the relationship in a positive manner and she's been throwing up out of anxiety, possibly,
"as far as the two people bonding together, it's since it's been a recurring event."
going to keep that from happening." She opined
that for a child to bond to someone, that person Green testified that if G.W. was removed
must be consistently in the child's life. Green from Shook's home, she would "freak out," cling
stated that to achieve that level of bonding, the to Shook, cry, scream, and throw up. According
person should have regular communication with to Green, if the visitation schedule "is too
the child by mail, telephone, or "face-to-face." accelerated," there could be problems "such as
Green testified that visits once every two months the continued vomiting during visits ... bed-
are inadequate for bonding to occur and that she wetting ... anxiety.... Maybe even she would
did not "feel" that G.W. had an adequate bond become more controlling, more bossy, which
with Gray, meaning that G.W. "would sense" could cause problems with her peer interaction."
Gray as a stranger. Green opined that bonding
-4-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
Gray testified that he works for Skansa, that they would be down in a
USA Building as an engineer and his salary is few hours.
$85,000 a year. According to Gray, in the past,
there has been "some resistance" to his visiting According to Gray, the visitation that was
with G.W. and that there was difficulty in scheduled to begin at 9:00 a.m. actually began at
exercising his last visitation with G.W. Gray 1:30 p.m., and he did not make that time up by
stated: returning G.W. later. Gray stated that his
visitation with G.W. went "exceptionally well,"
The day prior to me making the they had a lot of fun together and that he and
trip down here I called Lucy, G.W. have a strong healthy bond and
her mother—G.W.'s mother, relationship.
that is—and inquired where and
when I could pick her up, Gray testified that he lives with his
understanding that it was nine, girlfriend, Allison, in a house he recently
but just to confirm things. And purchased and that there is a bedroom for G.W.
[Lucy] informed me that her Gray started a college fund for G.W. and
daughter was out of town and provides health insurance for G.W., which he
didn't know exactly when she'd started doing "immediately following the first
return or where she was at that month of [G.W.'s] life." Gray claimed that at the
moment but she would call and time of G.W.'s birth, it was "very unclear who
inquire into that. And I asked the father was" and that was the reason Lucy
her to finally return my call and carried her own medical insurance during the
let me know what time the next pregnancy and birth.
morning I could pick her up and
where that would be. Gray stated that he was requesting custody
of G.W. because it had become increasingly
A few hours later, seven o'clock difficult to be as involved in her life as he would
my time, nine o'clock here, I like to be. Gray testified that he had not been
was getting ready to board an aware that G.W. lived with Shook until she filed
overnight plane flight down her petition for intervention; therefore, when he
here and I called back—I've also became aware of the situation, Gray decided that
called [Shook's] house at that he should seek custody of G.W. Gray believed
time to see if I could find
someone there that could [329 S.W.3d 192]
answer that question. Phone that G.W.'s living conditions were temporary
calls were not answered, and "evolved out of convenience almost in that
messages were left and I never Lucy was not taking care of [G.W.] as much as
heard back from them. needed...." He also believed that he could
And the next morning on my provide for G.W. and nurture and love her as
way down from Houston in a much as Shook has. Gray stated:
car, after flying in there, I made Lucy's interest in [G.W.'s]
another round of calls with no upbringing has not been as we
answers or return messages. would hope as a parent, and I
And then later in that morning I think that's even gone slightly
got a call from [Shook], less over the years and just kind
informing me that they were in of withered away. I think as a
Austin or somewhere in that young mother she's been, you
area and that they were thinking know, reluctant to give up parts
about leaving relatively soon,
-5-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
of her life that, you know, are to relocate from Seattle. According to Gray, if
enjoyed by single people and it's G.W. moved to Seattle to live with him, due to
put [G.W.] in an uncomfortable the flexibility of his work schedule, he could on
situation there. certain occasions work from home and would be
able to transport G.W. to and from her school.
On cross-examination, Gray stated that
Lucy had not been willing to provide financial Gray stated that the reason he could not
support and time to G.W. but that he has done visit with G.W. more than once every two
so. Gray stated that he lived in New Jersey for months is due to her inability to leave Victoria.
approximately one year and that he would be Gray thought that it would have been better if
"hard pressed to recall the exact number" of G.W. had been allowed to travel by plane to visit
times he visited G.W., but thought he saw her him in addition to his visits to Victoria.
every two months on average. Gray claimed that According to Gray, for "close to three years," he
at that time, it was difficult to contact G.W., and attempted to negotiate with Lucy a plan for
Lucy made visitation difficult for him by only G.W. to visit him. Gray explained, "I was
allowing short, supervised visits with G.W. Gray hoping that we could eventually work something
stated that when he lived in Colorado, he visited out that was mutually agreeable. Eventually
G.W. on average every two months. Gray communications have broken down to the point
testified that he was unable to visit G.W. on a that phone calls are unreturned, unanswered, and
monthly basis because his employer only they were unbending in their requests and
allowed ten days of vacation per year and demands." Gray acknowledged that "[v]isitation
therefore, "[t]here's not that many days in the was highly restrained, but as a mature,
year vacationwise to do that." On cross responsible parent [he] always hope[d] and [his]
examination by Shook's attorney, Gray testified goal
that in order to visit G.W. in Victoria, he is
required to take at least "three days of vacation [329 S.W.3d 193]
wrapped around a weekend." Therefore, Gray
stated, "Ten days of vacation means you do that was that [he and Lucy] could work out some
three times a year, you've used your vacation for mutually agreeable terms and conditions of
that year." Gray also explained that it was that."
expensive to make more visits. When asked if he According to Gray, his bond with G.W. is
had "telephone visits" with G.W., Gray replied, "very strong," but because of the recent
"I have in the past had many phone "extraordinarily strained" relations, contact with
conversations with her. In recent months phone G.W. has not been permitted. Gray testified that
calls are unanswered, unreturned. Phone records when he visited with G.W., she did not
could easily indicate the hundreds of phone calls demonstrate any behaviors indicating that she
tabbed and made." No phone records were was suffering from separation anxiety. Gray
admitted into the record. stated, "Regarding her getting sick, she's gotten
Gray admitted that he decided not to look sick one time in my presence. During my last
for employment in Texas although he believed visit I picked her up from dance and she was ill
that he could have found a job there. When on the way home in the car and recovered within
asked why he chose not to live in Texas if his the hour and was playing again." Gray testified
primary consideration was G.W., Gray that he picked G.W. up at Lucy's residence "a
responded, "I don't believe location is exclusive number of times" and also from Shook's
of visiting my daughter. Those two things don't residence for visitation. Gray stated that it had
have to contradict each other in any way." Gray been "less than a year" since he picked G.W. up
explained that moving to Seattle would allow at Lucy's residence.
him more visitation time with G.W. because he
made more money and he would never be asked
-6-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
Gray claimed that he was unaware that Yes, I have stepped up to the plate in that I have
G.W. resided with Shook and that his "family [in consistently been in her life. As soon as I had
Victoria] didn't know." When asked, "How hard any indication she wasn't living with her
do you think it would have been had you looked biological parent, I pressed for this, right? That's
to figure out where the child was living," Gray why we're here today, is because I have been
responded, "How hard would it have been had I trying to step up to the plate and seek more and
looked? I looked as far as I could; that is, she more time with G.W. since the day she was
clearly maintained two residences. That is, all of born, while they have pushed very hard back
her toys were both at [Lucy's] house and she had against that.
a lot of toys at [Shook's] house. As recently as
yesterday, for example, [G.W.] stated I live with Gray claimed that immediately after G.W.
[Shook]. Oh, I'm not supposed to say that." was born, he initiated some action, which he did
not explain, in order to assert his parental rights.
Shook's trial counsel asked Gray if he Shook's attorney stated, "You haven't done
agreed with Green's testimony that it was not in anything to establish rights to possession and
G.W.'s best "interest to be uprooted and moved access to medical records and to school records,
to Seattle." Gray replied, "I don't sir, in that I you haven't done any of those things until you
believe that she's in a damaging and destructive filed this lawsuit." Gray replied, "That's not true
environment currently and that currently her in that, as stated, right after she was born we
care is loving and nurturing but a little bit over sought all those things which you just discussed
controlling and possessive in a way that may and...." When Shook's
lead to some of these issues." During re-cross
examination, Shook's counsel asked, "Would [329 S.W.3d 194]
that be in [G.W.'s] best interest to remove her
that distance from the people that have taken counsel asked Gray to produce the court orders
care of her during the first five years of her life," establishing those rights, Gray said, "We could
Gray replied: pull them up. There were court orders, there
were attorneys involved the month after she was
Taken care of her, I don't really born involving just what you're discussing, sir."
accept how you use the phrase, Lucy's trial counsel then asked the trial court to
but I believe it would be in her take judicial notice of the fact that the pending
best interest. They've cared for action was the only suit affecting the parent-
her and I greatly appreciate child relationship that had been initiated and that
what they have done to provide it was not filed one month after G.W. was born.
the temporary solution they Gray then stated, "That's correct, it never
have. That as a more permanent reached—it never reached the court at that point,
solution I see her living with we were negotiating between the attorneys and it
one of her parents, and that was, like I said, a standard parental—I forget the
would be myself if the mother is right term for it right now—but
not taking care of her, which has acknowledgment of parent, that sort of thing that
been the case. So, I believe that we went through at that time."
it would be in my daughter's
best interest to reside with me in Lucy testified that G.W. lives with Shook
Seattle. and has lived at the Shook residence for
approximately one year. Lucy stated that she and
When asked if Gray believed he had "stepped up Shook decided to share the parental
to the plate and assumed the responsibility a responsibilities because Lucy "needed help
parent should," Gray responded, raising" G.W. According to Lucy, she was
diagnosed with depression when she was in
eighth grade, and since then, she has been taking
-7-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
medication for that disease. After G.W. was days out of that time, the other three days he
born, Lucy moved in with Shook and lived there spent in Austin or Dallas with friends." Lucy
two or three years. Lucy stated that she believes believed that Gray's infrequent visits have
that it is in G.W.'s best interest to continue living "damaged" his relationship with G.W.
with Shook and that she is available to
participate in raising G.W. The trial court appointed Shook managing
conservator with the right to determine G.W.'s
Lucy denied that she ever prevented Gray residence and appointed Gray and Lucy
from visiting with G.W. and claimed that she possessory conservators. The trial court ordered
"encouraged" him to visit regularly and more that neither possessory conservator live in the
often. Lucy stated that it would be better for same residence with
G.W. if Gray had more contact with her. Lucy
also denied that she ignored Gray's telephone [329 S.W.3d 195]
calls. Lucy explained that the "supervised" visits
occurred when she was breast feeding G.W., G.W. and Shook. The trial court entered findings
which she did for "a little over a year." of fact and conclusions of law, which stated in
Therefore, it was "necessary" for her to be pertinent part:
present during those visitations. Lucy testified 4. The Court finds that at the
that she did not want to prevent Gray from time of filing of the Petition in
having visits with G.W. and that she believes it Intervention, Intervenor [Shook]
is "very important" for G.W. to visit Gray. had actual care, control, and
Lucy stated that G.W. was "around" two possession of the child made the
when Gray moved to New Jersey and that she subject of this suit for more than
was not aware of any requests from Gray for six months ending no more than
G.W. to be flown to New Jersey for a visit. Lucy 90 days preceding the date of
testified that she has concerns about allowing filing of the Petition in
G.W. to fly to Seattle because she suffers from Intervention.
separation anxiety and she would be scared due 5. The Court finds that it is in
to her young age. Lucy agreed that she would the best interest of the child
work with G.W. to help her overcome her made the subject of this suit that
anxiety. However, Lucy did not believe that it [Shook] be appointed Sole
would be in G.W.'s best interest for Gray to be Managing Conservator of the
appointed sole managing conservator and that it child made the subject of this
was in G.W.'s best interest to continue living suit.
with Shook.
6. The Court finds that it is in
On cross-examination, Lucy said that it was the best interest of the child
not true that Gray had placed hundreds of made the subject of this suit that
telephone calls to G.W. Rather, she testified that [Gray] be appointed possessory
before the suit was filed, Gray called conservator of the child made
approximately twice a month to talk to G.W. the subject of this suit.
Lucy stated that Gray visited G.W. two or three
times per year, usually during a holiday like 7. The Court finds that
Christmas or Thanksgiving. When asked why appointment of [Gray] as joint
Gray did not visit more often, Lucy replied, "I managing conservator of the
guess numerous reasons, being the expense, the child made the subject of this
travel expense. Other plans. For example, he had suit would not be in the best
a four-or five-day trip down to Texas over New interest of the child made the
Year's Eve once and was only in Victoria two subject of this suit because the
-8-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
appointment would significantly Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 166
impair the child's physical (Tex.1990). Therefore, section 153.131 of the
health or emotional family code requires that the parent be appointed
development. sole managing conservator or both parents be
appointed joint managing conservators unless
Gray requested additional findings of fact the nonparent proves by a preponderance of the
"on how appointment of a parent or the parents credible evidence that "appointment of the
as sole or joint managing conservator in the parent or parents would
instant case would significantly impair the
child's physical health or emotional [329 S.W.3d 196]
development, including, what facts, if any, in the
record, support said findings." The trial court did not be in the best interest of the child because
not make any additional findings of fact, and this the appointment would significantly impair the
appeal ensued. child's physical health or emotional
development...." Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131
II. Standard of Review and Applicable Law (Vernon 2008); In re De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d
521, 527 (Tex.App.-El Paso 1999, no pet.). The
An appellate court reviews the family code's presumption in favor of parental
determination of conservatorship under an abuse custody places a "heavy burden on a nonparent
of discretion standard. Whitworth v. Whitworth, seeking custody." May v. May, 829 S.W.2d 373,
222 S.W.3d 616, 622-23 (Tex.App.-Houston 376 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, writ
[1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on reh'g) (citing denied). To rebut the presumption, "the evidence
Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 must support a logical inference that some
(Tex.1982)). "Under an abuse-of-discretion specific, identifiable behavior or conduct of the
standard, legal and factual insufficiency are not parent will probably cause significant physical
independent grounds of error, but rather are or emotional harm to the child." Id. at 377. Any
relevant factors in assessing whether the trial "close call" must be resolved in favor of the
court abused its discretion." Baltzer v. Medina, parent over the nonparent. Chavez v. Chavez,
240 S.W.3d 469, 475 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th 148 S.W.3d 449, 459 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004,
Dist.] 2007, no pet.); see also Morris v. Morris, no pet.).
No. 13-05-00297-CV, 2007 WL 2128882, at *2-
3, 2007 Tex.App. LEXIS 5878, at *6-7 III. Analysis
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi July 26, 2007, no pet.)
(mem. op.). The trial court abuses its discretion Shook relies heavily on Green's testimony
if its decision is arbitrary or unreasonable. that G.W. had suffered from separation anxiety
Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d at 623. A trial court may and that because she had not bonded with Gray,
also abuse its discretion if it fails to analyze or it would not be in her best interest to move to
apply the law correctly. In the Interest of Seattle. If the evidentiary burden on a nonparent
C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex.App.- was any evidence of any harm to the child, we
Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (citing would be required to find that the trial court
Walker v. Packer, 827 S.W.2d 833, 840 acted within its discretion in this case. However,
(Tex.1992) (orig. proceeding)). The trial court as we discuss below, the law requires the
does not abuse its discretion if there is some evidence to rise above mere speculation of harm,
evidence of a substantive and probative and further requires the harm to be attributable
character to support the decision. Whitworth, to a specific, identifiable act or omission of the
222 S.W.3d at 623. parent. The trial court abused its discretion, and
therefore, we sustain Gray's sole issue, because:
"The presumption that the best interest of a (1) Shook failed to offer any evidence of a
child is served by awarding custody to a natural specific, identifiable act or omission by Gray
parent is deeply embedded in Texas law." that would be likely to harm G.W; and (2) the
-9-
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
evidence of the general harm caused by children, but that holding was
"uprooting" in this case is only speculative and based on the fact that the father
therefore could not rebut the parental had been a drug user in the
presumption. recent past, and the holding was
only made after a careful and
A. Specific, Identifiable Act or Omission deliberate finding of a specific,
identifiable act of the parent that
Gray contends that the trial court abused its would significantly impair the
discretion because the record does not legally— child's physical health or
or even factually—demonstrate specific acts or emotional development. See id.
omissions by Gray that would significantly at 377-79.
impair the physical health or emotional
development of G.W. We agree. In Lewelling, the Texas Supreme Court
emphasized the portion of the statute under
In order for a nonparent to overcome the which a nonparent may obtain custody if "the
presumption that it is in the child's best interest court finds that appointment of the parent or
to be in the custody of a parent, there must be parents would not be in the best interest of the
evidence of "specific, identifiable" conduct by child because the appointment would
the parent that is likely to cause harm to the significantly impair the child's physical health
child's physical health or emotional or emotional development." Lewelling, 796
development.2 In S.W.2d at 166 (emphasis in original). After
[329 S.W.3d 197] emphasizing this specific language, the court
instructed that:
May v. May, this Court wrote that the family
code The [statutory] language
requiring a showing that
requires evidence of specific appointment of the parent would
actions or omissions of the significantly impair the child's
parent that demonstrate an
award of custody to the parent [329 S.W.3d 198]
would result in significant physical or emotional
physical or emotional harm to development creates a strong
the child.... In other words, the presumption in favor of parental
nonparent must usually present custody and imposes a heavy
evidence affirmatively showing burden on a nonparent. It is no
conduct of the parent which will longer adequate to offer
have a detrimental effect upon evidence that the nonparent
the child, such as physical would be a better custodian of
abuse, severe neglect, the child.... [T]he nonparent
abandonment, drug or alcoholic must affirmatively prove by a
abuse or very immoral behavior preponderance of the evidence
on the part of the parent. that appointment of the parent
829 S.W.2d 373, 376-77 as managing conservator would
(Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1992, significantly impair the child,
writ denied) (citing Lewelling v. either physically or emotionally.
Lewelling, 796 S.W.2d 164, 167 This statute thus requires the
(Tex.1990)). In May, we nonparent to offer evidence of
ultimately held that the father specific actions or omissions of
could not retain custody of the the parent that demonstrate an
- 10 -
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
award of custody to the parent above a mere speculation of harm. The record
would result in physical or indicates that vomiting had occurred on only one
emotional harm to the child. or two occasions out of the dozens of times
G.W. has met with her father, and on closer
Id. (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added). review of the record, Green testified that the
Absent evidence of some specific act or vomiting was "possibly" caused by anxiety.
omission by Gray that would cause G.W. harm, Moreover, there is no evidence that all of the
the parental presumption can not be overcome. other alleged dangers to G.W.'s emotional
We find no such evidence in the record. development were more than a mere possibility.
For example, on direct examination, when
The evidence in this case shows that the asked, "Can you give the Court some example[s]
only possible harm to the child is the of what some of those additional problems might
"uprooting" itself—not any specific, identifiable be [?]," Green responded, " sometimes
act or omission, conduct or behavior of Gray. depression develops, sometimes they're at risk
Therefore, it was an abuse of discretion for the for drug use," and further responded, "
trial court to name Shook, a nonparent, sole oftentimes we see long-term problems."
managing conservator of G.W. (Emphasis added). These are the exact types of
B. Speculative Harm speculative harms that we prohibited from
consideration in May. See May, 829 S.W.2d at
Furthermore, even if we look at general 377. Without consideration of this speculative
harm, not attributable to Gray's specific acts or harm, there is no evidence whatsoever to rebut
omissions, Shook failed to present any evidence the parental presumption. Therefore, again, we
that could overcome the parental presumption hold that the trial court abused its discretion in
because the evidence presented raises only appointing Shook,
speculative harm.
[329 S.W.3d 199]
In May, this Court wrote that "[the] harm to
the child ... may not be based on evidence which a nonparent, as G.W.'s sole managing
raises a mere surmise or speculation of possible conservator.
harm." May, 829 S.W.2d at 377 (citing Kindred IV. Conclusion
v. Con/Chem., Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63
(Tex.1983); Briones v. Levine's Dept. Store, Because we hold that the trial court abused
Inc., 446 S.W.2d 7, 10 (Tex.1969)). its discretion by appointing Shook to be G.W.'s
sole managing conservator, we sustain Gray's
Shook essentially relies on one theory of sole issue. Having failed to meet her burden,
harm in order to justify the trial court's judgment Shook may not maintain any legal custodial
that Shook had overcome the parental rights over G.W. "In most circumstances, a
presumption. That theory can be summarized as judgment is reversed and rendered when a legal
follows: (1) Green testified that G.W. suffers sufficiency challenge is sustained." Chavez, 148
from "some" separation anxiety; (2) this anxiety S.W.3d at 461. However, we are permitted to
has caused "recurring vomiting" in the past, remand a case such as this "when the interest of
could effect her peer relationships in the future, justice so requires." Id. (citing Tex.R.App. P.
and may lead to other long-term problems; and 43.3). In this case, the trial court held in Shook's
(3) these harms can be prevented if G.W. favor, making it unnecessary for that court to
remains with Shook because G.W. feels safe determine G.W.'s best interest as it related to the
with Shook and G.W. has not bonded with Gray. custodial or visitation rights that should exist
Evidence of sporadic, past vomiting and the between Gray and Lucy only. Because of this,
possibility of negative effects on peer and because we have overturned the trial court's
relationships is insufficient evidence to rise ruling designating Shook as sole managing
- 11 -
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
conservator, we find it to be in the interest of experiences anxiety. Green testified that
justice not to simply render judgment in Gray's consistency is also an important factor in
favor. Further, more than a year has passed since bonding with a child and that when there are
the custodial hearing; circumstances may have infrequent visits or large gaps between the visits,
changed during this time such that it would not bonding will not occur. Green opined that a
be in G.W.'s best interest to appoint Gray as her child is unable to bond with a person who only
sole managing conservator, and we have no visits the child three or four times per year. The
ability to determine the present circumstances of evidence showed, although contradicted by
any of the parties, nor do we have the luxury of Gray, that he had only visited G.W. three or four
sitting as a fact-finder. For the forgoing reasons, times per year since he moved away from
we remand this case to the trial court for Texas.4 Furthermore, according to Green, G.W.
custodial hearings to determine the rights as viewed Gray as a stranger, and Gray has not
between Gray and Lucy only. bonded with G.W. because he has not spent
enough time with her. Green stated that in order
Dissenting Opinion by Justice LINDA to bond with G.W., more frequent contact was
REYNA YAÑEZ. necessary.
Dissenting Opinion by Justice YAÑEZ. According to Green, after visiting Gray,
G.W. has vomited due to her anxiety. Green
I respectfully dissent to the majority's testified that G.W. would "freak out" if she was
conclusion that the trial court abused its removed from Shook's home and that she would
discretion in this case. A trial court does not vomit, scream, and cry. Due to G.W.'s
abuse its discretion when there is some evidence separation anxiety, Green stated that the added
of a substantive and probative character to stress of removing her from Shook's home could
support its decision.1 In some cases, the parental cause numerous problems for G.W.
presumption can be rebutted by other evidence
establishing the statutorily required negative Shook testified that G.W. has lived in her
effect on the child even when there is no home since she was born, that she has been
evidence establishing any particular "raising" G.W. for approximately a year-and-a-
blameworthy act of the parent.2 "Because safety, half, and that G.W. spends more time with
security, and stability are critical to child Shook than with Lucy. According to Shook, it
development, the danger of uprooting a child would significantly impair G.W.'s physical
may in some instances rise to a level that health if Gray was appointed managing
significantly impairs the child's emotional conservator because G.W. would be removed
development." 3 from the "only home she's ever known." Shook
testified that G.W. had never been away from
Here, Green testified that G.W. suffers Shook, Shook's husband, or Lucy for more than
from separation anxiety, a condition she defined "a night or two." Shook stated that G.W. has
as a fear of being separated from either the bonded with her and that it would be
parent or person of significance. Green testified "devastating" to G.W. if she were removed from
that G.W. considers Shook her "primary parent" Shook's home. Shook testified that G.W. would
and feels "safe" in Shook's home. The evidence suffer harmful effects if removed from her home
showed that G.W. has lived with Shook since because she would not have any family support
she was born and has never known another in Seattle. Shook stated that appointing Gray
home. managing conservator and removing G.W. from
Green stated that stability and consistency Shook's home would have harmful effects.
are very important to a child who In this case, there was evidence presented
[329 S.W.3d 200] that the danger of uprooting G.W. from Shook's
home would significantly impair G.W.'s
- 12 -
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
physical health and emotional development.5 Texarkana Court relied on the
Therefore, the trial court could have reasonably proposition that a nonparent may
concluded from the evidence that appointing be awarded custody of a child
Gray managing conservator would have the without a blameworthy act of the
parent; the opinion seems to merely
statutorily required negative effect on G.W. 6
state this proposition in dicta. See
Because there is some evidence of a substantive id.
and probative character to support the trial
court's decision, I believe that the trial court did Second, in In re Rodriguez, the
not abuse its discretion by concluding that facts are again distinguishable in a
Gray's appointment as managing conservator meaningful way from the present
would significantly impair G.W.'s physical case. 940 S.W.2d 265, 266-70
health or emotional (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997, writ
denied). In that case, the birth
[329 S.W.3d 201] mother gave the child up for
adoption and relinquished all
development.7 Therefore, I would affirm the trial parental rights, and the father had
court's judgment. met the child only twice in the
child's life. Id. at 267-69.
1
There is no evidence that Green had obtained Moreover, there was evidence
a medical degree, and she did not claim to be a presented that all interactions and
psychologist or psychiatrist. visitations were initiated and
facilitated by the child's paternal
2
The dissent cites three cases from our sister grandmother, not by the father
courts to support the proposition that a nonparent himself indicating a lack of concern
may be awarded custody even without a blameworthy for the child, especially in the
act of the parent. Each of those cases is child's early life, which the
distinguishable from the present case, and moreover, evidence does not support in this
the precedent in those cases is not binding on this case. Id. at 269-70. Additionally,
Court. the majority for the San Antonio
Court wrote that it didn't believe
First, in In re G.R.W., the that "[section] 153.131, Texas
Texarkana Court was dealing with Family Code contemplates that the
circumstances much different from environment which 'significantly
those in this case. 191 S.W.3d 896, impairs the child's physical health
898-900 (Tex.App.-Texarkana or emotional development' must be
2006, no pet.). In that case, the the product of some act or omission
father of the child had been on the part of the natural parent,"
indicted for sexual assault of the which we consider to be a blatant
mother for the very sexual misstatement of the law. We concur
encounter that led to the birth of the with Justice Carr's dissent insofar
child, and the father was convicted as it applies to this case. In
of the lesser offense of child response to the majority, Justice
endangerment. Id. at 898. Carr wrote:
Moreover, the court pointed to the
fact that the father was a smoker [W]hile I agree with the majority
and that the child had severe that our record reflects "that there
respiratory problems. Id. at 900-01. is no evidence that any act or
These facts establish specific, omission, behavior, or conduct by
identifiable acts of the parent that [the father] will impair [the child],"
would be likely to impair the I respectfully dissent because,
physical health or emotional unlike the majority, I do not agree
development of the child. Further, that this case is a case of first
there is no indication that the impression nor distinguishable
- 13 -
Gray v. Shook, 329 S.W.3d 186 (Tex. App., 2011)
from Lewelling v. Lewelling, 796 parent, the parental presumption can be rebutted by
S.W.2d 164 (Tex.1990). I would other evidence establishing the statutorily required
hold on this legal issue that negative effect on the child."); In re Rodriguez, 940
Lewelling is controlling; and, that S.W.2d 265, 273-75 (Tex.App.-San Antonio 1997,
at the present time [and] under the writ denied) (concluding that nonparent had rebutted
current state of Texas laws, the parental presumption solely by producing evidence
Lewelling standard that non-parents that the effect on the child of being removed from the
seeking custody here cannot benefit only home she had ever known would be
from their bonding or attachment "devastating").
with the child by "offering it as
3
some evidence of significant Chavez v. Chavez, 148 S.W.3d 449, 458-59
impairment to [the child]." Id. at (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, no pet.) (citing De La Pena,
168. Accordingly, because [the 999 S.W.2d at 529).
nonparent's] significant impact
4
argument was rejected by our I note that Green testified that even visits with
Supreme Court in Lewelling, we a child once every two months, as Gray claimed he
are required to reject the same did, is inadequate for bonding to occur.
argument here.
5
See In re G.R.W., 191 S.W.3d at 900; Chavez,
Id. at 275 (Carr, J., dissenting). 148 S.W.3d at 458-59; In re Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d
at 273-75.
Third, in Chavez v. Chavez, the
mother who was seeking to 6
See Tex. Fam.Code Ann. § 153.131; In re
reacquire custody was shown to be G.R.W., 191 S.W.3d at 900; Chavez, 148 S.W.3d at
a drug user and there was evidence 458-59; De La Pena, 999 S.W.2d at 529 ("We also
that she was physically abusive. agree that because safety, security, and stability are
148 S.W.3d 449, 453 (Tex.App.-El critical to child development, the danger of uprooting
Paso 2004, no pet.). The El Paso a child may in some instances rise to a level that
Court overturned the trial court's significantly impairs the child's emotional
ruling against the mother on other development."); In re Rodriguez, 940 S.W.2d at 270-
grounds and never actually reached 75; see also In the Interest of R.T.K., 324 S.W.3d
the issue of whether these specific, 896, 905 (Tex.App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2010, no
identifiable acts or some other pet.) (mem. op.) (concluding that the record
reason would prevent the mother sufficiently supported the trial court's conclusion that
from maintaining custody of the the nonparent rebutted the presumption found in
children. Id. at 459. If the dissent section 153.131(a) because based on the evidence
agrees with the reasoning in presented, the trial court could have reasonably
Chavez, it should at least recognize concluded that removal of the child from "the only
the present case as a "close call," home he has known" would significantly impair his
and settle any doubt in favor of the emotional development).
parent, as the El Paso Court
7
required. See id. See Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d at 623; see also In
the Interest of C.A.M.M., 243 S.W.3d at 214-15 ("But
1
Whitworth v. Whitworth, 222 S.W.3d 616, 623 the fact that a trial court may decide a matter within
(Tex.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) (op. on its discretionary authority in a different manner from
reh'g). an appellate court in a similar circumstance does not
2
demonstrate an abuse of discretion.") (citing Downer
In re G.R.W., 191 S.W.3d 896, 900 (Tex.App.- v. Aquamarine Operators, Inc., 701 S.W.2d 238,
Texarkana 2006, no pet.) ("In fact, even without 241-42 (Tex.1985)).
evidence establishing any blameworthiness of the
- 14 -
Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 10 (Tex., 2012)
381 S.W.3d 54056 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 10Ann Wood SHOOK, Petitioner,
v.
David GRAY, Respondent.
No. 11–0155.
Supreme Court of Texas.
Oct. 5, 2012.
Summaries:
PER CURIAM.
Source: Justia
G.W., David Gray and Lucy Wood's nine-
G.W., David Gray and Lucy Wood's nine-year- year-old daughter, has lived with her maternal
old daughter, had lived with her maternal grandmother, Ann Shook, for her entire life.
grandmother, Ann Shook, for her entire life. The Although G.W.'s parents have been in and out of
trial court appointed Shook as G.W.'s sole her life to varying degrees since she was born,
managing conservator and named Gray and no one disputes that at the time of the custody
Wood as G.W.'s possessory conservators. The hearing the grandmother's home was the only
court of appeals reversed, holding that the trial home G.W. had ever known. We are asked to
court abused its discretion in naming Shook, a decide whether the court of appeals erred by
nonparent, as G.W.'s sole managing conservator remanding this case to the trial court for
because Shook failed to present any evidence hearings to determine the custody and visitation
that could overcome the presumption that a rights as between Gray and Wood only. We
parent should be named as managing grant Shook's motion for rehearing of her
conservator. The court then remanded the case petition for review and, pursuant to Rule 59.1 of
to the trial court to determine the custody and the Rules of Appellate Procedure, hold that, by
visitation rights as between Gray and Wood barring the trial court from considering Shook,
only. The Supreme Court affirmed the court of the court of appeals unduly restricted the trial
appeals' judgment remanding the case but court's ability to protect the child's best interest.
reversed to the extent the judgment limited the
trial court's consideration of the role Shook When G.W. was three-and-a-half years old,
should play in G.W.'s life, whether as Gray filed an original suit affecting the parent-
conservator or a person with defined access child relationship requesting that he and Wood
rights. be appointed joint managing conservators and
that Wood be given the primary right to
establish G.W.'s residence.1 Shook intervened on
the basis that she “has had actual care, control,
and possession of [G.W.] for more than 6
[381 S.W.3d 541] months ending no more than 90 days preceding
[381 S.W.3d 542]
Cynthia T. Sheppard, Attorney at Law, Cuero,
Jack W. Marr, Marr, Meier & Bradicich LLP, the date of filing of [the] petition.” SeeTex.
Victoria, for Petitioner. Fam.Code § 102.003(a)(9). She requested that
she and Wood be appointed joint managing
Audrey Mullert Vicknair, Law Office of Mullert conservators and that she be named the joint
Vicknair, William A. Dudley, Law Office of managing conservator with the exclusive right to
William A. Dudley, P.C., Corpus Christi, David designate G.W.'s primary residence. She also
S. Kidder, Dallas, for Respondent. asked that Gray be appointed possessory
-1-
Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 10 (Tex., 2012)
conservator. Subsequently, Gray amended his the custodial hearing; circumstances may have
petition to request that the trial court appoint changed during this time such that it would not
him joint managing conservator with the be in G.W.'s best interest to appoint Gray as her
exclusive right to establish G.W.'s residence. sole managing conservator, and we have no
Gray did not specify who should be named the ability to determine the present circumstances of
other joint managing conservator. any of the parties, nor do we have the luxury of
sitting as a fact-finder. For the forgoing reasons,
Shortly after G.W. was born, G.W. and her we remand this case to the trial court for
mother moved into Shook's home in Victoria, custodial hearings to determine the rights as
Texas. At the time of the custody hearing, when between Gray and [Wood] only.
G.W. was almost five years old, G.W. still lived
with Shook. Wood had moved out of Shook's 329 S.W.3d at 199. Shook contends that the
home to live on her own two years earlier, and court of appeals should not have precluded the
Gray had lived in Houston, New Jersey, trial court from considering her role in G.W.'s
Colorado, and Seattle between G.W.'s birth and life on remand. We agree.
the time of the custody hearing. The trial court
appointed Shook as G.W.'s sole managing
conservator and named Gray and Wood as
G.W.'s possessory conservators. By foreclosing the trial court from
considering Shook on remand, the trial court
The court of appeals reversed, holding that may be unable to protect G.W.'s best interest.
the trial court abused its discretion in naming Tex. Fam.Code § 153.002 (“The best interest of
Shook, a nonparent, as G.W.'s sole managing the child shall always be the primary
conservator because Shook failed to present any consideration of the court in determining the
evidence that could overcome the presumption issues of conservatorship and possession of and
that a parent should be named as managing access to the child.”). As the court of appeals
conservator. 329 S.W.3d at 198–99;Tex. pointed out, it had “no ability to determine the
Fam.Code § 153.131 (stating that a parent shall present circumstances of any of the parties, nor
be appointed as a sole managing conservator or d[id it] have the luxury of sitting as a fact-
both parents shall be appointed as joint finder.” Id. That statement illustrates the
managing conservators “unless the court finds problem with remanding for custodial hearings
that appointment of the parent or parents would between Gray and
not be in the best interest of the child because
the appointment would significantly impair the [381 S.W.3d 543]
child's physical health or emotional Wood only. The trial court must be able to
development”). Additionally, the court of consider the changed circumstances. G.W. is
appeals remanded the case for the trial court to now nine years old and over four years have
reconsider the conservatorship and access rights passed since the trial court issued its order. Even
between Gray and Wood only and explained: assuming Shook previously failed to present
[T]he trial court held in Shook's favor, evidence capable of overcoming the parental
making it unnecessary for that court to presumption, it does not follow that she will
determine G.W.'s best interest as it related to the necessarily be unable to overcome the parental
custodial or visitation rights that should exist presumption under the present circumstances.
between Gray and [Wood] only. Because of this, Moreover, Shook pled and established
and because we have overturned the trial court's general standing to file a suit for conservatorship
ruling designating Shook as sole managing and access, as someone who has had care,
conservator, we find it to be in the interest of control, and possession of a child for the
justice not to simply render judgment in Gray's designated time. Tex. Fam.Code § 102.003
favor. Further, more than a year has passed since
-2-
Shook v. Gray, 381 S.W.3d 540, 56 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 10 (Tex., 2012)
(authorizing suit by “a person, other than a foster consideration of the role Shook should play in
parent, who has had actual care, control, and G.W.'s life, whether as conservator or a person
possession of the child for at least six months with defined access rights. Tex.R.App. P. 59.1.
ending not more than 90 days preceding the date
of the filing of the petition”). Shook's inability to
overcome the parental presumption does not --------
deprive her of standing to be considered for
conservatorship or access. If Shook fails to Notes:
overcome the presumption that a parent should In his petition, Gray stated, “The best
1.
be named managing conservator on remand, the interest of [G.W.] will be served by the
trial court may still name Shook as a possessory appointment of Lucy Wood as joint managing
conservator or grant her access if that would be conservator with the exclusive right to designate
in G.W.'s best interest. the primary residence of the child, and [Gray] so
Thus, we conclude that the court of appeals requests.” Gray further requested that
erred in preventing the trial court from “appropriate orders be made for access to the
considering Shook for conservatorship of or child and the allocation of the rights and duties
access to G.W. Accordingly, without hearing of the conservators.” Although Gray does not
oral argument, we affirm the court of appeals' explicitly state the type of conservatorship he
judgment remanding the case, but reverse to the sought, we infer that he wished to be named a
extent the judgment limits the trial court's joint managing conservator.
-3-