Laura Leticia Zepeda Vasquez, Individually and on Behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham Vasquez,Jr. v. Legend Natural Gas III, LP Legend Natural Gas, LLC Lewis Energy Group, LP And Lewis Petro Properties, Inc ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
04-14-00899-cv
FOURTH COURT OF APPEALS
SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
4/30/2015 5:06:18 PM
KEITH HOTTLE
CLERK
04-14-00899-CV
FILED IN
4th COURT OF APPEALS
In the Fourth Court of Appeals SAN ANTONIO, TEXAS
04/30/2015 5:06:18 PM
KEITH E. HOTTLE
Clerk
LETICIA ZEPEDA VASQUEZ, Individually and on
Behalf of the Estate of Jose Abraham Vasquez, Jr.,
Appellant,
v.
LEGEND NATURAL GAS III, LP; LEGEND NATURAL GAS, LLC;
LEWIS ENERGY GROUP, LP; LEWIS PETRO PROPERTIES, INC.;
ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING CO., INC.; VIRTEX HOLDNGS, LLP;
VIRTEX OPERATING CO., INC. ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS HOLDINGS,
LLC; ENTERPRISE PRODUCTS COMPANY; and
XTO ENERGY, INC.,
Appellees
On Appeal From the 81st District Court
In La Salle County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 14-07-0019-CVL
APPELLEE ROSETTA RESOURCES OPERATING CO., INC.’S BRIEF
William A. Abernethy DONNELL, ABERNETHY &
State Bar No. 00809800 KIESCHNICK, P.C.
555 N. Carancahua, Suite 1770
Clay E. Coalson Corpus Christi, Texas 78401-0853
State Bar No. 04422400 Telephone: (361) 888-5551
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....................................................................................................ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 1
ISSUES PRESENTED ......................................................................................................... 2
ISSUE 1........................................................................................................................ 2
ISSUE 2........................................................................................................................ 2
STATEMENT OF FACTS .................................................................................................. 2
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT ........................................................................................... 4
ARGUMENT ......................................................................................................................... 4
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY BASIS IN LAW. 4
A. Standard of Review .............................................................................. 4
B. Plaintiff is Essentially Contending That all Ten Defendants
Should be Liable for Collectively and Incrementally Causing Wear
and Tear to the Public Road ............................................................... 5
C. There is No Caselaw That Imposes Liability on Users of Public
Roads for Collectively Causing Wear and Tear to the Road .......... 6
D. Plaintiff’s Reliance on Buchanan v. Rose and Other Cases That
Cite it is Misplaced ............................................................................... 6
E. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Grapotte v. Adams is More
Factually On-Point Than Buchanan v. Rose .................................... 8
ii
F. Imposing A Legal Duty On Users of Public Roads to Repair the
Road to Prevent Dusty Conditions or Warn Other Drivers of
Dusty Conditions is Fraught With Legal and Practical
Impossibilities and Difficulties, and Therefore Supports the Trial
Court’s Determination That Plaintiff’s Claims Have No Basis in
Law ........................................................................................................ 9
1. The County has the power and duty to repair public roads,
and private citizens have no legal right to repair such
roads ........................................................................................... 9
2. Warning signs and other safety devices are the County’s
responsibility, so private users of the road cannot install
signs and devices to warn other motorists of dusty
conditions ................................................................................ 10
3. There are serious practical problems in having private users
attempt to repair public roads to alleviate dusty conditions
or warn other drivers of such conditions ............................ 10
4. The duty which Plaintiff seeks to impose on users of public
roadways would have negative public policy implications 12
CONCLUSION ................................................................................................................... 12
PRAYER ............................................................................................................................... 13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE .............................................................................. 14
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE ......................................................................................... 14
iii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases Page(s)
Buchanan v. Rose,
159 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1942)............................................................................... 6, 7, 8
City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne,
111 S.W.3d 22 (Tex. 2003) ......................................................................................... 9
Courville v. Home Transportation Co.,
497 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d n.r.e.)................... 7
DeVoll v. Demonbreun,
2014 Tex. App. Lexis 13865,
(Texas. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (memorandum opinion) .............. 2, 5
Gaulding v. Celotex Corp.,
772 S.W.2d 66 (Tex. 1989) ......................................................................................... 6
General Electric v. Moritz,
257 S.W.3d 211 (Tex. 2008)..................................................................................... 11
GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups,
429 S.W.3d 752 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied) ................................ 5
Grapotte v. Adams,
111 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1938)................................................................................... 8, 9
Roland v. Daimler Chrysler Corp.,
33 S.W.3d 468 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) ........................................ 11
Texas Home Management v. Peavy,
89 S.W.3d 30 (Tex. 2002) ......................................................................................... 12
Statutes
Tex. Transp. Code
§ 251.016 ...................................................................................................................... 9
§ 252.............................................................................................................................. 9
§ 252.005 .................................................................................................................... 10
iv
§ 252.105(b)(1)............................................................................................................. 9
§ 252.205(b)(4)........................................................................................................... 10
§ 252.215 .................................................................................................................... 10
§ 544.006(a)(e) ........................................................................................................... 10
Regulations
Tex. Admin. Code
§ 21.141 ...................................................................................................................... 10
§ 21.401 ...................................................................................................................... 10
§ 22.215 ...................................................................................................................... 10
Rules
Tex. R. Civ. P.
§ 91a .............................................................................................................................. 5
§ 91a.1 ........................................................................................................................... 5
Tex. R. App. P.
§ 9.4 (i)(1) ................................................................................................................... 14
§ 9.4 (i)(3) ................................................................................................................... 14
v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case is brought under the wrongful death and survival acts.
Appellant/Plaintiff Laura Vasquez is the widow of Jose Vasquez, who died when a
cloud of dust obscured his visibility while he was driving on a public road, causing his
vehicle to leave the roadway and go into a ditch. CR 82. Plaintiff has sued ten
Appellees/Defendants, who allegedly own or operate oil and gas wells in the area
around the public road, and therefore use the road. CR 81-82. Plaintiff contends that
the Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent because operating their vehicles
on the public road created a dangerous condition (i.e., dusty conditions) that they
failed to fix or warn other drivers about. CR 82-86.
The Defendants filed motions to dismiss under Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a, which
authorizes the dismissal of claims that have no basis in law or fact. CR 52, 62, 121.
The trial court granted the motions on the ground that the Plaintiff’s cause of action
had no basis in law, with the exception of a negligence claim against Defendants
Lewis Energy Group, LP and Lewis Petro Properties, Inc. for improperly operating a
vehicle at the scene of the accident, which the trial court found to be separate and
distinct from the claims that it was dismissing, and the trial court therefore severed
that remaining claim against the Lewis Defendants into a separate suit which is abated
until this appeal is resolved. Supp. CR 7-8. Thus, this appeal involves the Rule 91a
dismissal of Plaintiff’s claims for having no basis in law.
1
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1
Does Texas law recognize a cause of action in favor of a person who has an
automobile accident caused by diminished visibility due to dusty conditions while he
is driving on a public road, against other users of the public road who used the road
on earlier occasions and may have thereby caused wear and tear to the road?
ISSUE 2
Does Texas law impose a duty on users of a public road to either (1) repair the
road so as prevent dusty conditions from occurring on the public road, or (2) warn
other drivers that their visibility might be diminished by dusty conditions on the
public road?
STATEMENT OF FACTS
This Court has said that when reviewing a Tex. R. Civ. 91a dismissal, the
determination of whether a cause of action has any basis in law is a legal question that
the court reviews de novo, based on the allegations of the live petition and any
attachments thereto. DeVoll v. Demonbreun, 2014 Tex. App. Lexis 13865, 4 (Texas.
App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (memorandum opinion). Thus, we look to the
Plaintiff’s First Amended Petition for this Statement of Facts.
Plaintiff alleges that on August 4, 2012, decedent Jose Vasquez was operating a
vehicle on Krueger Road in LaSalle County. CR 82. Mr. Vasquez was travelling
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immediately behind Defendant Lewis Energy’s truck, which was “travelling at a high
rate of speed, throwing up dust, and driving recklessly”. CR 84. As a result of this
“reckless driving”, the Lewis Energy truck “caused an excessive amount of dust and
dirt to obstruct the view” of Mr. Vasquez. CR 84. A “cloud of dust” caused Mr.
Vasquez to lose sight of the road, drive into a ditch, and his vehicle flipped over and
killed him. CR 82.
Plaintiff tacitly acknowledges that Krueger Road is a county road that is
maintained by LaSalle County. CR 81-82. Plaintiff asserts that the ten Defendants
own or operate oil or gas wells “in the area around Krueger Road”, and that “every
day” the Defendants sent “numerous loaded and unloaded trucks up and down
Krueger Road…to operate and service the wells.” CR 81-82. Plaintiff claims LaSalle
County could not repair Krueger Road as fast as the Defendants destroyed it, thereby
“creating a dangerous condition”. Plaintiff says that the Defendants “failed to fix the
road” and “failed to provide any warnings to drivers…such as [Mr.] Vasquez”. CR
82, 83. Plaintiff contends that the Defendants were negligent and grossly negligent
because their vehicles, as well as the vehicles from the other companies they “hired,
commissioned and contracted with, “destroyed” the road by driving on it. CR 82-86.
The Defendants moved for dismissal pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a,
contending that Plaintiff’s claims had no basis in law. CR 52, 62, 121. Plaintiff filed a
response. CR 126. After a hearing, 1 RR 1-34, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s
claims against all Defendants. CR 147. The trial court thereafter signed another order
3
that clarified that the claim against the Lewis Defendants for improperly operating a
vehicle at the scene of the accident was “separate and distinct from Defendants’ 91a
claims” and was therefore severed from the action and assigned a new cause number
which was to be abated until this appeal is resolved. Supp. CR 007-008. This appeal
was thereafter perfected. Supp. CR 001.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Jose Vasquez died when he was blinded by a dust cloud stirred up by a truck
that was immediately in front of him on a county road, thereby causing him to lose
sight of the road and drive into a ditch. CR 82, 84. His widow is suing other users of
the public road for causing wear and tear through their use of the road, and then not
repairing the road or warning other drivers.
The trial court correctly ruled that Plaintiff’s claims have no basis in law. The
Defendants did not owe a duty to prevent the dust cloud that blinded Mr. Vasquez
and caused him to drive into the ditch. The Defendants did not have a duty to repair
the public road or warn Mr. Vasquez of dust clouds or other road conditions. Texas
law simply does not impose liability on users of a public road for accidents caused
dusty conditions purportedly resulting from wear and tear of the roadway.
ARGUMENT
I. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DISMISSED PLAINTIFF’S
CLAIMS BECAUSE THEY DO NOT HAVE ANY BASIS IN LAW
A. Standard of Review
4
Pursuant to Tex. R. Civ. P. 91a, the trial court dismissed the Plaintiff’s claims
because they have no basis in law. Supp. CR 007–008. Rule 91a allows a party to
move to dismiss a baseless cause of action on the grounds that it has no basis in law
or fact. DeVoll v. Demonbreun, 2014 Tex. App. Lexis 13865, 3 (Tex. App.–San
Antonio 2014 no pet.) (memorandum opinion). “A cause of action has no basis in
law if the allegations, taken as true, together with inferences reasonably drawn from
them, do not entitle the claimant to the relief sought.” Id. (quoting Rule 91a.1.). The
determination of whether a cause of action has any basis in law is a legal question that
appellate courts review de novo, based on the allegations of the live petition and any
attachments thereto. Id. at 4. In its review, this Court construes the pleadings
liberally in favor of the Plaintiff, looks at the pleader’s intent, and accepts as true the
factual allegations in the pleadings to determine if the cause of action has a basis in
law. Id. The Court considers “whether the petition contains enough facts to state a
claim to relief that is plausible on its face”. GoDaddy.com, LLC v. Toups, 429 S.W.
3d 752, 754 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2014, pet. denied).
B. Plaintiff is Essentially Contending That all Ten Defendants
Should be Liable for Collectively and Incrementally Causing Wear
and Tear to the Public Road
The core facts alleged in this case are that Jose Vasquez died when he was
blinded by a dust cloud stirred up by a truck that was immediately in front of him on a
public road, thereby causing him to lose sight of the road and drive into a ditch. CR
82, 84. Remarkably, the plaintiff fails to even mention those facts in her argument,
5
much less address them. She does not allege any unique conduct as to any of the 10
Defendants (other than the Lewis Energy truck “throwing up dust” by driving
immediately in front of Mr. Vasquez in a “dangerous manner”, a claim that has been
severed and abated and therefore is not before this Court). Instead, Plaintiff merely
complains that the 10 Defendants collectively sent “numerous loaded and unloaded
trucks up and down Krueger Road to operate and service their nearby wells, and that
those trucks “continually” drove at “high rates of speed” and some were “possibly”
overweight. CR 083, 085. Plaintiff does not allege any particular incident that
damaged the road; rather, she is merely complaining about incremental wear and tear
to the road due to significant economic activity in the area by numerous defendants.
C. There is No Caselaw That Imposes Liability on Users of Public
Roads for Collectively Causing Wear and Tear to the Road
Plaintiff does not cite any Texas cases where a group of defendants has been
held liable for collectively causing wear and tear to a public road. In fact, Defendant’s
counsel has conducted a nationwide search on Lexis for such a case, and has not
found any. Such a theory would be contrary to current Texas law, which has not
adopted collective theories of liability such as alternative liability, concert of action,
enterprise liability, or market share liability. Gaulding v. Celotex Corp., 772 S.W.2d
66, 71 (Tex. 1989).
D. Plaintiff’s Reliance on Buchanan v. Rose and Other Cases That
Cite it is Misplaced
6
Plaintiff contends that Texas courts have long held that if a party creates a
dangerous condition, it either has a duty to repair it (if the condition was created
negligently) or to warn those who may be injured by it (if the condition was created
without being negligent). Appellant’s Brief, pp. 6, 9-10. Of the eight cases Plaintiff
cites for that contention, only two of the cases involved automobile accidents
(Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109 (Tex. 1942) and Courville v. Home
Transportation Co., 497 S.W.2d 788 (Tex. Civ. App.—Beaumont 1973, writ ref’d
n.r.e.) and neither of those cases found that the defendant owed a duty under the facts
presented. The other cases cited involve unrelated situations like drug testing,
embezzlement, oilfield accidents, flooding, and electrocution. And beyond involving
unrelated situations, none of those cases found a duty owed by the defendants under
the rule urged by Plaintiff. So the cases cited by Plaintiff do not support her position.
All of the cases relied on by Plaintiff cite Buchanan v. Rose, 159 S.W.2d 109
(Tex. 1942). But Buchanan does not support Plaintiff’s position, but instead rejects it.
Specifically, the Supreme Court observed that the defendant in Buchanan (whose
truck broke a bridge that was already in a defective condition) had no duty to warn
other drivers of the broken bridge because the defendant “was merely the victim of a
defective condition that already existed”, and that “[i]t would be carrying the matter
too far to say that one must give notice of every known defect in a road naturally
resulting from his normal and legitimate use thereof.” Id. 159 S.W.2d at 393-394.
The Court further explained that “[t]o so hold would make the use of the highways
7
too hazardous from the standpoint of public liability.” Id. In our case, Buchanan’s
concern about excessive public liability is even more apparent, as Plaintiff seeks to
impose liability against 10 users of the road. Frankly, under the argument urged by
Plaintiff, she could theoretically sue ever motorist who drove on Krueger Road prior
to Mr. Vasquez’s accident. That potential for rampant public liability for merely using
public roads creates a compelling reason not to impose liability on the Defendants.
E. The Supreme Court’s Opinion in Grapotte v. Adams is More
Factually On-Point Than Buchanan v. Rose
Within Buchanan v. Rose, The Texas Supreme Court favorably cites its earlier
decision of Grapotte v. Adams, 111 S.W.2d 690 (Tex. 1938), which is more factually
on-point than Buchanan v. Rose. In Grapotte, the plaintiff tripped and fell while
walking on a public sidewalk in downtown San Antonio. The plaintiff contended that
she stepped in a depression in the sidewalk, which had been caused by numerous cars
going in and out of the defendant’s parking garage over an extended period of time.
The appellate courts reversed a judgment in favor of the plaintiff. The Supreme
Court noted that the duty to maintain the sidewalk rested upon the City of San
Antonio, rather than the abutting landowner-defendant. Id., p. 691. In holding that
the defendant was not legally responsible for the plaintiff’s accident, the Supreme
Court determined that numerous cars passing over the sidewalk showed the degree
and quantity of use, rather than an unusual, wrongful or unlawful use. Id., p. 691-692.
8
Our case is similar to Grapotte in that Plaintiff is attempting to hold the 10
Defendants liable for their rightful use of the public road to conduct their lawful
business activities, which may have ultimately led to wear and tear of the road that the
County had the duty to maintain. Under Grapotte, the Defendants cannot be liable
for Mr. Vasquez’s accident.
F. Imposing A Legal Duty On Users of Public Roads to Repair the
Road to Prevent Dusty Conditions or Warn Other Drivers of Dusty
Conditions is Fraught With Legal and Practical Impossibilities
and Difficulties, and Therefore Supports the Trial Court’s
Determination That Plaintiff’s Claims Have No Basis in Law
1. The County has the power and duty to repair public roads,
and private citizens have no legal right to repair such roads
At the heart of Plaintiff’s position is the belief that the 10 Defendants, as users
of a public road, had a duty to either repair it or warn other drivers of the purported
“dangerous condition”. Appellant’s Brief, 4, 6, 9, 10. Plaintiff’s argument erroneously
assumes that private citizens can repair public roads or install warning signs or similar
devices on them. This is not so. The Texas Transportation Code specifically
provides that county commissioner courts “may exercise general control over all
roads, highways and bridges in the county.” Tex. Transp. Code § 251.016. “By
granting commissioners courts general control over roads, the Legislature imposed on
them a duty to make roadways safe for public travel.” City of San Antonio v. City of
Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 31-32 (Tex. 2003). Chapter 252 of the Texas Transportation
Code creates various systems for county road administration, including adopting a
9
system for laying out, working on, draining and repairing the public roads (Section
252.005) and ensuring that roads are kept in good repair (Sections 252.105(b)(1) and
252.205(b)(4)). Similarly, as the owner or easement holder of Krueger Road, the
County was in control of the road and therefore had a duty to maintain it.
2. Warning signs and other safety devices are the County’s
responsibility, so private users of the road cannot install signs
and devices to warn other motorists of dusty conditions
Just as the Defendants could not repair the public road, they could not place
signs or other warning devices on the public road. See, e.g., Tex. Transp. Code
§ 544.006(a)(e), (prohibiting persons from placing unauthorized signs that attempt to
direct the movement of traffic on or in view of a road); Tex. Admin. Code §
21.141 et. seq., § 21.401, et seq. (regulations governing signage on right of ways); Tex.
Transp. Code § 252.215 (making persons who knowingly damage or misplace a sign
liable to the county and to anyone injured by such conduct). Further, because the
Defendants do not own or control the public road, they do not have any property
interest that would give them the legal right to place signs or devices on it.
3. There are serious practical problems in having private users
attempt to repair public roads to alleviate dusty conditions
or warn other drivers of such conditions
Thus, Plaintiff’s simplistic assertions that the 10 Defendants should have
repaired the public road or warned motorists of the dusty conditions ignores the
complex legal realities of what she is urging. Plaintiff’s bald assertion that the
Defendants should have repaired the road (presumably to make it relatively dust-free)
10
also ignores the practical realities of eliminating dust on an unpaved road in rural
South Texas in early August (when this accident occurred).
The only way to keep an unpaved road dust-free in dry, hot South Texas would
be to pave it. And even then, in a hot and windy locale, dust can still be blown across
the road in considerable volume. So keeping this unpaved road relatively dust-free
would be almost impossible, but would probably require that the Defendants pave the
unpaved road in an attempt to comply with the purported duty that Plaintiff is urging.
To require that private users of public roads pave an unpaved road in order to
effectively “repair” a purported dust problem is absurd.
And as far as the purported duty to warn Mr. Vasquez of the dangers of dust
clouds, a dust cloud is open and obvious, and the fact that it can obscure vision and
lead to accidents is within the common sense and common experience of drivers.
Should Texas law be dramatically expanded to impose liability upon users of public
roadways based on their failure to warn other drivers of something as open and
obvious as a dust cloud? The answer is clearly “no”. There is no duty to warn when
the danger is something that is open and obvious. See, e.g., General Electric Co. v.
Moritz, 257 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. 2008) (premises owner has no duty to warn an
independent contractor’s employees of an open and obvious danger); Roland v.
Daimler Chrysler Corp., 33 S.W.3d 468, 469-471 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet.
denied) (“In Texas, a manufacturer has no duty to warn of open and obvious
11
dangers”; riding in the bed of a pickup truck is an open and obvious danger as a
matter of law).
4. The duty which Plaintiff seeks to impose on users of public
roadways would have negative public policy implications
Courts must consider public policy implications when imposing a duty of
care. Texas Home Management v. Peavy, 89 S.W.3d 30, 37 (Tex. 2002). In this case,
expecting users of public roads to somehow conduct repairs or provide warnings to
other motorists has numerous public policy implications. First, how will a given user
even know whether its level of purported wear and tear triggers a duty to repair or
warn? And assuming a user has reason to believe its conduct or use reached the
requisite level of wear and tear, how would it go about fixing the road or placing signs
or devices? Would such a person need governmental approvals, and if so, how would
such be obtained and under what time frame? Or could a user simply barricade the
road and begin making repairs as it saw fit, or install whatever signs/devices it chose
to install? The duty Plaintiff seeks to impose is simply unfair and unworkable. It
would merely lead to worry, chaos and confusion among users of public roads.
CONCLUSION
There is no precedent for creating the duty that the Plaintiff is urging this
Court to impose on users of public roads. Further, such a duty would be completely
unworkable, assuming it was even legally possible, given the statutes that impose
governmental control over public roads. This case was properly dismissed.
12
PRAYER
Appellee Rosetta Resources Operating Co., Inc. prays that the trial court’s
judgment be affirmed, and that the costs of appeal be taxed against Appellant Leticia
Zepeda Vasquez.
Respectfully submitted,
/S/ Clay E. Coalson
William A. Abernethy
State Bar No. 00809800
E-MAIL: babernethy@dakpc.com
Clay E. Coalson
State Bar No. 04422400
E-MAIL: ccoalson@dakpc.com
DONNELL, ABERNETHY &
KIESCHNICK, P.C.
555 North Carancahua, Suite 1770
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401-0853
Telephone: (361) 888-5551
Facsimile: (361) 880-5618
Attorneys for Appellee Rosetta Resources Operating
Co., Inc.
13
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned
counsel – in reliance upon the word count of the computer program used to prepare
this document – certified that this document contains 2,859 words, excluding the
words that need not be counted under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(1).
/S/ Clay E. Coalson
Clay E. Coalson
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on April 30, 2015 a copy of this Appellee’s Opening Brief
was served by electronic filing upon the following counsel of record:
Jeffrey Lee Dorrell
E-mail: jdorrell@hanszenlaporte.com
H. Mark Burck
E-mail: mburck@hanszenlaporte.com
Daniel Dutko
E-mail: ddutko@hanszenlaporte.com
Hanszen Laporte, LLP
11767 Katy Freeway, Suite 850
Houston, Texas 77079
Attorneys for Appellant Leticia Zepeda Vasquez
Isaac J. Huron
E-mail: ihuron@lawdcm.com
Davis, Cedillo & Mendoza, Inc.
McCombs Plaza, Suite 500
755 E. Mulberry Avenue
San Antonio, Texas 78213
Attorney for Appellees Legend Natural Gas III, LP, and
Legend Natural Gas, LLC
David L. Ortega
E-mail: dortega@nhsl.com
Naman Howell Smith & Lee, PLLC
1001 Reunion Place, Suite 600
San Antonio, Texas 78216
Attorney for Lewis Energy Group, LP, and
Lewis Petro Properties, Inc.
14
Jose E. Garcia
E-mail: jeg@gvlaw.net
Garcia & Villarreal
4311 N. McColl Road
McAllen, Texas 78504
Attorney for Appellee XTO Energy, Inc.
Christopher Lowrance
E-mail: chris.lowrance@roystonlaw.com
Royston, Rayzor, Vickery & Williams, LLP
802 Carancahua, Suite 1300
Corpus Christi, Texas 78401
Attorney for Virtex Operating Co., Inc., and
Virtex Holdings, LLP
E. Michael Rodriguez
E-mail: mrodriguez@atlashall.com
Atlas, Hall & Rodriguez, LLP
P.O. Box 6369 (78523-6369)
50 W. Morrison Road, Suite A
Brownsville, Texas 78520
Attorney for Enterprise Products Holdings,
LLC, and Enterprise Products Co.
15