Titus Earl Webster v. State ( 2002 )


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    In The

    Court of Appeals

    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana



    ______________________________



    No. 06-02-00002-CR

    ______________________________





    TITUS WEBSTER, Appellant



    V.



    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee






    On Appeal from the 5th Judicial District Court

    Cass County, Texas

    Trial Court No. 97-F-109










    Before Morriss, C.J., Grant and Ross, JJ.

    Opinion by Justice Grant



    O P I N I O N



    Titus Webster appeals the revocation of his community supervision. Webster pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine in an amount greater than four grams, but less than 200 grams. The trial court sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment, but suspended the imposition of his sentence and placed him on ten years' community supervision.

    The State later moved to have the trial court revoke Webster's community supervision, alleging he sold cocaine to undercover officers on four different occasions and was in possession of cocaine on another occasion. Webster pleaded true to one of the State's delivery of cocaine allegations. The trial court found the delivery of cocaine allegations true, (1) revoked Webster's community supervision, and sentenced him to ten years' imprisonment.

    In related proceedings held on the same day, the trial court found Webster guilty of two delivery of cocaine offenses. The trial court sentenced him to eighteen months' imprisonment in a state jail facility for each offense. The trial court also ordered all sentences to run concurrently. Webster has also filed appeals from the judgments in those proceedings. We consider those appeals in separate opinions.

    Webster's attorney has filed an appellate brief in which he concludes that after a review of the record and the related law, the appeal is frivolous and without merit. He has evaluated the record and has found no error that arguably supports an appeal. The brief thus meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 18 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1967), and Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991). Webster did not file a pro se response.

    In his Anders brief, counsel raises the arguable issue that the trial court should have continued Webster on community supervision, but concludes that issue is without merit. The decision whether to continue or revoke community supervision is within the trial court's discretion. Wester v. State, 542 S.W.2d 403, 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976); Allen v. State, 946 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1997, no pet.). We review the trial court's ruling for abuse of discretion. See Jackson v. State, 645 S.W.2d 303, 305 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983); Lopez v. State, 46 S.W.3d 476, 481 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 2001, pet. ref'd).

    The trial court cannot revoke community supervision without a showing the defendant violated a condition of his or her supervision. DeGay v. State, 741 S.W.2d 445, 449 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987); Allen, 946 S.W.2d at 116. When there is sufficient evidence to support a finding the defendant violated a condition of his or her supervision, the trial court does not abuse its discretion by revoking community supervision. See Cardona v. State, 665 S.W.2d 492, 493-94 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984); Stevens v. State, 900 S.W.2d 348, 351 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1995, pet. ref'd). Proof of a single violation is sufficient to support revocation of community supervision. O'Neal v. State, 623 S.W.2d 660, 661 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981); Myers v. State, 780 S.W.2d 441, 445 (Tex. App.Texarkana 1989, pet. ref'd).

    In the present case, Webster pleaded true to one of the State's allegations in its motion to revoke. His plea was a sufficient basis in and of itself to support revocation of community supervision. See Jiminez v. State, 552 S.W.2d 469, 472 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977); Benoit v. State, 561 S.W.2d 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).

    In addition, the State presented evidence to support each allegation. Jeff McCullough and Johnny Phillips, two undercover officers, testified they purchased cocaine from Webster on the dates alleged in the State's motion to revoke. In addition, Lanette Fuqua, a chemist with the Texas Department of Public Safety, testified the substances purchased on the dates alleged in the State's motion to revoke each contained less than one gram of cocaine. Therefore, the trial court had a sufficient basis on which to revoke Webster's community supervision.

    Counsel also raises the arguable issue that on revocation, the trial court should have reduced Webster's term of imprisonment from the sentence originally imposed. When the trial court revokes community supervision, it can impose a sentence no greater than the sentence originally assessed and no less than the statutory minimum. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 23(a) (Vernon Supp. 2002); Serna v. State, 986 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1998, no pet.); Guzman v. State, 923 S.W.2d 792, 799 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1996, no pet.); Weed v. State, 891 S.W.2d 22, 24 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). The minimum punishment for possession of cocaine in an amount greater than four grams, but less than 200 grams, is two years. See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(d) (Vernon Supp. 2002); Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.33(a) (Vernon 1994). Here the trial court imposed a ten-year sentence.

    The trial court's sentencing decision is not an abuse of discretion. The court was confronted with evidence Webster was engaging in numerous drug transactions. It could have reasonably concluded that Webster had not succeeded on community supervision and that the original sentence should be imposed.

    We have otherwise reviewed the record and found no arguable issues for appeal. The judgment is affirmed.







    Ben Z. Grant

    Justice



    Date Submitted: July 11, 2002

    Date Decided: July 12, 2002



    Do Not Publish

    1. The State abandoned the possession of cocaine allegation.

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                                                             In The

                                                    Court of Appeals

                            Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

     

                                                    ______________________________

     

                                                                 No. 06-11-00027-CR

                                                    ______________________________

     

     

                                    WESLEY LEON SPANGLER, Appellant

     

                                                                    V.

     

                                         THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

     

     

     

     

                                           On Appeal from the 115th Judicial District Court

                                                                Upshur County, Texas

                                                                Trial Court No. 15,051

     

                                              

     

     

     

                                              Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.

                                                  Memorandum Opinion by Justice Carter


                                                          MEMORANDUM OPINION

     

                Wesley Leon Spangler, appellant, has filed with this Court a motion to dismiss his appeal.  The motion is signed by Spangler and his counsel in compliance with Rule 42.2(a) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a).  As authorized by Rule 42.2, we grant the motion.  See Tex. R. App. P. 42.2.

                Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

     

     

     

               

                                                                                        Jack Carter

                                                                                        Justice

     

    Date Submitted:          February 1, 2011

    Date Decided:             February 2, 2011

     

    Do Not Publish