Cordarian Henderson v. State ( 2009 )


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  •                     In The
    Court of Appeals
    Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana
    ______________________________
    No. 06-08-00128-CR
    ______________________________
    CORDARIAN HENDERSON, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court
    Gregg County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 35417-B
    Before Morriss, C.J., Carter and Moseley, JJ.
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Charged with two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child, Cordarian Henderson's
    defensive theory was that his eight-year-old victim had made up these allegations of sexual abuse
    as a result of having a fanciful imagination—an imagination that was the unfortunate product of
    being physically abused by his mother and of having what seemed to be unfettered access to
    pornographic videos. But for the pornography and being abused by his mother, the victim would
    never have "made up" these claims against Henderson—or so went Henderson's theory of the case.
    Henderson's jury disagreed with this defensive theory and found Henderson guilty of two
    counts of aggravated sexual assault. The jury assessed his punishment at ten years' imprisonment
    on each count. Henderson now appeals, claiming that the evidence is insufficient to support his
    conviction and that his ten-year sentences are disproportionate to his crimes. We overrule both
    issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
    (1)    The Evidence Is Legally and Factually Sufficient To Support the Jury's Verdict
    Henderson contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to establish that he
    committed either of the two counts of aggravated sexual assault for which the jury found him guilty.
    A legal sufficiency review requires an appellate court to ask "whether, after viewing the
    evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found
    the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt." Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    ,
    319 (1979). This standard mandates that the reviewing court accord deference to the fact-finder's
    2
    duty to resolve conflicts in testimony and other evidence. Clayton v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 772
    , 778
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This review standard requires an examination of all the evidence, both that
    which was properly admitted and that which was improperly admitted, to determine whether the
    cumulative force of all the evidence (direct, circumstantial, or both) supports the verdict when such
    evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to that verdict. Id.; see also Williams v. State, 
    235 S.W.3d 742
    , 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). During this review process, the court measures the
    evidence against the elements of the offense as defined in a hypothetically correct jury charge for the
    case. Malik v. State, 
    953 S.W.2d 234
    , 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). The hypothetically correct jury
    charge "sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State's
    burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's theories of liability, and adequately describes the
    particular offense for which the defendant was tried." 
    Id. A factual
    sufficiency review has subtle differences. "Evidence may be factually insufficient
    if: '1) it is so weak as to be clearly wrong and manifestly unjust or 2) the adverse finding is against
    the great weight and preponderance of the available evidence.'" Berry v. State, 
    233 S.W.3d 847
    , 854
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (quoting Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    , 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). "Such
    a factual sufficiency review requires the reviewing court to consider all of the evidence." 
    Id. (citing Marshall
    v. State, 
    210 S.W.3d 618
    , 625 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)). "A clearly wrong and unjust
    verdict occurs where the jury's finding is manifestly unjust, shocks the conscience, or clearly
    demonstrates bias." 
    Id. (citing Sells
    v. State, 
    121 S.W.3d 748
    , 754 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003);
    3
    Santellan v. State, 
    939 S.W.2d 155
    , 164 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). As in a legal sufficiency review,
    the hypothetically correct jury charge construct is employed in assessing the factual sufficiency of
    the evidence. Vega v. State, 
    267 S.W.3d 912
    , 916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).
    One way in which the crime of aggravated sexual assault can be committed is if the actor
    intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual organ of a child by any means
    and the victim is younger than fourteen years of age. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i),
    (a)(2)(B) (Vernon Supp. 2008). Another way the crime of aggravated sexual assault can be
    committed is if the actor intentionally or knowingly "causes the sexual organ of a child to contact
    or penetrate the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of another person, including the actor" and the victim
    is younger than fourteen years of age. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii), (a)(2)(B).
    These two methods of committing aggravated sexual assault were alleged as alternative paragraphs
    in Count I of the grand jury's indictment, the count alleging that offenses occurred April 1, 2006.
    The named victim for both alternative paragraphs was the same: John Doe 08201999.1
    Count II of the grand jury's indictment also contained two alternative allegations. These
    alternative allegations mirrored the allegations contained in Count I of the indictment, except that
    these offenses were alleged to have occurred April 15, 2006. The named victim for both paragraphs
    of Count II was the same as Count I: John Doe 08201999.
    1
    John Doe 08201999 is a pseudonym.
    4
    With respect to the first paragraph of either count of the indictment, the applicable
    hypothetically correct jury charge would require the State to bring forth proof of the following
    elements: that Henderson (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the penetration of the victim's
    anus, (3) by any means, and (4) the victim was younger than fourteen years of age. See TEX . PENAL
    CODE ANN . § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(i), (a)(2)(B). To satisfy its burden of proof under the second
    paragraph of either count of the indictment, the applicable hypothetically correct jury charge would
    require the State to bring forth proof that Henderson (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the
    victim's sexual organ to contact the mouth, anus, or sexual organ of any person; and (3) the victim
    was younger than fourteen years of age. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 22.021(a)(1)(B)(iii),
    (a)(2)(B). With this framework in mind, we turn now to a review of the evidence admitted at trial.
    The State called four witnesses during its case-in-chief: Doe (the victim), Nakiesta Myles,
    Bunny Terrell, and David Cheatham. Henderson called six witnesses to testify on his behalf:
    Cherelle Garrett, Chere Turner Kabeta, Janice Mary Coger, Kim Robison, Stacey Lee Myers, and
    Henderson himself. The jury also viewed a recorded interview of Doe conducted at the Child
    Advocacy Center and a recorded interview of Henderson conducted at the Longview Police
    Department. What follows is a summary of each witness' testimony and the contents of those
    recorded interviews.
    5
    (a)    Nakiesta Myles
    Nakiesta Myles is the mother of Doe, whose date of birth is October 20, 1999. Myles and
    Doe lived in a Longview apartment complex in 2005.2 While living at the complex, Myles met
    Robison, Henderson (who was Robison's son), and Cherelle Garrett (who was Robison's daughter).
    Robison and Henderson would alternately babysit Doe when Myles had to work. Garrett would also
    sometimes babysit Myles' three children. Eventually, Henderson became Doe's primary babysitter
    when Myles had to work. At some point, Myles and Doe moved into Robison's apartment.
    One afternoon, Myles walked into Doe's room and caught him doing "inappropriate" things
    with one of Myles' twin daughters. Doe then told Myles that he learned how to do this from
    Henderson, who had previously done the same inappropriate thing to Doe. Doe later explained that,
    while Myles had been at work, Henderson once tried to insert his penis in Doe's behind. Doe
    reported to his mother that the sexual assault hurt and that Henderson would not discontinue the
    assault despite Doe's muffled pleas to stop. Myles was unsure whether Doe said that Henderson
    actually inserted his penis into Doe's anus or that Henderson's penis had only touched the outside of
    Doe's anus. Myles' subsequent examination of her son revealed he had no observable physical
    injuries to his anus, so Myles did not personally believe that Henderon had actually been able to
    2
    Myles reported her son was, at the time of trial, finishing his third-grade year of school in
    Kilgore. Doe has been diagnosed with attention-deficit-hyperactivity disorder and reportedly has
    had behavioral problems at school. Myles also said Doe was behind his peers in his academic level,
    but that he was starting to catch up and was enjoying school. She also reported that his behavioral
    problems had improved slightly during the just-ended academic term.
    6
    penetrate her son's anus; this examination occurred, however, some length of time after the last
    suspected sexual assault. Myles testified that she remembered once seeing blood in Doe's stool
    sometime around April 2006.
    Henderson also reportedly made Doe watch pornographic movies. Once he was interviewed
    at the Child Advocacy Center, Doe revealed the sexual assaults occurred several different times.
    According to Myles, Doe has been wetting his bed and having nightmares that involved Henderson
    since the date of the last sexual assault.
    (b)     Doe
    Doe told the jury he was currently in third grade. He currently lives in Kilgore with his
    mother, sisters, and several members of his extended family. He previously lived at an apartment
    complex in Longview called Ware Meadows, at which time he was seven years old. When he lived
    in Longview, Doe would sometimes go to Robison's apartment after he got home from school and
    before his mother got home from work. Both Robison and Henderson would periodically babysit
    Doe at either Myles' apartment or at Robison's apartment.3
    Doe explained to the jury that Henderson had shown his "private part" to Doe.4 Doe then told
    the jury that Henderson stripped Doe of his clothes, after which Henderson put his private part "in"
    Doe's anus. Doe further explained that, by using the word "in," Doe meant that Henderson actually
    3
    Doe identified Henderson in open court.
    4
    The record reflects that the child victim was afraid to testify at trial about the sexual assaults.
    7
    inserted his penis into and inside Doe's own body. The assault hurt "[a] lot." Henderson reportedly
    assaulted Doe in this manner on three different occasions: first at Robison's home, later at Myles'
    home (at Longview's Ware Meadows apartment complex), and at the home of Henderson's
    grandmother. Doe also told the jury that he had previously watched a pornographic movie with
    Henderson and Henderson's girlfriend.
    Finally, Doe denied the claim that Henderson had touched Doe's penis during the first sexual
    assault. However, with respect to the second, assaultive episode, Doe agreed that Henderson did
    touch Doe's penis during that nonconsensual encounter.
    (c)    Bunny Terrell
    Bunny Terrell is a medical social worker with the Child Advocacy Center in Longview.
    Terrell told the jury that her position with the Center requires her to conduct forensic interviews of
    children between the ages of two and seventeen when those children have made outcries of abuse.
    Terrell explained that many of her interviews involve cases of a "delayed outcry," a term that means
    "something has happened to the child and there's been a period of time before the child has revealed
    that something has happened." Most often, according to Terrell, an abuser is someone who already
    has a close relationship with the child. Terrell informed the jury that no sexual assault medical
    examination was made of Doe in this case because he had delayed for several months before making
    an outcry of sexual abuse; the passing of time would have allowed the body to heal, resulting in a
    8
    complete absence of any medically valid information to connect the accused with these alleged
    sexual assaults.
    On cross-examination, Terrell told the jury that Doe has said Henderson "put his middle part
    on my [Doe's] butt." (Emphasis added.)
    (d)     David Cheatham
    David Cheatham is a detective with the Longview Police Department. Cheatham conducted
    the investigation into Doe's outcry of sexual abuse, which ultimately resulted in Cheatham's decision
    to seek an arrest warrant for Henderson. When Cheatham and several other uniformed police
    officers went to Henderson's home to execute that arrest warrant, they first knocked on the door to
    Henderson's apartment. The officers waited "some time" before Robison finally opened the door.
    The officers then began searching throughout the home for Henderson, whom they eventually found
    hiding beneath a bed.5 Henderson was then forcibly removed from beneath the bed, handcuffed,
    arrested, and transported to jail.
    5
    During his own later testimony, Henderson tried to explain that he hid from the police
    because he lived within a culture at the Ware Meadows Apartments that was generally distrustful
    of police officers. He told the jury that any time the police come to that apartment complex, the
    residents for whom the police are looking will generally attempt to hide. Henderson also reportedly
    hid because he thought the officers were attempting to arrest him for unpaid traffic tickets.
    9
    Once at the jail, Henderson agreed to waive his Miranda6 rights and speak with officers about
    the charges against him.7 Henderson repeatedly denied molesting Doe.
    Due to the lapse of several months between the alleged incident and the child's ultimate
    outcry, Cheatham decided not to send Doe for a sexual assault medical examination because "[t]here
    wouldn't be any physical evidence, not normally, not after that time frame." Cheatham also informed
    the jury that the State had used a pseudonym for the victim in this case, that pseudonym being "John
    Doe 0820199." Cheatham's continued testimony linked this pseudonym to the child victim from
    whom the jury had heard earlier.
    During cross-examination, Cheatham's police report in this case was admitted into evidence.
    Cheatham's report stated Myles initially reported that she did not believe Henderson penetrated Doe's
    anus during the assault. Cheatham explained that Doe had neither, at the time of Myles' initial
    report, disclosed to his mother that Henderson had actually penetrated the anus during the sexual
    assault, nor exhibited any physical symptoms of such penetration.
    (e)    Cherelle Garrett
    Cherelle Garrett is Henderson's younger sister. She lived with Henderson and their mother
    in 2006 and frequently babysat Doe. Garrett never witnessed any type of inappropriate behavior
    6
    Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
    (1966).
    7
    Cheatham testified that Henderson did not ask for an attorney at any time. The recording
    of the interview also does not suggest Henderson made any request for an attorney, but instead
    willingly waived his right to counsel and answered the detective's questions.
    10
    between Henderson and Doe during the relevant time period. She testified that she did, however,
    witness an episode in which Myles physically abused Doe by beating him with a belt, kicking him,
    and punching him with her fists. Garrett also testified that she witnessed Myles hit Doe's head
    against a wall, which resulted in Doe suffering visible, physical injuries and caused him to miss
    school the next day. Garrett claimed there were other instances of physical violence by Myles
    toward her son. Garrett then testified that Doe has a reputation for being untruthful and that she has
    witnessed Doe in this case watching pornographic movies.
    (f)    Chere Turner Kabeta
    Chere Kabeta used to live at the Ware Meadows Apartments in Longview. Henderson
    babysat Kabeta's son and daughter. Kabeta never witnessed Henderson act inappropriately with her
    children during this time; she had no reason to suspect any such inappropriate conduct by Henderson.
    When the current charges were brought, Kabeta confronted her son (who was eight at the time
    Henderson babysat him) about whether Henderson had similarly molested him. Kabeta's son
    repeatedly denied being molested by Henderson. And other than Doe's outcry, Kabeta has never
    heard molestation accusations made by any other child that Henderson previously babysat. Kabeta
    would even allow Henderson to continue babysitting her children today.
    (g)    Janice Mary Coger
    Janice Coger is Henderson's grandmother and lives at the Ware Meadows Apartments. Coger
    testified that she witnessed Myles beating Doe, slapping him, and locking him in the trunk of her car.
    11
    She also testified that Doe had a reputation for being "known as a big liar." Coger was unaware that
    Henderson himself had been previously sexually assaulted.
    (h)     Kim Robison
    Kim Robison is Henderson's mother. She lived with Henderson during the time in question
    and would babysit Doe. She once found a pornographic videotape in Doe's room. Robison also
    testified that Doe is known to tell lies.
    On cross-examination, Robison admitted that she had once been raped and had waited a long
    time before telling anyone about it. She also admitted that Henderson had only recently revealed to
    her that he had been molested as a young child.
    (i)     Stacey Lee Myers
    Stacey Myers lived at the Ware Meadows Apartments at the same time as did Henderson.
    Henderson lived with Myers for a time and took care of her teenage son when she was working.
    Myers never witnessed Henderson engage in any inappropriate behavior such as watching
    pornographic videos while her children were present.
    (j)     Henderson
    Henderson next testified in his own defense. He told the jury that he sometimes babysat Doe.
    Henderson testified that Doe would not behave when Henderson took care of the child. Henderson
    denied molesting Doe or doing anything to hurt the child.
    12
    On cross-examination, Henderson told the jury that he began babysitting Doe in November
    or December 2005. During the subsequent months, Henderson often spent the night at Myles'
    apartment, taking care of her children while she worked. This care included taking Doe to the barber
    or the mall, among other things. In exchange, Myles reportedly promised to pay Henderson $20.00
    each week; Henderson was also given permission to use Myles' home telephone line and had access
    to her internet service. In January 2006, Myles and Doe moved into the apartment where Henderson
    and his family lived. The next month Henderson stopped babysitting Myles' children for two
    reasons: First, Myles stopped giving Henderson the promised $20.00 per week payment. Second,
    Henderson moved out of his mother's home and into the home of his cousin. Henderson testified
    that he never had any close contact with Doe after Valentine's Day 2006.
    Henderson next told the jury that he personally observed Doe in this case watching a
    pornographic movie that Myles had absentmindedly left in her video player after a previous night's
    romantic interlude. (The movie apparently got stuck in the video player; Henderson told the jury that
    he had to use a butter knife to remove the disc from the video player). He also testified that he had
    seen Myles physically abuse her son in December 2005 and on at least five other occasions.
    Finally, Henderson told the jury that he had himself been sexually abused as a child and
    admitted that he waited about a month before he told anyone of the incident. Because he himself had
    been molested, Henderson told the jury that he would never want to put another child through the
    same pain and trauma he had experienced.
    13
    (k)    Child Advocacy Interview (Defense Exhibit 1)
    Defense Exhibit 1 is a recording of Doe's interview by Terrell at the Child Advocacy Center
    and lasted nearly twenty-seven minutes. At the beginning of the video, Terrell asks Doe to identify
    statements that are true and statements that are false. The video suggests that Doe appropriately
    identifies the difference between the truth and a lie and promises to tell the truth during the
    interview.
    Early during this interview, Doe tells Terrell that he sometimes spends the night at
    Henderson's home. Terrell then asked Doe why he was at the Center. Doe responded, "He
    [Henderson] put his middle part in my butt." (Emphasis added.) Doe told Terrell that he did not
    have his clothes on at the time Henderson committed the assault on a bed at Henderson's home. Doe
    also reportedly told Henderson to stop the assault, but Henderson would not cease. Henderson was
    also reportedly wearing "red jean pants" at the time he assaulted Doe. Doe repeatedly told Terrell
    that Henderson's penis went in and out of Doe's anus several times during each of the assaults that
    occurred over a period of three different, consecutive days.8 The assaults occurred at night according
    to the recorded interview.
    8
    Doe would later say that Henderson "stayed still" after he put "his middle part in" Doe's
    anus. Terrell did not ask Doe to clarify this apparent discrepancy among his various statements
    surrounding the facts of the multiple sexual assaults described during the interview's entirety.
    14
    Doe next told Terrell that he had seen Henderson watching "nasty movies" on several
    occasions that Henderson reportedly got from his cousin. Henderson also reportedly paddled Doe
    on several occasions. When asked by Terrell, Doe denied being sexually assaulted by anyone else.
    (l)    Henderson's Jailhouse Interview (State's Exhibit 1)
    Henderson was eighteen years of age at the time of his custodial interview by Detective
    Cheatham. The video begins with Cheatham reading the Miranda warnings to Henderson, then
    Henderson is given a written copy of the warnings (which he initials as an indication of his
    understanding of the warnings and the consequences of waiving his Miranda rights). Henderson
    acknowledges that he was hiding underneath his bed when the officers came to arrest him.
    Henderson explains that he previously babysat Myles' children, including Doe. Henderson and Doe
    sometimes would go to the mall, McDonalds, or the barber shop together. Henderson repeatedly
    denied molesting Doe. Henderson acknowledged owning a pornographic video. Henderson,
    however, denied watching pornography with Doe or while Doe was in a location where he could see
    Henderson watching pornography.
    Henderson then told Cheatham about being molested by a teenage cousin. Henderson said
    the cousin performed oral sex on Henderson and attempted anal intercourse on Henderson.
    Finally, Henderson told investigators he believed that Doe had made up these accusations
    of sexual molestation as a result of Doe being repeatedly, physically abused by Doe's own mother.
    15
    (m)    Analysis
    Viewing the above-summarized evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, we
    conclude that the jury had before it evidence from which it could determine that Henderson
    (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the penetration of Doe's anus, (3) by any means (in this
    case, Henderson's penis), and Doe was younger than fourteen years of age on or about April 1, 2006.
    The jury also had before it evidence that Henderson (1) intentionally or knowingly, (2) caused the
    penetration of Doe's anus, (3) by any means (in this case, Henderson's penis), and Doe was younger
    than fourteen years of age on or about April 15, 2006. We therefore conclude that legally sufficient
    evidence supports the jury's verdict, as evaluated under the required hypothetically correct jury
    charge standard.
    We similarly conclude the evidence is factually sufficient when measured against the
    hypothetically correct jury charge. While there are factual conflicts and discrepancies among the
    various witnesses' testimonies and among the exhibits, it was ultimately the jury's province to resolve
    these conflicts. Based on the above-summarized record, we cannot say the jury's resolution of the
    facts is against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence. We therefore overrule
    Henderson's challenges to the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to support his convictions.
    (2)    Henderson Did Not Preserve His Disproportionate Sentencing Claim
    In his final point of error, Henderson contends his ten-year prison sentence is
    disproportionate to his crime, citing Solem v. Helm, 
    463 U.S. 277
    (1983).
    16
    Texas courts have traditionally held that, as long as the punishment assessed is within the
    range prescribed by the Legislature in a valid statute, the punishment is not excessive, cruel, or
    unusual. See, e.g., Jordan v. State, 
    495 S.W.2d 949
    , 952 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973). Here, Henderson's
    ten-year sentence falls within the applicable range of imprisonment for a term of between five and
    ninety-nine years, or for life. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 12.32 (Vernon 2003).
    That does not end the inquiry. A prohibition against grossly disproportionate punishment
    survives under the Eighth Amendment to the United States Constitution apart from any consideration
    of whether the punishment assessed is within the range established by the Legislature. U.S. CONST .
    amend. VIII; see 
    Solem, 463 U.S. at 290
    ; Harmelin v. Michigan, 
    501 U.S. 957
    (1991) (Scalia, J.,
    plurality op.); Jackson v. State, 
    989 S.W.2d 842
    , 845 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1999, no pet.); Lackey
    v. State, 
    881 S.W.2d 418
    , 420–21 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. ref'd); see also Ex parte Chavez,
    
    213 S.W.3d 320
    , 323 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) (describing this principle as involving a "very limited,
    'exceedingly rare,' and somewhat amorphous" review).
    Solem had suggested, as a three-part test, that an appellate court consider: (1) the gravity of
    the offense compared with the harshness of the penalty; (2) the sentences imposed for similar crimes
    in the same jurisdiction; and (3) the sentences imposed for commission of the same crime in other
    jurisdictions. See 
    Solem, 463 U.S. at 292
    . Harmelin at least raised questions about the viability of
    the Solem three-part test. In fact, it was subsequently held that proportionality survived Harmelin,
    but that the Solem three-part test did not. See McGruder v. Puckett, 
    954 F.2d 313
    , 316 (5th Cir.
    17
    1992); Dunn v. State, 
    997 S.W.2d 885
    , 892 (Tex. App.—Waco 1999, pet. ref'd); 
    Lackey, 881 S.W.2d at 420
    –21. In light of Harmelin, the test has been reformulated as an initial threshold comparison
    of the gravity of the offense with the severity of the sentence, and then, only if that initial comparison
    created an inference that the sentence was grossly disproportionate to the offense should there be a
    consideration of the other two Solem factors—(1) sentences for similar crimes in the same
    jurisdiction and (2) sentences for the same crime in other jurisdictions. 
    McGruder, 954 F.2d at 316
    ;
    Mullins v. State, 
    208 S.W.3d 469
    , 470 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2006, no pet.); 
    Dunn, 997 S.W.2d at 892
    ; 
    Lackey, 881 S.W.2d at 420
    –21.
    Henderson did not object to his sentence at the trial court level on the ground that a ten-year
    prison sentence was disproportionate to his crimes (or on any other ground) at the time it was
    announced or later when it was imposed. His motion for new trial, however, contains a contention
    that the sentence was disproportionate to the offense. A motion for new trial is an appropriate way
    to preserve this type of claim for review. See Williamson v. State, 
    175 S.W.3d 522
    , 523–24 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2005, no pet.); Delacruz v. State, 
    167 S.W.3d 904
    (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005,
    no pet.).
    There is no evidence in the record, however, comparing the sentences imposed on persons
    in Texas with sentences imposed against defendants in other jurisdictions who committed a similar
    offense.    
    Mullins, 208 S.W.3d at 470
    ; Alberto v. State, 
    100 S.W.3d 528
    , 529–30 (Tex.
    App.—Texarkana 2003, no pet.); see Fluellen v. State, 
    71 S.W.3d 870
    , 873 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
    18
    2002, no pet.); Latham v. State, 
    20 S.W.3d 63
    , 69 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2000, pet. ref'd).
    Accordingly, Henderson has not brought forth a record on which this issue may be properly
    evaluated, and his claim must be overruled.
    For the reasons stated, we conclude the evidence is factually and legally sufficient to support
    the jury's verdict. We also hold that Henderson has not brought forth an adequate record on which
    we can evaluate his claim that his ten-year prison sentence for two counts of aggravated sexual
    assault is disproportionate to his crime.
    We affirm the trial court's judgment.
    Josh R. Morriss, III
    Chief Justice
    Date Submitted:        March 23, 2009
    Date Decided:          April 16, 2009
    Do Not Publish
    19