Wreathye Sue Guerrero v. State ( 2005 )

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

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No. 06-05-00200-CR

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WREATHYE SUE GUERRERO, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 32,721-B

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            Wreathye Sue Guerrero has filed a motion in which she asks this Court to dismiss her appeal. Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 42.2(a), her motion is granted.

            We dismiss the appeal.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          September 26, 2005

Date Decided:             September 27, 2005

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caps">MEMORANDUM OPINION

            In 1994, Timothy Bill Sahs and a confederate stole an automobile in Lamar County. When it appeared they would be caught, they set the car on fire, which spread to and damaged a county-owned bridge. After being convicted of both theft and arson, Sahs was sentenced, in a separate case, to confinement for the arson and, in this case, to ten years' community supervision for the theft. In addition to some common conditions, including regularly reporting to his community supervision officer, Sahs' community supervision was conditioned on his making monthly restitution payments to Lamar County for the cost of the burned bridge.

            In 1998, Sahs figuratively burned his own bridge when he violated several conditions of his community supervision. In 1999, the State moved to revoke Sahs' community supervision alleging that he failed to submit monthly report forms to the community supervision and corrections department and also failed to make monthly payments on court costs, restitution, and court-appointed attorney's fees. Sahs was not apprehended until he was stopped for speeding in 2005, after the period of his community supervision expired. Sahs appeals from the May 26, 2005, revocation of his community supervision and the resulting judgment, which imposes a seven-year sentence and an order for Sahs to pay $22,065.00 in restitution to Lamar County.

            Sahs' attorney has filed an appellate brief in which he concludes, after a review of the record and the related law, the appeal is frivolous and without merit. The brief contains a professional evaluation of the record and contains two points of error that arguably support reversal. This meets the requirements of Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).

            Counsel  provided  a  copy  of  his  brief  to  Sahs  November  14,  2005.  Sahs  has  not  filed a pro se response to his counsel's Anders brief, nor has the State filed a response.

            Counsel's brief first discusses the trial court's jurisdiction, the adequacy of pretrial proceedings, the sufficiency of the evidence, and the effective assistance of trial counsel. The brief appropriately dismisses those subjects because they contain no arguable issues. Then counsel raises two arguable issues: (1) whether the State was diligent in prosecuting Sahs on its motion to revoke, and (2) whether it was permissible to condition Sahs' community supervision on his paying restitution to Lamar County.

1.         There Is No Evidence the Motion to Revoke Was Not Prosecuted Diligently

            Because the revocation hearing was held after Sahs' community supervision expired and one of the bases for revocation was failure to report, we address the issue of due diligence. But because there is no evidence of lack of due diligence on the part of the State—in fact there is affirmative evidence that Sahs absconded from supervision not withstanding the State's efforts to locate him—we conclude the State's motion was diligently prosecuted. See Wheat v. State, 165 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2005, pet. ref'd).

2.         Impermissibly Conditioning Sahs' Community Supervision on Paying Restitution to Lamar County Is Not Appealable and Is Harmless Error

            One of the conditions of Sahs' community supervision was his paying restitution of $29,000.00, an amount which is obviously for Lamar County's bridge burned as a result of Sahs' arson offense, which was charged in a separate case—not for the private citizen's automobile which was the object of the theft involved in this case and supporting the community supervision.

            A condition of community supervision imposed at the time of the original sentencing is not appealable with a judgment revoking that community supervision, unless the condition had been objected to when it was originally imposed. Bailey v. State, 160 S.W.3d 11, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004); Hull v. State, 67 S.W.3d 215, 217 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). There is no evidence any objection was made at the time the condition was originally imposed. The condition of community supervision that Sahs pay restitution to Lamar County is not now properly appealable.

            Even if it had been appealable, the error would be harmless. While restitution may be ordered as a condition of community supervision, it may not be ordered paid to anyone other than the victim of the crime charged in the case. Martin v. State, 874 S.W.2d 674, 676–78 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994); see Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 11(b) (Vernon Supp. 2005) (limiting terms of community supervision restitution to "the victim"). As such, conditioning Sahs' community supervision on his paying restitution to Lamar County was improper.

            But because Sahs' community supervision was revoked on sufficiently established bases other than his failure to pay restitution, such error was harmless. Therefore, it would not be reversible error, even if it had been appealable.

3.         The Portion of the Judgment Requiring Sahs to Pay Restitution to the County Is Without Authority

            The judgment revoking Sahs' community supervision and sentencing him also requires his payment to Lamar County of the restitution remaining unpaid. While restitution may be ordered in conjunction with a criminal sentence, it is limited to a "victim of the offense." Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.037(a) (Vernon Supp. 2005). That language is equivalent to the community supervision limitation set out in Article 42.12, Section 11(b) mentioned above. Therefore, ordering restitution to Lamar County, though of praiseworthy intent, was unauthorized and, therefore, error.             When an error can be corrected by modifying a judgment, we are authorized to do that. Tex. R. App. P. 43.2 (b); see Hankins v. State, No. 03-04-00018-CR, 2005 Tex. App. LEXIS 6465 (Tex. App.—Austin Aug. 10, 2005, no pet. h.).

            After our review of the record, we agree with appellate counsel that Sahs' revocation and sentence is without reversible error and that the arguable issues counsel has raised are not meritorious. But—because the trial court's judgment, without authority, orders Sahs to pay restitution to Lamar County, not to the victim of the theft for which Sahs was convicted in this case—we modify the judgment by striking the order that Sahs pay restitution of $22,065.00 to Lamar County, and affirm the judgment as modified. We grant counsel's motion to withdraw as Sahs' counsel.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date Submitted:          February 3, 2006

Date Decided:             February 10, 2006

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