Cassandra Angela Williams v. State ( 2005 )

In The

Court of Appeals

Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

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No. 06-04-00140-CR

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CASSANDRA ANGELA WILLIAMS, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 124th Judicial District Court

Gregg County, Texas

Trial Court No. 31657-B

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Before Morriss, C.J., Ross and Carter, JJ.

Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

MEMORANDUM OPINION

            J.C. Penney employees observed Cassandra Angela Williams shoplifting at the store. When the employees pursued Williams into the parking lot and attempted to detain her for the theft, Williams kicked and bit two of the employees, and then said that one of the employees now had HIV as a result of being bitten by Williams. The employees were eventually able to subdue and handcuff Williams, and the police arrived shortly thereafter to take her into custody.

            Williams was charged by indictment with robbery. On September 9, 2004, Williams waived a  jury  trial  and  pled  guilty  to  the  offense,  a  second-degree  felony.  See  Tex.  Pen.  Code Ann. § 29.02(a)(1) (Vernon 2003). There was no negotiated plea agreement. The trial court accepted Williams' plea and then heard evidence and argument regarding punishment. The trial court then sentenced Williams to five years' imprisonment.

            On March 11, 2005, Williams' appellate counsel filed an Anders brief in which counsel professionally discussed the record, described the issues reviewed, and concluded there were no arguable grounds for appeal. As required by Anders, counsel also filed a motion to withdraw. Counsel also sent Williams a copy of the appellate brief and informed her of her right to file a response pro se and of her right to review the record.

            This Court informed Williams that her response, if any, was due by April 13, 2005. As of this date, we have not received such a response. The State has not provided us any response. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2.01 (Vernon 2005).

            We have independently reviewed the record and the brief filed by counsel in this appeal, and we agree there are no arguable issues that would support an appeal in this case. The record clearly demonstrates that Williams' guilty plea was knowingly and voluntarily entered and that she understood the consequences of relinquishing her Fifth Amendment right to remain silent. The range of punishment was explained to Williams, and she acknowledged to the trial court that she understood she faced between two and twenty years' imprisonment if the trial court did not grant community supervision. Williams testified on her own behalf at trial in support of her motion for community supervision; she was, therefore, properly subject to cross-examination by the State regarding the circumstances of her crime and her suitability for community supervision. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 37.07, § 3(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2004–2005) (evidence may be offered by State and defendant as to any matter court deems relevant to sentencing, including prior criminal record, circumstances of offense); Felder v. State, 848 S.W.2d 85, 99 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992) (citing Cantu v. State, 738 S.W.2d 249 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987)). The trial court assessed Williams' punishment at five years, which was within the range provided by our Legislature. See Tex. Pen. Code Ann. § 12.33(a) (Vernon 2003).

            Williams' appellate counsel suggests Williams might have received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial because trial counsel advised Williams to submit the issue of punishment to a judge instead of a jury. The record before us, however, does not shed light on why Williams' trial counsel advised her to submit the issue of punishment to the trial court rather than to a jury. Nor has Williams shown in her brief to this Court that, but for such alleged bad advice from trial counsel, Williams would have received a lesser sentence. See Hernandez v. State, 726 S.W.2d 53, 54–55 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (claims of ineffective assistance must show both deficient performance and resulting prejudice). In the absence of counsel being given an opportunity to explain the basis of such a strategy, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has stated it is error for an intermediate appellate  court  to  sustain  a  claim  of  ineffective  assistance.  See  State  v.  Goodspeed,  No.  PD-1882-03, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 520 (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 6, 2005).

            No reversible error appears in the record before us. We affirm the trial court's judgment.

                                                                                    Josh R. Morriss, III

                                                                                    Chief Justice

Date submitted:          June 3, 2005

Date decided:              July 8, 2005

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