Jennifer Leann Watson v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                                                             ACCEPTED
    01-15-00134-CR
    FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    11/19/2015 8:30:28 PM
    CHRISTOPHER PRINE
    CLERK
    No. 01-15-00134-CR
    ______________________________________________
    FILED IN
    1st COURT OF APPEALS
    IN THE                    HOUSTON, TEXAS
    COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE          11/19/2015 8:30:28 PM
    FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS         CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
    AT HOUSTON                         Clerk
    ______________________________________________
    JENNIFER LEANN WATSON
    VS.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS
    ______________________________________________
    Appealed from the 338th District Court
    of Harris County, Texas
    Cause Number 1363069
    ______________________________________________
    APPELLANT’S BRIEF
    ______________________________________________
    RANDALL J. AYERS
    Attorney for Appellant
    State Bar No. 01465950
    P.O. Box 1569
    Houston, Texas 77251-1569
    rjayerslaw@comcast.net (email)
    (281) 493-6333 (telephone)
    (281) 493-9609 (fax)
    ORAL ARGUMENT WAIVED
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES
    Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(a), a complete list of the names of
    all interested parties is provided below:
    1.     JENNIFER LEANN WATSON – Appellant
    14703 Red Canary Court
    Cypress, Texas 77433-6632
    2.     CHERYL BROWN – Trial Counsel for Appellant
    1314 Texas Avenue, Suite 1201
    Houston, Texas 77002-3525
    3.     RANDALL J. AYERS – Appellate Counsel for Appellant
    P.O. Box 1569
    Houston, Texas 77251-1569
    4.     BRADFORD CROCKER – Trial Counsel for State
    Harris County District Attorney’s Office
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002-1997
    5.     LAUREN BARD – Trial Counsel for State
    Harris County District Attorney’s Office
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002-1997
    6.     ALAN CURRY – Chief Appellate Counsel for State
    Harris County District Attorney’s Office
    1201 Franklin, Suite 600
    Houston, Texas 77002-1997
    7.     HONORABLE BROCK THOMAS – Trial Judge
    338th District Court
    1201 Franklin, 15th Floor
    Houston, Texas 77002-1913
    1
    TABLE OF CONTENTS
    Page
    IDENTIFICATION OF THE PARTIES ………………………..….     1
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ……………………………………..…          3
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ………………        4
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE …………………………………..…          4
    ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW …………………………….        5
    STATEMENT OF FACTS …………………………………………             5
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ………………………………            9
    POINT OF ERROR ONE …………………………………………..           9
    THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REVOKING
    APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR COMMITTING
    THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
    SUBSTANCE WHEN THE EVIDENCE DID NOT PROVE ALL OF
    THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THAT OFFENSE.
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER …..………………………………           14
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE …………………………………..…         15
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ……………………………….         15
    2
    INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
    Page
    Cases
    Cardona v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) …………….. 10
    Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1993) ………………… 10
    Evans v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 158
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) …………… 11, 12
    Hargesheimer v. State, 
    182 S.W.3d 906
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ……… 10
    Herndon v. State, 
    787 S.W.2d 408
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) …………..… 12
    Johnson v. State, 
    943 S.W.2d 83
         (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1997) ……………………………. 
    10 Jones v
    . State, 
    787 S.W.2d 96
          (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1990) ……………………………. 10
    Nheem v. State, 
    129 S.W.3d 696
         (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2004) ……………………………. 11
    Poindexter v. State, 
    153 S.W.3d 402
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) ……..... 11, 12
    Shaw v. State, 
    622 S.W.2d 862
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1981) …….………….. 10
    Wester v. State, 
    542 S.W.2d 403
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) …………..…… 10
    Statutes and Rules
    Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.002(38) ……………………………... 11
    Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.115 ………………………………….. 11
    Tex. Pen. Code §1.07(39) ………………………………………….……. 11
    Tex. R. App. Proc. 38.1(a) …...………………………………………….                       1
    Tex. R. App. Proc. 39.7 ………………………………………………… 4
    3
    STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
    Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 39.7, Appellant waives oral argument.
    STATEMENT OF THE CASE
    Appellant was indicted for possession with intent to deliver a
    controlled substance. (CR 16)1. Appellant pled guilty pursuant to an agreed
    plea bargain with the State for 3 years deferred adjudication community
    supervision and was placed in the Felony Mental Health Court specialized
    caseload. (CR 29-35, 117). The State filed a motion to adjudicate guilt
    alleging Appellant had violated her conditions of community supervision.
    (CR 50-51). Appellant pled not true to allegations in the motion to
    adjudicate. (CR 62-63; RR-V2 12-14)2. After a hearing, the trial court found
    it true that Appellant had violated her community supervision as alleged in
    the motion, adjudicated her guilty, and sentenced her to 6 years in prison.
    (CR 62-63, 120; RR-V2 122-123; RR-V3 19-20). Appellant filed timely
    written notice of appeal. (CR 68-69, 120).
    1
    CR = Clerk’s Record, Volume I of I; RR = Reporter’s Record, Volumes 1 through 4.
    2
    Appellant pled not true on the record at the beginning of the adjudication hearing, as is
    clearly shown in the Reporter’s Record (RR-V2 12-14); however the Clerk’s Judgment
    Adjudicating Guilt incorrectly states that Appellant pled true (CR 62-63).
    4
    ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
    Did the trial court abuse its discretion when it found it true that
    Appellant had violated her community supervision by committing the
    offense of possession of a controlled substance where the evidence was
    insufficient to prove that Appellant intentionally and knowingly possessed
    the controlled substance in question?
    STATEMENT OF FACTS
    At the adjudication hearing, Harris County Deputy Sheriff Jimmie
    Norris testified that in an attempt to locate a suspect wanted on an open
    felony arrest warrant from another county, he and several other deputies
    went to an address in Harris County, Texas, where they had received
    information that the suspect might be found. (RR-V2 39-42). Norris testified
    that when they arrived at the address, they observed the front door of the
    residence standing open, so they announced “Sheriff’s Office” and entered
    the residence. (RR-V2 42-45). Norris testified that they heard voices coming
    from a bedroom in the house, and when they went to investigate, they
    observed Appellant and an adult male asleep on a bed, and two other adult
    females standing next to the bed. (RR-V2 45-48). Norris testified that he
    5
    observed an open purse on the bed next to where Appellant had been
    sleeping, and that inside the purse he could see a smaller “Disney makeup
    bag” that had syringes protruding from it, as well as plastic baggies
    containing a grayish white powder that later tested positive as
    methamphetamine weighing 1.963 grams. (RR-V2 49-52, 70-72). Norris
    testified that Appellant’s identification was subsequently located in a wallet
    found inside the same purse. (RR-V2 52-53). Norris testified that
    Appellant’s four children were in another part of the residence, and that
    when everyone in the residence denied any knowledge or ownership of the
    methamphetamine, Appellant was arrested and charged with possession of
    the methamphetamine. (RR-V2 48-55).
    Chris Hernandez, Appellant’s boyfriend, testified that he was asleep
    alongside of her in the bed when the deputies came into the residence. (RR-
    V2 75-76). Hernandez testified that the other two females in the bedroom
    when the deputies came in were his cousin Jessica Matou and an
    acquaintance named Desiree Haas, and the he knew Desiree Haas to be a
    drug addict who abused, among other things, methamphetamine. (RR-V2
    76-77).   Hernandez    testified   that   he   did   not   believe   that   the
    methamphetamine was Appellant’s, and that when asked by the deputies
    6
    both he and Appellant denied any knowledge of the methamphetamine, as
    did Desiree Hass and his cousin Jessica Matou. (RR-V2 79-82).
    Mileah Alvarez, Appellant’s 14-year old daughter, testified that she
    was also present when the deputies came into the residence, and that it was
    she who had let Desiree Haas, whom she knew as a former baby-sitter and
    acquaintance of her mother, into the residence earlier that day. (RR-V2 86-
    88). Alvarez testified that when Hass arrived, she had noticed that Haas had
    in her possession a “little Mickey Mouse” pencil bag, which Alvarez
    recognized as something that she believed Hass had stolen from her
    previously. (RR-V2 87-88). Alvarez testified that Haas went into the
    bedroom where her mother, Appellant, was asleep. (RR-V2 88-90). Alvarez
    testified that she then went to sleep in her room until the deputies awakened
    her sometime later. (RR-V2 89). Alvarez testified that when the deputies
    asked everyone about the methamphetamine in the Mickey Mouse bag, Haas
    claimed it belonged to Chris Hernandez, and repeatedly stated that she could
    not “take the charge because if I take the charge, my brother will kill me,”
    and that Haas was “real jumpy and real twitchy and real frantic.” (RR-V2
    89-92).
    Appellant testified that she was asleep in bed when the deputies came
    into her residence, and that she did not know that Desiree Haas and Jessica
    7
    Matou were even in her residence as they had arrived after she had gone to
    sleep. (RR-V2 93-101). Appellant testified that she had no knowledge of the
    methamphetamine found inside her purse. (RR-V2 99-100, 106-107).
    Appellant testified that she knew Desiree Haas had a history of drug use,
    including methamphetamine, and that Haas appeared to Appellant to be “on
    drugs” at the time. (RR-V2 101-105). Appellant testified that when asked by
    the deputies Haas denied that the methamphetamine was hers and said it
    belonged to Chris Hernandez, and that when Appellant’s daughter asked
    Haas to tell the deputies whose methamphetamine it really was, Haas stated,
    “Because if I do, my brother will kill me.” (RR-V2 108-109).
    Sheena Poole testified that she was Appellant’s probation officer in
    the Felony Mental Health Court program. (RR-V2 17-19). Poole testified
    that Appellant failed to report as scheduled on four occasions, and failed to
    submit a urine sample on three occasions. (RR-V2 22-25). Poole further
    testified that Appellant was also in arrears on paying various fees and costs
    totaling $154.50. (RR-V2 25-26). Poole testified that for these reasons,
    Appellant had failed to successfully participate in the Felony Mental Health
    Court program. (RR-V2 26).
    8
    SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
    The trial court abused its discretion when it found it true that
    Appellant had violated her community supervision by committing the
    offense of possession of a controlled substance where the evidence did not
    prove that Appellant intentionally and knowingly possessed the controlled
    substance in question.
    POINT OF ERROR ONE
    THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY REVOKING
    APPELLANT’S COMMUNITY SUPERVISION FOR COMMITTING
    THE OFFENSE OF POSSESSION OF A CONTROLLED
    SUBSTANCE WHEN THE EVIDENCE DID NOT PROVE ALL OF
    THE NECESSARY ELEMENTS OF THAT OFFENSE.
    RELEVANT FACTS, AUTHORITIES & ARGUMENT
    In Appellant’s case, the State’s motion to adjudicate guilt alleged that
    Appellant violated the terms and conditions of her community supervision
    by committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance, more
    specifically by:
    “Committing an offense against the State of Texas, to-wit; on or about
    July 15, 2104, in Harris County, Texas, JENNIFER LEANN WATSON,
    hereafter styled the Defendant, did then and there unlawfully intentionally
    and     knowingly      possess    a     controlled     substance,    namely
    METHAMPHETAMINE, weighing more than 1 gram and less than 4 grams
    by aggregate weight, including any adulterants and dilutants.” (CR 50).
    9
    A defendant on deferred adjudication supervision has the right to
    appeal a trial court’s determination to proceed with an adjudication of guilt,
    as well as all proceedings following an adjudication of guilt, in the same
    manner as a revocation of regular community supervision or probation. Tex.
    Code Crim. Proc. Art. 42.12 § 5(b); Hargesheimer v. State, 
    182 S.W.3d 906
    , 910-913 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). The decision on whether or not to
    revoke community supervision rests within the sound discretion of the trial
    court, and will not be reversed on appeal absent abuse of that discretion.
    Wester v. State 
    542 S.W.2d 403
    , 405 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976). The burden of
    proof in a revocation proceeding is on the State, and is measured by a
    preponderance of the evidence. Cobb v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 871
    , 873 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 1993); Shaw v. State, 
    622 S.W.2d 862
    , 863 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1981). The law is clear that the State bears the burden of proving every
    element of an alleged violation of community supervision relied upon for
    revocation. 
    Shaw, 622 S.W.2d at 863
    ; Johnson v. State, 
    943 S.W.2d 83
    , 85
    (Tex. App – Houston [1st Dist.] 1997), citing Jones v. State, 
    787 S.W.2d 96
    ,
    97 (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 1990). When the State fails to meet its
    burden of proving the alleged violation of community supervision, the trial
    court abuses its discretion in revoking that community supervision. Cardona
    v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 492
    , 493-494 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984).
    10
    Thus, in Appellant’s case, the State was required to prove that
    Appellant committed the offense of possession of a controlled substance as
    alleged in the motion to adjudicate. One of the required elements to prove
    possession of a controlled substance is proof that the accused intentionally or
    knowingly possessed the controlled substance. Tex. Health & Safety Code
    §481.115. “Possession” means actual care, custody, control, or management.
    Tex. Health & Safety Code §481.002(38); Tex. Penal Code §1.07(39). In
    order to prove unlawful possession of a controlled substance, the State must
    prove that: (1) the accused exercised actual care, custody, control, or
    management over the substance; and (2) that the accused affirmatively knew
    the matter possessed was contraband. Poindexter v. State, 
    153 S.W.3d 402
    ,
    405-406 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Further, when the accused is not in
    exclusive possession of the place where a controlled substance is found, the
    State must prove additional independent facts and circumstances that
    affirmatively link the accused to the knowing possession of the contraband in
    such a way that it can be concluded that the defendant had actual knowledge
    of the contraband’s existence as well as knowingly exercising actual control
    over it. Evans v. State, 
    202 S.W.3d 158
    , 161-162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006);
    
    Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406
    ; Nhem v. State, 
    129 S.W.3d 696
    , 699-700
    (Tex. App. – Houston [1st Dist.] 2004). Mere presence of the accused at the
    11
    location of the contraband, or even knowledge that someone else is in
    possession of the contraband at the location, does not make the accused a
    party to the possession. Herndon v. State, 
    787 S.W.2d 408
    , 410 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1990). In addition to mere presence, the State must establish sufficient
    “affirmative links” between the accused and the contraband which are more
    than fortuitous. 
    Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161
    . These “affirmative links” are
    necessary to protect the otherwise innocent bystander – a relative, friend,
    spouse, or roommate for example – from conviction based solely upon the
    her fortuitous proximity to someone else’s illegal activities. 
    Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 161
    -162; 
    Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 406
    .
    In Appellant’s case, the record is clear that Appellant was not in
    exclusive control of the residence in which the methamphetamine was
    found. There were three other adults present, and it is undisputed that
    Appellant was asleep when the deputies entered the residence and found the
    purse from which the methamphetamine was recovered. (RR-V2 39-62). It is
    likewise undisputed that two of the other adults present, Desiree Haas and
    Jessica Matou, were both awake and were seen standing next to the bed on
    which the purse was found, and that Deputy Norris saw them “fiddling with
    stuff” … “digging in purses and bags and stuff’ … “just plundering” in the
    vicinity of the bed where the purse was located. (RR-V2 46-49, 56-57).
    12
    Deputy Norris also noticed that both Desiree Haas and Jessica Matou had
    visible needle marks on their arms indicative of drug use, and that Appellant
    did not have any such marks. (RR-V2 60-62). Further, there is testimony in
    the record that Desiree Haas was seen in possession of the “Mickey Mouse”
    bag wherein the methamphetamine was found prior to going into the
    bedroom where Appellant was asleep, and that Haas appeared to be under
    the influence of drugs, and made statements somewhat indicative of guilt.
    (RR-V2 86-92, 103-104, 108-109). It is clear then from the facts and
    circumstances that there is little beyond Appellant’s mere presence to link
    her to the methamphetamine, and in fact more than ample evidence to
    affirmatively link Desiree Haas to the methamphetamine.
    Since the evidence before the trial court was insufficient to prove the
    independent facts and circumstances necessary to affirmatively link
    Appellant to the knowing possession of the methamphetamine in such a way
    that it could be concluded that Appellant had both actual knowledge of the
    methamphetamine’s existence as well as that Appellant knowingly exercised
    actual control over it, and in fact ample evidence to the contrary, the State
    failed to prove a required element of the offense of possession of a
    controlled substance, and thus it was an abuse of discretion for the trial court
    13
    to find that Appellant had violated her community supervision by
    committing the offense of possession of a controlled substance.
    CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
    For the reasons set out in the foregoing point of error, Appellant prays
    that this Honorable Court of Appeals will reverse Appellant’s conviction and
    sentence and remand this case back to the trial court for a new trial or such
    other relief as this Honorable Court deems appropriate.
    Respectfully submitted,
    /s/ Randall J. Ayers
    RANDALL J. AYERS
    Attorney for Appellant
    State Bar No. 01465950
    P.O. Box 1569
    Houston, Texas 77251-1569
    rjayerslaw@comcast.net (email)
    (281) 493-6333 (telephone)
    (281) 493-9609 (fax)
    14
    CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
    I certify that I served the foregoing Appellant’s Brief on the District
    Attorney of Harris County, Texas, by sending a copy to Mr. Alan Curry,
    Chief of the Appellate Division, Harris County District Attorney’s Office,
    via electronic service to curry_alan@dao.hctx.net on November 19, 2015.
    /s/ Randall J. Ayers
    RANDALL J. AYERS
    Attorney for Appellant
    State Bar No. 01465950
    P.O. Box 1569
    Houston, Texas 77251-1569
    rjayerslaw@comcast.net (email)
    (281) 493-6333 (telephone)
    (281) 493-9609 (fax)
    CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
    Pursuant to Rule 9(i)(3) of the Texas Rules of Appellate Procedure I
    certify that this document contains a total of 2,799 words.
    /s/ Randall J. Ayers
    RANDALL J. AYERS
    Attorney for Appellant
    State Bar No. 01465950
    P.O. Box 1569
    Houston, Texas 77251-1569
    rjayerslaw@comcast.net (email)
    (281) 493-6333 (telephone)
    (281) 493-9609 (fax)
    15