Sandra Kay Hargrove v. Gary M. Hargrove ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
03-15-00415-CV
6108044
THIRD COURT OF APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/21/2015 3:40:03 PM
JEFFREY D. KYLE
CLERK
NO. 03-15-00415-CV
FILED IN
3rd COURT OF APPEALS
In the Court of Appeals AUSTIN, TEXAS
9/21/2015 3:40:03 PM
For the Third Judicial District JEFFREY D. KYLE
Clerk
Austin, Texas
SANDRA KAY HARGROVE,
Appellant,
v.
GARY M. HARGROVE
Appellee.
On Appeal from the 27th Judicial District Court,
Cause No. 186,223-A
APPELLANT’S BRIEF
RAY & WOOD
Doug W. Ray
State Bar No. 16599200
2700 Bee Caves Road
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 328-8877 (Telephone)
(512) 328-1156 (Telecopier)
dray@raywoodlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
The following is a complete list of all parties, and the names and
addresses of all counsel of record:
Appellant
Sandra Kay Hargrove
Counsel for Appellants
Doug W. Ray (State Bar No. 16599200)
Ray & Wood
2700 Bee Caves Road, Suite 200
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 328-8877 (Telephone)
(512) 328-1156 (Telecopier)
dray@raywoodlaw.com
Andrea Sheinbein (State Bar No. 24005101)
The Law Office of Andrea Sheinbein, PC
213-A West 8th Street
Georgetown, Texas 78626
(512) 686-3809 (Telephone)
(512) 686-3816 (Telecopier)
andrea@sheinbeinlaw.com
Appellee
Gary M. Hargrove
Counsel for Appellee
Robert O. Harris, III (State Bar No. 09098800)
Law Office of Robert O. Harris, III
404 North Main
Belton, Texas 76513
(254) 690-4800 (Telephone)
(254) 939-2121 (Telecopier)
buck@buckharrislaw.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel i
Table of Contents ii
Index of Authorities iii
Statement of the Case v
Issues Presented vi
Statement of Facts 1
Summary of the Argument 4
Argument 6
I. Standard of Review 6
II. The Divorce Decree Awarded Sandra Spousal
Maintenance 7
III. Sandra is Still Owed Spousal Maintenance 10
Prayer 14
Appellate Rule 9.4(i)(3) Certificate of Compliance 15
Certificate of Service 16
Appendix 17
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
Ammann v. Ammann,
No. 03-09-00177-CV, 2010 WL 4260955 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2010,
no pet.) ...................................................................................................................9
Anderson v. City of Seven Points,
806 S.W.2d 791 (Tex. 1991) ................................................................................6
Bennett v. Grant,
460 S.W.3d 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2015, pet. filed).....................................6
Cadle Co. v. Regency Homes, Inc.,
21 S.W.3d 670 (Tex. App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied) ................................11
Cain v. Bain,
709 S.W.2d 175 (Tex. 1986) ................................................................................7
City of Austin v. Whittington,
384 S.W.3d 766 (Tex. 2012) ................................................................................7
Ex parte Gorena,
595 S.W.2d 841 (Tex. 1979) ....................................................................... 10, 11
Hagen v. Hagen,
282 S.W.3d 899 (Tex. 2009) ................................................................................8
HealthTronics, Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc.,
382 S.W.3d 567 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) ........................................7
Holland v. Holland,
357 S.W.3d 192 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.) .........................................9
Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Double C Coal Co.,
817 F.2d 105, 1987 WL 37258 (6th Cir. 1987) ...................................................8
iii
Matrix, Inc. v. Provident Am. Ins. Co.,
658 S.W.2d 665 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no writ) ......................................11
Milligan v. Niebuhr,
990 S.W.2d 823 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) ........................................8
Ray v. Farmers’ State Bank,
576 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. 1979) ................................................................................7
Seasha Pools, Inc. v. Hardister,
391 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) ....................................6, 7
Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Larue,
367 S.W.2d 162 (Tex. 1963) ..............................................................................11
Thompson v. Thompson,
500 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1973, no writ) ................................8
Ware v. State Dept. of Soc. & Health Services,
157 Wash. App. 1071 (2010) ............................................................................12
Waste Mgmt. of Texas, Inc. v. Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc.,
434 S.W.3d 142 (Tex. 2014) ................................................................................6
Statutes
TEX. FAM. CODE § 8.059(a)(2) ................................................................................11
iv
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant filed a petition to enforce her divorce decree against
Appellee for 1) contempt and an income withholding order for his failure
to pay the full amount of ordered spousal maintenance, 2) contempt for his
failure to pay the full amount of money awarded from an IRA, 3) fraud, 4)
constructive fraud and 5) breach of fiduciary duty/constructive trust. (CR
1:79-89). Appellee filed a general denial and asserted the affirmative
defense of statute of limitations. (CR 1:92-93). After a two-day bench trial
the trial court signed a take-nothing judgment for Appellee on April 7,
2015. (CR 1:98-100; App. 1). Appellant filed a request for findings of fact
and conclusions of law (CR 1:101) and the trial court filed its findings and
conclusions. (CR 1:147-48).
v
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE 1: The trial court erred by concluding that the divorce decree
awarded contractual alimony.
ISSUE 2: The trial court erred by finding that all ordered spousal
maintenance payments had been paid.
vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After forty-three years of marriage Appellee Gary M. Hargrove
(“Gary”) filed a petition for divorce from his wife, Appellant Sandra Kay
Hargrove (“Sandra”). (RR 2:3; 2nd Supp. CR 1:3). The Agreed Final Decree
of Divorce provided:
Spousal Maintenance (Alimony)
The Court finds that Petitioner has agreed to provide Spousal
Maintenance to Respondent. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
Spousal Maintenance is paid as follows . . . GARY M.
HARGROVE shall pay to SANDRA KAY HARGROVE the
amount of $625.00, beginning thirty days after this Decree of
Divorce is signed by the Court and continuing on the same day
of each month thereafter for a period of thirty-six months.
(2nd Supp. CR 1:6-7)
Claiming that she had not received all of the $22,500.00 in spousal
maintenance ordered, Sandra filed an original petition for contempt
seeking the unpaid maintenance payments. (CR 1:8-11). During discovery
Sandra received from Gary carbon copies of checks shown to be written for
maintenance payments along with some deposit slips, cancelled checks and
signed receipts for maintenance payments. (RR 2:47). Sandra also had
available her own bank statements from December 2002 forward showing
those maintenance payments deposited into her account. (RR 3:25-26).
1
Using this information Sandra created a detailed review of these
documents that was admitted without objection. (P. Ex. 6:1-5; RR 3:29).
Under this review the documents showed proof of maintenance payments
through a deposit slip, a cancelled check or a signed receipt for cash of only
$2,875.00 in 2001, $2,075.00 in 2002,1 $4,687.00 in 2003, $4,175.00 in 2004 and
$1,285.00 in 2005. (P. Ex. 6:1-5). Together these sums add up only to
$15,097.00,2 which is $7,403.00 less than the amount the court ordered Gary
to pay in spousal maintenance. Sandra testified that she had received
$7,403.00 less in spousal maintenance from Gary than he was ordered to
pay her. (RR 2:52-53).
Gary did not dispute any of the information regarding the check
carbon copies, deposit slips or signed cash receipts that Sandra put into
evidence pertaining to the spousal maintenance payments. Rather, Gary
simply testified that he had reviewed all of the check carbon copies that
1 The documents showed deposits into Sandra’s account from Gary’s IRA of $990.00 in
November 2001 and $895.35 in January 2002. (P. Ex. 6:1-2). Because Sandra was entitled
to receive 50% of this IRA by the terms of the divorce decree, these deposits do not
constitute payment of spousal maintenance. (2nd Supp. CR 1:5). Also, the calculation for
2002 contains a computational error and says $2,025.00 where it should say $2,075.00.
(P. Ex. 6:2).
2 The exhibit also shows deposits made into Sandra’s account after 2005, but Gary
testified that he made his last spousal maintenance payment in 2005 and any funds
provided after 2005 would have been “when she borrowed money.” (RR 3:36, 45).
2
they had supplied to Sandra’s counsel and that he believed that they added
up to the correct amount. (RR 3:34-35). Gary did not introduce his own
recap or reconciliation of the documents he had turned over in discovery,
or any other exhibit, but simply testified that although he had not paid the
spousal maintenance timely, he believed he had ultimately paid all that
was owed. (RR 3:44-45, 52). This included a $340.00 cash payment that he
claims he made to Sandra without any receipt or evidence that she received
it (RR 3:35, 46), which payment Sandra denied receiving. (RR 3:59).
After a bench trial the trial court signed a judgment stating that the
spousal maintenance in the Agreed Final Decree of Divorce constituted
contractual alimony and that Gary had paid all contractual alimony that
was due. (CR 1:98-100, App. 1:1-3). The trial court repeated these as
findings in its findings of fact. (CR 1:147-48, App. 2:1-2, FOF 5).
3
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Sandra and Gary signed an agreed divorce decree containing a very
simple and unequivocal provision stating that he had agreed to provide
her with “Spousal Maintenance” and that such “Spousal Maintenance”
would be paid at $625.00 a month for three years. The words “contractual
alimony” appear nowhere in the decree, although the term “Spousal
Maintenance” is also defined as “Alimony” for shorthand in the decree.
There is nothing ambiguous about the decree’s award of spousal
maintenance to Sandra. When an unambiguous agreed decree provides for
spousal maintenance, the court’s have no basis for simply declaring that it
is contractual alimony instead. In this case the parties unambiguously
stated that Gary owed Sandra spousal maintenance and the trial court’s
conclusion to the contray is in error and must be reversed.
The trial court’s finding that Gary had paid all $22,500 in spousal
maintenance that was due under the decree is also in error and must be
reversed. Gary turned over all the documents relating to his spousal
maintenance payments and without objection or disagreement Sandra
accounted for each carbon copy of every check, each deposit slip, each
cancelled check and each signed receipt for a cash payment. There was
4
only $15,097.00 in spousal maintenance payments that were supported by
any evidence, because carbon copies of checks are not evidence of
payment. Moreoever, despite Gary’s testimony that the carbon copies of
the checks added up to the correct amount, the undisputed evidence is that
even if the carbon copies were sufficient evidence of payment, the total
amount of payments would still only equal $19,667.00. The evidence
introduced at trial is neither legally nor factually sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding that Gary paid all the spousal maintenance due under
the decree.
5
ARGUMENT
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Findings of fact in a case tried to the court have the same force and
dignity as a jury’s verdict upon questions. ”Anderson v. City of Seven
Points, 806 S.W.2d 791, 794 (Tex. 1991); Seasha Pools, Inc. v. Hardister, 391
S.W.3d 635, 639 (Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.). Accordingly, a “trial
court’s findings are reviewable for legal and factual sufficiency of the
evidence by the same standards that are applied in reviewing evidence
supporting a jury’s answer.” Catalina v. Blasdel, 881 S.W.2d 295, 297 (Tex.
1994); Hardister, 391 S.W.3d at 639.
“A party will prevail on its legal-sufficiency challenge of the evidence
supporting an adverse finding on an issue for which the opposing party
bears the burden of proof if there is a complete absence of evidence of a
vital fact or if the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no more than a
scintilla.” Waste Mgmt. of Texas, Inc. v. Texas Disposal Sys. Landfill, Inc., 434
S.W.3d 142, 156 (Tex. 2014); Bennett v. Grant, 460 S.W.3d 220, 234 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2015, pet. filed). “When a party attacks the factual
sufficiency of the evidence on an adverse finding on an issue upon which
the other party had the burden of proof,” the court must “consider and
6
weigh all the evidence, and . . . set aside the judgment only if it is so
contrary to the overwhelming weight of the evidence as to be clearly
wrong.” HealthTronics, Inc. v. Lisa Laser USA, Inc., 382 S.W.3d 567, 581-82
(Tex. App.—Austin 2012, no pet.) (citing Cain v. Bain, 709 S.W.2d 175, 176
(Tex. 1986) (per curiam)).
Courts “review conclusions of law de novo.” City of Austin v.
Whittington, 384 S.W.3d 766, 788 (Tex. 2012); Hardister, 391 S.W.3d at 639.
However, “a trial court’s designation of items as findings of fact or
conclusions of law is not controlling on appeal, and [the appellate court]
may treat the court’s ruling as a factual finding or legal conclusion
regardless of the label used.” Hardister, 391 S.W.3d at 640 (citing Ray v.
Farmers’ State Bank, 576 S.W.2d 607, 608 n. 1 (Tex. 1979)).
II. THE DIVORCE DECREE AWARDED SANDRA SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
The trial court concluded that the spousal maintenance awarded in
the divorce decree was actually contractual alimony. (App. 2:2). Although
labeled as a finding of fact, this is actually a conclusion of law and based
upon a de novo review this Court should hold that this conclusion was in
error.
7
Courts “interpret divorce decree language as [they] do other
judgments of courts.” Hagen v. Hagen, 282 S.W.3d 899, 901 (Tex. 2009). “If
the decree is unambiguous, the Court must adhere to the literal language
used. If the decree is ambiguous, however, the decree is interpreted by
reviewing both the decree as a whole and the record.” Id. “Whether a
divorce decree is ambiguous is a question of law.” Id. at 901-02. For an
“agreed decree of divorce [courts] interpret its meaning by the rules
relating to the construction of contracts.” Milligan v. Niebuhr, 990 S.W.2d
823, 825 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.). As such, the “court is ‘bound
by the express stated intent of the parties as manifested within the four
corners of the instrument itself.’” Id. (quoting Thompson v. Thompson, 500
S.W.2d 203, 207 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1973, no writ)).
The decree in this case is unambiguous and it clearly requires Gary to
pay Sandra spousal maintenance, not contractual alimony. The heading to
the section of the decree on spousal maintenance is entitled “Spousal
Maintenance (Alimony).” (2nd Supp. CR 1:6). This shows that the parties
intended the word “alimony” to be shorthand for “spousal maintenance”
when used in the decree. See Leasing Serv. Corp. v. Double C Coal Co., 817
F.2d 105, 1987 WL 37258, at *2 (6th Cir. 1987) (unpublished table decision)
8
(“The use of parentheses to enclose a shorthand term in apposition to a
longer term is absolutely standard in both legal and non-legal writing. It is
used in this opinion. It does not create ambiguity.”). This also accords with
how the two terms are used judicially. See, e.g., Ammann v. Ammann, No.
03-09-00177-CV, 2010 WL 4260955, at *1 (Tex. App.—Austin Oct. 28, 2010,
no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Before 1995, the award of post-divorce alimony or
spousal maintenance was held to be impermissible under the statutes and
public policy of Texas.”).
The decree also states explicitly that “Petitioner has agreed to provide
Spousal Maintenance to Respondent. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that
Spousal Maintenance is paid as follows . . . .” (2nd Supp. CR 1:6). The
parties to the decree could have just as easily used other words, such as
“contractual alimony” to define what was being ordered, but they instead
chose the precise term “spousal maintenance” and the term “contractual
alimony” appears nowhere in the decree. These two terms are not
interchangeable and it is error for the trial court to conclude that the
decree’s order for “spousal maintenance” is actually “contractual alimony.”
See Holland v. Holland, 357 S.W.3d 192, 199 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2012, no pet.)
(holding that where agreed decree awarding contractual alimony also
9
provided for an income withholding order to collect the contractual
alimony, the trial “court’s Order of Income Withholding for Spousal
Maintenance was not consistent with the divorce decree and constituted a
material change in the decree” and was therefore in error).
Based upon the foregoing, Sandra respectfully requests the Court to
hold that the trial court erred when it concluded that Gary’s obligation to
her was contractual alimony rather than spousal maintenance as
specifically set out in the decree.
III. SANDRA IS STILL OWED SPOUSAL MAINTENANCE
Sandra sought to enforce the judgment for Gary’s failure to pay the
spousal maintenance she was owed through contempt and a wage
withholding order. Although the decree was an agreed judgment, once
“the agreement of the parties has been approved by the court and made a
part of its judgment, the agreement is no longer merely a contract between
private individuals but is the judgment of the court.” Ex parte Gorena, 595
S.W.2d 841, 844 (Tex. 1979). As such, “’an agreed judgment is accorded the
same degree of finality and binding force as a final judgment rendered at
the conclusion of an adversary proceeding,’ and . . . the agreement is
enforceable as part of the court’s decree if it appears in the recitals and is
10
approved by the court.” Id. (citation omitted) (holding that trial court may
enforce by contempt failure to pay over portion of retirement benefits as
part of property division contained in agreed divorce decree); accord TEX.
FAM. CODE § 8.059(a)(2) (“The court may enforce by contempt against the
obligor . . . an agreement for periodic payments of spousal maintenance
under the terms of this chapter voluntarily entered into between the parties
and approved by the court.”).
When suit is filed to enforce payment under a prior judgment, the
“argument . . . that all or a portion of the judgment [has] been paid” is “an
affirmative defense, as required by Tex. R. Civ. P. 94.” Matrix, Inc. v.
Provident Am. Ins. Co., 658 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1983, no
writ). “[P]ayment is [a] defense on which the defendant has the burden of
proof.” Southwestern Fire & Cas. Co. v. Larue, 367 S.W.2d 162, 163 (Tex.
1963); accord Cadle Co. v. Regency Homes, Inc., 21 S.W.3d 670, 675 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2000, pet. denied). In this case, the evidence
overwhelmingly shows that Gary clearly failed to meet his burden of proof
and the trial court’s finding otherwise must be reversed.
Gary turned over to Sandra’s prior counsel all the evidence of
payment that he had. This included carbon copies of checks, deposit slips,
11
cancelled checks and signed receipts for cash payments. (RR 2:47, 3:34-35).
Sandra took these and listed each and every check number, direct deposit
into her account and signed cash receipt. (P. Ex. 6:1-5). During his
testimony Gary referred to a note book full of carbon check copies that he
did not introduce into evidence, (RR 3:3-34), but he never even hinted that
Sandra had failed to accurately reflect all the documents he had turned
over to her counsel in her evidence to the trial court.
Gary first testified that he believed that the carbon copies of the
checks added up to the correct amount of spousal maintenance. (RR 3:34).
But whether or not the carbons added up to the correct amount is the
wrong question, because the carbon copies of the checks by themselves are
not proof of anything. Although research has not revealed any Texas case
that squarely decides the issue of whether carbon check copies prove
payment, the court in Ware v. State Dept. of Soc. & Health Services, 157 Wash.
App. 1071 (2010) held “that a carbon copy of a check duplicate, without
more, establishes only the writing of a check, but not the fact that the check
was negotiated or that any payment has occurred through the banking
system.”
12
Gary never testified that he gave each check represented by a carbon
copy to Sandra or that she negotiated all the checks that were represented
by a carbon copy. Rather, Gary simply made some blanket statements that
he didn’t believe he owed Sandra any money and had paid what he
believed he owed her (3:44-45, 52). Accordingly, the carbon copies of the
checks are no evidence of payment and the trial court’s finding that all
payments have been made should be reversed.
This would be true even if the carbon copies constituted some
evidence of payment. Taking every payment for which there was some
proof along with all the carbon copies still produces payments totaling less
than the $22,500.00 Gary was ordered to pay undere the decree. The
uncontested evidence shows that there were unsupported carbon copies of
checks totaling $1,600.00 in 2001, $2,820.00 in 2002 and $150.00 in 2003, for
a total of $4,570.00. (P. Exh. 6:1-3). Adding this to the total of $15,097.00 in
payments that are supported by evidence produces total payments of only
$19,667.00, which is $2,833.00 less than what was ordered to be paid.
Accodingly, the evidence is clearly insufficient to support the trial
court’s finding that Gary paid all of the spousal maintenance payments
due. Without contradiction Gary testified that he produced all the
13
documents for his spousal maintenance payments to Sandra’s counsel.
Without contradiction Sandra put into evidence a detailed listing for each
payment claimed by Gary. Even including the check carbon copies, which
are no evidence of payment, the total amount of payments is still less than
what the trial court ordered Gary to pay in spousal maintenance. Under
the evidence in this case the trial court’s finding that Gary paid all of the
spousal maintenance simply has no evidence to support it and is clearly
wrong. This Court should therefore reverse the trial court’s judgment on
Sandra’s claims for spousal maintenance.
PRAYER
Based upon the foregoing, Sandra respectfully requests the Court to
reverse the trial court’s take nothing judgment on her claims for unpaid
spousal maintenance and remand for further proceedings on those claims
and any attorney’s fees for those claims.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY & WOOD
By: ______________________________
Doug W. Ray
State Bar No. 16599200
14
2700 Bee Caves Road, Suite 200
Austin, Texas 78746
(512) 328-8877 (Telephone)
(512) 328-1156 (Telecopier)
dray@raywoodlaw.com
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT
SANDRA KAY HARGROVE
APPELLATE RULE 9.4(I)(3) CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Counsel hereby certifies that this brief was computer generated using
14-point Book Antiqua typeface and that this brief, excluding those
portions enumerated in Appellate Rule 9.4(i)(1), contains 2,800 words,
based upon the word count of the computer program used to generate the
brief.
_________________________________
Doug W. Ray
15
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the above and
foregoing Appellant’s Brief was served through the electronic filing
manager or by email to the following:
Robert O. Harris, III
404 North Main
Belton, Texas 76513
buck@buckharrislaw.com
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
on this the 21st day of September, 2015.
_________________________________
Doug W. Ray
16
NO. 03-15-00415-CV
In the Court of Appeals
For the Third Judicial District
Austin, Texas
SANDRA KAY HARGROVE,
Appellant,
v.
GARY M. HARGROVE
Appellee.
APPENDIX TO APPELLANT’S BRIEF
17
APPENDIX TABLE OF CONTENTS
TAB DOCUMENT
1 Final Judgment
2 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
18
TAB 1
r Il 0RrGrNAr
NO. 186,223-A
l\J
G}
SANDRA KAY HARGROVE $ IN TIIE DISTRICT Gft
V.
$
$ 27TH JUDrC
lir
F;rc+ 'H
J
ilfflF
$ ftr." rs I
GARY M. HARGROVE $ BELL COUNTY, l4r+
ts&r
r 4
fM
lll
ud*
q3
oRDER oN pErrrroN FoR ENFoRCEMENT B4HH
q.r tr
on March 24, 2015 the Court corrsitlerecl the Petition for Enliorc**#, of San# rcav
Hargrove, Petitioner.
Appearances
Petitioner, Sandra Kay Hargrove, appeared in person and thrclugh attorney of record,
Andrea Sheinbein, and announced reacly for trial.
Rcspondent, Gary M. Hargrovc, appeared in person and through attomey of record, Robert
O. I{amis, III, and announced ready for trial.
.lurisdiction
I'he Court, after examining the record and the evidence and argument of counsel, fincls that
it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties in this case. All persons e,titled to
citation were properly citcd.
Record
The record of tcstimony was duly reported by the couft repofter for the 27th Judicial
District Court.
Jury
SCAN
4-r- t r
A jury was waived, and all questions of fact and of law werc submitted to the Court.
, r' -"t
lllllltl ililll t[Iltl llll
Order 0n Petition For Hnforcement Page 1
98
T
Order Subject of Enforcement
The Court finds that on July 17,2001 an order was rendered providing in relevant part as
f-ollows:
All right, title, and interest in and to fifty percent (50%) of the IRA Mutual Funds to date of
divorce after deduction fbr the payrnents of comrnunity debts, penalties and taxes.
The Court finds that Petitioner has agrecd to provide Spousal Maintcnance to Respondent.
IT IS TI'{EREFORE ORDERED that Spousal Maintenance is paid as follows: Amount - Cary M.
Hargrove shall pay to Sandra Kay Hargrove the amount of $625.00, beginning thirty days after this
Decrce ol Divorce is signed by the Court and continuirrg on thc same clay of each rnonth thereafter
tbr a period of thirty-six rnonths.....
ITindings
The Court finds that the spousal maintenance/alirnony clescribecl on page 4 to page 6 of the
Agreed Final Decree of Divorce that was rendcred in this Court on July 17,2001 is contractual
alimony and rrot Spousal Maintenance as describeil in Chapter I of the Texas Farnily Code. The
Coutt finds that Gary M. Hargrove has cornpliecl with the terms of the contractual alimony as
described on pages 4 to 6 in the Agreed Final Dccree Of Divorce and that all cgntractual alimoly
has been paid to Sandra Kay Hargrove.
'fhe Court further finds that the IRA Mutual Funcls
have been divided and paid.
The Court further finds that all costs of court are to be paid by thc party incurring the cost.
Reliel'Denied
IT IS ORDERED that all relief requestecl is hereby denied and that all rcquests for
attomey's fces, cttutt costs and contempt against Cary M. Hargrove are also denicd.
Order On Petition For Enforcement -p-ag*
Z
99
I
SIGNED on APR 0 7 2015
0rder 0n Petition For Enforcement page 3
100
TAB 2
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CONTAINS SENSITIVE DATA
CONTAINS SENSITIVE DATA r +
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NO.186,223~A
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NO. [86,223-A' t- ,,-
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SANDRA I(AY HARGROVE
SANDRA KAY HARGROT/E §$ IN
§$
THE DISTRICT
NVTHE C ffE
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v.v. §$ 27TH
27THJUDICIAL
JIJDTCTAL DIS
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§$
GARY M.
GARY M. HARGROVE
TIARGROVE g
§ BELL
BErL COUNTY,
COUNTY, TEXAS
TEI(AS
Findings
Findinqs of Frct aDd
of Fact and Conclusions
Conclusione of
of Law
Law
In response
In responsc to
to the
the request of Petitioner,
requcsr of Petitioner, Sandra
Sandra Kay
Kay Hargrove,
Hargrove, the
the Court
Coqrt makes
mskes and
and files
files
the following as
the following original Findings
as original of Fact
Findings of Fact and
and Conclusions
Conclusions of
of Law
Law in
in accordance
acc.ordflnce with
with rules
rules 296
29d
and 297
and ofthe
297 of Tcxas Rules
the Texas of Civil
Rulcs of procedwe.
Civil Procedure.
Findingt ofF
Findings act -- Divorce
of Fact Divorce Decree
Decree
l.
1. Sandra Kay Hargrove,
Sandra Kay Hargrove, Petitioner,
Petitioner, and
and Gary
Gary M.
M. Hargrove,
Hargrove, Respondent,
Respondent, Were
wero
divorced on
divorced JuIy 17,2001.
on July 17, 2001.
7.
2. Thc Agreed
The Agreed Final Decree of Divorce
Divorcc awarded
awarded Sandra Kay
Kay Hargrove
Hugrove All
All right,
right,
title, interest in
and interest
title, and and to fifty percent (50%) of
in and of the IRA
IRA Mutqal
Mutual Funds date of
Funds to datc divorce afier
of divorcc after
dcdrrction
deduction for the paymcnrs
for the payments of
of community
community debts, penaltics
penalties and
and taxcs.
tax.es.
3.
3. The Agreed Final
The Agreed Decree of Divorce
Final Decrce Divorce ordered Gary M.
ordered Gary M. llargrove
Hargrove to
to make
make
payments of
paymcnts of Spousal Maintenance to
Spousal Maintenance to Sandra Kay Hargrove
Sandra Kay Hargrove the
the amount
amount of
of $625.00,
$625.00, bcgir:ning
beginning
thirty
thirty days
days after
after this
this Decrcc
Decree of
ofDivorce
Divorce isis signed
signed by
by rhe
the Court
Court and
and continuing
continuing on
on the same day
the same day of
of
each
each month
month therca.fter
thereafter for
for aaperiod ofthixty-six
period of thirty-six months.
months.
Findings of
Findings FacI -- Division
ofFacr Division of the Marital
ofthe Marital Esrarc
Estale
4'
4. The corut
Thc Court finds
finds that the IRA
that the IRA Mutual
Mutual Funds have been
Fundshave divided and
been divided tlnd paid
paid to
to Sendra
Sandra
Hargrove
Hargroveby
byGary
GaryHargrove
Hargroveininaccordance
accordancewirh thetcrms
withthe termsofofthc
theFinal
Final Decree
Decreeof Divorce.
ofDivorce.
Findings
FindingsofofFacr*- Spousat
Fact Spousal Maintenance
Maintenance
Findings Fact&& Couct,.rious
FindingsofofFect oiffi
CODcJusions of Law PageI1ofz
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5.
5. The Court finds
The Court the spousal mainIenance/alimony
finds that the on Page
describcd on
mainrenance/alirnony described 4 to
Page 4
Page 5 of
Pagc 6 of the
thc Agreed Decree of Divorce that was rendered
Agrecd Final Decree rcndered in this Court on July t7, 2001
July 17, 2001 is
is
contractual alimony and not Spousal Maintenance
Maintcnance as described Chaptcr 8I of the Texas
dcscribcd in Chapter Tcxas Family
Code. The Court
Code. Conrt finds that Gary
Oary M. complicd with the telms
M. Hargrove has complied terms of the contractual
alimony as
alimony as described on
on pages 4 to
pagcs 4 in the
to 66 in Final Decree
Agrced Final
the Agreed Decrcc Of Divorce
Divorce and dl
that all
and that
conhactual alimony has been paid to Sandra Kay Hargrove.
contractual
Findings
Findingsof Fact as
olPact as Conclusions
Conclusions of
of Law
Lmt,
6.
6. Any rmding
Any finding of fact that lew shall be
is aa conclusion of law
thnt is decmed aa conclusion
bc deemed conclusion of
law.
Conclusions
Conclusions of
of Law Division 0/
Lm+ - Division Marital Estate
of Marital Estate - Reimbursement
Reimbursement
7.
7. The request
The to enforce
request to the Final
cnforce the Final Decree Divorce as
Decrce of Divorce plead are
as plead are denied
dcnicd in
accordance
sccordance with the
the findings of the Respondent, Gary Hargrove, has
the Court that Respondent, wittr
has complied with
the thc final
tcrms of the
the tenns Final Decree Divorcc and
Decree of Divorce no monies·
and no monies' are
arc owed to satisfy
owed to the obligations
saflsry the obligations
prior order.
contained in the prior
SIONED on
SIGNED JUL t $ 2015
JUL 13 2015
-----------------------------
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Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Lrw
of Law Page 2 of2
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