City of Houston v. Randall Kallinen ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-12-00050-CV
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
12/9/2015 5:34:23 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
No. 01-12-00050-CV
FILED IN
______________________________________________________________
1st COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
12/9/2015 5:34:23 PM
In the Court of Appeals for the
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
First District of Texas at Houston Clerk
______________________________________________________________
CITY OF HOUSTON,
Appellant
V.
RANDALL KALLINEN AND PAUL KUBOSH,
Appellees
______________________________________________________________
On Appeal from the 295th District Court of Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 2008-75633
Honorable Caroline Baker, Presiding Judge
______________________________________________________________
Supplemental Brief of Appellant
______________________________________________________________
Donna L. Edmundson Fernando De Leon
City Attorney Senior Assistant City Attorney
SBN: 24025325
Judith L. Ramsey CITY OF HOUSTON LEGAL
Chief, General Litigation Section DEPARTMENT
900 Bagby Street, 4th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
832.393.6491 (telephone)
832.393.6259 (facsimile)
fernando.deleon2@houstontx.gov
Attorneys for Appellant
Oral Argument Requested
Identity of Parties and Counsel
Appellant: Trial & Appellate Counsel:
City of Houston Judith L. Ramsey
Fernando De Leon
CITY OF HOUSTON LEGAL DEPARTMENT
900 Bagby Street, 4th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
832.393.6491 (telephone)
832.393.6259 (facsimile)
judith.ramsey@houstontx.gov
fernando.deleon2@houstontx.gov
Appellees: Trial & Appellate Counsel:
Randall Kallinen Joseph R. Larsen
and Paul Kubosh SEDGWICK LLP
1200 Smith Street, Suite 1600
Houston, Texas 77002
832.426.7020 (telephone)
877.527.1451 (facsimile)
joseph.larsen@sedgwicklaw.com
David A. Furlow
LAW OFFICE OF DAVID A. FURLOW, P.C.
4126 Rice Boulevard
Houston, Texas 77005
713.202.3931 (telephone)
866.382.0147 (facsimile)
dafurlow@gmail.com
ii
Table of Contents
Page
Identity of Parties and Counsel ..................................................................... ii
Index of Authorities ................................................................................... vii
Record and Appendix Reference Key ........................................................... x
Statement of the Case .................................................................................. xi
Statement Regarding Oral Argument .......................................................... xii
Issues Presented ......................................................................................... xii
Introduction and Overview........................................................................... 1
Statement of Facts........................................................................................ 2
A. Only Kallinen submits TPIA Requests to City............................. 2
B. City releases 82% of requested documents. .................................. 2
C. Appellees sue City. .................................................................... 3
D. Appellees ensure Attorney General does not rule on City’s
proper request. ........................................................................... 4
E. Trial court grants partial summary judgment to Appellees;
City releases all documents held not excepted from
disclosure. ................................................................................. 4
F. Trial court holds attorney fees hearing; enters final judgment
for Appellees. ............................................................................ 5
G. City files plea and new trial motion contesting jurisdiction
and fee award. ........................................................................... 6
H. Trial court modifies judgment, dismisses Kubosh, awards
fees only to Kallinen .................................................................. 6
I. This Court rules for City; Texas Supreme Court disagrees. .......... 8
iii
Summary of Argument................................................................................. 8
Argument .................................................................................................. 11
I. The trial court erred by denying the City’s plea and otherwise had
no subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellees’ claims. ......................... 11
A. The trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction because
Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were
not justiciable. ......................................................................... 11
1. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims
were no longer justiciable at the time of final judgment
because they were mooted when the City, prior to
final judgment, produced all withheld documents that
the trial court ordered the City to disclose. ....................... 11
2. As a result, the trial court had no subject-matter
jurisdiction because Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and
attorney fee claims were not justiciable at the time of
final judgment. ............................................................... 13
B. The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction
because all Appellees’ claims are barred by immunity. ............... 15
1. Appellees’ TDJA claims are barred by immunity
because they are redundant and duplicative of their
TPIA claims. .................................................................. 15
2. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus claims are also barred by
immunity because the TPIA does not waive the City’s
immunity and the only proper defendant for such
claims is the pertinent public information officer. ............. 17
3. Appellees’ TDJA claims are likewise barred by
immunity because the TDJA also does not waive the
City’s immunity and the only proper defendant for
such claims is the pertinent public information officer. ..... 20
4. As a result, the trial court also had no subject-matter
jurisdiction because all Appellees’ claims are barred by
immunity. ...................................................................... 21
iv
II. The trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to Appellees
because there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support
any award of fees to them. ................................................................. 22
A. Kallinen was not entitled to any award of attorney fees
because he did not actually incur any attorney fees—as
Kubosh incurred all the claimed fees. ........................................ 22
B. Appellees were not entitled to any award of attorney fees
because they failed to properly segregate recoverable
(alleged) fees from non-recoverable (alleged) fees. ..................... 24
C. Appellees offered no evidence or insufficient evidence to
support the amount of the award of attorney fees. ..................... 25
III. The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction over
Kubosh’s claims; Kubosh’s TPIA mandamus and attorney fee
claims were never justiciable due to lack of ripeness and standing
because he never submitted any TPIA request to the City. .................. 28
Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................... 29
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................... 30
Certificate of Service .................................................................................. 31
Appendix
A. Order on Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment (dated October 12, 2009)
(CR.582)
B. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
and No-Evidence Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on
Conceded Documents (dated October 12, 2009) (CR.583-85)
C. Order (dated December 8, 2009) (CR.931-32)
D. Order on City’s Motion to Strike Paul Kubosh (dated March 1,
2010) (CR.969)
E. Final Judgment (dated October 12, 2011) (CR.1094-95)
v
F. Order (dated January 5, 2012) (CR.1208)
G. Amended Final Judgment (dated July 12, 2012) (CR[2].17-18)
H. First Court of Appeals Judgment and Opinion (dated August 29,
2013)
I. Supreme Court Judgment and Opinion (dated March 20, 2015)
J. Order for Supplemental Briefing On Remand
vi
Index of Authorities
Page(s)
Cases
A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp,
904 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1995) ................................................................... 18
BHP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Millard,
800 S.W.2d 838 (Tex. 1990) ................................................................... 16
Bonham State Bank v. Beadle,
907 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. 1995) ................................................................... 15
Chenault v. Phillips,
914 S.W.2d 140 (Tex. 1996) ................................................................... 15
City of El Paso v. Heinrich,
284 S.W.3d 366 (Tex. 2009) ........................................................ 18, 19, 20
City of Houston v. Kallinen,
414 S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013), rev’d, 462
S.W.3d 25 (Tex. 2015) ............................................................................ xi
City of Houston v. Texan Land & Cattle Co.,
138 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.) ............ 16
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman,
252 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2008) ................................................................... 14
Guthrie v. Garcia,
352 S.W.3d 307 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.) . 18, 19, 20
Int’l Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P.,
295 S.W.3d 650 (Tex. 2009) ................................................................... 12
Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings,
351 S.W.3d 290 (Tex. 2011) ........................................................ 16, 17, 23
Kallinen v. City of Houston,
462 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. 2015)...................................................................... xi
vii
M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. Novak,
52 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2001)..................................................................... 13
MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co.,
292 S.W.3d 660 (Tex. 2009) ................................................................... 16
Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia,
253 S.W.3d 653 (Tex. 2008) ................................................................... 21
Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation,
469 S.W.3d 69 (Tex. 2015)..................................................................... 16
Patterson v. Planned Parenthood of Houston,
971 S.W.2d 439 (Tex. 1998) ................................................................... 14
Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v. Settlement Funding, LLC,
358 S.W.3d 777 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.) ............ 24
Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas,
197 S.W.3d 371 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................... 21
State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez,
891 S.W.2d 243 (Tex. 1994) ................................................................... 14
Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd.,
852 S.W.2d 440 (Tex. 1993) ........................................................ 13, 14, 15
Tex. Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Holmes,
294 S.W.3d 328 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet. denied) .......................... 20
Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones,
8 S.W.3d 636 (Tex. 1999) ...................................................................... 21
Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy,
74 S.W.3d 849 (Tex. 2002)..................................................................... 21
Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman,
408 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.)................. 11, 12, 13, 16
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa,
212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................... 24
viii
Williams v. Lara,
52 S.W.3d 171 (Tex. 2000)................................................................ 14, 15
Constitution and Statutes
Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5 ................................................................................. x
Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034 ......................................................................... 21
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.003 .................................................................... 18, 28
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221 ......................................................................... 17
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.321 .................................................................... 18, 28
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.323 .............................................................. 11, 22, 26
Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 9.008 ....................................................................... x
ix
Record and Appendix Reference Key
All record and appendix items are cited as follows:
“CR.[page]” Clerk’s Record (filed January 26, 2012).
“CR[1].[page]” 1st Supplemental Clerk’s Record (filed June 6,
2012).
“CR[2].[page]” 2nd Supplemental Clerk’s Record (filed August 17,
2012).
“CR[3].[page]” 3rd Supplemental Clerk’s Record (filed April 12,
2013).
“CR[4].[page]” [4th] Supplemental Clerk’s Record (filed June 5,
2013, but without designation as the “4th”
supplement).
“RR[1].[page]” Reporter’s Record of October 6, 2010 trial court
hearing on Appellees’ attorney fee claim.
“RR[2].[page]” Reporter’s Record of the December 12, 2011 trial
court hearing on the City of Houston’s motion for
new trial and plea to the jurisdiction.
“Ex. [number or letter]” Exhibits to a specified Reporter’s Record.
“App. [letter]” Items in the attached Appendix.
x
Statement of the Case
Nature of the case: Randall Kallinen [Kallinen] and Paul Kubosh
[Kubosh] sued the City of Houston [City]1 seeking
mandamus relief under the Texas Public Information
Act [TPIA] to compel release of documents and
declaratory relief under the Texas Declaratory
Judgment Act [TDJA] to declare that release is
required. CR.2-8, 30-38.
Course of proceedings: Kallinen and Kubosh [Appellees] filed a motion for
partial summary judgment. CR.648-54. On October
12, 2009, the trial court granted in part and denied in
part Appellees’ motion and ordered the City to
disclose certain documents. CR.582-85; App. A;
App. B. On October 12, 2011, the court entered a
final judgment reiterating its summary judgment
ruling and awarding attorney fees to Appellees
jointly. CR.1094-95; App. E.
The City filed a motion for new trial and plea to the
jurisdiction. CR.1103-47. On January 5, 2012, the
trial court denied the City’s plea and granted in part
and denied in part the City’s motion. CR.1208;
App. F.2
1
The City is a Texas home-rule city operating under a municipal charter pursuant to Article
XI, Section 5, of the Texas Constitution. See Tex. Const. art. XI, § 5. In accordance with
Section 9.008(b) of the Texas Local Government Code, the City respectfully requests this
Court to take judicial notice of its published charter and status thereunder as a home-rule
city. See Tex. Loc. Gov’t Code § 9.008(b).
2
In its original brief in this appeal (prior to the Supreme Court’s ruling), the City addressed
issues relating to the trial court’s original final judgment in an abundance of caution given
that it did learn that the trial court entered a modified final judgment until the day it filed its
original appeal brief. Although the modified final judgment is at issue here, the City
addresses issues relating to Kubosh also in an abundance of caution in the event that this
Court’s September 3, 2015 order (App. J) allowing supplemental briefing by the parties does
not contemplate the filing of a responsive brief by the City to Appellees’ supplemental brief.
In addition, for the same reason, to the extent that any of the City’s arguments as to
Kallinen also apply to Kubosh, the City addresses those arguments as to Appellees.
xi
Trial court disposition: On July 12, 2012, the trial court entered a modified
final judgment dismissing Kubosh due to lack of
standing and awarding attorney fees only to
Kallinen. CR[2].17-18; App. G. The City timely
appealed. CR.1213-14; CR[5].29-30.
Prior judgments by this This Court reversed the trial court’s order denying
Court and Supreme the City’s plea and rendered judgment dismissing
Court: Appellees’ claims against the City for want of
jurisdiction. See City of Houston v. Kallinen, 414
S.W.3d 815 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013),
rev’d, 462 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. 2015); App. H. The
Texas Supreme Court reversed this Court’s judgment
and remanded to this Court for further proceedings
in accordance with its opinion. See Kallinen v. City of
Houston, 462 S.W.3d 25 (Tex. 2015); App. I.
Current procedural On September 3, 2015, this Court entered an order
posture: allowing the parties to file supplemental briefing to
aid this Court’s consideration of the issues on
remand. App. J.
Statement Regarding Oral Argument
The City respectfully requests that the Court hear oral argument in this
appeal to allow the parties an opportunity to simplify and focus the issues for
the Court’s consideration.
Issues Presented
The trial court erred in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and
motion for new trial for the following reasons:
xii
1. The trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over
Appellees’ claims.
a. The trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over
Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims because
they were no longer justiciable at the time of final judgment;
they were mooted when the City, prior to final judgment,
produced to Kallinen all withheld documents that the trial
court ordered the City to disclose.
b. The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction
because all Appellees’ claims are barred by immunity.
i. Appellees’ TDJA claims are barred by immunity because
they are redundant and duplicative of their TPIA claims.
ii. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus claims are also barred by
immunity because the TPIA does not waive the City’s
immunity and the only proper defendant for such claims
is the pertinent public information officer.
iii. Appellees’ TDJA claims are likewise barred by immunity
because the TDJA likewise also does not waive the City’s
immunity and the only proper defendant for such claims
is the pertinent public information officer.
2. The trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to Appellees
because there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to
support any award of fees to them.
a. Kallinen was not entitled to any award of attorney fees
because he did not actually incur any attorney fees—as
Kubosh incurred all the claimed fees.
b. Appellees offered no evidence or insufficient evidence to
support the amount of the award of attorney fees.
3. The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction over
Kubosh’s claims; Kubosh’s TPIA mandamus and attorney fee
claims were never justiciable due to lack of ripeness and
xiii
standing because he never submitted any TPIA request to the
City.
xiv
Introduction and Overview
After the City released most of the documents that Kallinen requested
relating to the City’s red light traffic camera system under the TPIA, Appellees
sued the City seeking mandamus relief (as well as attorney fees) under the
TPIA to compel disclosure of documents that the City withheld based on
TPIA disclosure exceptions. They filed their suit against the City, not a City
official. They also sought redundant and duplicative declaratory relief (as well
as attorney fees) under the TDJA to declare that disclosure is required. Kubosh
joined the suit despite the fact that only Kallinen submitted any TPIA request
to the City.
In late 2009, the trial court ruled on the TPIA exceptions asserted by the
City, and the City immediately complied by producing all documents that the
trial court ruled were not excepted from disclosure. In late 2011, the trial court
entered a final judgment which included an attorney fee award jointly to
Appellees. Later, in mid-2012, after the City filed a motion for new trial and
plea to the jurisdiction, the trial court entered modified final judgment
dismissing Kubosh for lack of standing and awarding attorney fees only to
Kallinen.3 But as a result of the City’s production of all documents that the trial
3
In its original brief in this appeal, given that it did not learn that the trial court entered a
modified final judgment until the day it filed that brief, the City addressed issues relating to
court ordered the City to disclose, Kallinen’s claims were all rendered moot
prior to final judgment and he was entitled to no attorney fee award. As a
result, all Kallinen’s claims should be dismissed for lack of subject matter
jurisdiction and the fee award to him should be reversed and rendered in the
City’s favor.
Statement of Facts
A. Only Kallinen submits TPIA Requests to City.
In November and December 2008, Kallinen submitted four email
requests to the City pursuant to the TPIA requesting release of documents
relating to the City’s red light traffic camera system. CR.41-48. Kubosh did not
submit to the City any TPIA request for documents. CR.75, 194, 322, 607,
674, 746-47, 920, 1001; CR[1].139, 258, 262; RR[1].28, 54. Kallinen’s requests
did not mention or reference Kubosh. CR.41-48.
B. City releases 82% of requested documents.
The City released approximately 3,235 pages of documents to Kallinen
pursuant to his requests (about 82% of all responsive documents). CR.398,
the trial court’s original final judgment in an abundance of caution. Although the modified
final judgment is at issue here, the City addresses issues relating to Kubosh also in an
abundance of caution in the event that this Court’s September 3, 2015 order allowing
supplemental briefing by the parties does not contemplate the filing of a reply brief by the
City. In addition, for the same reason, to the extent that any of the City’s arguments as to
Kallinen would also apply to Kubosh, the City addresses those arguments as to both.
2
541-68, 586, 746, 825, 883, 890, 901, 908, 1054, 1071. The City withheld only
about 700 pages of documents based primarily on TPIA disclosure exceptions
for materials protected by the deliberative process privilege and attorney-client
privilege. CR.398, 586, 746, 825, 883, 890, 901, 908, 1054, 1071. The City also
timely requested a ruling by the Texas Attorney General on application of the
exceptions. CR.75, 80, 81-83, 86-91, 194, 199-202, 205-10, 321, 326-29, 334-
39, 399, 421-27, 587, 607, 746-47, 867, 919-20, 1054, 1071.
C. Appellees sue City.
On December 26, 2008, both Appellees sued the City seeking mandamus
relief under the TPIA to compel disclosure of all the documents that Kallinen
sought in his four requests to the City and declaratory relief under the TDJA to
declare that disclosure is required. CR.2-8, 30-38. Appellees filed suit: (1) less
than two weeks after Kallinen’s fourth request to the City, (2) before the City
completed all its submissions to the Attorney General supporting TPIA
exceptions for the withheld documents, (3) before the Attorney General had an
opportunity to complete its review of the City’s submissions and issue its
ruling, and (4) despite the fact that Kubosh never requested any documents
from the City. CR.2-8, 30-38, 41-48, 75, 80-83, 86-91, 176-77, 194, 199-202,
205-10, 321, 326-29, 334-39, 341-42, 399, 421-27, 429-34, 587, 607, 746-47,
867, 919-20, 1054, 1071, 1110-11, 1135-36, 1139-42, 1186-87.
3
D. Appellees ensure Attorney General does not rule on City’s proper
request.
On January 30, 2009, Appellees (through their counsel) sent an email to
the Attorney General’s office requesting that it decline to issue a ruling, despite
the City’s proper request, based on the pendency of their recently-filed lawsuit
against the City. CR.399, 428-30, 1110, 1135-36. On December 16, 2008, and
January 8, 2008, the Attorney General sent letters to the City declining to issue
any ruling and instead deferring to the trial court to decide whether the
withheld documents were excepted from disclosure under the TPIA. CR.176-
77, 341-42, 399, 431-34, 1110-11, 1139-42, 1186-87.
E. Trial court grants partial summary judgment to Appellees; City
releases all documents held not excepted from disclosure.
On September 14, 2009, Appellees filed a motion for partial summary
judgment arguing that the withheld documents were not excepted from
disclosure. CR.615, 648-54. On September 28, 2009, the City filed a response.
CR.398-541. On October 2, 2009, Appellees filed a reply. CR.569-74. On
October 12, 2009, the trial court entered two orders granting in part and
denying in part Appellees’ motion for summary judgment and ordering the
City to disclose some of the withheld documents. CR.582-85; App. A; App. B.
The City then immediately disclosed to Appellees all withheld documents that
the trial court ordered the City to disclose. CR.1104.
4
F. Trial court holds attorney fees hearing; enters final judgment for
Appellees.
On November 16, 2009, Appellees filed a motion for entry of judgment
and award of attorney fees. CR.659-67. On December 3, 2009, the City filed a
response. CR.882-920. On December 8, 2009, the trial court entered an order
reiterating its October 12, 2009 ruling and stating that Appellees’ attorney fee
claim would be heard at the January 2010 trial setting (which was postponed
several times). CR.925, 931-32, 940-41; App. C.4
On November 20, 2009, the City filed a motion to strike Kubosh as a
party-plaintiff on the ground that he has no standing to seek relief as a TPIA
“requestor” because he never actually submitted to the City any request for
documents. CR.746-50. On November 25, 2009, Appellees filed a response.
CR.810-14. On December 30, 2009, Appellees filed a supplemental response.
CR.935-37. On March 1, 2010, the trial court entered an order denying the
City’s motion to strike Kubosh. CR.969; App. D.
On October 6, 2010, the trial court held a hearing on Appellees’ attorney
fee claim against the City. RR[1]. On October 12, 2011, the court entered a
4
Judge Tracy Christopher presided over all trial court proceedings below until December
2009 when she was appointed as a Justice of the Fourteenth Court of Appeals. After Judge
Christopher entered the December 8, 2009 order, Judge Caroline Baker presided over all
subsequent trial court proceedings below.
5
final judgment again reiterating its October 12, 2009 ruling and awarding
attorney fees to Appellees jointly. CR.1094-95; App. E.
G. City files plea and new trial motion contesting jurisdiction and fee
award.
On November 10, 2011, the City filed a motion for new trial and plea to
the jurisdiction. CR.1103-47. On December 8, 2011, Appellees filed a
response. CR.1151-61. On December 12, 2011, the trial court held a hearing
on the City’s new trial motion and plea. RR[2]. On January 5, 2012, the court
entered an order granting in part and denying in part the City’s new trial
motion and denying the City’s plea. CR.1208; App. F. The court granted the
City’s new trial motion only as to the attorney fee award to Kubosh and denied
the remainder of the motion. CR.1208; App. F. The parties subsequently filed
motions seeking clarification of the trial court’s ruling. CR[1].2-5, 44-122, 257-
60. But in an abundance of caution, on January 12, 2012, the City filed a
notice of appeal. CR.1213-14.
H. Trial court modifies judgment, dismisses Kubosh, awards fees only to
Kallinen
On March 9, 2012, Appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of the
trial court’s ruling on the City’s new trial motion as to the award of attorney
fees to Kubosh or (alternatively) for severance as to Kubosh so that the
judgment as to Kallinen may become final and appealable. CR[1].2-5. On
6
April 12, 2012, the City filed a response. CR[1].44-122. The City also filed a
motion seeking (alternatively) entry of judgment awarding no attorney fees to
any Appellee. CR[1].44-122. On May 4, 2012, Appellees filed a supplemental
motion for reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling on the City’s new trial
motion as to the award of attorney fees to Kubosh or (alternatively) for entry of
an amended final judgment and order reflecting dismissal as to Kubosh.
CR[1].257-60. On May 24, 2012, the City filed a response. CR[2].2.
On July 12, 2012, the trial court entered a modified final judgment ruling
that Kubosh has no standing and awarding him no attorney fees. CR[2].17-18;
App. G. On July 24, 2012, the City filed a request for findings of fact and
conclusion of law. CR[2].19-20. On August 10, 2012, the City filed a motion
for new trial as to the trial court’s amended final judgment. CR[2].21-33. On
August 15, 2012, Appellees filed proposed findings of fact and conclusion of
law. CR[2].36-41. On August 17, 2012, the City filed a notice of past due
findings of fact and conclusion of law. CR[3].26-27.
On September 19, 2012, in an abundance of caution, the City filed
another notice of appeal as to the trial court’s amended final judgment.
CR[3].29-30. On October 3, 2012, Appellees also filed a notice of appeal notice
of appeal as to the trial court’s amended final judgment. CR[4].3-4. On
7
February 6, 2013, the trial court issued findings of fact and conclusion of law
relating to the award of attorney fees to Kallinen. CR[4].5-6.
I. This Court rules for City; Texas Supreme Court disagrees.
On August 29, 2013, this Court reversed the trial court’s order denying
the City’s plea and rendered judgment that Appellees claims against the City
are dismissed for want of jurisdiction. App. H. On March 20, 2015, the
Supreme Court reversed this Court’s judgment and remanded to this Court for
further proceedings in accordance with its opinion. App. I. Both this Court’s
and the Supreme Court’s rulings focused on the City’s argument regarding
whether the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction over Appellees’ claims
before the Attorney General ruled on the City’s request for decision on the
documents it withheld based on TPIA disclosure exceptions—and did not
address other arguments raised by the City. App. H; App. I.5
Summary of Argument
First, Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were not
justiciable. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were no longer
5
For the Court’s convenience, the City includes in this brief arguments (infra, pp. 17-28) that
were raised in its original appeal brief in the event the Court prefers to have one brief
containing all the City’s arguments not addressed by this Court’s and the Supreme Court’s
rulings.
8
justiciable at the time of final judgment because they were mooted when, prior
to final judgment, the City produced to Kallinen all withheld documents that
the trial court ordered the City to disclose, obviating any justiciable
controversy regarding entitlement to mandamus relief or attorney fees. The
trial court therefore had no subject matter jurisdiction at the time it entered its
modified final judgment because Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee
claims were no longer justiciable at that time due to mootness.
Second, Appellees’ claims against the City are barred by governmental
immunity, which defeats subject matter jurisdiction, for several reasons.
Appellees’ TDJA claims are barred by immunity because they are redundant
and duplicative of their TPIA claims. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus claims are
also barred by immunity because the TPIA does not waive the City’s immunity
and the only proper defendant for such claims is the pertinent public
information officer. Appellees’ TDJA claims are likewise barred by immunity
because the TDJA likewise does not waive immunity and the only proper
defendant for such claims is the pertinent public information officer. The trial
court therefore had no subject matter jurisdiction because Appellees’ claims
against the City are barred by governmental immunity.
Third, there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support any
award of attorney fees to Appellees. Kallinen was not entitled to any award of
9
attorney fees because he did not actually incur any fees—as Kubosh, who was
not a “requestor” and therefore had no justiciable claim on which to sue,
incurred all the claimed fees. In addition, Appellees offered no evidence or
insufficient evidence to support the amount of the attorney fee award. The trial
court therefore also erred by awarding attorney fees to Appellees because they
failed to satisfy their burden to support any award of fees.
Finally, although the trial court ultimately dismissed Kubosh and his
claims, the City nonetheless also addresses those claims here in the event that
it does not have the opportunity to file a reply brief. Kubosh’s TPIA
mandamus and attorney fee claims were never justiciable due to lack of
ripeness and standing because he never actually submitted any TPIA request to
the City, obviating any status as a TPIA “requestor” authorized to file suit.
The trial court therefore also never had no subject matter jurisdiction over
Kubosh’s TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims.
10
Argument
I. The trial court erred by denying the City’s plea and otherwise had no
subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellees’ claims.
A. The trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction because
Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were not
justiciable.
1. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were
no longer justiciable at the time of final judgment because
they were mooted when the City, prior to final judgment,
produced all withheld documents that the trial court
ordered the City to disclose.
The trial court had no subject-matter jurisdiction over Appellees’ TPIA
mandamus and attorney fee claims due to mootness. The TPIA provides that,
in an action under Section 552.321, “the court shall assess costs of litigation
and reasonable attorney fees incurred by a plaintiff who substantially prevails”
(subject to certain exceptions). See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.323(a).6 The term
“substantially prevails” incorporates the concept of a “prevailing party” and
must be construed in line with prevailing-party requirements for recovering
attorney fees. See Tex. State Bd. of Veterinary Med. Exam’rs v. Giggleman, 408
S.W.3d 696, 703 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).
6
Section 552.323(a) specifies exception prohibiting the court from assessing “costs and fees
against a governmental body if the court finds that the governmental body acted in
reasonable reliance on: (1) a judgment or an order of a court applicable to the governmental
body; (2) the published opinion of an appellate court; or (3) a written decision of the
attorney general, including a decision issued under Subchapter G or an opinion issued
under Section 402.042.” See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.323(a).
11
Although a requestor may plead TPIA mandamus and attorney fee
claims and even obtain favorable interlocutory summary judgment on
mandamus, the case is rendered moot and the requestor does not substantially
prevail where the governmental body produces the disputed documents before
final judgment, thus obviating any justiciable controversy. See Giggleman, 408
S.W.3d at 702-06; see also Int’l Grp. P’ship v. KB Home Lone Star L.P., 295
S.W.3d 650, 653 (Tex. 2009) (to qualify as “prevailing party” there must be
judicially sanctioned relief on the merits that materially alters the legal
relationship between the parties such as damages award, injunctive or
declaratory relief, or consent decree or settlement in party’s favor). Satisfaction
of the TPIA “substantially prevails” prong for fee recovery requires an
enforceable final judgment against the defendant from whom fees are sought,
or comparable relief through a consent decree or settlement. See Giggleman, 408
S.W.3d at 703; see also Int’l Grp. P’ship, 295 S.W.3d at 654.
In this case, Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were
mooted prior to the trial court’s final judgment. It is undisputed that, after the
trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Appellees but before it
entered final judgment, the City immediately and voluntarily produced to
Appellees all withheld documents that the trial court ordered the City to
disclose. CR.1104. By doing so, the City obviated any justiciable controversy
12
regarding Kallinen’s (or Kubosh’s) entitlement to mandamus relief or attorney
fees. See Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d at 704. This result is particularly appropriate
here, where the City timely and properly requested an Attorney General
opinion, but was deprived of the ability to obtain and rely on such an
opinion—by Appellees’ filing suit before the Attorney General ruled and
requesting the Attorney General to defer ruling due to their suit. Had the City
not been so deprived, Appellees would not have been entitled to attorney fees
because the City would have complied with the Attorney General ruling. It is
also consistent with both Section 552.321 and Giggleman to hold that the City
which—once it was provided with authoritative guidance in the trial court’s
ruling, relied on it, and produced the documents—should not have been
subjected to an award of attorney fees.
2. As a result, the trial court had no subject-matter
jurisdiction because Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and
attorney fee claims were not justiciable at the time of final
judgment.
Subject matter jurisdiction is essential to the authority of a court to
decide a case. See M.D. Anderson Cancer Center v. Novak, 52 S.W.3d 704, 708
(Tex. 2001); Tex. Ass’n of Bus. v. Tex. Air Control Bd., 852 S.W.2d 440, 443 (Tex.
1993). Subject matter jurisdiction requires that the party bringing the suit have
standing, that there be a live controversy between the parties, and that the case
13
be justiciable. See State Bar of Tex. v. Gomez, 891 S.W.2d 243, 245 (Tex. 1994);
Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 443-46. The justiciability doctrines of ripeness,
standing, and lack of mootness are constitutional components of subject matter
jurisdiction—and are rooted in the prohibition against advisory opinions,
which is rooted, in turn, in the separation-of-powers doctrine. See Patterson v.
Planned Parenthood of Houston, 971 S.W.2d 439, 442-43 (Tex. 1998); Williams v.
Lara, 52 S.W.3d 171, 184 (Tex. 2000).
Ripeness concerns when an action may be brought and requires that, at
the time a lawsuit is filed, the facts have developed sufficiently so that an injury
has occurred or is likely to occur, rather than being contingent or remote. See
Patterson, 971 S.W.2d at 442. A controversy is not ripe when resolution
depends on contingent or hypothetical facts. Id. at 443. Standing concerns who
may bring an action and requires the plaintiff to be personally aggrieved.
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Inman, 252 S.W.3d 299, 304-05 (Tex. 2008). A plaintiff
does not have standing unless the alleged injury is concrete and particularized,
actual or imminent, not hypothetical. Id. at 305. Mootness concerns the
cessation of what was once a live controversy between the parties. Williams, 52
S.W.3d at 184. A controversy ceases to exist and a case becomes moot if the
issues presented are no longer live or the parties lack a legally cognizable
14
interest in the outcome. Id. If a case becomes moot, the parties lose standing to
maintain their claims. Id.
The trial court therefore had no jurisdiction at the time it entered final
judgment because Appellees’ TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were
mooted, and thus no longer justiciable, prior to that judgment due to the City’s
production of the remaining documents to Kallinen.
B. The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction because
all Appellees’ claims are barred by immunity.
1. Appellees’ TDJA claims are barred by immunity because
they are redundant and duplicative of their TPIA claims.
The TDJA also does not waive immunity for Appellees’ TDJA claims
seeking relief that is redundant or duplicative of the relief they seek through
their TPIA mandamus claims. Declaratory relief is proper if a justiciable
controversy exists as to the rights and status of the parties and the controversy
will be resolved by the declaration sought. See Bonham State Bank v. Beadle, 907
S.W.2d 465, 467 (Tex. 1995); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 446. But a mere
request for declaratory relief alone does not establish jurisdiction because the
TDJA is not a grant of jurisdiction, but merely a procedural device for deciding
cases already within a court’s jurisdiction. See Chenault v. Phillips, 914 S.W.2d
140, 141 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam); Tex. Ass’n of Bus., 852 S.W.2d at 444. The
15
TDJA is not available to settle disputes already pending before a court. See
BHP Petroleum Co., Inc. v. Millard, 800 S.W.2d 838, 841 (Tex. 1990).7
Under the redundant remedies doctrine, courts will not entertain an
action brought under the TDJA when the same claim could be pursued
through different channels. See Patel v. Tex. Dep’t of Licensing & Regulation, 469
S.W.3d 69, 79 (Tex. 2015). The focus of the doctrine is on the initiation of the
case and, in the jurisdictional and immunity context, whether the Legislature
created a statutory waiver of sovereign immunity that permits the parties to
raise their claims through some avenue other than the UDJA. Id. The Texas
Supreme Court, as well as the Austin Court of Appeals, has confirmed that an
award of attorney fees under the TDJA is unavailable if the claim for
declaratory relief is merely incidental to or redundant of relief sought through
TPIA claims. See Jackson v. State Office of Admin. Hearings, 351 S.W.3d 290, 300-
01 (Tex. 2011); Giggleman, 408 S.W.3d at 704.
In this case, Appellees’ pleadings confirm that their TDJA claims are
redundant and duplicative their TPIA claims. Their TDJA and TPIA claims
both complain only about the disclosure of documents that Kallinen requested
7
Nor can a party use the TDJA to seek the same relief afforded under another cause of
action merely in an effort to obtain recovery of otherwise impermissible attorney fees. See
MBM Fin. Corp. v. Woodlands Operating Co., 292 S.W.3d 660, 669 (Tex. 2009); see also City of
Houston v. Texan Land & Cattle Co., 138 S.W.3d 382, 392 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2004, no pet.).
16
from the City. So Appellees’ TDJA claims only seek to resolve issues already
pending before the trial court through their TPIA claims and raise no new or
different controversies. Appellees allege duplicative TDJA claims merely in an
effort to obtain attorney fees, under the permissive TDJA standard, that are
otherwise unrecoverable under the TPIA here. Allowing Appellees to recover
attorney fees under the TDJA when they cannot meet the requirements for fee
recovery under the TPIA would frustrate the limits established by the TPIA.
See Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 300. Appellees’ TDJA claims are therefore also
barred by immunity because they seek relief that is redundant and duplicative
of the relief that they seek through their TPIA claims.
2. Appellees’ TPIA mandamus claims are also barred by
immunity because the TPIA does not waive the City’s
immunity and the only proper defendant for such claims is
the pertinent public information officer.
The TPIA does not waive immunity for Appellees’ TPIA mandamus
claims against the City under section 552.321(a)—it authorizes such claims
only against the pertinent City official. The TPIA requires an “officer for
public information of a governmental body” to produce public information for
inspection and/or duplication on application by any person to the officer. See
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.221(a). It also authorizes a “requestor” to file suit for a
17
writ of mandamus compelling “a governmental body” to make information
available for public inspection. See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.321(a).8
The Texas Supreme Court reconciled these provisions and held that the
only “proper party” against whom mandamus may be sought under Section
552.321(a) is the officer for public information rather than the governmental
body. See A & T Consultants, Inc. v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 672-73, 681 (Tex.
1995). The Court based its conclusion on the duty that the public information
officer has to make public information available under Sections 552.203 and
552.221(a). Id. In addition, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals followed Sharp
and reversed a summary judgment disposing of a mandamus suit filed against
a county sheriff in his official capacity. See Guthrie v. Garcia, 352 S.W.3d 307,
308-10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2011, no pet.).
The Guthrie Court also relied on the Texas Supreme Court decision in
Heinrich regarding the ultra vires exception to governmental immunity based on
the distinction between suits against a governmental entity and those against a
public official in his official capacity. See Guthrie, 352 S.W.3d at 309
(discussing City of El Paso v. Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d 366, 372-76 (Tex. 2009)). The
Heinrich court explained as follows:
8
The TPIA defines a “requestor” as “a person who submits a request to a governmental
body for inspection or copies of public information.” See Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.003(6).
18
From this rationale, it is clear that suits to require state officials to
comply with statutory or constitutional provisions are not
prohibited by sovereign immunity, even if a declaration to that
effect compels the payment of money. To fall within this ultra vires
exception, a suit must not complain of a government officer’s
exercise of discretion, but rather must allege, and ultimately prove,
that the officer acted without legal authority or failed to perform a
purely ministerial act. Thus, ultra vires suits do not attempt to exert
control over the state—they attempt to reassert the control of the
state. Stated another way, these suits do not seek to alter
government policy but rather to enforce existing policy.
Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372. The Guthrie court therefore held that the
requestor’s mandamus suit against the county sheriff in his official capacity
was proper under Section 552.321(a) because any claim against the county for
mandamus relief would necessarily have failed as a matter of law. See Guthrie,
352 S.W.3d at 309-10.
In this case, Appellees filed their TPIA mandamus claims under Section
552.321(a) only against the City. They did not file those claims against the
City’s public information officer for the withheld information. So Appellees
did not file suit against the only proper party against whom mandamus relief
may be sought under Section 552.321(a), and the City is therefore immune
from Appellees’ TPIA mandamus claims under Section 552.321(a).
19
3. Appellees’ TDJA claims are likewise barred by immunity
because the TDJA also does not waive the City’s
immunity and the only proper defendant for such claims is
the pertinent public information officer.
The TDJA also does not waive immunity for Appellees’ TDJA claims
against the City—and, just like the TPIA, only authorizes such claims against
the pertinent City official. As outlined above, the Heinrich Court explained the
ultra vires exception to immunity based on the distinction between suits against
a governmental entity and those against public officials in their official
capacities. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-76; see also Guthrie, 352 S.W.3d at
309. But Heinrich also confirmed that a plaintiff may not bring declaratory
judgment actions against a governmental entity to determine rights under a
particular statute. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73; see also Tex. Dep’t of State
Health Servs. v. Holmes, 294 S.W.3d 328, 335 (Tex. App.—Austin 2009, pet.
denied). Rather, plaintiffs are limited to bringing ultra vires suits against
governmental officials in their official capacities. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at
372-73; Holmes, 294 S.W.3d at 335. So as a technical matter, governmental
entities—as opposed to their officers in their official capacities—remain
immune from suit. See Heinrich, 284 S.W.3d at 372-73.
In this case, like their TPIA claims, Appellees also filed their TDJA
claims only against the City. They did not file those claims against the
20
pertinent City official in his or her official capacity. So Appellees did not file
suit against the only proper party against whom declaratory relief may be
sought under the TDJA, and the City is therefore also immune from
Appellees’ TDJA claims.
4. As a result, the trial court also had no subject-matter
jurisdiction because all Appellees’ claims are barred by
immunity.
Sovereign and governmental immunity protect the State and its political
subdivisions, including municipalities, from suit and liability unless such
immunity is waived. See Mission Consol. Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Garcia, 253 S.W.3d
653, 655 & n.2 (Tex. 2008); Reata Const. Corp. v. City of Dallas, 197 S.W.3d 371,
374 (Tex. 2006). Courts interpret waivers of immunity narrowly because the
intent to waive must be clear and unambiguous. See Garcia, 253 S.W.3d at 655;
Reata Const. Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 375; Tex. Gov’t Code § 311.034. The party
suing the governmental entity has the burden to both plead and prove consent
to suit under a clear and unambiguous constitutional or statutory waiver of
that immunity. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm’n v. IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d
849, 853-55 (Tex. 2002); Tex. Dep’t of Transp. v. Jones, 8 S.W.3d 636, 638 (Tex.
1999). Immunity from suit defeats subject-matter jurisdiction. See Reata Const.
Corp., 197 S.W.3d at 374; IT-Davy, 74 S.W.3d at 855.
21
The trial court therefore had no jurisdiction because all Appellees’ claims
are barred by immunity for several reasons: (1) their TDJA claims are barred
because they are redundant and duplicative of their TPIA claims, (2) their
TPIA mandamus claims are barred because the TPIA does not waive
immunity and the only proper defendant for such claims is the pertinent public
information officer, and (3) their TDJA claims are barred by immunity because
the TDJA also does not waive immunity and the only proper defendant for
such claims is the pertinent public information officer.
II. The trial court erred by awarding attorney fees to Appellees because
there was no evidence or insufficient evidence to support any award of
fees to them.
A. Kallinen was not entitled to any award of attorney fees because
he did not actually incur any attorney fees—as Kubosh incurred
all the claimed fees.
Even if the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction (which the City
denies), Kallinen was not entitled to any attorney fee award because he did not
actually incur any fees. As noted above, the TPIA requires the trial court to
assess costs of litigation and reasonable attorney fees in a mandamus suit
under Section 552.321—but may only award costs and fees that are actually
incurred by a plaintiff who substantially prevails. See Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 552.323(a). The Texas Supreme Court has confirmed that attorney fees are
incurred only where a party becomes liable for them and that a fee award
22
under Section 552.323(a) or the TDJA is proper only where the fees are
actually incurred. See Jackson, 351 S.W.3d at 299-301 (holding that licensed
attorney was not entitled to recover attorney fees under TPIA because he did
not incur attorney fees since he represented himself or under TDJA because his
declaratory relief claim was merely incidental to his TPIA claim).
In this case, the evidence presented at the trial court hearing on attorney
fees, including all billing invoices that Appellees’ counsel submitted for
representation of Appellees in this case, conclusively establishes that only
Kubosh incurred all the claimed fees allegedly incurred in connection with the
TPIA requests for information that only Kallinen submitted to the City.
Appellees’ counsel submitted all billing invoices only to Kubosh—and did not
submit any billing invoices to Kallinen. RR[1] Ex. 2. Kallinen offered no
evidence that he incurred any of the claimed fees. RR[1] Ex. 2. Kallinen was
therefore not entitled to any award of attorney fees because he did not actually
incur any attorney fees—as Kubosh incurred all the claimed fees.9
9
To the extent that Appellees challenge the trial court’s dismissal of Kubosh due to lack of
standing, the attorney fee award under the court’s original final judgment was nonetheless
erroneous. First, for the reasons outlined above (which are incorporated here for all
purposes), Kubosh was not entitled to any fee award because his TPIA mandamus and
attorney fee claims were not justiciable. Second, for the same reasons that Kubosh was not
entitled to any fee award, the fee award to Appellees jointly was erroneous and could not
stand because Kallinen was not entitled to any fees that Kubosh was not entitled to recover
—and Appellees failed to segregate the fees that each allegedly incurred.
23
B. Appellees were not entitled to any award of attorney fees
because they failed to properly segregate recoverable (alleged)
fees from non-recoverable (alleged) fees.
Even if Kallinen incurred any fees (which the City denies), neither
Appellee was entitled to any award of attorney fees because each failed to
properly segregate recoverable (alleged) fees from non-recoverable (alleged)
fees. The Texas Supreme Court has confirmed that where attorney fees relate
to a claim for which fees are not recoverable, a claimant must segregate
recoverable from unrecoverable fees. See Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212
S.W.3d 299, 313 (Tex. 2006). Intertwined facts do not make fees recoverable;
it is only when discrete legal services advance both a recoverable and
unrecoverable claim that they are so intertwined that they need not be
segregated. See Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14; see also Rapid Settlements, Ltd. v.
Settlement Funding, LLC, 358 S.W.3d 777, 787 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2012, no pet.) (citing Chapa, 212 S.W.3d at 313-14).
In this case, as noted above, Appellees’ counsel failed to segregate any
attorney fees incurred with regard to documents that the trial court ordered the
City to disclose from any incurred with regard to documents that the City
ultimately disclosed to Appellees voluntarily. RR[1] Ex. 2. Appellees’ counsel
also failed to segregate any attorney fees incurred by Kubosh from any
incurred by Kallinen. RR[1] Ex. 2. But such segregation as to Kubosh and
24
Kallinen is critical to determining the amount of fees to which each may be
entitled. It is particularly critical to ensuring that neither is awarded any
attorney fees incurred only by Kubosh—who, as outlined above, lacks standing
not only for the same reasons why Kallinen lacks standing, but also for the
additional reason that he never actually submitted any TPIA request to the
City and therefore is not even a requestor authorized to file suit for mandamus
relief under Section 552.321(a). Appellees were therefore not entitled to any
award of attorney fees because they failed to properly segregate recoverable
(alleged) fees from non-recoverable (alleged) fees.10
C. Appellees offered no evidence or insufficient evidence to support
the amount of the award of attorney fees.
In the alternative, and subject to the City’s arguments on lack of
jurisdiction (including that Kallinen is not a prevailing party for purposes of
TPIA fee recovery), Appellees also failed to offer any evidence or any
sufficient evidence to support any fee award. As noted above, the TPIA
authorizes the court to assess reasonable attorney fees incurred by a plaintiff
who substantially prevails in a mandamus suit under Section 552.321(a). See
10
Although Appellees did segregate fees to a limited (and insufficient) extent after the trial
court’s original final judgment, they failed to properly segregate fees separately incurred by
each of them.
25
Tex. Gov’t Code § 552.323(a). In this case, Appellees offered no evidence or
insufficient evidence to establish that any attorney fees they allegedly incurred
were reasonable. The City’s attorney fee expert, Patrick Zummo, testified at
the attorney fee hearing in the trial court that Appellees’ claimed attorney fees
were not reasonable or proper for multiple reasons.
Mr. Zummo explained that Appellees’ counsel did not exercise
appropriate billing judgment. RR[1].122, 134-35, 139, 1144. Mr. Zummo’s
testimony also confirms that Appellees’ evidence cannot support their burden
to prove that the claimed attorney fees were reasonable because:
1. The billing invoices included many single entries for total time allegedly
expended in a single day instead of multiple daily entries broken down
for discrete individual tasks. RR[1].128-29, 141-43, 149, 182.
2. Many task descriptions were too generic which precluded any
independent assessment of the reasonableness of the stated time
amounts. RR[1].132, 133, 147.
3. Many task descriptions were redacted which also precluded independent
assessment of the reasonableness of the stated time amounts. RR[1].121,
130, 133, 149, 151, .
4. Tasks relating to the deliberative process privilege and attorney-client
privilege on which the City relied were not segregated even though they
could have been segregated for the most part. RR[1].148-49, 152-54.
5. The billing invoices included amounts for extensive research on legal
issues of Appellees’ counsel touted expertise. RR[1].132, 156-57.
6. The billing invoices included amounts for numerous attorney-client
conferences to discuss “strategy” despite the fact that strategy had not
26
significantly changed and that Appellees are lawyers. RR[1].132-33, 141-
42, 147-48, 150, 151, 180, .
7. The billing invoices included amounts for unproductive speculation and
investigation regarding whether Professor Robert Stein of Rice
University allowed an alleged employment relationship between his wife
and staff of the Mayor of the City of Houston to influence his research,
analysis and opinions. RR[1].146-47.
8. The billing invoices included amounts for excessive time spent reviewing
the City’s documents and performing other tasks. RR[1].136-44, 151.
Mr. Zummo’s testimony therefore raised numerous fact issues regarding
whether Appellees satisfied their burden to prove that the claimed attorney fees
were reasonable.
Mr. Zummo testified that the foregoing issues with Appellees’ claimed
attorney fees required reduction of about $21,440.00 (based upon 67 hours at
$320 per hour). RR[1].151-52. Mr. Zummo also testified that, based on the
count of the documents subject to the trial court’s rulings, Appellees were not
successful in their attempt to obtain 25% of the documents they sought—
reflecting the total percentage of withheld document for which the City
claimed the attorney-client privilege. RR[1].153-55. Mr. Zummo determined
that, even after deduction of $21,440 as stated above, the remaining amount
should be further reduced accordingly to a percentage reflecting only the total
percentage of withheld documents that the trial court ordered the City to
27
disclose. RR[1].153-55. Mr. Zummo’s testimony therefore also confirms that
the amount of attorney fees awarded was excessive.
III. The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction over Kubosh’s
claims; Kubosh’s TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims were never
justiciable due to lack of ripeness and standing because he never
submitted any TPIA request to the City.
The trial court also had no subject-matter jurisdiction over Kubosh’s
TPIA mandamus and attorney fee claims due to lack of ripeness and standing.
As noted above, the TPIA authorizes a “requestor” to file suit for a writ of
mandamus compelling a governmental body to make information available for
public inspection—and defines a “requestor” as “a person who submits a
request to a governmental body for inspection or copies of public information.”
See Tex. Gov’t Code §§ 552.321(a), 552.003(6). The plain language of Section
552.321 therefore only authorizes a person who submits a request for
information to a governmental body to file suit for a writ of mandamus. In this
case, it is undisputed that Kubosh never actually submitted any request for
information to the City before filing his TPIA claims against the City—despite
their lack of ripeness and his lack of standing. The trial court therefore had no
subject-matter jurisdiction over Kubosh’s TPIA mandamus and attorney fee
claims under Sections 552.321(a) and Section 552.323 because those claims
were not justiciable due to lack of ripeness and standing.
28
Conclusion and Prayer
For these reasons, the City Houston asked this Court to (1) reverse the
order of the trial court denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction and render
judgment in the City’s favor that all Kallinen’s claims against the City are
dismissed for want of jurisdiction, and (2) reverse the modified final judgment
of the trial court awarding attorney fees to Kallinen and render judgment in the
City’s favor that Kallinen is not entitled to attorney fees and shall take nothing
on any of his claims against the City.
29
Respectfully submitted,
DONNA L. EDMUNDSON
City Attorney
JUDITH L. RAMSEY
Chief, General Litigation Section
By: /s/ Fernando De Leon
Fernando De Leon
Senior Assistant City Attorney
SBN: 24025325
CITY OF HOUSTON LEGAL
DEPARTMENT
900 Bagby Street, 4th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
832.393.6491 (telephone)
832.393.6259 (facsimile)
fernando.deleon2@houstontx.gov
Attorneys for Appellee
Certificate of Compliance
I certify that the foregoing was prepared in Microsoft Word 2010
Version 14.0 in Calisto MT 14 point font; the word-count function shows that,
excluding those sections exempted under TRAP 9.4(i)(1), the brief contains
6,660 words.
/s/ Fernando De Leon
Fernando De Leon
30
Certificate of Service
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document
has been forwarded on December 9, 2015 to the following counsel of record by
e-service:
Joseph R. Larsen David A. Furlow
SEDGWICK LLP LAW OFFICE OF DAVID
1200 Smith Street, Suite 1600 A. FURLOW, P.C.
Houston, Texas 77002 4126 Rice Boulevard
joseph.larsen@sedgwicklaw.com Houston, Texas 77005
dafurlow@gmail.com
Attorneys for Appellees
/s/ Fernando De Leon
Fernando De Leon
31
Appendix
Tab
A. Order on Plaintiffs’ Summary Judgment (dated October 12, 2009)
(CR.582)
B. Order Granting Plaintiffs’ Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and
No-Evidence Partial Motion for Summary Judgment on Conceded
Documents (dated October 12, 2009) (CR.583-85)
C. Order (dated December 8, 2009) (CR.931-32)
D. Order on City’s Motion to Strike Paul Kubosh (dated March 1, 2010)
(CR.969)
E. Final Judgment (dated October 12, 2011) (CR.1094-95)
F. Order (dated January 5, 2012) (CR.1208)
G. Amended Final Judgment (dated July 12, 2012) (CR[2].17-18)
H. First Court of Appeals Judgment and Opinion
(dated August 29, 2013)
I. Supreme Court Judgment and Opinion (dated March 20, 2015)
J. Order for Supplemental Briefing On Remand
Tab A
P-
re\PsTz.
NO. 2008-75633
Randall Kallinen, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
VS.
HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
City of Houston
295th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
Order on Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment
After reviewing the requested documents in camera, the court grants the Plaintiffs'
Motion for Summary Judgment in part and denies it in part. The court holds that the documents
that the City of Houston are withholding under the deliberative process privilege do not fall
under that exception as defined by Garland v. Dallas Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351 (Tex.
2000).
However, most of the documents that the City is withholding under the attorney client
privilege are privileged with the exception of:
COMA 64, 102, 133 and 149.
There are a few documents that the City has listed under both exceptions. COHP 36, 37
and 38, 40 are protected under attorney client. COHP 39, the top email only is protected. COHP
41, the top email is protected.
The documents will remain confidential pending a decision to appeal by the City.
FILED Loren Jackson Signed October 12, 2009.
District Clerk
OCT 12 2009
Harris County, Texas
By
Tracy Christopher
Judge Presiding
Tab B
Flied 09 October 8 P6:18
Low Jackson - District Cleric
Harris Cou239854
ED101J01
CAUSE NO. 2008-75633 By Sandra Talbert
RANDALL KALLINEN and
PAUL KUBOSH
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
P- 3
v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
s 7-
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS 295th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT
AND NO-EVIDENCE PARTIAL MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ON
CONCEDED DOCUMENTS
CAME BEFORE the Court this day Plaintiffs Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh's Motion
for Entry of Judgment on Conceded Documents. The Court FINDS that the City, in its Response to
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and No-Evidence Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment, provided no evidence or argument that the documents identified below fall within either
the attorney-client privilege or deliberative process privilege exception to the Texas Public
Information Act. Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and No-Evidence Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment is hereby GRANTED as to these documents, set out below by Bates
numbers:
A004 A055
A005-A007 A056
A009-A014 A057-A058
A015-A018 A059-A061
A025 A062
A034-A035 A063
A036-A037 A072-A075
A049 A076-A078
A050 A079
A051 A080
A084 A094-A095
A085 A096-A097
A086-A088 A100-A101
A089-A091 A103
A092-A093 A104
100583
A105 A183
A112-A113 A184
A114 A185
A123-A124 A186
A125 A187-A188
A126 A192-A193
A127-A131 A202-A203
A132 A208
A134-A136 A222
A137-A138 A223
A139-A141 A224
A142-A143 A225
A144-A148 A226
Al 56-A160 A227
A161 A228
A163 A229
A172 A240
A175 A241
A176 A243
A177 A245
A178 A247-A248
A179 A249
A180
P004-P005 P220-P221
P005-P007 P222
P008-P009 P223-P228
P027-P029 P250
P030 P251
P031 P252
P032 P257
P033 P258
P034 P261-P262
P035 P288
P044-P045 P289
P046 P290-294
P047 P295
P048 P296
P063 P297-P313
P066-P114 P313-P315
P115-P116 P357
P117-P119 P390
P124 P393-P425
P157 P426
P159-P160
2
Judgment is hereby entered in favor of Plaintiffs Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh on their
claims under the Texas Public Information Act and Texas Declaratory Judgments Act for the above-
referenced documents. 11 • VI V .11 I •I e: .1
., • s• :1 nce o ion :1 I .1 "I • •• • Si IS se documents
_3.1Alielt-remain-irminrfition and on which the Court has nT)ryarruleci7—•
Signed this 1a day of October, 2009.
JUDGE TRACY CHRI HER
APPROVED AS TO FORM AND SUBSTANCE:
Jose
SE P WICK, DETERT, MORAN & ARNOLD LLP
1 1 1 Bagby St., Suite 2300
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone No.: (832) 426.7000
Facsimile No.: (832) 426.7009
Attorneys for Plaintiffs Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh
3
ar..k 1•—.4
Tab C
Flied 09 November 18 P2:30
Loren Jackson - District Cie*
Herds
ED101=7944
CAUSE NO. 2008-75633 • By: Melanie Broughton-Cooper
RANDALL KALLINEN and IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
PAUL KUBOSH
v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS roocx
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS 295th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
74 74 A b.. R mai r 0 kikt.J__
On the day of , 2009, came on to be heard Plaintiffs Randall
Kallinen and Paul Kubosh's Motion for Judgment and for Award of Attorneys' Fees. The Court,
having reviewed papers on file in this case and having heard arguments of counsel, is of the opinion
that the motion has merit and it is hereby GRANTED.
The Court specifically FINDS that the documents set out in the Order on Summary Judgment
and Order Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and No-Evidence Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment on Conceded Documents are public information that may not be withheld
from release pursuant to an exception to the Act. The Court further FINDS that the City of Houston
had refused to release this information from release necessitating Plaintiffs' mandamus suit and that
Plaintiffs have substantially prevailed in this action. pursuant to TEX. GOV 'T CO ' • 552.323(a),
ainti s s ou s recover their reasonable and nec attorney's fees. On
e evidence presented, the Co • FINDS Plaintiffs reasona and necessary attorneys fees to be
($ ).
IT IS THEREFORE, ORDERE R , A • ' • ED AND DECREED that the documents
identified by the Order on Sum Judgment and Or• Granting Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment o-Evidence Motion for Partial S i ary Judgment on Conceded
Documents are lic information that may not be withheld pursuant to • ception to the Act.
nt.1235172 hit
^ ^,x46,47J. •..,.&"
The Court er ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECRE that Plaintiffs should recover its
reasonable and ssary attorney's fees, ch the Court finds to be
dollars ($ with post judgment interest thereon at the
rate of peace t (%) per um from the date of this judgment until paid, together
with all costs of court in its beh ex ded.
The Court further ORDE' , D.TUDGES and DECREES that, in the event the City appeals
this Final Judgment, the r .nable an• ecessary attorneys fees to Plaintiffs for successful defense
of this Judgment on ap al will be dollars ($ ) and successful
defense of this Ju ent before the Texas S reme Court will be dollars
($
P intiffs Randall Kal linen and Paul Kubosh allowed such writs and processes as may be
ne ary in the enforcement and collection of this Jud: ent.
it-is-so-61WERED. "1/41
_tarri.lFs t 9010
SIGNED this day of 02--C-- . , 2009. +u-To Luea (4.
ockL4,_
A k
HONORA JUDGE TRACY STOPHER
2
2
Tab D
Filed 09 December 30 P5:44 I
Loren Jackson - Dtstrict Clerk!
Harris County
ED101J015619292
CAUSE NO. 2008-75633 By: Sandra Talbert
RANDALL KALLINEN and IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF /7---
/7---
PAUL KUBOSH
ST Y
v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
CITY OF HOUSTON, TEXAS 295th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER ON CITY'S MOTION TO STRIKE PAUL KUBOSH
CAME BEFORE the Court today the City's Motion to Strike Paul Kubosh as plaintiff in this
action. The Court, having reviewed the papers on file, including previous Orders of the Court, and
having heard argument of counsel, hereby FINDS:
The City's Motion to Strike Kubosh has already been denied by Order of the Court of
December 7, 2009 finding Paul Kubosh to be a substantially prevailing party in this lawsuit;
The City has presented no argument or authority in addition to the papers it submitted to the
Court prior to this ruling and the Court finds no basis for overturning the Order finding Kubosh a
substantially prevailing party in this case; and
The Court ORDERS that the City's Motion to Strike Paul Kubosh as a plaintiff in this matter
is, in all respects, DENIED.
Signed the day of January, 2010.
JUDGE PRESIDING
Tab E
V
CAUSE NO. 2008-75633
RANDALL KALLINEN and IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
PAUL KUBOSH
v. HARRIS COUNTY, TEXAS
CITY OF HOUSTON. TEXAS 295th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINAL JUDGMENT
The Court FOUND in its Order on Plaintiffs' Summary Judgment and its Order Granting
Plaintiffs' Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and No-Evidence Partial Motion for Summary
Judgment on Conceded Documents, both of October 12, 2009, that the documents set out therein are
public information that may not be withheld from release pursuant to an exception to the Act. As set
out in these prior Orders of the Court. Judgment is hereby entered that the following documents
identified by Bates number in the litigation are public information and not subject to an exception to
the Act:
COHA004-COHA007 COHA183-COHA188
COHA009-COHA018 COFIA192-COHA193
COHA025 COHA202-COHA203 C=D
C".41
COHA034-COHA037 COHA208 f,5 oa
COHA049-COHA051 COHA222-COHA229 ..1;
c'
.0 so
COHA055-COHA064 CO1{A240-COHA241 0,3
L)
f=")
COHA072-COHA080 COHA243
COHA084-COHA097 COHA245
COHA100-COHA105 COHA247-COHA249
COHA112-COHA114
COHA123-COHA149
COHA156-COHA161 COHP001 COHP035
COHA163 COHP039 (except top e-mail)
COHA172 COHP041 (except top e-mail)
COHA175-COHA180 COHP042-COHP426
The Court FOUND in its Order of December 8, 2009 that the City of Houston had refused to
release this information necessitating Plaintiffs' mandamus suit, and that Plaintiffs have substantially
2676379-1
010'7-'4
•
prevailed in this action. The three referenced prior Orders of the Court are attached hereto and
incorporated herein. Judgment is hereby entered that Plaintiffs have substantially prevailed in this
Public Information Act mandamus suit and pursuant to TEX. GOV'T CODE § 552.323(a) shall
recover their reasonable attorneys' fees. Following trial on this issue and on the evidence presented,
the Court FINDS Plaintiffs' reasonable attorney's fees to be ninety-five thousand six hundred sixty
four and no/100 dollars ($95,664.00).
The Court further ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that Plaintiffs should recover its
reasonable and necessary attorney's fees. which the Court finds to be ninety-five thousand six
hundred sixty four and no/100 dollars ($95.664.00), with post-judgment interest thereon at the rate of
five percent (5 %) per annum from the date of this judgment until paid, together with all costs of
court in its behalf expended.
The Court further ORDERS, ADJUDGES and DECREES that, in the event the City appeals
this Final Judgment, the reasonable and necessary attorneys fees to Plaintiffs for successful defense
of this Judgment on appeal will be thirty thousand and no/100 dollars ($30,000.00) and successful
defense of this Judgment before the Texas Supreme Court will be fifty thousand and no/100 dollars
($50,000.00).
Plaintiffs Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh are allowed such writs and processes as may be
necessary in the enforcement and collection of this Judgment.
It is so ORDERED.
SIGNED this i2 day of c77LA_ , 2011.
kA_ 0-4,4_4;LL
HONORABLE JUDGE CAROLINE BAKER
2676379-1
Tab F
O P-
pJuRY
CAUSE NO. 2008-75633 r yNNTr34 S.W.3d 547, 553–54 (Tex. 2000). A plea
challenging a trial court’s jurisdiction is a question of law that is reviewed de novo.
See City of Dallas v. Carbajal, 324 S.W.3d 537, 538 (Tex. 2010).
3
The construction of a statute, too, is a question of law which is reviewed de
novo. See Atmos Energy Corp. v. Cities of Allen, 353 S.W.3d 156, 160 (Tex.
2011). The purpose of interpretation is to arrive at the legislature’s intent in
creating the statute. F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680,
683 (Tex. 2007). In discerning legislative intent, we consider the plain and
common meaning of the statutory language. See McIntyre v. Ramirez, 109 S.W.3d
741, 745 (Tex. 2003). The statute must be read as a whole, giving effect to all—
not just isolated—portions. See City of San Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d
22, 25 (Tex. 2003). Courts also consider the objective the law seeks to obtain. See
TEX. GOV’T CODE § 311.023(1) (West 2005).
Discussion
In its first issue, the City contends that the trial court erred in denying its
plea to the jurisdiction because, among other reasons, the Attorney General
declined to perform his statutory duty to issue a decision on the City’s request.
Appellees argue that they have a statutory right to file a suit for writ of mandamus
against the City because the City refused to release public information.
A. Applicable Law
The TPIA governs public disclosure of information about the affairs of the
government and the official acts of public officials and employees, and it requires
the officer for public information of a governmental body to produce public
4
information for inspection or copying on application by any person to the officer.
See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. §§ 552.001, .203, .221(a) (West 2012). A “requestor”
is defined as “a person who submits a request to a governmental body for
inspection or copies of public information.” Id. § 552.003(6).
The TPIA also lists numerous exceptions from required disclosure. See id.
§§ 552.101–.153. Though the act is to be liberally construed in favor of granting
requests for information, id. § 552.001(b), a governmental body may seek to
withhold requested information that it believes falls within one of the statutory
exceptions to disclosure. See id. §§ 552.101–.153. To do so, the government body
must timely request an Attorney General determination (if there has not been a
previous determination) and assert which exceptions to disclosure apply to the
information requested. Id. § 552.301. The TPIA provides that “the attorney
general shall promptly render a decision requested . . . determining whether the
requested information is within one of the exceptions . . . .” Id. § 552.306(a).
However, the governmental body may disclose the requested information to the
public or to the requestor before the Attorney General—or, if suit is filed under the
TPIA, the court with jurisdiction—makes a final determination that the requested
information is public, except if the requested information is confidential by law.
See id. § 552.303(a).
5
The TPIA also provides that the Attorney General and the original requestor
may file suit for a writ of mandamus to compel a governmental body to release
information to the public “if the governmental body refuses to request an attorney
general’s decision . . . or refuses to supply public information or information that
the attorney general has determined is public information.” Id. § 552.32(a). If a
governmental body does not request an Attorney General decision after receiving a
written request for information, the requested information is presumed to be
subject to required public disclosure and must be released unless there is a
compelling reason to withhold it. See id. § 552.302. Further, the TPIA also
provides that the only exceptions to required disclosure that the governmental body
may raise in such a suit are those that it properly raised before the Attorney
General to support its request for a decision as to whether disclosure is required.
See id. § 552.326(a).
B. Analysis
The issue before us is whether the TPIA allows a requestor to sue for a writ
of mandamus prior to the Attorney General issuing a decision when the
governmental body has requested one. The City contends that the TPIA requires
the Attorney General to render a decision before a mandamus suit may be filed.
Appellees argue that no such requirement has been or should be read into the
TPIA.
6
As previously noted, section 552.321(a) sets out three scenarios under which
the Attorney General or a requestor may file a mandamus suit. First, if a
governmental body fails to request an Attorney General decision in the time
permitted, the information is presumed to be open to public disclosure, and the
governmental body must release the information. See id. § 552.321(a). If it fails to
do so, the requestor may file suit for a writ of mandamus. See id. Second, if the
Attorney General has rendered a decision and the governmental body has failed to
comply with the decision, the Attorney General or the requestor may then file suit.
See id. Finally, either the Attorney General or the requestor may file suit, if the
governmental body “refuses to supply public information.” Id.
Appellees argue that the third scenario applies here. That is, they argue that
the City refused to release public information and they were therefore entitled to
file a mandamus suit. In support of their argument, appellees point out that the
legislature did not qualify the word “refuse” by including exceptions for cases in
which the government body has requested an Attorney General ruling. 2 That
2
Appellees rely on Thomas v. Cornyn, 71 S.W.3d 473, 486 (Tex. App.—Austin
2002, no pet.) (noting that mandamus statute “does not qualify the word ‘refuse’
by including an exception for cases in which the governing body has filed a suit
against the attorney general under the Act, and we will not read such an exception
into the statute.”). That reliance is misplaced. In Thomas, the Attorney General
had already rendered a decision on the nature of the information. According to
section 552.324(a)(2), a governmental body may sue for declaratory relief from
compliance with an already issued decision by the Attorney General. The Thomas
court correctly determined that the suit for writ of mandamus filed after the
Attorney General decision and before the suit for declaratory relief had been
7
reading, however, is unpersuasive. Though the term “refuse” is not qualified, the
term “information” is. See id. § 552.321(a) (permitting suit for writ of mandamus
where “governmental body refuses to supply public information”) (emphasis
added). Because the TPIA carves out numerous exceptions to disclosure of certain
types of information and establishes procedures to determine whether information
falls under those exceptions, it is illogical to presume that information is public
while its very status is being challenged. Additionally, considering that the statute
explicitly states when information is presumed to be public—i.e., if the
governmental body has not made an Attorney General request—it does not stand to
reason that information should be considered public when a request has been made.
Not only does the statute clearly provide when a mandamus suit may be
filed, but it is equally clear that the Attorney General must render a decision on the
nature of the information in question. The City contends that the TPIA is a
comprehensive regulatory scheme under which the Attorney General must issue a
decision before a mandamus suit may be filed.3 It argues that because the Attorney
decided was a valid one, pointing to the relevant provision in 552.325(a) allowing
a requestor to intervene in such suits. The language that appellees cite from
Thomas is clearly applicable only to fact patterns involving governmental bodies’
suits against the Attorney General, not for suits for writ of mandamus prior to an
Attorney General ruling.
3
An agency has exclusive jurisdiction when it is clear that the legislature instituted
a pervasive regulatory scheme meant to be the exclusive means of remedying
certain problems targeted by the legislation. See Subaru of America, Inc. v. David
McDavid Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002). If an agency has
8
General did not issue a decision in this case before appellees filed their suit, the
jurisdictional prerequisite for filing suit under section 552.321 was not met.
Appellees, citing past Attorney General decisions, contend that the Attorney
General may—indeed, must in this case—defer to courts’ decisions when certain
issues are being litigated.
The Attorney General, however, has already weighed in on this debate:
Open Records Decision No. 687 concludes that “in accordance with its
legislatively[] mandated function, the Attorney General has a statutory directive to
rule on a PIA disclosure question in the first instance in advance of judicial
review.” Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2011-687. After acknowledging the previous agency
decisions cited by appellees in which the agency had declined to issue an opinion
when that same question was pending before a court, the Attorney General ruled
that “this litigation policy is withdrawn and is no longer applicable to the PIA
ruling process.” Id.
This decision is significant in several ways. First, it notes that the Attorney
General may not refuse to fulfill his duty to render open records decisions. See
Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co. v. Mattox, 767 S.W.2d 695, 698 (Tex. 1989). Second,
exclusive jurisdiction, a party must exhaust all administrative avenues before
asking for judicial review of the agency’s action. Cash Am. Int’l Inc. v. Bennett,
35 S.W.3d 12, 15 (Tex. 1999). Otherwise, a trial court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction and must dismiss the claims within the agency’s exclusive jurisdiction.
See Tex. Educ. Agency v. Cypress-Fairbanks Indep. Sch. Dist., 830 S.W.2d 88, 90
(Tex. 1992).
9
it points out the 1999 revisions to the TPIA, which expanded the scope of the
Attorney General’s role. In particular, the decision highlights the addition of
section 552.011, which charges the Attorney General with “maintain[ing]
uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation of this chapter.” The
decision then concludes that the detailed statutory scheme under which the
Attorney General’s open records ruling process operates, as well as the lack of any
language affirmatively directing the Attorney General to decline to issue an open
records ruling for the benefit of the public, demonstrate that such Attorney General
decisions are, indeed, mandatory. Finally, Open Records Decision No. 687 offers
insights into the policy considerations underpinning the Attorney General’s
expanded role under the statute. Vesting the Attorney General with the role of
evaluating requests by governmental bodies to withhold putatively excepted
information is both more efficient, avoiding the expense of court action, and more
democratic, allowing Texans equal access to information regardless of their ability
to secure legal representation. The decision concludes by stating that “there is
little to commend a rule that would avoid ruling on a pending question where the
Attorney General has not previously spoken.” Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2011-687.
10
We agree with the Attorney General’s interpretation. 4 The TPIA is a
comprehensive statutory scheme under which “the Attorney General [is] the first
arbiter of openness before Texans can be denied access to their government’s
records.” See Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2011-687 (noting that, in enacting TPIA,
legislature “set[] out a detailed statutory scheme . . . which . . . evidences [its]
intention that the Attorney General play a critical, quasi-judicial role when a
governmental body wishes to avoid releasing information requested pursuant to the
PIA.”); see also Tex. Dep’t of Pub. Safety v. Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343
S.W.3d 112, 121 (Tex. 2011) (Wainwright, J., concurring) (describing TPIA as
“comprehensive scheme arming the public with statutory mandates for the
government to disclose information . . . .”). Although district courts have subject
matter jurisdiction under the TPIA, that jurisdiction only arises after the Attorney
General has ruled. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 552.321(a).
Appellees filed suit for writ of mandamus before the Attorney General
issued a ruling on the information that the City sought to withhold. Because
4
Although not binding authority on appellate courts, we give due consideration to
the Attorney General on questions involving the TPIA. See Holmes v. Morales,
924 S.W.2d 920, 924 (Tex. 1996) (explaining that Attorney General opinions are
“persuasive but not controlling” authority); City of Lubbock v. Cornyn, 993
S.W.2d 461, 463 (Tex. App.—Austin 1999, no pet.) (recognizing due
consideration to be given Attorney General decisions especially in cases involving
TPIA); City of Hous. v. Hous. Chronicle Publ’g Co., 673 S.W.2d 316, 322 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1984, no writ) (“While opinions of the Attorney
General are not binding upon the courts, they should be given great weight.”).
11
appellees failed to exhaust their administrative remedies before doing so, the trial
court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over their mandamus suit. As such, the
trial court erred in denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction. We sustain the
City’s first issue.
Conclusion
We reverse the trial court’s order denying the City’s plea to the jurisdiction
and render judgment that appellees’ claims against the City are dismissed for want
of jurisdiction.
Jim Sharp
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Bland, Sharp, and Massengale.
12
Tab I
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
444444444444
NO . 14-0015
444444444444
RANDALL KALLINEN AND PAUL KUBOSH, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE CITY OF HOUSTON, RESPONDENT
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
JUDGMENT
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS, having heard this cause on petition for review from
the Court of Appeals for the First District, and having considered the appellate record and parties’
briefs, but without hearing oral argument under Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 59.1, concludes
that the court of appeals’ judgment should be reversed.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED, in accordance with the Court’s opinion, that:
1) The court of appeals’ judgment is reversed;
2) The case is remanded to the court of appeals for further proceedings consistent with
this Court’s opinion; and
3) Petitioners Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh shall recover, and Respondent City of
Houston shall pay, the costs incurred in this Court.
Copies of this judgment and the Court’s opinion are certified to the Court of Appeals for the
First District and to the District Court of Harris County, Texas, for observance.
Opinion of the Court delivered Per Curiam
March 20, 2015
*********
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
444444444444
NO . 14-0015
444444444444
RANDALL KALLINEN AND PAUL KUBOSH, PETITIONERS,
v.
THE CITY OF HOUSTON, RESPONDENT
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
ON PETITION FOR REVIEW FROM THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS
4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444
PER CURIAM
The Texas Public Information Act (“PIA”), Chapter 552 of the Texas Government Code,
“guarantees access to public information, subject to certain exceptions.” Tex. Dep’t Pub. Safety v.
Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d 112, 114 (Tex. 2011). The PIA provides that when a
governmental body receives a written request for information for which it wishes to claim an
exception, it must timely seek a ruling from the Attorney General if the exception’s applicability to
the requested information has not previously been determined. TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.301(a); see
also id. § 552.301(g). But the PIA also provides that a requestor may sue to compel disclosure of
the information. TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.321(a). In this case, the court of appeals held that a trial
court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over such a suit until the Attorney General rules. 414 S.W.3d
815, 820 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013). We disagree.
Invoking the PIA, Randall Kallinen requested information from the City of Houston
regarding a study of traffic light cameras it had commissioned. The City produced a large number
of documents but withheld some and timely asked the Attorney General for an opinion on whether
the PIA excepted the withheld information from disclosure. The PIA gives the Attorney General
forty-five business days to issue opinions, though the time can be extended. TEX . GOV ’T CODE
§ 552.306(a). But before this time elapsed and before the Attorney General ruled, Kallinen sued for
a writ of mandamus to compel the City to disclose the withheld information. The City moved to
abate the lawsuit pending the Attorney General’s ruling, but the Attorney General closed his file
when he was alerted to the suit. At the time, the Attorney General did not interpret the PIA to
require an open records ruling on issues already in litigation. See Tex. Att’y Gen. OR2011-687
(citing Tex. Att’y Gen. OR1990-560 at 3 (declining to rule on sensitive information on the ground
the issues should be resolved in the pending Texas prison litigation), and A & T Consultants, Inc.
v. Sharp, 904 S.W.2d 668, 671 (Tex. 1995) (noting in dicta that the Attorney General withdrew his
opinion pending litigation on PIA questions)).
The City filed a plea to the jurisdiction, arguing that the court lacked jurisdiction over the suit
until the Attorney General ruled. The district court overruled the plea, granted summary judgment
for Kallinen, ordered disclosure of many of the withheld documents, and awarded Kallinen $175,664
in attorney fees through appeal to this Court.
The City complied with the order to disclose but appealed the attorney fee award. The parties
agree that the only basis for the trial court’s jurisdiction is Section 552.321(a) of the PIA. That
2
provision, with subsections inserted in brackets for ease of reference, conditions the court’s exercise
of jurisdiction as follows:
A requestor or the attorney general may file suit for a writ of mandamus
compelling a governmental body to make information available for public inspection
if the governmental body [A] refuses to request an attorney general’s decision . . . or
[B] refuses to supply [1] public information or [2] information that the attorney
general has determined is public information that is not excepted from disclosure.
TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.321(a). The parties agree that conditions A and B2 do not apply. The court
of appeals reasoned that condition B1 cannot apply when the governmental body is challenging
whether an exception to disclosure applies because the information has not yet been determined to
be public. 414 S.W.3d at 818. Accepting the City’s argument, the court stated that the Attorney
General must determine whether information is subject to disclosure when asked to do so, that he
has exclusive jurisdiction to make that determination in the first instance, that the requestor of
information must exhaust all administrative remedies before suing, and that therefore a trial court’s
jurisdiction over a requestor’s suit “only arises after the Attorney General has ruled.” Id. at 818–20.
The City’s position is flawed in several respects. First, it equates information that is public
with information that has been determined by the Attorney General to be public, so that condition
B2 swallows up condition B1. This violates a duty of statutory interpretation to “give effect to all
the words of a statute and not treat any statutory language as surplusage if possible.” Chevron Corp.
v. Redmon, 745 S.W.2d 314, 316 (Tex. 1987).
Further, the City’s view of Section 552.321(a) would relegate mandamus relief to compelling
a governmental body to request an Attorney General’s decision and then comply with it. The
correctness of that decision would be unreviewable. But we have reviewed the Attorney General’s
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rulings. See Cox Tex. Newspapers, L.P., 343 S.W.3d at 113; In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d
328, 329–36 (Tex. 2001). And we have interpreted PIA exceptions without a ruling by the Attorney
General. See City of Garland v. Dall. Morning News, 22 S.W.3d 351, 358–64 (Tex. 2000); A & T
Consultants, Inc., 904 S.W.2d at 671, 674–81. The court of appeals’ interpretation ignores these
cases.
The City argues, and the court of appeals held, that requestors of information should be
required to exhaust their remedies in placing disputes before the Attorney General before resorting
to the courts. But requestors have no such remedies. While the Attorney General may invite their
arguments, they have no right to request or demand a ruling or disclosure from the Attorney General,
and no right to an administrative appeal. See TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.304. Requestors cannot be
required to finish something they have no right to start. The requirement that a governmental body
seek a ruling from the Attorney General when withholding requested information is a check on the
governmental body, not a remedy for the requestor to exhaust. And again, the City’s view of Section
552.321(a) would make the Attorney General’s ruling unreviewable.
The City argues that because information is generally “presumed to be subject to required
public disclosure” when a governmental body fails to timely request an Attorney General’s ruling,
TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.302, the information should not be considered public when a ruling is
requested. But the premise cannot establish its converse. One may infer from a governmental
body’s failure to request a ruling that the body is not claiming an exclusion, else it would advance
its position in compliance with prescribed procedures. See TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.301. One
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cannot likewise infer that just because a governmental body properly seeks an Attorney General’s
ruling, its exclusion claim must be correct.
The Attorney General advises in an amicus brief that he does not claim exclusive jurisdiction
to decide open records issues. Consistent with that position, at the time of the City’s request for a
ruling, as noted above, the Attorney General’s policy was not to rule on issues in litigation. See Tex.
Att’y Gen. OR2011-687. In reversing that policy, he does not claim the authority to rule without
court review.
A requestor of information certainly has the choice to await the Attorney General’s decision.
A governmental body may decide to release the requested information during the process and on
receipt of an adverse opinion from the Attorney General. Efficiency may counsel patience. But the
governmental body is entitled to insist on its position to a final ruling, see TEX . GOV ’T CODE
§ 552.324, and a requestor is not required to defer a suit for mandamus.
A court may decide, exercising sound discretion, to abate proceedings to await the Attorney
General’s ruling. The Attorney General characterizes its authority as akin to primary jurisdiction,
a prudential doctrine that applies when an agency is “staffed with experts trained in handling the
complex problems in the agency’s purview” and there is a benefit to be “derived from [the] agency[]
uniformly interpreting its laws, rules, and regulations.” Subaru of Am., Inc. v. David McDavid
Nissan, Inc., 84 S.W.3d 212, 221 (Tex. 2002). The Legislature has expressly charged the Attorney
General with maintaining “uniformity in the application, operation, and interpretation” of the PIA,
TEX . GOV ’T CODE § 552.011, and the Office of the Attorney General is experienced in interpreting
and applying the subchapter C exceptions. If the court determines that under the circumstances of
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a particular case a decision from the Attorney General before adjudication of the merits of disclosure
would be beneficial and any delay would not impinge on a requestor’s right to information,
abatement would be within the court’s discretion.
The court of appeals erred in dismissing Kallinen’s suit for want of jurisdiction.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for review and, without hearing oral argument, reverse the court
of appeals’ judgment and remand to that court for further proceedings in accordance with this
opinion. TEX . R. APP . P. 59.1.
Opinion issued: March 20, 2015
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Tab J
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS AT HOUSTON
ORDER FOR SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING ON REMAND
Case name: City of Houston, Appellant v.
Randall Kallinen and Paul Kubosh, Appellees
Cause No. 01-12-00050-CV
This court is in receipt of the mandate of the Texas supreme court in this appeal. The
parties may file supplemental briefing if they believe it will aid this court’s consideration of the
issues on remand. The appellant’s supplemental brief is due by October 9, 2015. The appellees’
brief is due 30 days after the appellant’s brief is filed, or by November 9, 2015, whichever is later.
Judge’s signature: /s/ Jane Bland
Jane Bland
Justice, acting individually
Date: September 3, 2015