Sadie Breann Brown v. State ( 2014 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00045-CR
SADIE BREANN BROWN APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM COUNTY CRIMINAL COURT NO. 4 OF TARRANT COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. 1336205
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MEMORANDUM OPINION 1
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Appellant Sadie Breann Brown appeals from the trial court’s denial of her
motion to suppress. We affirm.
Background Facts
At about 1:00 a.m. on July 12, 2013, Corporal Jason Henninger of the City
of Southlake Police Department was sitting at a red light when he saw a white
Ford Explorer driven by Appellant approaching the intersection. Corporal
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
Henninger noticed that the vehicle was travelling faster than the 30-mile-per-hour
speed limit. Before reaching the intersection, Appellant rapidly braked in a way
that Corporal Henninger described as “not a normal slowdown manner” and an
“overcompensation in braking.” Corporal Henninger also noticed that the driver’s
side door was closed but appeared unlatched.
Corporal Henninger followed the vehicle for approximately half a mile. He
watched Appellant “drastically change[] speeds a couple of times,” and then
“dramatically slow[] down.” Corporal Henninger then observed the vehicle’s
speed fluctuating between twenty and twenty-five miles per hour, which was
“steadily below what normal people would drive for that speed on that roadway.”
Corporal Henninger also testified that the vehicle swerved and touched the
center line several times. 2 Concluding that, based on all his observations, the
vehicle was not being operated in a safe manner and that the speed issues, both
above and below the speed limit, weaving on the center line, and hard braking
rose to a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, Corporal Henninger turned on
his overhead lights and pulled the car over. A second officer arrived,
administered field sobriety tests to Appellant, and ultimately arrested her.
Appellant filed a motion to suppress the evidence from the stop. Corporal
Henninger was the only witness at the suppression hearing. He admitted that his
2
The recording made by the patrol car camera during the traffic stop was
admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 2. This court has reviewed that
recording and confirmed that Appellant swerved onto the center line a number of
times.
2
suspicion that Appellant was speeding as he initially observed her, standing
alone, was insufficient to justify a traffic stop. He also acknowledged that his
report contained no mention of the erratic braking or swerving but testified that
Appellant did, in fact, swerve and brake suspiciously.
The trial court denied Appellant’s motion. Appellant subsequently pleaded
guilty. The trial court convicted her and sentenced her to 180 days’ confinement
probated for 18 months and a $1,250 fine. Appellant now brings this appeal.
Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
We give almost total deference to a trial court’s rulings on questions of historical
fact and application-of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of
credibility and demeanor, but we review de novo application-of-law-to-fact
questions that do not turn on credibility and demeanor. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at
673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d 604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson v.
State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); State
v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When, as here, the record
is silent on the reasons for the trial court’s ruling, or when there are no explicit
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fact findings and neither party timely requested findings and conclusions from the
trial court, we imply the necessary fact findings that would support the trial court’s
ruling if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling,
supports those findings. State v. Garcia-Cantu, 253 S.W.3d 236, 241 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2008); see Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 25. We then review the trial court’s legal
ruling de novo unless the implied fact findings supported by the record are also
dispositive of the legal ruling. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d at 819.
Discussion
In one issue, Appellant contends the trial court should have suppressed
Corporal Henninger’s testimony because he lacked reasonable suspicion that
she was breaking the law prior to pulling her over. An officer conducts a lawful
temporary detention when he has reasonable suspicion to believe that a person
is violating the law. Crain v. State, 315 S.W.3d 43, 52 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010);
see State v. Duran, 396 S.W.3d 563, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (“An officer
must have reasonable suspicion that some crime was, or is about to be,
committed before he may make a traffic stop.”); Fernandez v. State, 306 S.W.3d
354, 356 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2010, no pet.) (“[A]n officer may stop and detain
a driver . . . on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.”). Reasonable suspicion
exists when, based on the totality of the circumstances, the officer has specific,
articulable facts that when combined with rational inferences from those facts
would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that a particular person is, has
been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. Fernandez, 306 S.W.3d at
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357. This is an objective standard that disregards any subjective intent of the
officer making the stop and looks solely to whether an objective basis for the stop
exists. Id.; see Duran, 396 S.W.3d at 570 (“If the facts that the officer knows ‘at
the inception of the detention’ support a finding of reasonable suspicion or
probable cause to conduct a traffic stop, then it is irrelevant that the officer
subjectively decided to stop the driver for a bad reason.”).
Texas courts have held that an officer is justified in pulling over a vehicle if
the circumstances, taken as a whole, could reasonably lead to the conclusion
that the driver is intoxicated. Fox v. State, 900 S.W.2d 345, 347 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 1995) (holding that acts arousing suspicion need not be themselves
“inherently illegal” and that speed fluctuation and weaving “each was sufficient to
create a reasonable suspicion that some activity out of the ordinary was or had
occurred”), pet. dism’d, 930 S.W.2d 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Driving below
the speed limit alone fails to support a reasonable suspicion of intoxication. See
Peters v. Texas Dept. of Pub. Safety, 404 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st
Dist.] 2013, no pet.) (holding no reasonable suspicion arises when slow speed
alone is observed and the record is otherwise “silent with respect to the
characteristics of the area”); Richardson v. State, 39 S.W.3d 634, 640 (Tex.
App.—Amarillo 2000, no pet.) (holding that mere observation of slow speed,
absent other unusual behavior “would not justify an investigatory stop for driving
while intoxicated”). But observations of slow speed in conjunction with other
unusual driving patterns may support an officer’s suspicion. Aziewicz v. State,
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No. 10-05-00164-CR, 2006 WL 1697648, at *2–3 (Tex. App.—Waco June 21,
2006, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (affirming denial of a
motion to suppress where trial court found reasonable suspicion based on
weaving, erratic braking, and driving ten miles per hour below the posted limit);
McQuarters v. State, 58 S.W.3d 250, 253 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2001, pet.
ref’d) (holding that officer’s observations of a vehicle traveling slowly in a passing
lane helps support a suspicion of intoxication). In totality-of-the-circumstances
inferences, Texas courts may factor an officer’s experience recognizing
intoxication through certain driving patterns. Foster v. State, 326 S.W.3d 609,
614 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) (finding reasonable suspicion existed “[i]n light of the
time of night, the location, [and the officer’s] training and experience”).
Appellant argues that Corporal Henninger unlawfully based his reasonable
suspicion “on no more than an inarticulate hunch.” The stop occurred at 1 a.m.
Officers may heighten their suspicions when they observe unusual driving
behavior late at night. Foster, 326 S.W.3d at 614. Appellant’s sudden braking
reasonably alerted the officer that something might be awry. See Fox, 900
S.W.2d at 347. Appellant’s slow pace and inconsistent speed could likewise
instill reasonable suspicion in an officer that perhaps her motor skills were
impaired by alcohol. See Aziewicz, 2006 WL 1697648, at *3; McQuarters, 58
S.W.3d at 253. For the same reasons, Appellant’s swerving further supports the
objective reasonableness of Corporal Henninger’s suspicion. See Fox, 900
S.W.2d at 347. Corporal Henninger also testified that Appellant’s driver-side
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door appeared unlatched and “warranted further looking at.” We consider that
Corporal Henninger had at least fifteen years of on-the-job experience and
training, including a Master’s degree in Criminology and Criminal Justice, to
identify indications of intoxication. See Foster, 326 S.W.3d at 614 (holding that
officer’s inference that appellant was intoxicated was rational “[i]n light of the time
of night, the location, [the officer]’s training and experience, and [the appellant]’s
aggressive driving”). Taken as a whole, these factors support an “objective
justification” for the stop. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err
by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress, and we overrule her only issue. 3
Conclusion
Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s
judgment.
/s/ Lee Gabriel
LEE GABRIEL
JUSTICE
PANEL: GARDNER, WALKER, and GABRIEL, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: November 20, 2014
3
Because the record supports a conclusion of reasonable suspicion, we
need not address Appellant’s community-caretaking argument. See Tex. R. App.
P. 47.1.
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