in the Matter of the Marriage of John Thomas Scott and Alta Mae Scott ( 2003 )

NO. 07-01-0200-CV

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL E

OCTOBER 7, 2003 ______________________________

IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE OF ALTA MAE SCOTT AND JOHN THOMAS SCOTT _________________________________

FROM THE 316^TH DISTRICT COURT OF HUTCHINSON COUNTY;

NO. 33,458; HON. JOHN LAGRONE, PRESIDING _______________________________

Before JOHNSON, C.J., QUINN, J., and BOYD, S.J. ⁽¹⁾

OPINION

John Thomas Scott (John) appeals from a final divorce decree which ended his 53 year marriage to Alta Mae Scott (Alta) and divided the community property. The four issues before us fall within two general categories. The first involves the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial court's decision to grant the divorce and divide the marital estate. The second concerns the ability of the trial court to award title to realty to one who is not a party to the action. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part.

Issue One -- Sufficiency of the Evidence Underlying the Grounds for Divorce

John initially contends that the evidence underlying the trial court's decision to grant the divorce was both legally and factually insufficient. We disagree.

Alta petitioned for divorce on the grounds that the marriage had become insupportable due to discord or conflict of personalities that destroys the legitimate ends of the marital relationship and prevents any reasonable expectation of reconciliation. See Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §6.001 (Vernon 1998). Though she did not personally testify at trial, the record nonetheless contains evidence indicating that 1) the Scotts had not slept in the same bedroom for approximately 22 years or lived under the same roof for one and one-half years prior to the final hearing, 2) Alta had changed her lifestyle, 3) Alta had attempted to run John off of the road with a vehicle, 4) John believed Alta was undermining his business, and 5) John wanted to "get rid of this deal." This is more than ample evidence upon which the trial court could have determined that the marital relationship has been impeded, that discord and conflict of personalities existed, and that the marital relationship had ended without reasonable expectation of reconciliation. See Baxla v. Baxla, 522 S.W.2d 736, 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1975, no writ) (holding evidence that indicated one spouse threatened to kill the other and attempts at reconciliation went for naught evinced that the marital relationship had become insupportable).

As stated in precedent, whether the evidence is sufficient to establish insupportability is left to the discretion of the trial court when the divorce is tried by the court. Id. at 738-39; Cusack v. Cusack, 491 S.W.2d 714, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1973, writ dism'd w.o.j.). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it held that the marital relationship between the Scotts had become insupportable.

Issue Two -- Award to J & J Panhandle Construction, Inc.

Next, John asserts that the trial court erred when it awarded title to several parcels of realty to J & J Panhandle Construction, Inc. (J & J) even though J & J was not a party to the divorce proceeding. We overrule the point.

The property in question (various tracts totaling 40 acres) was transferred by an entity known as Riata to John and Alta. At the time of the transfer, Riata owed J & J for work that J & J had performed for it. And, to satisfy the outstanding debt due J & J, Riata transferred the realty to Alta and John, the latter being a director and the president of the corporation. Thereafter, John's son, James, intervened in the divorce proceeding. He did so alleging that he, like his father, was a shareholder of J & J and that John had "engaged in fraudulent or dishonest conduct . . . in that he breached his fiduciary duty to the Corporation by using corporate funds to acquire property in his personal name" and that "he has failed to reveal to other directors and officers pertinent facts adverse to corporate interests . . . ." Thereafter, he prayed for damages, the removal of John as a director of J & J, interest, costs, attorney's fees, and "such other relief which the Intervenor may be entitled." Though John answered the petition, he did so by general denial. No special exceptions were included in the pleading.

James' petition can be reasonably interpreted as being in the nature of a shareholder's derivative suit. That is, he, as a shareholder of J & J, initiated suit on behalf of the corporation to recover upon claims of the corporation against its president. And, though the petition may have omitted various pleading requirements mandated by statute, see Edlund v. Bounds, 842 S.W.2d 719, 728-29 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ) (holding that the shareholder must allege in his pleading that he made demand upon the corporate officers to prosecute the action and they refused or explain why no such demand was made), no one specially excepted to their absence. Thus, they were waived.

Similarly waived was any complaint about James failing to join J & J as a party to the suit. While the corporation was a necessary or indispensable party to the proceeding, see DeBoard v. Cicle Y Of Yoakum, Inc., 951 S.W.2d 127, 134 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1997), rev'd on other grounds, 967 S.W.2d 352 (Tex. 1998) (holding it an indispensable party to a shareholders derivative suit); Providential Inv. Corp v. Dibrell, 320 S.W.2d 415, 418 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston 1959, no writ) (holding it a necessary party to such a suit), no one objected to its absence below. Thus, the defect was waived. See Puryear v. Red River Authority, 383 S.W.2d 818, 821 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1964, writ ref'd n.r.e.) (holding that in the absence of a plea of non-joinder of necessary parties, the appellate court was not authorized to reverse the trial court's judgment because of the lack of a necessary party); Cox v. Johnson, 638 S.W.2d 867, 68 (Tex. 1982) (holding that the failure to join an indispensable party generally is not fundamental error because seldom will the absence of an indispensable party deprive the trial court of jurisdiction to adjudicate between the parties already joined).

Finally, a reading of the record discloses ample evidence upon which the factfinder could have reasonably decided that the realty actually belonged to J & J. Again, Riata owed the corporation a debt. Thus, the receivable belonged to J & J, not John, its president and a shareholder. Moreover, the conveyance occurred in satisfaction of the debt owed to J & J, according to John's own testimony. It is well settled that when one party pays the purchase price of realty (that price being satisfaction of the debt due J & J at bar) but title is placed in the name of another, a purchase money resulting trust will arise in favor of the entity providing the purchase money. Nolana Dev. Ass'n v. Corsi, 682 S.W.2d 246, 250 (Tex. 1984). There existing evidence illustrating that such a trust arose here, the trial court did not err in vesting J & J with title to the land.

Issue Three -- Sale of Horses Below Fair Market Value

Next, John attacks the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial court's finding number VIII. In the latter, the trial court stated that on

December 7, 1999, [it] ordered the eleven horses belonging to the parties to be sold and the proceeds paid into the registry of the Court. John . . ., without consulting [Alta], sold the horses at a private sale for $3,100, an amount below their fair market value, with intent to reacquire said horses after the divorce was final.

However, John neither argues nor attempts to illustrate the effect, if any, that the court's finding had upon the judgment ultimately rendered. This is of import since the burden lay with him to establish on appeal that the purported error caused the rendition of an improper judgment. In re M.S., No. 02-0509, 2003 WL 21512654 (Tex. July 3, 2003); Crescendo Inv., Inc. v. Brice, 61 S.W.3d 465, 477 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2001, pet. denied). Consequently, we may not reverse the judgment of the trial court (assuming that the error of which he complains was indeed error). See Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a) (stating that no judgment may be reversed on appeal on the ground that the trial court made an error of law unless the court of appeals concludes that the error complained of probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment or probably prevented the appellant from properly presenting the case to the court of appeals); Goode v. Shoukfeh, 915 S.W.2d 666, 673 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1996), affirmed, 943 S.W.2d 441 (Tex. 1997) (overruling the point of error since the appellant did not claim or attempt to show that he was harmed by the purported error).

Issue Four - Valuation and Division of Property

Through his last issue, John attacks the trial court's distribution of the marital estate. He does so by first contending that the trial court erred in valuing two separate tracts of land. Then, he questions the sufficiency of the evidence underlying the trial court's finding that the personalty awarded to each litigant was substantially equal. We sustain the issue.

Statute obligates the trial court to divide the marital estate, upon the divorce of the parties, "in a manner that the court deems just and right, having due regard for the rights of each party and any children of the marriage." Tex. Fam. Code Ann. §7.001 (Vernon 1998). This provision does not obligate the court to divide the property equally. Tate v. Tate, 55 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2000, no pet.). Indeed, it has long been held that trial courts have great discretion in determining how to divide the estate, and we cannot interfere with that decision unless and until it is shown that its discretion was abused. Murff v. Murff, 615 S.W.2d 696, 698 (Tex. 1981). With this said, we turn to the contentions before us.

As to the valuation of the two tracts of land, the first parcel consists of five acres located in Hutchinson County. On it sits a three bedroom 1700 square foot house in average condition, a detached two car garage, another detached garage, three storage buildings, a metal shop, two horse stables with a pipe fence corral, one water well, a windmill, several chicken coops, and other improvements. The trial court valued the property at $35,610. This was the very same value placed upon it by Alta in her verified inventory and appraisement, which document was received into evidence. See Vannerson v. Vannerson, 857 S.W.2d 659, 671 (Tex. App.-Houston [1^st Dist.] 1993, no writ) (holding that the trial court could rely upon the contents of a sworn inventory when arriving at its conclusions of law); Bailey County Appraisal Dist. v. Smallwood, 848 S.W.2d 822, 824 (Tex. App.-Amarillo 1993, no writ) (stating that an owner is qualified to testify about the market value of his property). Furthermore, she represents (through her brief and verified inventory and appraisement) that the $35,610 figure was the valuation assigned to the parcel by the Hutchinson County Appraisal District in 1997 (three years prior to trial). Thus, some evidence appears of record supporting the trial court's valuation of the property.

Yet, also of record is other evidence concerning the value of the tract. For instance, Alta tendered an appraisal wherein the appraiser opined that the realty had a market value of $80,000. He based his opinion upon comparable sales in the area. Next, a local real estate agent represented that based on his inspection of the home and improvements, "we could list [the] home for sale at an asking price of $125,000 and could probably get an offer somewhere in that price range." Additionally, John valued the parcel from $125,000 to $150,000. As can be seen, this other evidence, including that of Alta's own appraiser, valued the parcel at a sum far greater than that assigned by the local appraisal district three years before trial. More importantly, authority has long recognized that "values reflected by the tax rolls do not reflect actual value." Housing Authority v. Brown, 256 S.W.2d 656, 659 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1953, no writ). Given Brown, Alta's apparent reliance on the local tax rolls when valuing the tract in her inventory and appraisement, the trial court's obvious reliance on Alta's opinion, and the other evidence illustrating a value at least twice as much as the dated valuation assigned the land by local tax rolls, we conclude that the valuation placed on the land by the trial court is so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to make the valuation clearly wrong or manifestly unjust.

In short, the evidence underlying the valuation is factually insufficient. Therefore, the finding is erroneous. So too is it harmful. For instance, in addition to awarding the tract to Alta, the trial court also entered a $12,000 judgment against John and in favor of Alta "[f]or the purpose of a just and right division of property." Obviously, revaluation of the five acre parcel would materially affect the sum, if any, John is obligated to pay Alta to gain a just and right division of their estate. So, the error probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. Tex. R. App. P. 44.1(a)(1). And, because it did, we must remand the entire community estate for a new division. Jacobs v. Jacobs, 687 S.W.2d 731, 732 (Tex. 1985) (holding that where error in part of the division of the marital estate materially affects the trial court's just and right division of the entire estate, the reviewing court must remand the entire community estate for a new division); In re Taylor, 992 S.W.2d 616, 621 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1999, no pet.) (holding the same).

Having sustained that portion of issue four involving valuation of the five acre tract, we need not consider the other aspects of the issue. Accordingly, we reverse that part of the trial court's judgment that divides the community estate of John and Alta Scott and remand the cause for further proceedings. In all other aspects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Per Curiam

1. John T. Boyd, Chief Justice (Ret.), Seventh Court of Appeals, sitting by assignment. Tex. Gov't Code Ann. §75.002(a)(1) (Vernon Supp. 2003).

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NO. 07-09-00376-CR

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

AT AMARILLO

PANEL A

SEPTEMBER 23, 2010

RICKY BOLTON, JR.,

A/K/A RICKY JUNIOR BOLTON, APPELLANT

v.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE

 FROM THE 108TH DISTRICT COURT OF POTTER COUNTY;

NO. 58,354-E; HONORABLE DOUGLAS WOODBURN, JUDGE

Before CAMPBELL and HANCOCK and PIRTLE, JJ.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Ricky Bolton, Jr., appeals his conviction for possession of a controlled substance, cocaine, less than one gram.[1]  Appellant was sentenced to two years in a State Jail Facility of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice (SJF-TDCJ).  Appellant appeals the judgment of the trial court contending that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to sustain the jury’s verdict.  We affirm.

Factual and Procedural Background

            On August 13, 2008, Officer Terry Moore of the Amarillo Police Department was dispatched to a Toot’n Totum convenience store at 1400 East Amarillo Boulevard as part of a forgery investigation.  Upon arriving at the Toot’n Totum, Moore observed a 1999 Chevrolet Lumina containing two occupants parked in the parking lot.  When Moore pulled into the parking lot, both occupants of the Lumina appeared to duck down. Upon obtaining information that the Lumina might have been involved in the forgery incident, Moore and another officer, Scott Chappel, approached the Lumina in order to interview the two occupants.  Appellant was seated in the front passenger seat of the Lumina.  Chappel approached the driver, and Moore went to the front passenger side to speak to appellant.

            As Moore approached appellant, he noticed that appellant appeared to be nervous.  When asked for identification, appellant said he did not have any.  When speaking to Moore, appellant would not make eye contact and spoke in such a low tone that Moore had trouble understanding appellant.  Moore then asked appellant to step from the vehicle and, instead of getting out of the vehicle, appellant took his left hand and reached back towards his back left pocket.  Moore testified he thought appellant might be going for a weapon.  Appellant was ordered to show his hand, and, instead of showing his left hand as directed, appellant reached down the right side of the seat with his closed right hand.  As appellant made this second move with his hand, Moore reached in through the window to grab appellant’s arm to get control of the situation.  Appellant kept his right hand tightly closed even as Moore delivered two blows to it in an effort to force the hand open. 

            Eventually, with the assistance of another officer, Moore pulled appellant from the vehicle.  As appellant was being wrestled to the ground, he still kept his right hand tightly closed.  While the police attempted to pull appellant’s arms behind his back to apply hand-cuffs, Moore noticed appellant make a throwing gesture with his right hand. Moore testified that he did not see anything fly out of appellant’s hand; however, upon gaining control of appellant, Moore peered under the vehicle toward which appellant made the throwing gesture.  Under the vehicle, Moore found a plastic baggie of crack cocaine.  After appellant had been secured, Moore checked the area around where appellant had been seated and found a glass crack pipe stuffed between appellant’s seat and the console.  Moore testified that this was where appellant had reached with his left hand. After the cocaine was retrieved, it was placed in the property room of the police department until it was taken to the Department of Public Safety laboratory for testing. 

            Chappel testified that he did not see appellant make the throwing gesture.  However, Chappel also testified that he remembered that, all during the struggle to get appellant out of the vehicle, appellant kept his right hand securely clinched.  Chappel did recall that Moore commented on appellant making a throwing motion and that the comment was made before the cocaine was found under the vehicle.

            The jury convicted appellant and he was subsequently sentenced to serve two years in a SJF-TDCJ.  Via two issues, appellant contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to link appellant to the contraband discovered under the vehicle.  Disagreeing with appellant, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Standard of Review

When an appellant challenges both legal and factual sufficiency, we are required to conduct an analysis of the legal sufficiency of the evidence first and then, only if we find the evidence to be legally sufficient, do we analyze the factual sufficiency of the evidence. See Clewis v. State, 922 S.W.2d 126, 133 (Tex.Crim.App. 1996).  In assessing the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict to determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979); Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007). In conducting a legal sufficiency review, an appellate court may not usurp the role of the factfinder; rather, our role on appeal is restricted to guarding against the rare occurrence when a factfinder does not act rationally.  See Laster v. State, 275 S.W.3d 512, 517 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009).  

            In a factual sufficiency review, we must consider all of the evidence in a neutral light to determine whether a jury was rationally justified in finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Watson v. State, 204 S.W.3d 404, 415 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006).  In our analysis, we must determine whether the evidence supporting the verdict is so weak or so against the great weight and preponderance of the evidence as to render the verdict manifestly unjust.  See Steadman v. State, 280 S.W.3d 242, 246 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009).  A wrong and unjust verdict includes instances in which the jury’s finding “shocks the conscience[]” or clearly demonstrates bias.  See Grotti v. State, 273 S.W.3d 273, 280 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).  In a factual sufficiency review, we must be mindful that a jury has already passed on the facts and must give due deference to the determinations of the jury.  See Lancon v. State, 253 S.W.3d 699, 704-05 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008).  If our decision is to set aside the verdict of the jury, our opinion should clearly explain how the evidence supporting the verdict is too weak on its own or how the contradicting evidence so greatly outweighs the evidence in support of the verdict.  See id. at 705.  Conversely, if our decision is to uphold a verdict, we are required to consider the most important evidence that the appellant claims undermines the jury's verdict and explain why that evidence does not have the persuasive force the appellant believes is sufficient to overturn the verdict. See Sims v. State, 99 S.W.3d 600, 603 (Tex.Crim.App. 2003).

            In a sufficiency of the evidence review, the essential elements of the offense are those of a hypothetically correct jury charge for the offense in question (i.e., one that accurately sets out the law and adequately describes the offense for which the appellant was tried without increasing the State’s burden of proof or restricting the State’s theory of criminal responsibility).  See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 14; Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997).

            In our review, we consider both direct and circumstantial evidence and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence.  See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.  Circumstantial evidence alone is sufficient to establish the guilt of the accused, and the standard of review as to the sufficiency of the evidence is the same for both direct and circumstantial evidence cases.   See id.  Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of the accused, so long as the cumulative force of all the evidence, when coupled with reasonable inferences to be drawn from that evidence, is sufficient to support the conviction.  See id.

Possession of a Controlled Substance

A conviction for possession of cocaine is supported only when the defendant Aknowingly or intentionally possesses@ the drug.  Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a) (Vernon 2010).  Proof of possession requires evidence the accused exercised Aactual care, custody, control, or management@ over the substance.  See id. § 481.002(38) (Vernon 2010).  Thus, the State must prove the accused (1) Aexercised care, custody, control, or management over the [contraband]@ and (2) knew that the substance Apossessed@ was contraband.  See Martin v. State, 753 S.W.2d 384, 387 (Tex.Crim.App. 1988).

When the accused is not in exclusive control of the place where the contraband is found, the State must establish care, custody, control, or management by linking the accused to the substance through additional facts and circumstances.  See Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 161-62 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006); Poindexter v. State, 153 S.W.3d 402, 406 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005).  Whether the State=s evidence is direct or circumstantial, its evidence of links must establish, Ato the requisite level of confidence, that the accused=s connection with the drug was more than just fortuitous.@  Poindexter, 153 S.W.3d at 405-06 (citing Brown v. State, 911 S.W.2d 744, 747 (Tex.Crim.App. 1995)); Park v. State, 8 S.W.3d 351, 353 (Tex.App.BAmarillo 1999, no pet.).

  The many factors by which an accused may, under the unique circumstances of each case, be sufficiently Alinked@ to the contraband, include: (1) the defendant=s presence when a search is conducted; (2) whether the contraband is in plain view; (3) the defendant=s proximity to and the accessibility of the contraband; (4) whether the defendant was under the influence of contraband when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee; (8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11) whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13) whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12; See Triplett v. State, 292 S.W.3d 205, 208 (Tex.App.BAmarillo 2009, pet. ref’d.) (listing numerous factors).  These factors, however, are simply that: factors which may circumstantially establish the sufficiency of evidence offered to prove a knowing Apossession.@  See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162 n.12 (explaining that factors Aare not a litmus test@).  It is not the number of links that is dispositive, but rather the logical force of all the evidence.  See id. at 162.

Analysis

Appellant contends that a lack of links to the contraband makes the evidence legally and factually insufficient.  This is so, according to appellant, because no one testified that they saw appellant actually throw the baggie of cocaine later found beneath the car.  Appellant’s theory of the case continues that, since Moore only saw a throwing motion, there is no link between appellant and the later found baggie.

Links

            The record before the Court contains the following facts that link appellant to the contraband in question: 1) appellant’s conduct indicated a consciousness of guilt in that he: a) slid down and tried to duck down in his seat when the police arrived at the location of the forgery, b) appeared nervous when Moore approached him, c) would not make eye contact with Moore, d) replied to questions in such a low voice that Moore had difficulty hearing him, and e) refused to exit the vehicle when ordered; 2) appellant made a furtive gesture with his left hand; 3) appellant had his right fist closed and refused to open it; 4) the closed fist was the hand with which appellant made the throwing gesture; 5) the cocaine was found at a location which was in line with the throwing gesture made by appellant; and 6) the glass crack pipe was found between the seat appellant occupied and the console.  See id. at 162.

Legal Sufficiency

            When the links that tie appellant to the contraband are examined, we are left with a significant amount of testimony connecting appellant to the cocaine.  Remembering that circumstantial evidence is as probative of the links required as is direct evidence, we conclude that the links recited above are sufficient to legally connect appellant to the contraband.  See Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.  Finally, we must be mindful that it is not the number of links that are important but the logical force of the links in question that is important.  Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162. Because we find there are sufficient links to connect appellant to the cocaine, the jury was acting as a rational factfinder when it found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319; Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13.  Appellant’s first issue is overruled.

Factual Sufficiency

            The same links that tie appellant to the cocaine in a legal sufficiency review are present when the evidence is viewed in a neutral light, as we must do when reviewing factual sufficiency issues.  Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 415.  Further, nothing about the jury’s finding “shocks the conscience” or clearly demonstrates bias.  See Grotti, 273 S.W.3d at 280. Neither is the evidence so weak as to render the verdict manifestly unjust.  See Steadman, 280 S.W.3d at 246. Simply stated, from appellant’s first contact with Moore, he sensed that appellant was trying to hide something. Appellant’s actions in refusing to show his hands and then keeping the right hand in a closed fist were indications that appellant had contraband.  When we add to this the throwing motion and finding the cocaine directly in line with where the throwing motion indicated, we have factually sufficient evidence to connect appellant with the cocaine.  Finally, finding the glass crack pipe stuffed down between the seat and the console where Moore observed appellant place his left hand further ties appellant to the cocaine.  All of this evidence serves as links to tie appellant to the cocaine. See Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162.

            Appellant posits that since there were other people in the parking lot that the evidence was insufficient to connect appellant to the contraband.  See Sims, 99 S.W.3d at 603. The essence of appellant’s argument is that someone else could have placed the cocaine on the ground under the car. When each officer was questioned about this, they all had basically the same response: none of them had ever seen anyone simply place drugs on the ground and walk away from the drugs.  The jury heard all of this testimony and chose to believe that appellant tossed the drugs under the car.  See Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 704-05.  We cannot say that the jury’s decision was irrational when it found appellant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.  See Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 417.  Accordingly, appellant’s second issue is overruled.

Conclusion

            Having overruled appellant’s issues, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

                                                                                                Mackey K. Hancock

                                                                                                            Justice

Do not publish. 

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[1] See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(b) (Vernon 2010).