Tony G. Bailey v. State ( 2004 )


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  •                                              NO. 07-03-0148-CR
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    AT AMARILLO
    PANEL E
    MARCH 23, 2004
    ______________________________
    TONY G. BAILEY,
    Appellant
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,
    Appellee
    _________________________________
    FROM THE 364TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
    NO. 2002-439,301; HON. BRADLEY UNDERWOOD, PRESIDING
    _______________________________
    Before QUINN and REAVIS, JJ., and BOYD, S.J.1
    Appellant, Tony G. Bailey, appeals his convictions for possessing, with intent to
    deliver, a controlled substance (methamphetamine) and manufacturing a controlled
    substance. His sole issue on appeal involves whether he voluntarily consented to a
    second search of his house. As a result of that search, the contraband in question was
    found. So too was it later admitted into evidence at trial prior to appellant attempting to
    suppress its admission. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    1
    John T. B oyd, C hief Justice (R et.), Se venth Court o f Appea ls, sitting by assignm ent. T EX . G O V ’T
    C ODE A N N . §75.002 (a)(1 ) (Vernon 199 8).
    The record illustrates that when the police arrived at appellant’s home they did so
    with the intent to search for an individual named Roberts. Appellant invited the police in
    and permitted them to look for Roberts. After discovering various items of contraband, the
    police testified that they asked for and received additional consent to conduct an additional
    search for drugs and drug-making paraphernalia. On appeal, appellant contends that the
    contraband found should have been suppressed because the second purported instance
    of consent was coerced. However, this reason for suppressing the evidence was never
    mentioned below. Indeed, appellant denied, at trial, that he even consented to the second
    search of his abode. Having denied that he even consented to a second search, he could
    have hardly argued that his consent to the second search was coerced. So, because the
    ground underlying his claim on appeal does not match that uttered at trial, it was not
    preserved for review. See Johnson v. State, 
    651 S.W.2d 303
    , 311 (Tex. App.--San
    Antonio 1983, no pet.) (holding that the appellant was precluded from seeking review of
    the voluntariness of his girlfriend’s consent to search when his objection at trial was that
    the police failed to obtain permission from him to search).
    Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Brian Quinn
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    2
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 07-03-00148-CR

Filed Date: 3/23/2004

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/7/2015