Dalton James Bennett, Jr. A/K/A Dalton James Bennett v. State , 471 S.W.3d 5 ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
DALTON JAMES BENNETT, JR. A/K/A §
DALTON JAMES BENNETT, No. 08-13-00138-CR
§
Appellant, Appeal from the
§
v. 372nd District Court
§
THE STATE OF TEXAS, of Tarrant County, Texas
§
Appellee. (TC# 1244131D)
OPINION
Appellant Dalton James Bennett was found guilty by a jury of one count of capital murder
of his wife and his sister-in-law, and received an automatic life sentence. On appeal, Appellant
contends the trial court violated his right to be free from double jeopardy, his right to a unanimous
verdict, and his Sixth Amendment right to confront witnesses. We conclude Appellant’s rights
were not violated and affirm the trial court’s judgment.1
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Appellant separated from his wife, Sheryl Bennett, approximately six months before the
killings that formed the basis of his capital murder conviction. Appellant and Sheryl had a
1
This case was transferred from our sister court in Fort Worth, and we decide it in accordance with the precedent of
that Court to the extent required by TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
somewhat rocky relationship. While separated, Sheryl became involved with Jose Reyes, and the
two began living together in Sheryl’s apartment on a part-time basis. According to friends,
Appellant appeared to be upset about his wife’s new relationship and believed she was “cheating”
on him. Approximately two weeks before the killings, Appellant met with a mutual friend,
advised her that he was upset with Sheryl because of her new relationship, and stated: “You don't
know how bad I want to give her an extra hole to breathe out of.”
Around 10:30 p.m. the night before the killings, Sheryl and Jose walked from her
apartment to a nearby bar, along with Sheryl’s brother, Johnny Todd, and Johnny’s wife, Tana
Todd, who lived in the apartment adjacent to Sheryl. Sheryl’s brother, James Todd, remained at
the apartment to babysit Sheryl’s five children, as well as Johnny and Tana’s three children.
Appellant arrived at the same bar to meet mutual friends. When Appellant learned that
Sheryl was at the bar with Jose, he advised his friends he intended to leave because of their
presence. After Appellant left the bar, he exchanged several negative text messages with both
Sheryl and his sister-in-law Tana in the hours leading up to the killings.
Sheryl, Tana, Jose, and Johnny left the bar together, arriving back at Sheryl’s apartment at
approximately 12:30 a.m. The four of them went into Sheryl’s bedroom located in the back of the
apartment, and began drinking “Jager shots,” while at least three of their children were in the living
room playing video games.
Shortly thereafter, Appellant walked into the apartment through an unlocked door and
entered Sheryl’s bedroom. According to Johnny Todd, who survived the shootings, when
Appellant walked in, he told Sheryl, “Here’s your divorce,” and proceeded to shoot Sheryl in the
arm. Immediately thereafter, Appellant shot Johnny Todd in the neck, causing him to collapse to
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the ground. Johnny Todd recalled that Appellant also shot his wife, Tana, at the same time,
causing her to fall to the ground as well. Johnny Todd testified that he recalled hearing three or
four additional shots after he and Tana were shot.
Although unable to move for several minutes, Johnny was eventually able to check on the
other victims. He determined they were all dead and then went next door to his apartment to call
911. During that call, Johnny identified Appellant as the shooter to the 911 operator.
Sheryl’s son, Jason Todd, who was ten years old at the time of the shootings, testified that
he was in the living room of Sheryl’s apartment playing a video game when he heard someone
enter the apartment and walk into his mother’s bedroom. Jason thereafter heard at least two
gunshots and then saw Appellant leave his mother’s bedroom with a gun in his hand. After
entering the bedroom and seeing the three bodies on the floor, Jason ran to the apartment next door
and told his uncle, James Todd, to call 911. At that same time, Jason observed his other uncle,
Johnny Todd, bleeding from a hole in his neck and trying to call 911 as well.
When Arlington police officers arrived at the scene, they determined that Sheryl, Tana, and
Jose had been shot, and showed no signs of life. Upon learning from witnesses that Appellant
was a suspect in the killings, police officers were dispatched to Appellant’s home, where they
found Appellant in the garage bleeding from apparently self-inflicted wounds, unresponsive to
their verbal commands. It appeared to the officers that Appellant had cut himself on the arms and
neck with a box cutter that was found nearby on the garage floor. The officers also found a
possible suicide note on a desk in Appellant’s bedroom, in which Appellant apologized to his
mother and son, saying he could not “handle the pain anymore” and that he could not “let her get
away with this.”
3
The officers found a Llama .45 caliber, semi-automatic handgun and holster under
Appellant’s bed, as well as a gun box with “two empty magazines” in a nearby closet. The police
later tested bullets and .45 auto-caliber shell casings found at the crime scene, and concluded they
were all fired from the .45 Llama gun found at Appellant’s residence.
Immediately after the shootings, Appellant was transported to the hospital for treatment for
his wounds, but was released shortly thereafter and taken to the jail where detectives interviewed
him. After waiving his rights and voluntarily agreeing to speak to the detectives, Appellant made
a full recorded confession, admitting that he had shot all four victims in Sheryl’s apartment.
During this interview, Appellant advised detectives that he would have shot himself after the
killings, but he had no bullets left.
At trial, Dr. Lloyd White, a physician contracted with the Tarrant County Medical
Examiner’s Office, testified that he personally conducted an autopsy on Tana Todd’s body, and
concluded that she had died from a gunshot wound that went through her head and brain, exiting
through the other side. Dr. White further concluded that the shot was fired just a few inches from
Tana’s head, causing her instantaneous death, and that Tana’s death was a homicide.
Dr. White testified that he also personally performed an autopsy on Sheryl’s body and
concluded that Sheryl suffered three gunshot wounds to her shoulder, eye, and collarbone area, all
of which went through her body. According to Dr. White, shots were fired a few inches away
from Sheryl’s body, but the only fatal wound was the one in her collarbone area. Dr. White
concluded that Sheryl’s death was a homicide.
Dr. White, however, did not perform the autopsy on Jose Reyes’ body, and the doctor who
performed the autopsy, Dr. Gary Sisler, had retired prior to trial and was not called as a witness.
4
Over Appellant’s continuing objection, Dr. White was allowed to testify that he had reviewed Dr.
Sisler’s autopsy report and medical file, and on that basis had formed an opinion that the cause of
Jose’s death was a homicide, resulting from a “perforating gunshot wound of the head and brain.”
The jury found Appellant guilty of capital murder, expressly finding that Appellant had
intentionally killed Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd in a single criminal transaction. The trial
court imposed an automatic life sentence as required by statute.
DISCUSSION
The Trial Court’s Denial of the Motion to Quash the Indictment
In his first two issues, Appellant contends that the trial court erred when it denied his
motion to quash the indictment, contending that the indictment violated both his right to be free
from double jeopardy and his right to a unanimous verdict.
Background
The indictment charged Appellant with a single count of capital murder, based on the
theory that he had intentionally killed multiple victims in a single transaction in violation of
TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(A) (West Supp. 2014).2 However, the indictment contained
three separate paragraphs, each setting forth an alternative theory of prosecution. The first
paragraph alleged Appellant had intentionally caused the death of Sheryl Bennett and Jose Reyes
in the same transaction; the second paragraph alleged Appellant had intentionally caused the death
of Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd in the same transaction; and the third paragraph alleged
Appellant had intentionally caused the death of Tana Todd and Jose Reyes in the same transaction.
Appellant filed a pretrial motion to quash the indictment, contending the indictment in
2
TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) provides that an individual commits the offense of capital murder if “(7) the
person murders more than one person: (A) during the same criminal transaction….”
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effect accused him of committing three separate capital murder offenses involving the same three
victims, and that he therefore faced the possibility of being convicted of three separate capital
murder charges in violation of his double jeopardy rights. Appellant also argued that the
indictment improperly raised the possibility that a jury could reach a non-unanimous verdict, as
some jurors could base a guilty verdict on a finding that Appellant had killed Sheryl Bennett and
Jose Reyes in a single transaction; while others could base their verdict on a finding that he had
killed Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd in a single transaction; while yet others could base their
verdict on a finding that he had killed Tana Todd and Jose Reyes in a single transaction.
At a pretrial hearing, another judge sitting in place of the trial court denied the motion to
quash. Appellant thereafter renewed his motion at various times during the trial, but the trial
court denied his motion on each occasion.
Standard of Review
The standard of review for assessing a trial court’s ruling on a motion to quash turns on
which judicial actor is in the best position to determine the issue in controversy. See Guzman v.
State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex.Crim.App. 1997). Questions of law – such as the sufficiency of an
indictment – are reviewed de novo because neither the trial court nor the reviewing court occupies
an appreciably better position than the other to decide the issue. See State v. Moff, 154 S.W.3d
599, 601 (Tex.Crim.App. 2004); Guzman, 955 S.W.2d at 89; Ahmad v. State, 295 S.W.3d 731, 739
(Tex.App. – Fort Worth 2009, pet. ref’d) (op. on reh’g). Appellant is challenging the legal
sufficiency of the indictment, and we therefore review Appellant’s challenges to the indictment de
novo.
Appellant’s Double Jeopardy Rights were not Violated
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In Issue One, Appellant contends the trial court’s failure to quash the indictment violated
his double jeopardy rights, as it potentially subjected Appellant to three separate convictions for
capital murder when only one such conviction was permissible. In support of his argument,
Appellant relies almost exclusively on Saenz v. State, 166 S.W.3d 270 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005). In
Saenz, the defendant was charged with capital murder in a three-count indictment involving three
murders alleged to have occurred in a single criminal transaction. Each count alleged the murder
of a different victim, and each count alleged the murder of two other victims in the same criminal
transaction as aggravating circumstances. The jury convicted the defendant of all three counts of
capital murder, but the San Antonio Court of Appeals concluded that double jeopardy prohibited
the defendant from being convicted of multiple counts of capital murder involving the same three
victims. Id. at 271. The court of appeals therefore vacated two of the defendant’s convictions
and allowed only one to stand.
On the State’s petition for discretionary review, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals
agreed with the appellate court, holding that the capital murder statute, TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. §
19.03(a)(7)(A), allowed only a single conviction under these circumstances. The Court explained
that the Penal Code provides that a defendant may commit capital murder in several different
ways, including situations in which the defendant commits a predicate murder, with the
commission of one or more additional murders in a single transaction as an aggravating
circumstance. The Court pointed out that when the State is prosecuting a defendant for capital
murder on this basis, its prosecution necessarily rests on the theory that the defendant killed “more
than one person” in a single transaction, making this the “allowable unit of prosecution[.]” Saenz,
166 S.W.3d at 273-74.
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The Court explained that in a non-capital murder case, the murder itself is the “allowable
unit of prosecution,” and a defendant may therefore be convicted of more than one count of murder
when charged individually with the deaths of multiple victims. However, in capital murder cases
in which the multiple murder itself is considered to be the “allowable unit of prosecution,” the
defendant may not be charged or convicted of three separate counts of capital murder utilizing the
same three victims for each count, and may instead only be charged and convicted of a single count
of capital murder. The Court therefore upheld the court of appeals’ decision to vacate two of the
defendant’s convictions and to allow only one conviction to stand. Id. at 274.
Appellant acknowledges that unlike the defendant in Saenz, he was not convicted of
multiple counts of capital murder; however, he believes that simply being charged in an indictment
that allowed for the possibility of multiple convictions violated his right to be free from double
jeopardy. Appellant points out that in its holding in Saenz, the Court of Criminal Appeals
expressly stated that the defendant’s double jeopardy rights had been violated when he was
“charged” with three separate counts of capital murder. Id. Appellant believes this is the
“operative” language in the opinion, and that the Court intended to hold that the double jeopardy
violation occurred at the time the defendant was charged with multiple counts of capital murder,
rather than at the time he was convicted. Appellant reasons that his double jeopardy rights were
also violated at the time that he was charged with what he describes as a “facially
unconstitutional[]” indictment, improperly accusing him of committing three separate acts of
capital murder. Appellant asserts that this allegedly fundamental error in the indictment
somehow “tainted” the entire proceedings, and requires us to reverse the trial court’s judgment and
order a new trial. Appellant’s argument fails for several reasons.
8
First, unlike the defendant in Saenz, Appellant was not charged in a three-count indictment,
and was instead charged with only a single count of capital murder. As explained in more detail
below, the three paragraphs contained in the indictment alleged the alternative means by which the
one count of capital murder was committed. Further, the trial court expressly instructed the jury
that it could only convict Appellant of one count of capital murder as set forth in the indictment,
and the jury form given to the jury allowed for only one conviction of capital murder. In contrast
to Saenz in which the defendant was charged and convicted of three separate offenses, there was no
possibility that Appellant could have been convicted of more than one count of capital murder, and
in fact, he was not.
Second, we note that even though the Court in Saenz stated that the defendant’s double
jeopardy rights had been violated when he was “charged” with three separate counts of capital
murder, the Court nevertheless made it clear that the double jeopardy violation did not actually
occur until the defendant was convicted of three separate charges. As the Court in Saenz noted,
the Fifth Amendment’s “Double Jeopardy Clause protects against multiple punishments for the
same offense.” Saenz, 166 S.W.3d at 272 (emphasis added). It is only violated when a
defendant “is convicted of more offenses than the legislature intended.” Id. (emphasis added)
(quoting Ex parte Ervin, 991 S.W.2d 804, 807 (Tex.Crim.App. 1999)); see also Ex parte Milner,
394 S.W.3d 502, 506 (Tex.Crim.App. 2013) (“The Double Jeopardy Clause protects criminal
defendants from … multiple punishments for the same offense.”).
Further, we find it significant that the Court in Saenz did not find it necessary to remand the
defendant’s case for a new trial, despite its conclusion that the defendant had been improperly
charged and convicted of three separate counts of capital murder. Instead, the Court believed that
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any such error could be remedied by vacating two of the capital murder convictions, and allowing
only one conviction to stand. Saenz, 166 S.W.3d at 274. Therefore, even if the Court in Saenz
believed that a constitutional violation had existed at the charging stage of the proceedings, it
clearly believed that any such violation did not completely taint the proceedings, and that the
violation could be remedied by ensuring that only one conviction stood in the defendant’s case.
In the present case, Appellant suffered only one conviction for capital murder, and we
therefore reject Appellant’s argument that his double jeopardy rights were violated.
The Jury Returned a Unanimous Verdict
In a somewhat related argument, Appellant contends in his second issue that the trial
court’s failure to quash the indictment violated his right to a unanimous verdict. Appellant
correctly points out that a jury in a criminal case must reach a unanimous verdict. See TEX.CODE
CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 36.29(a) (West Supp. 2014) (not less than twelve jurors can render and
return a verdict in a felony case). Most recently, the Court of Criminal Appeals addressed this
issue in Saenz v. State, 451 S.W.3d 388 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014), when it stated: “Texas law requires
a unanimous jury verdict in all criminal cases. More specifically, ‘the jury must be unanimous in
finding every constituent element of the charged offense in all criminal cases.’” Id. at 390 (quoting
Jourdan v. State, 428 S.W.3d 86, 94 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014)).
Appellant argues that the indictment improperly raised the possibility that a jury could
have reached a non-unanimous verdict, as some jurors could have based a guilty verdict on a
finding that he had killed Sheryl Bennett and Jose Reyes in a single transaction; while others could
have based their verdict on a finding that he had killed Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd in a single
transaction; while yet others could have based their verdict on a finding that he had killed Tana
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Todd and Jose Reyes in a single transaction. Appellant contends that because of the possibility of
a non-unanimous verdict, the State should not have been permitted to proceed on the alternative
theories set forth in the indictment, and should have instead been required to elect only one theory
of prosecution to submit to the jury.
We initially note that the State is permitted to charge a defendant with a single offense, and
to use multiple paragraphs to assert alternative means of committing the crime alleged. In
Martinez v. State, 225 S.W.3d 550, 554 (Tex.Crim.App. 2007), the Court of Criminal Appeals
explained that when the State elects to charge multiple offenses in a single indictment, it is
required by statute to set out each separate offense in a separate “count.” However, the State may
include separate “paragraphs” within a single count, alleging different methods of committing the
same offense, in accordance with TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 21.24(b). 3 Id.; see also
Landrian v. State, 268 S.W.3d 532, 535 (Tex.Crim.App. 2008) (State is permitted to plead
alternative “manner and means” of committing the same offense).
In capital murder cases in particular, the State is permitted to charge a defendant with
committing capital murder by alternative means in a single-count indictment. See Gamboa v.
State, 296 S.W.3d 574, 582-84 (Tex.Crim.App. 2009) (State properly charged defendant with one
count of capital murder in a two-paragraph indictment, alleging that the defendant caused the death
of the same victim while robbing him, or alternatively, while murdering another victim during the
same criminal transaction); Kitchens v. State, 823 S.W.2d 256, 258 (Tex.Crim.App. 1991)
(alternative pleading of differing methods of committing capital murder may be charged in one
indictment). In fact, in light of the Court of Criminal Appeals’ opinion in the 2005 Saenz case, it
3
TEX.CODE CRIM.PROC.ANN. art. 21.24(b) (West 2009) provides that: “A count may contain as many separate
paragraphs charging the same offense as necessary, but no paragraph may charge more than one offense.”
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appears that the State had little choice but to allege capital murder in a one-count indictment based
on its theory that Appellant had intentionally killed three victims in a single criminal transaction.
Saenz, 166 S.W.3d at 273-74 (State must avoid charging a defendant with multiple counts of
capital murder involving the same victims to ensure that the defendant’s double jeopardy rights are
not violated by the possibility of multiple convictions). If the State had charged Appellant with
separate capital murder counts, naming the same victims in each count, it would have subjected
Appellant to a possible double jeopardy violation – the very thing that concerned Appellant in his
first point of error. We therefore conclude that the State properly charged Appellant in a
single-count indictment, utilizing multiple paragraphs for each alternative theory in support of its
prosecution.
Further, we note that when a defendant is charged with capital murder involving multiple
victims killed in a single criminal transaction, a defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict is only
violated if the record reflects a possibility that the jury did not agree on which victims were killed
in the transaction. The 2014 Saenz case is illustrative of this point. In that case, the defendant
had been indicted, among other things, on one count of capital murder, based on the allegation that
she had intentionally killed five different victims pursuant to the same scheme or course of conduct
in violation of TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a)(7)(B). 4 Saenz, 451 S.W.3d 388. In the
indictment, the State had simply listed the names of each individual victim, and the jury charge
instructed the jurors to determine if the defendant had caused the death of “more than one” of the
five named individuals during the same scheme or course of conduct.
The Court held that the jury charge was defective, as it did not specify the “killing of any
4
TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.03(a) provides that a person commits capital murder if “(7) the person murders more
than one person: . . . (B) during different criminal transactions but the murders are committed pursuant to the same
scheme or course of conduct[.]”
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one victim as the predicate murder, and the jury was not required to specify which two or more of
the five alleged victims that they agreed the appellant had murdered.” Id. at 391. In particular,
the Court noted that the language used in the jury charge “made it possible for the jurors to convict
without agreeing that any one particular person was murdered by the appellant,” and there was no
requirement that the jurors had to agree on which of the various victims were killed; thus, as the
Court pointed out, some jurors could have agreed that the defendant “killed victims A, B, and C,
while the other six agreed she killed victims D and E.” The Court therefore concluded that
defendant’s right to a unanimous verdict had been violated. Id. at 391-92; see also Ngo v. State,
175 S.W.3d 738, 749 (Tex.Crim.App. 2005) (trial court erred in failing to instruct jury that it must
be unanimous in deciding which one of the three disjunctively submitted offenses it found
appellant committed).
In contrast, in the present case the indictment alleged three separate, alternative paragraphs
naming two of the victims in each paragraph. The jury charge made it abundantly clear that the
jury was required to consider each of the three paragraphs set forth in the indictment separately,
and to unanimously select only one of those paragraphs as a basis for its verdict.5 Read in
5
In particular, the jury was instructed to initially consider the first paragraph of the indictment, and to determine
whether it found beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had intentionally caused the deaths of both Sheryl Bennett
and Jose Reyes during the same criminal transaction. The charge then instructed the jury that if it found the
allegations set forth in the first paragraph to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, it was required to find Appellant guilty
of the offense of capital murder. At that point, the jury’s task would be complete. However, the charge went on to
instruct the jury that if it did not find the allegations in paragraph one to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, then it
would be required to consider the allegations set forth in the second paragraph, and determine whether it found beyond
a reasonable doubt that Appellant had intentionally caused the deaths of both Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd in the
same criminal transaction. If the jury answered in the affirmative, it was instructed to find Appellant guilty of capital
murder, and once again, the jury’s task would be complete. If, however, the jury did not find the allegations in
paragraph two to be true beyond a reasonable doubt, it was then instructed to consider the third paragraph in the
indictment, and determine whether Appellant had intentionally caused the deaths of both Tana Todd and Jose Reyes in
the same criminal transaction. Once again, if the jury answered in the affirmative, it was instructed to convict
Appellant of capital murder, and if not, it was to instructed to consider the lesser included offenses of murder with
regard to each of the three victims.
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conjunction with the trial court’s instruction to the jury that its verdict had to be unanimous, the
jury was clearly instructed that it was required to unanimously agree on one theory of prosecution,
and to expressly decide which victims it believed were intentionally killed by Appellant, before it
could find Appellant guilty of capital murder.
Further, the Verdict Form also made it clear to the jury that it was required to select and
agree upon only one of the State’s three theories of prosecution in reaching its verdict. In
particular, the Verdict Form gave the jury three alternatives for finding Appellant guilty of capital
murder:
We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Dalton James Bennett, Jr., guilty of the offense of
capital murder, as charged in the first paragraph of the indictment.
OR
We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Dalton James Bennett, Jr., guilty of the offense of
capital murder, as charged in the second paragraph of the indictment.
OR
We, the Jury, find the Defendant, Dalton James Bennett, Jr., guilty of the offense of
capital murder, as charged in the third paragraph of the indictment.
The presiding juror signed his name under the second option for finding Appellant guilty of capital
murder as charged in the second paragraph of the indictment (i.e., the killings of Sheryl Bennett
and Tana Todd). Further, after the jury’s verdict was read in court, specifically stating that the
jury had found Appellant guilty of capital murder as alleged in the second paragraph of the
indictment, the jury was polled, and all of the jurors affirmed that this was their unanimous
decision. As such, it is clear that the jury did in fact reach a unanimous verdict finding that
Appellant was guilty of capital murder in Sheryl Bennett’s death, based on the aggravating
circumstance that Appellant also intentionally killed Tana Todd in this same criminal transaction.
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The Jury Charge did not Allow the Jury to Acquit Appellant and then Reconsider its Decision
Also in his second issue, Appellant makes one last argument criticizing the jury charge,
asserting that the jury charge allowed the jury to “acquit” Appellant of murdering Sheryl Bennett
when it found there was reasonable doubt as to the allegations in the first paragraph in the
indictment (i.e., that Appellant had intentionally killed Sheryl Bennett and Jose Reyes in the same
transaction), and then improperly allowed the jury to “reconsider” its “acquittal” in Sheryl
Bennett’s death, when the jury was asked to consider the allegations set forth in the second
paragraph of the indictment (i.e., that Appellant had intentionally killed Sheryl Bennett and Tana
Todd in the same transaction). Appellant asserts that the jury charge allowed not only for “double
jeopardy problems, but also the possibility of a conviction on less than a unanimous verdict.” We
disagree.
As explained above, each of the three paragraphs in the indictment properly alleged an
alternative theory of prosecution for capital murder, and each paragraph in effect charged a
separate “allowable unit of prosecution” for capital murder, i.e., the killing of more than one
individual in a single criminal transaction. See Saenz, 451 S.W.3d 388; Ex parte Milner, 394
S.W.3d at 507. Thus, with respect to the first paragraph in the indictment, the jury was not asked
to determine if Appellant had intentionally killed Sheryl Bennett, without any aggravating
circumstances, as it would have done in a simple murder case; instead, the jury was asked if
Appellant had intentionally killed both Sheryl Bennett and Jose Reyes in a single criminal
transaction, in support of the State’s first theory of prosecution in its capital murder case.
When the jury declined to enter a verdict based on that particular theory of prosecution, it
did not acquit Appellant of Sheryl Bennett’s murder; instead, it simply determined that there was
15
insufficient evidence to find that Appellant had intentionally killed both Sheryl and Jose in a single
criminal transaction, and therefore insufficient evidence to support a capital murder conviction on
the State’s first theory of prosecution. The jury was then instructed to proceed to the State’s next
theory of prosecution, as set forth in paragraph two of the indictment, and determine whether it
believed beyond a reasonable doubt that Appellant had intentionally caused the deaths of both
Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd in a single criminal transaction.
As the State’s alternative theories of prosecution related solely to the capital murder charge
that Appellant had murdered multiple victims in a single transaction, the jury’s rejection of one of
those theories did not amount to an implied or express acquittal of Appellant on the lesser included
charge of simple murder as to each individual victim. We therefore find no defect in the jury’s
charge, and we reject Appellant’s argument on this point.
Appellant’s Right to Confront Witnesses
In his third issue, Appellant contends the trial court violated his Sixth Amendment right to
confront witnesses by allowing the county’s medical examiner, Dr. Lloyd White, to provide his
opinion on the cause of Jose Reyes’ death based on his review of an autopsy report that was
prepared by a now-retired medical examiner, Dr. Gary Sisler, who was not present in court to
testify. The jury, however, did not find that Appellant had intentionally killed Jose Reyes, and
instead based its verdict solely on the deaths of Sheryl Bennett and Tana Todd. Further, we have
concluded there was no error in the jury’s verdict in this regard. Consequently, Appellant’s third
issue is irrelevant and moot. We overrule all of Appellant’s issues.
Reformation of Error in the Judgment
In its brief, the State points out that the trial court’s written judgment mistakenly recorded
16
that the jury assessed the punishment in Appellant’s case. The reporter’s record, however, reveals
that the trial court actually imposed the life sentence on Appellant, recognizing that capital murder
carries an automatic life sentence in cases in which the death penalty has been waived. See
TEX.PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.31(a)(2) (West 2011).
The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has held that when there is a variation between the
oral pronouncement of sentence and the written memorialization of the sentence, the oral
pronouncement controls. Coffey v. State, 979 S.W.2d 326, 328 (Tex.Crim.App. 1998). In such
cases, an appellate court is authorized to reform or modify the judgment to conform to the record
of the proceedings and to render an appropriate judgment, in accordance with its authority under
TEX.R.APP.P. 43.2. See French v. State, 830 S.W.2d 607, 609 (Tex.Crim.App. 1992) (appellate
court has authority to reform a judgment to include an affirmative finding to make the record speak
the truth when the matter has been called to its attention by any source); Bigley v. State, 865
S.W.2d 26, 27–28 (Tex.Crim.App. 1993) (appellate court has the power to modify incorrect
judgments when the necessary data and information are available to do so).
We therefore believe it is appropriate to modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect that the
trial court, and not the jury, assessed the sentence in this case, in accordance with the trial court’s
oral pronouncement at trial.
CONCLUSION
The trial court’s judgment is affirmed as modified to reflect that the trial court assessed the
punishment in Appellant’s case.
STEVEN L. HUGHES, Justice
June 30, 2015
17
Before McClure, C.J., Rodriguez, and Hughes, JJ.
(Publish)
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