Christopher Raymond Cisneros v. State ( 2019 )


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  •                                        In The
    Court of Appeals
    Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo
    ________________________
    No. 07-17-00257-CR
    ________________________
    CHRISTOPHER RAYMOND CISNEROS, APPELLANT
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
    On Appeal from the 286th District Court
    Hockley County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 15-07-8332; Honorable Pat Phelan, Presiding
    March 19, 2019
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before QUINN, CJ., and PIRTLE and PARKER, JJ.
    Appellant, Christopher Raymond Cisneros, was convicted following a jury trial of
    possession of a controlled substance (methamphetamine) in an amount of one gram or
    more but less than four grams, enhanced.1 He was sentenced by the trial court to fifteen
    1 See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 481.115(c) (West 2017) (a felony of the third degree).
    Punishment level was enhanced to that of a felony of the second degree by virtue of a prior felony conviction
    for DWI, third or more, in August 2005. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(a) (West Supp. 2018).
    years confinement and assessed a $1,000 fine. In a single issue, Appellant asserts that
    law enforcement officers did not have reasonable suspicion or probable cause to detain
    or arrest him. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    BACKGROUND
    In July 2015, an indictment issued alleging that on or about May 7, 2015, Appellant
    intentionally and knowingly possessed a controlled substance, methamphetamine, in an
    amount of one gram or more but less than four grams. In June, the State filed its Notice
    of Intent to Use Prior Convictions to Enhance the Classification and/or Range of
    Punishment of the Indicted Offense alleging that in 2005, Appellant was finally convicted
    of the felony offense of driving while intoxicated, third or more. Appellant subsequently
    filed a motion to suppress alleging that law enforcement officers did not have reasonable
    suspicion or probable cause to search the residence or Appellant. The motion was
    overruled by the trial court following the jury trial.
    The State’s evidence at trial was that multiple officers responded to a call regarding
    a possible burglary in progress at 10:00 a.m. Officer Jim Dukantnik contacted the suspect
    who advised him that he owned the residence and explained that he had left earlier that
    morning without his keys.        Officer Andrew Mosteller arrived with a detective and
    immediately observed someone running in the alley toward a house that was in a state of
    disrepair, unoccupied, and uninhabitable. A neighbor was also pointing the officers in the
    direction of the abandoned house.
    Officers Dukantnik and Mosteller entered the house and announced their
    presence. They could hear noises in a back room. When they investigated the noises,
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    they discovered Appellant. He was sweating profusely and crouched down. When
    addressed by the officers, he was unresponsive.           When Officer Dukantnik began
    advancing toward Appellant, he made a motion toward a medium-size boot knife attached
    to his belt. The officer feared for his safety and believed Appellant was a danger to himself
    and others. He disarmed Appellant, handed the knife over to the other officer, performed
    a quick pat-down search for other weapons, and handcuffed Appellant.
    When Appellant emerged from the house, he was met by Officer Jermaine Davis.
    She asked Appellant if she could search him and he agreed. When she patted him down,
    she felt a bulge inside his change pocket and upon examination, discovered what was
    later identified as methamphetamine and drug paraphernalia. Appellant was then placed
    under arrest.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence on appeal under
    an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Cortez, 
    543 S.W.3d 198
    , 203-04 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 2018). As long as the record supports the trial court’s determinations of historical
    facts and mixed questions of law and fact that rely on credibility, we grant those
    determinations almost total deference. Id.; State v. Kerwick, 
    393 S.W.3d 270
    , 273 (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2013). We review the trial court’s application of law to the facts de novo.
    Wiede v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 17
    , 25 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). Further, when, as in this case,
    the trial court does not make formal findings of fact, we uphold the trial court’s ruling on
    any theory of law applicable to the case and presume the court made implicit findings in
    support of its ruling if the record supports those findings. State v. Ross, 
    32 S.W.3d 853
    ,
    855-56 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
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    ANALYSIS
    Appellant asserts the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled his motion
    to suppress all the State’s evidence. In support, he contends (1) the officers did not have
    a reasonable suspicion or probable cause to search the abandoned house or Appellant
    and (2) the State failed to prove Appellant did not have permission to be in the building.
    We disagree.
    ABANDONED HOUSE
    Regarding his assertion that the fruits of the warrantless search of the abandoned
    house should have been suppressed, we need only note that since Appellant made no
    showing that he had any reasonable expectation of privacy in the house or that he had a
    right of ownership or possession of the house, he has no standing to challenge the validity
    of the search. See Thomas v. State, 
    681 S.W.2d 672
    , 676 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
    Dist.] 1984, pet. ref’d) (citing Goehring v. State, 
    627 S.W.2d 159
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1982)).
    See also Henderson v. State, No. 01-99-00567-CR, 2000 Tex. App. LEXIS 3995, at *7-9
    (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
    (“The accused has the burden of proving facts establishing a legitimate expectation of
    privacy.”).
    DETENTION
    A police officer’s interaction with a citizen can be classified as an encounter,
    detention, or seizure. See Harper v. State, 
    217 S.W.3d 672
    , 675 (Tex. App.—Amarillo
    2007, no pet.).    An investigative detention is a confrontation of a citizen by law
    enforcement officers wherein a citizen yields to a display of authority and is temporarily
    detained for purposes of investigation. 
    Id. (citing Johnson
    v. State, 
    912 S.W.2d 227
    , 235
    4
    (Tex. Crim. App. 1995)). During an investigative detention, an officer may employ force
    necessary to affect the reasonable goals of the detention: investigation, maintenance of
    the status quo, and officer safety. Rhodes v. State, 
    945 S.W.2d 115
    , 117 (Tex. Crim.
    App. 1997). Moreover, an officer may conduct a limited pat-down search of the outer
    clothing for weapons during an investigative detention if the officer fears for his safety or
    that of others. Martinez v. State, 
    304 S.W.3d 642
    , 652-53 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010,
    pet. ref’d).
    An investigative detention is permitted if it is supported by reasonable suspicion.
    Citizen v. State, 
    39 S.W.3d 367
    , 370 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2001, no pet.).
    Reasonable suspicion is a particularized and objective basis for suspecting the person is,
    has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. 
    Id. (citing Crockett
    v. State, 
    803 S.W.2d 308
    , 311 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991)). The test for reasonable suspicion focuses
    solely on whether an objective basis exists for the detention. Tutson v. State, 
    530 S.W.3d 322
    , 328 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, no pet.).2
    Here, Appellant was detained in an abandoned house for the purpose of officer
    safety after he had fled there as law enforcement officers were arriving to investigate a
    possible burglary in progress. In the house, he was discovered sweating profusely,
    unresponsive, crouched down, and he made a motion toward a weapon on his belt.
    Under these circumstances, the officers had a reasonable suspicion authorizing them to
    2 An officer has reasonable suspicion if the officer has specific, articulable facts that, combined with
    rational inferences from those facts, would lead the officer to reasonably conclude that the person detained
    is, has been, or soon will be engaged in criminal activity. 
    Kerwick, 393 S.W.3d at 273
    . A determination
    must be based on the totality of the circumstances, and reasonable suspicion may exist even if the
    circumstances presented are as consistent with innocent activity as with criminal activity. 
    Id. 5 detain
    Appellant and remove any weapons that might pose a threat to officer safety,
    pending further investigation.
    Probable Cause to Arrest
    Once outside the abandoned house, Appellant consented to the search of his
    person by Officer Davis. Meekins v. State, 
    340 S.W.3d 454
    , 458 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)
    (a warrantless search conducted without probable cause is not illegal if the search is
    conducted with the person’s voluntary consent). During the search, Officer Davis found
    what appeared to be drug paraphernalia and methamphetamine on Appellant’s person.
    The substance later tested positive for methamphetamine. This information provided
    probable cause for Appellant’s subsequent arrest. Lewis v. State, 
    412 S.W.3d 794
    , 801
    (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2013, no. pet.) (“Probable cause for a warrantless arrest exists
    when the arresting officer possesses reasonably trustworthy information sufficient to
    warrant a reasonable belief that an offense has been or is being committed.”).
    Based upon our review of the record, we find that the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion by denying Appellant’s motion to suppress evidence. Accordingly, Appellant’s
    single issue is overruled.
    CONCLUSION
    The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    Patrick A. Pirtle
    Justice
    Do not publish.
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