in the Interest of R. J, Jr., a Child v. Department of Family and Protective Services ( 2019 )

Opinion issued March 26, 2019
In The
Court of Appeals
For The
First District of Texas
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NO. 01-18-00729-CV
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IN THE INTEREST OF R. J., JR., A CHILD
On Appeal from the 344th District Court
Chambers County, Texas
Trial Court Case No. CV29910
DISSENTING OPINION
Before the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services intervened
in E.M.’s and her husband R.J.’s lives, and the lives of their children, the family’s
circumstances were untenable. E.M. and R.J. struggled with homelessness and
finding steady employment. R.J. had the additional barriers of debilitating mental
illness resulting in multiple suicide attempts since childhood and a long-standing
history of drug use, including benzodiazepines, amphetamine, and
methamphetamine. After E.M. and R.J. failed to discontinue the use of drugs and
to participate in services in 2015, the Department asked them to leave their son
“Ray” with his grandmother and to find somewhere else to live. Ray was just nine
months old when he was removed from his parents.
E.M. and R.J. moved to a small town about five hours from where the
Department eventually placed their son. E.M. began working as a floor manager at
the local Denny’s, and R.J. eventually worked as a cook. They were able to stagger
their shifts so that they did not require outside child care. They had health
insurance.
They lived with their youngest son, Alex, and E.M.’s three children from a
prior relationship came to live with them in 2017. They lived in a house that they
wanted to buy someday. Under the parents’ supervision, the children were reading
35 to 40 minutes per day. Shortly before the hearing that terminated their parental
rights, E.M. and R.J. were able to obtain a vehicle.
While E.M. and R.J. worked imperfectly at putting their lives together, the
Department was successful in terminating their parental rights as to Ray’s younger
sister, Jane. That termination was used as a predicate finding to terminate their
rights as to Ray in this case. Ray’s case lasted 28 months. Although under current
law, if Ray’s case had remained unresolved as long as it did, the court would have
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lost jurisdiction to terminate parental rights, that law was not in effect when this
case began. Because the case lasted most of Ray’s life, it is not surprising that he
bonded with his foster placement.
Although he had been in therapy for two years by the time of the termination
hearing and intended to continue it, R.J. reported that he had reduced or eliminated
his psychiatric medications by the time of the termination hearing. When he was
not taking his medications in 2016, he used cocaine and attempted to commit
suicide shortly after Jane was born. E.M. saved his life.
R.J. continued to struggle. In April 2018, after consuming alcohol, he
allegedly pushed E.M. into a chair, prompting a Department investigation into the
welfare of their youngest child after police were called. R.J. was required to move
out of the house. He moved back in shortly before Ray’s termination hearing.
In addition to a predicate violation, the party seeking to terminate another’s
parental rights must establish by clear and convincing evidence that termination is
in the child’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(2); see id. § 153.002. The
clear and convincing standard is the degree of proof that will produce in the mind
of the trier of fact a “firm belief or conviction” as to the truth of the allegations
sought to be proved. In re G.M., 596 S.W.2d 846, 847 (Tex. 1980) (quotation and
citation omitted). There is a strong presumption that the child’s best interest will be
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served by preserving the parent-child relationship. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256,
294 (Tex. 2002). To prevail, the Department must rebut this presumption.
The termination of parental rights involves fundamental constitutional rights.
Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); Holick v. Smith, 685 S.W.2d 18, 20
(Tex. 1985). “Termination of parental rights, the total and irrevocable dissolution
of the parent-child relationship, constitutes the ‘death penalty’ of civil cases.” In re
K.M.L., 443 S.W.3d 101, 121 (Tex. 2014) (Lehrmann, J., concurring).
Accordingly, appellate courts strictly scrutinize termination proceedings and
strictly construe involuntary termination statutes in favor of the parent. In re
E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012).
Because of the strong presumption that maintaining the parent-child
relationship is in the child’s best interest, “the best interest standard does not
permit termination merely because a child might be better off living elsewhere.
Termination should not be used to merely reallocate children to better and more
prosperous parents.” In re W.C., 98 S.W.3d 753, 758 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth
2003, no pet.) (citation omitted); see In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d at 809.
Courts may consider the following non-exclusive factors in reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support the best-interest finding: the desires of the
child; the physical and emotional needs of the child now and in the future; the
emotional and physical danger to the child now and in the future; the parental
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abilities of the persons seeking custody; the programs available to assist those
persons seeking custody in promoting the best interest of the child; the plans for
the child by the individuals or agency seeking custody; the stability of the home or
proposed placement; acts or omissions of the parent that may indicate the existing
parent-child relationship is not appropriate; and any excuse for the parent’s acts or
omissions. Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371–72 (Tex. 1976).
The Holley factors are non-exclusive. See id. at 372. In evaluating Ray’s best
interest, it would seem proper to take account of the significant strides E.M. and
R.J. made. See In re K.C.M., 4 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.]
1999, pet. denied) (reversing parental termination where mother “turned her life
around” in jail because a “firm belief or conviction” that the best interest of the
child required termination of mother’s rights “could not be fairly reached”),
disapproved of on other ground by In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002). To
rise from being unstable in housing, transportation, and employment to obtaining
stable full-time work with benefits and being able to rent a three-bedroom home
and reunite with children who had to be placed with relatives is noteworthy. The
parents have become able to provide for the physical needs of their children,
including Ray. See Holley, 544 S.W.2d at 372. Spending time daily reading and
playing with their children and thinking about the children’s college education is
tending to the emotional needs of the children now and in the future. See id.
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Once a family is under the Department’s microscope and one child is
removed for neglect or endangerment, return of other children can become a
Herculean task. This is especially so where the family suffers from addiction,
mental illness, housing instability, poverty, or, in this case, all four. When the
proceedings take more than two years and parent-child visits are logistically
difficult, it is very easy to find that a child too young to state his preferences has
bonded to his new caretakers. E.M. and R.J. have improved dramatically in two
years. But as the pushing incident shortly before trial demonstrates, R.J. is not
completely recovered.1 In looking at all the evidence, not just the evidence
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Although under different circumstances this Court has concluded that “[e]vidence
that a person has engaged in abusive conduct in the past permits an inference that
the person will continue violent behavior in the future,” Jordan v. Dossey, 325
S.W.3d 700, 724 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied), using R.J.’s
2013 conviction to permit an inference that he will be abusive toward E.M. or his
children in the future is not well supported. First, the offense occurred before R.J.
sought treatment for his PTSD and two years before Ray was born. Second, there
is no information that the offense was directed toward E.M. or any other details
about the offense. Third, in Jordan, the father was a sex offender, had pushed,
kicked, and punched the mother in the face while she was pregnant with the child
on at least 10 occasions, and, after the child was born, the mother saw blood and
bruises on the child after the child was in the father’s care. Id. at 707. The facts in
Jordan were sufficient to show a course of conduct that would permit an inference
about future conduct. Without knowing more, one assault conviction before Ray
was born and one incident with the mother four years later does not give a factual
trajectory that would support an inference of future violent conduct here. Assault,
even felony assault, may be committed by offensive touching or reckless conduct.
TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.01(a)–(b). The inference here is also less well founded
because R.J. has engaged in prolonged therapy and medication to address his
mental health. The inference is not the kind that “will produce in the mind of the
trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations.” See In re
J.O.A. 283 S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. 2009) (citing TEX. FAM. CODE § 101.007).
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supporting the termination decision, In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264, E.M. and R.J.
are not perfect parents; given their improvements, however, the evidence was not
factually sufficient to conclude that termination would be in Ray’s best interest.
Conclusion
In light of the dramatic improvements that E.M. and R.J. made in terms of
their ability to care for the physical and emotional needs of their children,
including Ray, there was factually insufficient evidence that termination was in
Ray’s best interest. I respectfully dissent.
Sarah Beth Landau
Justice
Panel consists of Justices Keyes, Higley, and Landau.
Justice Landau, dissenting from the judgment.
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