Heritage Grove v. Department Of Health ( 2019 )


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  •                                                                                            Filed
    Washington State
    Court of Appeals
    Division Two
    December 10, 2019
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    HERITAGE GROVE, a Washington not-for-                        No. 52393-1-II
    profit corporation; PRESTIGE CARE, INC., a
    Washington corporation; CARE CENTER
    (YAKIMA), INC., a Washington corporation;
    and YAKIMA VALLEY VENTURES, LLC, a
    Washington limited liability company.
    Appellants,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH; STATE OF                           PUBLISHED OPINION
    WASHINGTON and SELAH CARE AND
    REHABILITATION; LANDMARK CARE
    AND   REHABILITATION;     EMERALD
    CARE; GOOD SAMARITAN HEALTH
    CARE CENTER; WILLOW SPRINGS CARE
    AND   REHABILITATION;    CRESCENT
    HEALTH CARE, INC.; and SUMMITVIEW
    HEALTHCARE CENTER,
    Respondents.
    MELNICK, J. — Heritage Grove submitted a certificate of need (CN) application to the
    Department of Health (DOH). DOH initially approved the application, but a group of nursing
    homes in Yakima (collectively Respondent Nursing Homes1) administratively challenged the CN.
    At the conclusion of the administrative proceedings, DOH issued findings of fact, conclusions of
    1
    Selah Care and Rehabilitation, Landmark Care and Rehabilitation, Emerald Care, Good
    Samaritan Health Care Center, Willow Springs Care and Rehabilitation, Crescent Health Care,
    Inc., and Summitview Healthcare Center.
    52393-1-II
    law, and final order (Final Order) denying it. Heritage Grove and others2 petitioned for judicial
    review of the Final Order. The superior court affirmed the Final Order and also dismissed the
    petition for judicial review on mootness grounds.
    Concluding that the case is moot, we affirm.
    FACTS
    I.      OVERVIEW OF THE CN APPLICATION PROCESS
    Washington created the CN program (the Program) to “promote, maintain, and assure the
    health of all citizens in the state, provide accessible health services, health manpower, health
    facilities, and other resources while controlling increases in costs, and recognize prevention as a
    high priority in health programs.” RCW 70.38.015(1). DOH administers the Program. RCW
    70.38.105(1). Health care providers may open certain health care facilities, including nursing
    homes, only after receiving a CN from DOH. RCW 70.38.025(6), .105(4)(a).
    In determining whether to issue a CN for a new health care facility, DOH usually considers
    the following four criteria: (1) need, (2) financial feasibility, (3) structure and process of care, and
    (4) cost containment. WAC 246-310-200(1); see WAC 246-310-210 to -240. However, RCW
    70.38.115(13)(b) provides that “[w]hen an entire nursing home ceases operation, the licensee or
    any other party who has secured an interest in the beds may reserve his or her interest in the beds
    for eight years or until a [CN] to replace them is issued, whichever occurs first.” This procedure
    is referred to as “banking” beds. The statute and regulations then allow the party who has banked
    their beds to “unbank” them in a new facility. For providers filing a CN application seeking to
    unbank beds, assuming certain conditions are met including that the new beds are located in the
    2
    Numerous entities jointly filed the petition for judicial review: Heritage Grove, Prestige Care,
    Inc., Care Center (Yakima), Inc., and Yakima Valley Ventures, LLC.
    2
    52393-1-II
    same planning area where they were before they were banked, the applicant does not need to prove
    the “need” criterion, WAC 246-310-210, in their CN application. RCW 70.38.115(13)(b); WAC
    246-310-396.
    II.    HERITAGE GROVE’S APPLICATION
    Until October 15, 2009, Heritage Grove operated a 97-bed nursing home facility in Yakima
    County. The facility closed, and Heritage Grove sent a letter to DOH requesting to bank its beds.
    DOH granted Heritage Grove’s request and stated that Heritage Grove’s reservation of the beds
    would expire on October 15, 2017, unless it issued a CN before then.
    In December 2014, Heritage Grove submitted an application for a CN. Heritage Grove
    sought to build a facility focused on post-acute care and sought to unbank its 97 beds. The
    application stated that the facility would open as Heritage Grove but would be managed by Prestige
    Care, Inc. It also stated that Prestige had “a Purchase and Sale Agreement with the current owners
    of the property . . . [which] allow[ed] for the purchase to be finalized once certain contingencies
    [were] met, including the approval of the [CN] application.” Admin. Record (AR) at 2494.
    After one round of screening questions, the Program began its review of Heritage Grove’s
    application. It received public comments, including those by Respondent Nursing Homes, and
    rebuttal comments. The Program also held a public hearing.
    On July 15, 2015, the Program completed review of the proposed facility. The Program
    conditionally approved Heritage Grove’s CN application, provided that Heritage Grove agreed to
    five conditions. Heritage Grove accepted all five conditions, and shortly thereafter, in August, the
    Program approved Heritage Grove’s CN application. The document it sent stated: “ISSUANCE
    OF THIS CERTIFICATE OF NEED IS BASED ON THE DEPARTMENT’S RECORD AND
    3
    52393-1-II
    EVALUATION.” AR at 3153. The Director of the Office of Community Health Systems authored
    the approval.
    Respondent Nursing Homes then requested an adjudicative proceeding to contest the CN
    approval. After a hearing, a health law judge affirmed the Program’s approval of the CN.
    Respondent Nursing Homes then administratively appealed the decision.
    On August 25, 2017, at the end of the administrative appeal process, the Secretary of DOH,
    via a designee, issued the Final Order denying the CN because the application failed both the
    financial feasibility and cost containment criteria. Heritage Grove did not petition the secretary’s
    designee to stay the Final Order.
    On September 21, 2017, Heritage Grove sought judicial review of the Final Order in
    superior court. Heritage Grove did not file a petition to stay the Final Order before October 15,
    2017, which was eight years from when Heritage Grove “banked” its beds.
    On August 16, 2018, the superior court affirmed the Final Order on the merits. It also
    dismissed the petition on mootness grounds. Heritage Grove appeals.
    ANALYSIS
    I.     STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
    We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Flight Options, LLC v. Dep’t of
    Revenue, 
    172 Wn.2d 487
    , 495, 
    259 P.3d 234
     (2011). In interpreting statutes, “[t]he goal . . . is to
    ascertain and carry out the legislature’s intent.” Jametsky v. Olsen, 
    179 Wn.2d 756
    , 762, 
    317 P.3d 1003
     (2014). We give effect to the plain meaning of the statute as “derived from the context of
    the entire act as well as any ‘related statutes which disclose legislative intent about the provision
    in question.’” Jametsky, 
    179 Wn.2d at 762
     (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC,
    
    146 Wn.2d 1
    , 11, 
    43 P.3d 4
     (2002)).
    4
    52393-1-II
    If a statute’s meaning is plain on its face, “we must give effect to that meaning as an
    expression of legislative intent.” Blomstrom v. Tripp, 
    189 Wn.2d 379
    , 390, 
    402 P.3d 831
     (2017).
    However, if “after this inquiry, the statute remains ambiguous or unclear, it is appropriate to resort
    to canons of construction and legislative history.” Blomstrom, 189 Wn.2d at 390. “A statute is
    ambiguous if ‘susceptible to two or more reasonable interpretations,’ but ‘a statute is not
    ambiguous merely because different interpretations are conceivable.’” HomeStreet, Inc. v. Dep’t
    of Revenue, 
    166 Wn.2d 444
    , 452, 
    210 P.3d 297
     (2009) (quoting State v. Hahn, 
    83 Wn. App. 825
    ,
    831, 
    924 P.2d 392
     (1996)).
    II.    MOOTNESS
    The parties’ mootness arguments involve two issues. First, they dispute whether, under
    RCW 70.38.115, DOH “issued” a CN to Heritage Grove within eight years. If we conclude that
    DOH did not issue a CN to Heritage Grove within eight years, then they next dispute whether
    RCW 34.05.574 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) enables this court to order specific
    performance and require that DOH overturn the Final Order and reinstate the Program’s initial
    approval of Heritage Grove’s CN application.
    A.      Legal Principles
    “A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief.” SEIU Healthcare 775NW
    v. Gregoire, 
    168 Wn.2d 593
    , 602, 
    229 P.3d 774
     (2010). “When an appeal is moot, it should be
    dismissed.” Klickitat County Citizens Against Imported Waste v. Klickitat County, 
    122 Wn.2d 619
    , 631, 
    860 P.2d 390
    , 
    866 P.2d 1256
     (1993). “‘The central question of all mootness problems
    is whether changes in the circumstances that prevailed at the beginning of litigation have
    forestalled any occasion for meaningful relief.’” City of Sequim v. Malkasian, 
    157 Wn.2d 251
    ,
    5
    52393-1-II
    259, 
    138 P.3d 943
     (2006) (quoting 13A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD
    H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3533.3, at 261 (2d ed. 1984)).
    It is undisputed that Heritage Grove’s CN application failed to prove “need.” Heritage
    Grove’s CN application relied on the RCW 70.38.115(13)(b) exception so that its application did
    not have to prove the “need” criterion. And if DOH never “issued” Heritage Grove a CN within
    eight years, then Heritage Grove’s need-exempt status expired.              RCW 70.38.115(13)(b).
    Therefore, if Heritage Grove’s need-exempt status expired and we are bound to remand to the
    agency for it to reconsider the Final Order, DOH would simply deny Heritage Grove’s CN
    application because the application failed to prove “need” and, in turn, failed to prove all of the
    requisite CN application criteria.
    B.      DOH Did Not Issue a CN with Its Initial Approval
    Heritage Grove contends that DOH issued a CN when the Program approved Heritage
    Grove’s application in August 2015. According to Heritage Grove, the issuance of that CN is
    simply in the appeals process. We disagree.
    RCW 70.38.115(13)(b) allows a party to bank beds, but only “for eight years or until a
    [CN] to replace them is issued, whichever occurs first.” In other words, a party’s reservation of
    beds expires after eight years unless they are “issued” a CN within those eight years.
    Here, the only way Heritage Grove was “issued” a CN within eight years is if the Program’s
    August 2015 initial approval of Heritage Grove’s CN application counted as such.3
    Our goal in interpreting statutes is to determine the legislature’s intent, and it is unlikely
    that the legislature intended for a subordinate order, later overruled, to constitute the issuance of a
    3
    Neither party argues that the health law judge’s decision affirming the Program’s initial approval
    of Heritage Grove’s CN application constituted the “issuance” of a CN.
    6
    52393-1-II
    CN such to preserve Heritage Grove’s banked-bed status. Therefore, we conclude that the
    Program’s initial approval of Heritage Grove’s CN application did not constitute the issuance of a
    CN for the purposes of RCW 70.38.115(13)(b).
    The principles of finality illustrate our conclusion. “An administrative determination is not
    a final order where it is a mere preliminary step in the administrative process, but it becomes final
    when a legal relationship is subsequently fixed upon ‘consummation of the administrative
    process.’” Lewis County v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n, 
    31 Wn. App. 853
    , 862, 
    644 P.2d 1231
    (1982) (quoting Dep’t of Ecology v. Kirkland, 
    84 Wn.2d 25
    , 30, 
    523 P.2d 1181
     (1974)). Here, the
    initial approval was merely a preliminary step in the administrative process. Thus, Heritage Grove
    could not justifiably rely on the subordinate order because that order was appealable, was in fact
    appealed, and was later overruled. Additionally, the appeal to the superior court and to this court
    is from the Final Order, not the subordinate order.
    We recognize that the subordinate order contained language indicating that it was the
    “issuance” of a CN. However, the nomenclature used in that subordinate order does not overrule
    the fact that the subordinate order was appealable and thus subject to be overturned, which it later
    was. Cf. Kirkland, 
    84 Wn.2d at 29
     (“[W]hether or not the statutory requirements of finality are
    satisfied in any given case depends not upon the label affixed to its action by the administrative
    agency, but rather upon a realistic appraisal of the consequences of such action.”).
    Furthermore, Heritage Grove did not file a stay of the Final Order as permitted under the
    APA. See RCW 34.05.467. It had approximately two months, from the time the Final Order
    issued and the time its banked-bed status expired, to do so.4
    4
    Heritage Grove does not argue that there should be any tolling of the eight-year statutory time
    period; therefore, we decide this issue strictly on statutory interpretation of RCW
    70.30.115(13)(b).
    7
    52393-1-II
    Accordingly, we conclude that DOH did not issue a CN to Heritage Grove within eight
    years from when Heritage Grove banked its beds. Therefore, Heritage Grove’s reservation of beds
    expired.
    C.       This Court Cannot Provide Meaningful Relief
    Heritage Grove argues that this court can nonetheless provide meaningful relief because it
    has the authority under RCW 34.05.574 to correct the Final Order’s errors and reinstate the
    Program’s initial approval of the CN. We disagree.
    Under the relief provisions of the APA,
    [A] court may (a) affirm the agency action or (b) order an agency to take action
    required by law, order an agency to exercise discretion required by law, set aside
    agency action, enjoin or stay the agency action, remand the matter for further
    proceedings, or enter a declaratory judgment order. . . . In reviewing matters within
    agency discretion, the court shall limit its function to assuring that the agency has
    exercised its discretion in accordance with law, and shall not itself undertake to
    exercise the discretion that the legislature has placed in the agency. The court shall
    remand to the agency for modification of agency action, unless remand is
    impracticable or would cause unnecessary delay.
    RCW 34.05.574(1).
    The dispositive question here is whether the issuance of a CN is within DOH’s discretion.
    If so, we “shall not . . . undertake to exercise the [agency’s] discretion.” RCW 34.05.574(1)(b).
    Pursuant to RCW 70.38.105(1), DOH “is authorized and directed to implement the [CN]
    program in this state pursuant to the provisions of this chapter.” DOH “shall specify information
    to be required for [CN] applications.” RCW 70.38.115(6). Additionally, CNs “shall be issued . .
    . by the designee of the secretary in accord with the provisions of this chapter and rules of the
    department which establish review procedures and criteria for the [CN] program.”                RCW
    70.38.115(1).
    8
    52393-1-II
    We conclude that the legislature has vested the discretion to issue CNs solely with DOH.
    Accordingly, we will not and cannot exercise the agency’s discretion on its behalf. Because
    Heritage Grove’s CN application is based on a now-expired exception to showing the “need”
    criterion, on remand, DOH would not consider granting the CN application. In other words,
    agreeing substantively with Heritage Grove that the Final Order was unlawful would not provide
    Heritage Grove meaningful relief. Accordingly, we conclude that this case is moot.5
    We affirm.
    Melnick, J.
    We concur:
    Worswick, J.
    Lee, A.C.J.
    5
    Heritage Grove requests attorney fees and costs under the Equal Access to Justice Act. Because
    we conclude that Heritage Grove does not prevail, we decline to award fees.
    9