Aaron R. Dial v. State ( 2009 )

NO. 07-08-0303-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
AT AMARILLO
PANEL D
JUNE 8, 2009
______________________________
AARON R. DIAL,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
_________________________________
FROM THE 137TH DISTRICT COURT OF LUBBOCK COUNTY;
NO. 2006-413,416; HON. CECIL PURYEAR, PRESIDING
_______________________________
On Motion for Rehearing
_______________________________
Before QUINN, C.J., and CAMPBELL and PIRTLE, JJ.
Pending before the court is appellant’s motion for rehearing. We grant the motion
for rehearing, withdraw the original opinion and judgment issued on March 24, 2009, and
substitute this opinion for the one we previously issued.
Aaron R. Dial appeals a judgment revoking his probation and sentencing him to two
years confinement in a state jail facility for the offense of possession of a controlled
substance. Through two complaints, he apparently argues that 1) the trial court erred in
failing to conduct an investigation into whether his plea of guilty to the original offense was
voluntary, and 2) the trial court relied upon illegally obtained evidence in finding that
appellant failed to identify himself to a police officer. We affirm the judgment.
Issue One – Investigating Voluntariness of Guilty Plea
In a rather rambling discourse, appellant complains about the voluntariness of his
guilty plea which resulted in the trial court’s decision to revoke his community supervision.
We are unsure of whether he contends that the plea was involuntary, that he should have
been entitled to withdraw his plea, or that the trial court failed to inquire into the
voluntariness of his prior plea at the subsequent revocation hearing.1 If it is the first, then
we cannot consider the dispute via an appeal from an order revoking his community
supervision. Jordan v. State, 54 S.W.3d 783 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) (affirming the
appellate court’s refusal to entertain claims regarding the voluntariness of the appellant’s
guilty plea because those claims should have been raised in an appeal from the imposition
of community supervision).
If it is the second, then the claim was not preserved for appellant did not request
leave to withdraw his plea from the trial court. The Court of Criminal Appeals required as
much in Mendez v. State, 138 S.W.3d 334, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
1
W e would ask those appearing before this court to cautiously proofread their briefs for typographical
errors, im proper gram m ar, and questionable sentence structure. So too would we ask them to note that the
longer a sentence is, the m ore difficult it is for the reader to understand it. Finally, it also would be wise to
rem em ber that the clarity of one’s discourse is m uch m ore im portant than its length.
2
If it is the third, appellant’s receipt of the statutory admonishments was prima facie
evidence that his plea was knowing and voluntary.2 See Brown v. State, 11 S.W.3d 360,
362 (Tex. App.–Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. ref’d) (holding that the receipt of statutory
admonishments is prima facie evidence that the plea is knowing and voluntary). Moreover,
without citation to either evidence or authority suggesting that one’s ingestion of cocaine
alone impairs his ability to think rationally, perceive the circumstances before him or
understand the consequences of his actions, we hesitate to impose on a trial judge the
duty contemplated by appellant. See Villareal v. State, 860 S.W.2d 529, 533 (Tex. App.
–Corpus Christi 1993, pet. ref’d) (stating the trial court had no duty to sua sponte examine
retrospectively the voluntariness of the defendant’s guilty plea even though he was found
incompetent at the adjudication hearing).
Issue 2 - Illegal Detention
Via his second issue, appellant attacks the trial court’s finding that he failed to
identify himself. Purportedly, the evidence upon which the trial court relied was acquired
through an illegal detention. Be that as it may, we do not see how that changes the validity
of the decision to revoke. Appellant’s failing to identify himself was only one of many
grounds alleged by the State in support of its motion. Moreover, appellant pled true to at
least two grounds the validity of which had nothing to do with his misidentifying himself to
a police officer. So, even if we were to accept appellant’s protestations about the
supposed illegal detention and ignore that finding as a ground supporting revocation,
nothing would change. Simply put, the decision to revoke is supported by the other
2
Though the appellate record does not contain a transcript of the original plea hearing, the written
adm onishm ents containing appellant’s signature appears in the clerk’s record.
3
findings about which he utters no complaint. Moore v. State, 605 S.W.2d 924, 926 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980) (stating that only one ground can justify the trial court’s decision to revoke
community supervision).
Accordingly, we overrule each issue and affirm the judgment.
Brian Quinn
Chief Justice
Publish.
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