Ex Parte Richard Lawrence Nugent ( 2017 )


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  • Opinion issued January 12, 2017
    In The
    Court of Appeals
    For The
    First District of Texas
    ————————————
    NO. 01-16-00903-CR
    ———————————
    EX PARTE RICHARD LAWRENCE NUGENT, Appellant
    On Appeal from the 228th District Court
    Harris County, Texas
    Trial Court Case No. 1015171A
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Appellant, Richard Lawrence Nugent, has filed a “Motion for Out of Time
    Appeal” regarding his untimely notice of appeal from the trial court’s denial of his
    article 11.072 application for a writ of habeas corpus. We deny the motion and
    dismiss the appeal.
    Background
    On April 11, 2005, Nugent pleaded guilty to the first-degree felony offense of
    aggregate theft in an amount in excess of $200,000.00 without an agreed
    recommendation as to punishment. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 31.03 (West
    Supp. 2016); 31.09 (West 2011). On June 24, 2005, the trial court sentenced Nugent
    to ten years’ confinement but suspended the sentence and placed him on ten years’
    community supervision. The court further ordered that Nugent pay $248,621.00 and
    relinquish any interest in certain real property as restitution.
    On April 8, 2015, through new counsel, Nugent filed an application for writ
    of habeas corpus pursuant to Article 11.072 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
    claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, involuntariness of his plea, and newly
    discovered evidence establishing innocence. At the conclusion of the May 31, 2016
    hearing on the application, the trial court denied the application in open court. The
    trial court subsequently issued signed findings of fact and conclusions of law on July
    25, 2016.
    On November 2, 2016, Nugent’s counsel filed a notice of appeal from the
    denial of his habeas application. Included with the notice of appeal was an undated
    affidavit of Edwin Dee McWilliams, one of the attorneys who represented Nugent
    in his habeas application. McWilliams stated in his affidavit that a notice of appeal
    had not been filed because (1) he mistakenly thought that the notice of appeal was
    2
    due thirty days after the findings of fact and conclusions of law were entered rather
    than thirty days after the court ruled on May 31, 2016 and (2) he was unaware that
    the trial court signed the findings of fact and conclusions of law on July 25, 2016.
    The affidavit concluded by stating that “It has always been Mr. Nugent’s intent to
    challenge his conviction and appeal any adverse decision in this case to the furthest
    extent. Due to a mistaken view of the law, and lack of notice, a notice of appeal has
    not been filed in this case.” On November 18, 2016, Nugent’s counsel filed a
    “Motion for Out of Time Appeal” similarly relying upon McWilliams’s affidavit.
    Discussion
    In a criminal case, a defendant’s notice of appeal is due within thirty days after
    sentence is imposed in open court or the trial court enters an appealable order. See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(1). The deadline to file a notice of appeal is extended to
    ninety days after the sentence is imposed if the defendant timely files a motion for
    new trial. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2(a)(2). The time for filing a notice of appeal may
    be further extended if, within fifteen days of deadline for filing the notice of appeal,
    appellant files the notice of appeal and a motion complying with Rule 10.5(b). See
    TEX. R. APP. P. 26.3.
    An order denying habeas corpus relief under article 11.072 that does not
    impose or suspend a sentence is an appealable order. See TEX. CODE CRIM. P. ANN.
    art. 11.072, § 8 (West 2015). Therefore, a notice of appeal from such an order must
    3
    be filed within the thirty-day time period specified in rule 26.2(a)(1). See TEX. R.
    APP. 26.2(a)(1); Ex Parte Chavez, No. 13–16–00331–CR, 
    2016 WL 4040252
    , at *1
    (Tex. App.—Corpus Christ–Edinburg, July 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication); Ex parte Delgado, 
    214 S.W.3d 56
    , 58 (Tex. App.—El
    Paso 2006, pet. ref’d); see also Fowler v. State, No. 01–12–00300–CR, 
    2013 WL 653276
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Feb. 21, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.,
    not designated for publication); Mireles v. State, No. 02–14–00228–CR, 
    2014 WL 6601964
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Nov. 20, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op., not
    designated for publication).
    Nugent’s counsel asserts that the thirty-day deadline for filing a notice of
    appeal began to run when the trial court denied the habeas application in open court
    on May 31, 2016. Although the trial court denied the habeas application in open
    court on May 31, 2016, we note that its written order containing findings of fact and
    conclusions of law was not issued until July 25, 2016. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.
    ANN. art. 11.072 § 7(A) (“the court shall enter a written order including findings of
    fact and conclusions of law.”); Ex Parte Martinez, No. PD–1801–10, 
    2011 WL 2582199
    , at *1 (Tex. Crim. App. June 29, 2011) (“For the purposes of the appellate
    timetable, a trial court ‘enters’ an order when it signs the order.”) (not designated for
    publication).
    4
    Assuming that the deadline to file a notice of appeal did not run until the later
    date in which the trial court issued its written order, Nugent’s notice of appeal was
    due by no later than August 24, 2016 (thirty days from July 25, 2016). A motion to
    extend the deadline was not filed in this case. Accordingly, Nugent’s November 2,
    2016 notice of appeal, filed one hundred days after the trial court issued its written
    order on July 25, 2016, was untimely. See TEX. R. APP. P. 26.2.
    If an appeal is not timely perfected, a court of appeals does not obtain
    jurisdiction to address the merits of the appeal and can take no action other than to
    dismiss the appeal. See Castillo v. State, 
    369 S.W.3d 196
    , 198 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2012); Slaton v. State, 
    981 S.W.2d 208
    , 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998); Olivo v. State,
    
    918 S.W.2d 519
    , 523 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996). Nugent acknowledges that his notice
    of appeal was untimely and requests that we grant an “out of time appeal.” But this
    Court has no authority to allow the late filing of a notice of appeal except as provided
    by Rule 26.3. See 
    Olivo, 918 S.W.2d at 522
    .
    Moreover, Nugent’s counsel requests an out of time appeal on the basis that
    they were unaware of the trial court’s July 25, 2016 written order. Although Texas
    Rule of Appellate Procedure 4.2 and Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 306a(4) allow
    for additional time to file a notice of appeal when a party does not receive timely
    notice of a judgment in a civil case, there is no comparable rule extending the time
    in criminal cases. See Carrillo v. State, No. 01–11–00495–CR, 
    2011 WL 4507218
    ,
    5
    at *1 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] Sept. 29, 2011) (“Rule 4.2 of the Texas Rules
    of Appellate Procedure allows for additional time to file a notice of appeal when a
    party does not receive timely notice of a judgment in a civil case, but there is no
    comparable rule for criminal cases.”) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
    Dewalt v. State, 
    417 S.W.3d 678
    , 689–90 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, pet. ref’d)
    (“Although [no notice of the appealable order] might excuse an untimely notice of
    appeal in a civil case, ‘[n]o comparable rule exists for criminal cases,’ and Texas
    courts have routinely held, as we must do here, that being unaware of an appealable
    order or judgment does not excuse an untimely notice of appeal.”); Pope v. State,
    No. 05–10–01455–CR, 
    2011 WL 924477
    , at *2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 18, 2011,
    no pet.) (same) (mem. op., not designated for publication).
    Conclusion
    Accordingly, we deny the motion for an out of time appeal and dismiss this
    appeal for want of jurisdiction. See TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(f). Any other pending
    motions are dismissed as moot.
    PER CURIAM
    Panel consists of Chief Justice Radack and Justices Jennings and Bland.
    Do not publish. TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 01-16-00903-CR

Filed Date: 1/12/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/18/2017