Douglas Hegar v. Charles B. McGregor ( 1998 )


Menu:
  • Dunbar v. State







      IN THE

    TENTH COURT OF APPEALS


    No. 10-98-021-CV


         DOUGLAS HEGAR,

                                                                                                  Appellant

         v.


         CHARLES B. MCGREGOR,

                                                                                                  Appellee


    From the 74th District Court

    McLennan County, Texas

    Trial Court No. 97-426-3

    MEMORANDUM OPINION

                                                                                                                    


          This is an interlocutory appeal from a denial of transfer of venue. Because such interlocutory appeal is prohibited, we lack jurisdiction over this appeal and dismiss it for that reason.

          The appellee, Charles B. McGregor, brought suit against the appellant, Douglas Hegar, to collect on a note Hegar signed for the purchase of 33.26 acres of land located in Brazos

    County. Hegar filed a motion to transfer venue to Brazos County, and after a hearing, the trial court denied Hegar’s motion in a written order signed December 8, 1997. On December 19, Hegar filed a pro se notice of appeal “on the basis that the [m]andatory [v]enue requirements of the State of Texas require that any lawsuit involving interest in real property has to be brought in the county where the real estate is located.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.011 (Vernon Supp. 1998).

          McGregor has filed a motion to dismiss Hegar’s appeal, contending this court lacks jurisdiction over Hegar’s appeal because an interlocutory appeal from a trial court’s venue determination is expressly prohibited by rule and statute. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(a) (Vernon 1986); Tex. R. Civ. P. 87; Orion Enters., Inc. v. Pope, 927 S.W.2d 654, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1996, orig. proceeding). We agree.

          Absent a statute making an interlocutory order appealable, a final judgment is necessary to our jurisdiction. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 51.012 (Vernon 1997); New York Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Sanchez, 799 S.W.2d 677, 678-79 (Tex. 1990). Section 15.064 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code states that “[n]o interlocutory appeal shall lie from the [trial court’s venue] determination.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 15.064(a). An interlocutory venue determination is not appealable until it is made final by merger into the final judgment. Orion Enters., 927 S.W.2d at 659. Therefore, we grant McGregor’s motion and dismiss Hegar’s appeal for want of jurisdiction.

          McGregor also “suggests” that this court award damages against Hegar for filing a frivolous appeal. See Tex. R. App. P. 45. We decline to do so.

          The appeal is dismissed.

                                                                                   PER CURIAM

    Before Chief Justice Davis,

          Justice Cummings, and

          Justice Vance

    Appeal dismissed

    Opinion delivered and filed March 18, 1998

    Do not publish

Document Info

Docket Number: 10-98-00021-CV

Filed Date: 3/18/1998

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/10/2015