Phinny Paul Norton v. State ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS
SECOND DISTRICT OF TEXAS
FORT WORTH
NO. 02-14-00074-CR
PHINNY PAUL NORTON APPELLANT
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS STATE
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FROM THE 43RD DISTRICT COURT OF PARKER COUNTY
TRIAL COURT NO. CR13-0708
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MEMORANDUM OPINION1
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I. Introduction
Trooper Cary Brasher stopped the vehicle that appellant Phinny Paul
Norton was driving for speeding, searched the vehicle, and ultimately discovered
a small amount of methamphetamine. Norton pleaded guilty to possession of a
controlled substance of less than one gram in exchange for three years’ deferred
1
See Tex. R. App. P. 47.4.
adjudication community supervision, a $1,250 fine, and various other terms and
conditions after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. In two points, he
appeals the denial of his motion to suppress.2 We affirm.
II. Factual and Procedural Background
On February 4, 2013, at around 7:50 p.m., Trooper Brasher was
concentrating on westbound traffic near mile marker 392 on Interstate 20 when
he stopped Norton for driving 83 miles per hour in a 65-mile-per-hour zone. After
some general conversation with Norton and his passengers—his girlfriend
Jennifer and Jennifer’s son—Trooper Brasher asked Norton for consent to
search the vehicle.
Trooper Brasher said that when he asked Norton for consent to search the
vehicle, Norton replied, “I don’t have a problem with it.”3 But when Trooper
Brasher asked Norton if he was responsible for everything inside the vehicle,
Norton responded that it was not his vehicle and that the vehicle belonged to
2
In his first point, Norton complains that the trial court reversibly erred by
failing to make and include findings of fact and conclusions of law. We abated
the appeal and remanded the case to the trial court to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, and the trial court did so. Therefore, this point is now moot.
3
Norton testified that he said, “Well, it’s not my car, but other than that, I
wouldn’t have a problem.” The dashboard camera recording indicates that
Norton twice said, “I don’t have a problem with it.” [Emphasis added.]
2
Jennifer. According to Trooper Brasher, he then reconfirmed with Norton that he
had consent to search the vehicle,4 and this time Norton told him, “Go ahead.”5
At some point, Trooper Brasher ran the vehicle’s registration, which
eventually came back as registered to Jennifer’s mother. Although Trooper
Brasher testified that he did not ask Jennifer for consent to search the vehicle
because he was under the impression that she was not the vehicle’s owner, the
dashboard camera recording shows Norton’s and Jennifer’s claims that she was
the owner began as soon as Trooper Brasher inquired about searching the
vehicle and continued throughout their encounter with him. Further, the
recording shows that Trooper Brasher did not learn that the car was registered in
Jennifer’s mother’s name until well after the methamphetamine was found and
Norton had been handcuffed and arrested. Nevertheless, there is no evidence in
the record that Jennifer objected to the search, asked that the troopers stop the
search, or refused consent.6 At most, while the search was ongoing, she said,
“This is my car. Nobody asked me.”
4
Trooper Brasher testified that he asked Norton for consent because
Norton was in care, custody, and control of the vehicle as its operator.
5
However, the dashboard camera recording indicates that Norton actually
said, “But like I said, it’s not my car. I mean you’re welcome . . . you have my
consent . . . it’s her car.”
6
Nor is there any evidence that she gave consent. But Jennifer was not
arrested or charged with any crime as a result of the search of the vehicle.
3
Trooper Brasher testified that at one point he asked Norton whether there
was anything illegal in the vehicle. Norton replied in the negative and then pulled
a traffic citation out of his pocket and added, “You know, I’ve already been
searched once tonight. I’ve already been stopped.”7
Trooper Brasher then contacted Trooper Carson Bening, the trooper who
issued the citation,8 and at the conclusion of the conversation he returned to
Norton and, for some reason that is not clear in this record, Trooper Brasher then
commented to Norton, “I always go on this side . . . I carry a gun.” Trooper
Brasher then reconfirmed with Norton that he had consent to search the vehicle,
and he was in the process of searching the vehicle when other troopers arrived
to assist him.
The dashboard camera recording showed—and Trooper Brasher
confirmed—that during the search Trooper Basher began questioning Norton
about a small, locked bag he had found in the trunk. Trooper Brasher showed
the bag to Norton and asked, “Do you have the key to this?” and “Can you open
7
The dashboard camera recording showed that Norton’s remark actually
came earlier, in response to Trooper Brasher’s question about whether Norton
was responsible for everything in the car. The trial court admitted the ticket,
which reflected that Norton had been stopped at 6:25 p.m. and had received a
citation for open container in the vehicle and an expired inspection certificate.
Norton had also received a warning for speeding.
8
The dashboard camera recording contains Trooper Brasher’s one-sided
conversation with Trooper Bening wherein he relates that Norton said that he did
not really want to be searched again because “this other trooper down the road
just stopped [him].”
4
it for me?” Norton replied, “Do you have a warrant?” The two then engaged in a
back-and-forth discussion about the location of the key and the contents of the
bag.9 While this discussion was taking place, Trooper Josh Moore continued
searching inside the vehicle’s trunk, which contained several duffle bags. A few
minutes later, Trooper Moore discovered a clear bag, containing what the
troopers believed, through training and experience, to be methamphetamine,
concealed in a Crown Royal bag that was wrapped inside a pair of cargo shorts
inside the bag he was searching.10 Trooper Brasher and Norton’s
conversation about the locked bag and the key was interrupted when Trooper
Moore emerged from the trunk area, approached Trooper Brasher and Norton,
asked Norton whose bag it was “in the back” (apparently referring to the trunk),
and informed Norton that he had found methamphetamine in it. Trooper Brasher
turned to Norton and asked him if the “big black bag” was his. Norton confirmed
9
Responding to Norton’s question about the warrant, Trooper Brasher
responded, “It was in your vehicle,” and then Norton replied, “I don’t have the
keys with me.” Trooper Brasher then asked, “What’s in it?” Norton responded
with a remark that the keys were in the car. Trooper Brasher followed-up by
asking, “Can I open it if I find the keys?” At first, Norton said yes and then he
said that if Trooper Brasher got the keys out, he would open it for him. Norton
explained that the bag contained his medicine, some money, and other “stuff”
that he did not want anyone getting into.
10
Norton testified that there were five or six bags in the trunk; Norton said
that one of the bags was his, two or three bags belonged to Jennifer, and two or
three belonged to Jennifer’s son. Norton stated that none of the officers asked
who owned which bags.
5
that it was his bag,11 but he said he had never seen the methamphetamine there
before and did not know why it was in his bag.12
Trooper Brasher testified that Norton was not handcuffed, detained or
under arrest at any point prior to the time that Trooper Moore found the
methamphetamine and that he read Norton’s Miranda warnings to him after the
discovery and asked Norton if he knew to whom the methamphetamine
belonged. Norton said he did not. At that point, Trooper Brasher placed him
under arrest for possession of methamphetamine. Norton then reiterated that the
black bag was his. The trooper repeated that the black bag was where they had
found the methamphetamine and then placed Norton in handcuffs.
Norton filed a motion to suppress (1) “all tangible evidence seized on or
about February 4, 2013” from him or the vehicle he was driving, “including, but
not limited to methamphetamine”; (2) all of his oral or written statements made at
the time of and subsequent to his arrest and search “and/or search of the
vehicle”; and (3) the testimony of any law enforcement officers about statements
or evidence acquired or seized with regard to the search and seizure. The trial
court denied the motion, and this appeal followed.
11
Norton does not complain about this statement on appeal, and, as stated
below, he repeated the same incriminating statement after receiving his Miranda
warnings.
12
Norton implicated Jennifer, claiming that she had insisted on packing the
bags at the motel and had become angry when he had tried to pack the bags.
6
III. Suppression
Norton argues that his consent to search was not voluntary and hence
invalid.13
A. Standard of Review
We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence under a
bifurcated standard of review. Amador v. State, 221 S.W.3d 666, 673 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
In reviewing the trial court’s decision, we do not engage in our own factual
review. Romero v. State, 800 S.W.2d 539, 543 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990); Best v.
State, 118 S.W.3d 857, 861 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.). The trial
judge is the sole trier of fact and judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the
weight to be given their testimony. Wiede v. State, 214 S.W.3d 17, 24–25 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2007); State v. Ross, 32 S.W.3d 853, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000),
modified on other grounds by State v. Cullen, 195 S.W.3d 696 (Tex. Crim. App.
2006). Therefore, we give almost total deference to the trial court’s rulings on
(1) questions of historical fact, even if the trial court’s determination of those facts
was not based on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, and (2) application-
of-law-to-fact questions that turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor.
13
We note that except for a general reference to the contents of the motion
to suppress and to “the actions that flowed” from his detention, Norton provides
no briefing on appeal with regard to whether his statements were voluntary. See
Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i); cf. Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 38.22, § 6 (West 2005
& Supp. 2014); Urias v. State, 155 S.W.3d 141, 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).
7
Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Montanez v. State, 195 S.W.3d 101, 108–09 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2006); Johnson v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App.
2002). But when application-of-law-to-fact questions do not turn on the credibility
and demeanor of the witnesses, we review the trial court’s rulings on those
questions de novo. Amador, 221 S.W.3d at 673; Estrada v. State, 154 S.W.3d
604, 607 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 652–53.
Stated another way, when reviewing the trial court’s ruling on a motion to
suppress, we must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling. Wiede, 214 S.W.3d at 24; State v. Kelly, 204 S.W.3d 808, 818
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006). When, as here, the trial court has made explicit fact
findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most
favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those fact findings. Kelly, 204
S.W.3d at 818–19. We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its
explicit fact findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the
legal ruling. Id. at 818.
B. Applicable Law
In his second point, Norton argues that his consent was nothing more than
“a submission to a claim of authority” and hence invalid. Specifically, Norton
complains that Trooper Brasher’s awareness that the vehicle had been searched
earlier that evening and that Norton did not want it to be searched again, along
with Trooper Brasher’s comment about carrying a gun made just before he
requested consent, rendered Norton’s consent involuntary. He further argues
8
that his detention “was delayed well beyond the ordinary time associated with
issuing a traffic citation.”14
With regard to the validity of a consent to search, the court of criminal
appeals has stated that it
is a question of fact to be determined from all the circumstances. A
person’s consent to search can be communicated to law
enforcement in a variety of ways, including by words, action, or
circumstantial evidence showing implied consent. “But the Fourth
and Fourteenth Amendments require that a consent not be coerced,
by explicit or implicit means, by implied threat or covert force.” The
voluntariness of a person’s consent is also a question of fact that is
determined by analyzing all of the circumstances of a particular
situation. The trial judge must conduct a careful sifting and
balancing of the unique facts and circumstances of each case in
deciding whether a particular consent search was voluntary or
coerced.
“Reasonableness” is the touchstone for the Fourth
Amendment; “reasonableness” is also the touchstone for
determining voluntary consent to search. The Supreme Court has
explained, that “the standard for measuring the scope of consent
under the Fourth Amendment is that of ‘objective’ reasonableness—
what would the typical reasonable person have understood by the
exchange between the officer and the suspect?” In other words,
courts review the totality of the circumstances of a particular police-
citizen interaction from the point of view of the objectively reasonable
person, without regard for the subjective thoughts or intents of either
the officer or the citizen. The ultimate question is whether the
person’s “‘will ha[s] been overborne and his capacity for self-
determination critically impaired,’” such that his consent to search
must have been involuntary.
14
The dashboard camera video indicates that 50 minutes elapsed between
the initial stop and Norton’s arrest. However, within the first four minutes of the
stop, Norton had twice consented to the search. He consented again five
minutes into the stop and again around the ten-minute mark. There is no
evidence that Norton ever withdrew consent during the 50-minute period.
9
Under federal law, the government must show voluntary
consent by a preponderance of the evidence, but Texas has long
stated that the State must “prove the voluntariness of a consent to
search by clear and convincing evidence.” While this burden differs
somewhat from that employed in the federal system, the legal
analysis is the same in both Texas and federal courts: whether
consent was voluntary is a factual question and must be analyzed
based on the totality of the circumstances. Trial courts may consider
numerous factors in that analysis.
Meekins v. State, 340 S.W.3d 454, 458–60 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citations
omitted). Factors that the trial court may consider include, among others,
physical mistreatment, use of violence, threats, threats of violence, promises or
inducements, deception or trickery, and the physical and mental condition and
capacity of the defendant within the totality of the circumstances. Id. at 460 n.26.
Another factor to consider is whether the appellant was told during the exchange
that he had a right to refuse consent. Carmouche v. State, 10 S.W.3d 323, 332
(Tex. Crim. App. 2000). However, failing to inform the accused that he can
refuse consent does not automatically render his consent involuntary. Johnson
v. State, 68 S.W.3d 644, 653 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Because issues of consent
are necessarily fact-intensive, a trial court’s finding of voluntariness must be
accepted on appeal unless it is clearly erroneous. Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 460.
Additionally, consent to search is not rendered ineffective merely because
it comes immediately upon completion of a traffic stop. See James v. State, 102
S.W.3d 162, 173 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2003, pet. ref’d) (“[R]easonable
suspicion is not required for a police officer to request consent to search an
automobile after the reason for an initial stop is concluded as long as a message
10
is not conveyed that compliance is required.”); see also Magana v. State, 177
S.W.3d 670, 673 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, no pet.) (stating that an
officer can request consent to search during a traffic stop as long as the stop is
not prolonged beyond its normal duration if consent is refused); cf. Lambeth v.
State, 221 S.W.3d 831, 834, 837–38 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2007, pet. ref’d)
(op. on reh’g) (stating that officer, who told appellant that he was not free to
leave, had reasonable suspicion before appellant refused consent).
C. Analysis
In its findings of fact, the trial court found that Trooper Brasher lawfully
stopped Norton for the offense of speeding15 and that Norton twice gave the
trooper voluntary verbal consent to search the vehicle that he was operating.
The record supports this interpretation. See Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at 462–63
(concluding that trial court could reasonably have interpreted appellant’s “I
guess” in response to request for consent to search as a positive response). In
fact, as explained above, the dashboard camera footage actually records four
such instances of verbal consent. And although Norton complains that he did not
have authority to give consent to search the vehicle, common authority to give
consent derives from the mutual use of property, not the ownership or lack
thereof. Maxwell v. State, 73 S.W.3d 278, 281–82 (Tex. Crim. App.) (holding that
15
An officer has probable cause to stop and arrest a driver if he observes
the driver commit a traffic offense. State v. Gray, 158 S.W.3d 465, 469–70 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005); see State v. Ballman, 157 S.W.3d 65, 70 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2004, pet. ref’d).
11
employee who had mutual use and control over the vehicle he was driving had
authority to give consent to search it without assistance or permission from
vehicle’s owner), cert. denied, 537 U.S. 1051 (2002).16
While the evidence establishes that Norton was not advised that he could
refuse consent, that fact, standing alone, does not render consent involuntary.
Johnson, 68 S.W.3d at 653; see United States v. Drayton, 536 U.S. 194, 206,
122 S. Ct. 2105, 2113 (2002) (“The Court has rejected in specific terms the
suggestion that police officers must always inform citizens of their right to refuse
when seeking permission to conduct a warrantless consent search.”); see also
Perez v. State, No. 03-12-00041-CR, 2013 WL 4822915, at *3 (Tex. App.—
Austin Aug. 29, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (“An
officer is not required to expressly inform someone she is free to refuse consent
16
A warrantless vehicle search based on the driver’s consent, but without
the consent of the passenger who claims to be the vehicle’s owner, is not per se
unreasonable. See State v. Copeland, 399 S.W.3d 159, 159–60, 162 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2013) (declining to apply Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103, 126 S. Ct.
1515 (2006), under which a co-tenant can disallow police to search a residence
after a fellow tenant has consented to the search, to vehicular searches). The
court of criminal appeals reasoned that the principles underlying Randolph
weighed against treating vehicles as mobile “castles.” Id. at 164. While the court
also acknowledged that “fluid events” may occur during a traffic stop that can
change the positions of the occupants in the “hierarchy of the vehicle” with regard
to control over it, see id. at 164–65, and the record reflects that Trooper Brasher
did not ask Jennifer for consent to search and that Jennifer complained that
“[n]obody asked [her],” she was not charged with an offense, and Norton
expressly consented to the search. Cf. Houston v. State, 286 S.W.3d 604, 608
(Tex. App.—Beaumont 2009, pet. ref’d) (concluding that vehicle search did not
violate appellant’s rights when driver consented to the search and appellant did
not object), cert. denied, 558 U.S. 1124 (2010).
12
to search her belongings because a request for consent to search indicates to a
reasonable person that she has the right to refuse consent.”).
Nothing in the record shows that Norton was physically mistreated,
deceived, or promised anything for his consent, or that he lacked the physical
and mental condition and capacity to give consent. See Meekins, 340 S.W.3d at
460 n.26.
With regard to whether Trooper Brasher’s comment to Norton that he
carried a gun prevented his objection to the search, the trial court had discretion
to interpret what the officer meant by this statement.17 Norton admitted during
the hearing that neither Trooper Brasher nor any other trooper at the scene
pulled a gun on him, his girlfriend, or her son. Norton was never placed on the
ground with his hands behind his head or in any other submissive position prior
to his giving of consent to search. Therefore, the trial court could have
reasonably concluded that the troopers did not use violence, threats, or threats of
violence to obtain Norton’s consent to search the vehicle. See id.
Additionally, Norton points out that Trooper Brasher knew he had been
searched earlier and did not want to be searched again.18 But there is a
17
The dashboard camera DVD shows that Norton had already given
consent to search twice before Trooper Brasher said, “I always go on this
side [unintelligible remark] . . . I carry a gun.”
18
It is clear from the dashboard camera recording that Trooper Brasher did
know that Norton did not want to undergo another search of the vehicle. On it
Trooper Brasher tells Trooper Bening that “I asked [Norton] for consent to search
13
distinction between not wanting something to happen and refusing to permit
something to happen. A person may not particularly want his or her vehicle to be
searched but may nevertheless consent to it.19 See id. at 457, 463–64
(observing that the defendant demonstrated reluctance to consent to the search
through evasive answers to five requests for consent during a 30-second
interlude before finally consenting after the officer demanded a “yes or no”
response on the sixth request; the court acknowledged that reluctant consent
may nevertheless be voluntary, holding that “repeatedly asking for consent does
not result in coercion, particularly when the person refuses to answer or is
otherwise evasive in his response” and that “mere acquiescence” may constitute
consent).
Furthermore, the legal standard is not what Trooper Brasher subjectively
knew but rather what a typical reasonable person would have understood by the
exchange between the trooper and Norton. See id. at 459. But, finally, even
assuming more than one permissible view exists under the totality of these
circumstances, the standard of review requires that we give deference to the trial
the vehicle and he’s like ‘well I don’t really want to get searched again . . . this
other trooper down the road just stopped me . . . .’”
19
Trooper Brasher’s remarks to Trooper Bening illustrate this point. After
Trooper Brasher related to Trooper Bening that Norton “[didn’t] really want to get
searched again,” he goes on to add “he said I could go ahead so I’m still going to
go ahead and take a look.”
14
court’s view of the evidence. See id. at 460, 465. Therefore, we conclude that
the trial court did not err by finding Norton’s consent valid.
Norton also complains about the scope of the search, particularly the
vehicle’s trunk, where the methamphetamine was found inside a bag. However,
absent a suspect’s limiting of his consent to search to a particular area of a
vehicle, such as the trunk or passenger compartment, a request to search “the
car” reasonably includes all areas of the vehicle. State v. Garrett, 177 S.W.3d
652, 657 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2005, pet. ref’d); cf. Shelton v. State,
No. 02-07-00437-CR, 2009 WL 614506, at *1, *3–5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Mar.
5, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op. on reh’g, not designated for publication) (reversing
denial of motion to suppress when a reasonable person could have interpreted
appellant’s statements that he would open up the trunk as a limitation on his
consent, authorizing a search of the trunk only). Here, Norton did not limit his
consent to search to just the vehicle’s passenger compartment, and he did not
limit his consent to exclude any particular bag, or specifically the bag in which
methamphetamine was found. See Lemons v. State, 298 S.W.3d 658, 661 (Tex.
App.—Tyler 2009, pet. ref’d) (stating that if an officer makes a general request to
search and the individual consents, knowing that there are unlocked containers
in the car, the individual should expressly limit his consent to the vehicle but not
the containers or, at the very least, object when the officer begins to open the
container).
15
As set out above, the record supports the trial court’s finding that Norton
was not coerced or threatened in any way into giving consent before the
suspected methamphetamine was located in the trunk.20
Based on this record, the trial court did not err by concluding that there
was a valid traffic stop followed by a consensual search until the point that the
methamphetamine was discovered in Norton’s bag. Therefore, we overrule
Norton’s remaining point.
IV. Conclusion
Having overruled Norton’s remaining point, we affirm the trial court’s order
denying Norton’s motion to suppress.
/s/ Bonnie Sudderth
BONNIE SUDDERTH
JUSTICE
20
In his brief, Norton argues that his consent to search was not voluntary
because “the search of the bag from which the contraband was recovered was
not obtained until the troopers’ [sic] told him that if he did not hand over the key
they would just cut it open.” This argument is specious for three reasons, all of
which are clearly shown on the dashboard camera recording: (1) Trooper
Moore’s statement regarding cutting open a bag was directed at Jennifer, not
Norton, (2) the methamphetamine was located in an unlocked bag, not in the
locked bag that Trooper Brasher and Norton had discussed, and (3) most
importantly, the comment by Trooper Moore to Jennifer that they could “cut open”
one of the bags occurred 2 minutes and 20 seconds after Trooper Moore first
confronted Norton about the methamphetamine that he had already found. Thus,
the complained-of comment could not have played any part in the voluntariness
of the consent obtained prior to the discovery of the methamphetamine. See
Tex. Disciplinary Rules Prof’l Conduct R. 3.03(a)(1) & cmt. 2–3, reprinted in Tex.
Gov’t Code Ann. tit. 2, subtit. G, app. A (West 2013) (Tex. State Bar R. art. X,
§ 9).
16
PANEL: WALKER, MEIER, and SUDDERTH, JJ.
DO NOT PUBLISH
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
DELIVERED: August 20, 2015
17