Jeremy Rhynes v. State ( 2019 )

IN THE
TENTH COURT OF APPEALS
No. 10-17-00248-CR
No. 10-17-00249-CR
JEREMY RHYNES,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 40th District Court
Ellis County, Texas
Trial Court No. 40903CR & 40904CR
MEMORANDUM OPINION
In two issues, appellant, Jeremy Douglas Rhynes, challenges his convictions for
two counts of forgery on application for title. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. § 501.155(a)(1)
(West 2013). Specifically, Rhynes contends that the evidence is legally insufficient to
prove: (1) that he signed the name of another without legal authority on an application
for title in trial court cause number 40904CR; and (2) his identity as the suspect in trial
court cause number 40903CR.1 We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Rhynes was charged in two indictments with one count of forgery on application
for title pertaining to two different transactions for the sale of automobiles. Rhynes
pleaded “not guilty” to the charged offenses, and both offenses were tried together.
The jury found Rhynes guilty of both charged offenses and sentenced him to five
years’ incarceration in trial court cause number 40903CR and ten years’ incarceration,
with community supervision recommended, and a $10,000 fine in trial court cause
number 40904CR. The trial court sentenced Rhynes to ten years of community
supervision in trial court cause number 40904CR and ordered that the sentence run
concurrently with the sentence imposed in trial court cause number 40903CR. These
appeals followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
In Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011), the Texas Court of
Criminal Appeals expressed our standard of review of a sufficiency issue as follows:
In determining whether the evidence is legally sufficient to support a
conviction, a reviewing court must consider all of the evidence in the light
most favorable to the verdict and determine whether, based on that
evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom, a rational fact finder could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 Trial court cause number 40903CR corresponds with appellate cause number 10-17-00248-CR, and
trial court cause number 40904CR corresponds with appellate cause number 10-17-00249-CR.
Rhynes v. State Page 2
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19, 99 S. Ct. 2781, 61 L. Ed. 2d 560 (1979);
Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). This “familiar
standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to
resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” Jackson, 443 U.S. at
319. “Each fact need not point directly and independently to the guilt of
the appellant, as long as the cumulative force of all the incriminating
circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d
at 13.
Id.
Our review of “all of the evidence” includes evidence that was properly and
improperly admitted. Conner v. State, 67 S.W.3d 192, 197 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). And if
the record supports conflicting inferences, we must presume that the factfinder resolved
the conflicts in favor of the prosecution and therefore defer to that determination. Jackson,
443 U.S. at 326, 99 S. Ct. at 2793. Furthermore, direct and circumstantial evidence are
treated equally: “Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct evidence in
establishing the guilt of an actor, and circumstantial evidence alone can be sufficient to
establish guilt.” Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13. Finally, it is well established that the factfinder
can choose to believe all, some, or none of the testimony presented by the parties.
Chambers v. State, 805 S.W.2d 459, 461 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991).
The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by reference to the elements of the
offense as defined by a hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically-correct jury charge does four
things: (1) accurately sets out the law; (2) is authorized by the indictment; (3) does not
Rhynes v. State Page 3
unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State's
theories of liability; and (4) adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried. Id. Under the certificate of title act, a person commits an offense if
he knowingly provides false or incorrect information or without legal authority signs the
name of another person on an application for a certificate of title. TEX. TRANSP. CODE
ANN. § 501.155(a)(1).
III. TRIAL COURT CAUSE NUMBER 40904CR
In his first issue, Rhynes contends that the State failed to produce proof that he
signed a title application with the name “Norma Beasley,” an individual who died in
2012, in an October 22, 2015 transaction involving the sale of a used 1997 Mercedes S-500
automobile to Lakeishia Shaw. The record reflects that Rhynes was charged in trial court
cause number 40904CR with “knowingly provid[ing] false or incorrect information or
without legal authority sign[ing] the name of another person, namely, Norma Beasley,
on an application for a certificate of title.” However, the State elected to proceed in this
cause number solely on the allegation of providing false or incorrect information. Indeed,
the application portion of the jury charge provided the following:
Now, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that on or
about October 22, 2015, in Ellis County, Texas, the defendant, JEREMY
DOUGLAS RHYNES, did then and there knowingly provide false or
incorrect information on an application for a certificate of title, then you will
find the defendant guilty of Forgery on Application for Title as charged in
the indictment.
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Because Rhynes’s appellate complaint does not challenge this manner of committing the
charged offense, we conclude that this issue is inadequately briefed and, therefore,
presents nothing for review. See TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i); see also Busby v. State, 253 S.W.3d
661, 673 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (“This Court has no obligation to construct and compose
appellant’s issues, facts, and arguments ‘with appropriate citations to authorities and to
the record.’” (quoting TEX. R. APP. P. 38.1(i))). We overrule Rhynes’s first issue.
IV. TRIAL COURT CAUSE NUMBER 40903CR
In trial court cause number 40903CR, Rhynes was charged with “knowingly
provid[ing] false or incorrect information or without legal authority sign[ing] the name
of another person, namely, Larry Jordan, on an application for a certificate of title.” In
his second issue, Rhynes argues that the State failed to prove his identity as the suspect
with regard to this transaction, which involved the sale of a used 2003 BMW 530i
automobile to Kathy Holcomb. In particular, Rhynes asserts that his identity as the
suspect was never connected to his courtroom identification. We disagree.
A. Applicable Law
The State is required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is the
person who committed the crime charged. Roberson v. State, 16 S.W.3d 156, 167 (Tex.
App.—Austin 2000, pet. ref’d) (citing Johnson v. State, 673 S.W.2d 190, 196 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1984); Rice v. State, 901 S.W.2d 16, 17 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1990, pet. ref’d)).
Identity may be proven by direct or circumstantial evidence. Id. (citing Earls v. State, 707
Rhynes v. State Page 5
S.W.2d 82, 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Couchman v. State, 3 S.W.3d 155, 162 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref’d); Creech v. State, 718 S.W.2d 89, 90 (Tex. App.—El Paso 1986,
no pet.)). “In fact, identity may be proven by inferences.” Id. (citing United States v.
Quimby, 636 F.2d 86, 90 (5th Cir. 1981)); see Clark v. State, 47 S.W.3d 211, 214 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2001, no pet.); see also Jones v. State, 900 S.W.2d 392, 399 (Tex. App.—San
Antonio 1995, pet. ref’d) (explaining that the jury may use common sense and apply
common knowledge, observation, and experience gained in ordinary affairs of life when
giving effect to inference that may reasonably be drawn from evidence).
B. Discussion
In this cause number, both Holcomb and Detective Kyle Ranton of the Waxahachie
Police Department identified Rhynes as the person who committed the offense. In fact,
after testifying in detail about observing Rhynes filling out the application for title while
purporting to be Larry Jordan, Holcomb noted the following:
Q [The State]: And the person that you are calling—that purportedly
told you his name is Larry Jordan and I’m selling this
car, do you see him in the courtroom today?
A [Holcomb]: Yes, I do.
Q: Would you please identify him?
A: He is wearing a light blue shirt and dark blue suit.
Q: Sitting with Defense Counsel?
A: Yes, Ma’am.
Rhynes v. State Page 6
[Prosecutor]: Judge, let the record reflect she’s identified the
Defendant.
THE COURT: Record will so reflect.
Moreover, Detective Ranton later explained how he arranged a photographic lineup and
that Holcomb identified Photograph 6—Jeremy Rhynes—as the perpetrator of the
offense. And finally, Detective Ranton also identified Rhynes in open court as the
individual for whom a warrant was issued in this cause number.
Based on the foregoing, and viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the jury’s verdict, we cannot say that the evidence pertaining to the identity element of
the charged offense in this cause number is insufficient. See TEX. TRANSP. CODE ANN. §
501.155; Johnson, 673 S.W.3d at 196; Clark, 47 S.W.3d at 214; Roberson, 16 S.W.3d at 167;
Jones, 900 S.W.2d at 399; see also Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318-19, 99 S. Ct. at 2788-89; Lucio, 351
S.W.3d at 894. As such, we overrule Rhynes’s second issue.
V. CONCLUSION
Having overruled both of Rhynes’s issues on appeal, we affirm the judgments of
the trial court.
JOHN E. NEILL
Justice
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Before Chief Justice Gray,
Justice Davis, and
Justice Neill
Affirmed
Opinion delivered and filed April 10, 2019
Do not publish
[CR25]
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