Kathie Meadows Spears v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
12-14-00163-cr
TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
2/4/2015 11:17:24 PM
CATHY LUSK
CLERK
NUMBER 12-14-00163-CR
FILED IN
12th COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE TWELFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS TYLER, TEXAS
TYLER, TEXAS 2/4/2015 11:17:24 PM
CATHY S. LUSK
Clerk
KATHIE MEADOWS SPEARS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 7th District Court of Smith County, Texas
Trial Cause Number 007-1236-05
STATE’S BRIEF
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
D. MATT BINGHAM
Criminal District Attorney
Smith County, Texas
AARON REDIKER
Assistant District Attorney
State Bar of Texas Number 24046692
Smith County Courthouse, 4th Floor
Tyler, Texas 75702
Phone: (903) 590-1720
Fax: (903) 590-1719
Email: arediker@smith-county.com
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Index of Authorities ....................................................................................................2
Statement of Facts ......................................................................................................3
Summary of Argument ...............................................................................................5
I.ISSUE ONE: While a second, nearly identical judgment entered before mandate had
issued in appellant’s first appeal was void, the original judgment of conviction was still
in full force and effect at the time appellant violated the conditions of her community
supervision, and therefore the trial court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
State’s application to revoke. .......................................................................................6
Standard of Review .....................................................................................................6
Argument ....................................................................................................................6
II.ISSUES TWO AND THREE: The assessment of $300 in appointed attorney fees
should be deleted from the bill of costs.....................................................................10
Argument ..................................................................................................................10
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................12
Certificate of Service ................................................................................................12
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INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Texas Cases
Davis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 708 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ............................................6
Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ............................................8
Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985) ...................................8
Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) ......................................6
Hardy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 785 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d) ................9
Isabell v. State, 494 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973) ..........................................6
Jones v. State, 571 S.W.2d 191 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978) ............................................6
Lundgren v. State, 434 S.W.3d 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)......................................9
Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) .................................................7
Owen v. State, 352 S.W.3d 542 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d) .................10
Simon v. State, 442 S.W.3d 581 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) .................9
Spears v. State, No. 12-07-00168-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 98 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Jan. 9, 2008, no pet.) ..............................................................................................4
Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) ................................................7
State v. Moore, 225 S.W.3d 556 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)...........................................8
Texas Statutes
Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 15(b) .........................................................4
Texas Rules
Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(g) ..............................................................................................9
Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(b) ............................................................................................10
Tex. R. App. P. 34.5(d) ............................................................................................10
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NUMBER 12-14-00163-CR
IN THE TWELFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER, TEXAS
KATHIE MEADOWS SPEARS,
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS,
Appellee
From the 7th District Court of Smith County, Texas
Trial Cause Number 007-1236-05
STATE’S BRIEF
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS:
Comes now the State of Texas, by and through the undersigned Assistant Criminal
District Attorney, respectfully requesting that this Court overrule appellant’s first
alleged issue, and after the assessment of attorney fees is deleted from the bill of costs,
affirm the judgment of the trial court in the above-captioned cause.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a bench trial, the trial court entered the original judgment of conviction
against appellant on 2 April 2007 for the offense of state jail felony theft (Clerk’s R.
3
at 71-72). Appellant received a sentence of confinement for two years in the Texas
Department of Criminal Justice—State Jail Division, probated for a term of five years
under numerous conditions of supervision (Id. at 71-76). This Court affirmed her
conviction on 9 January 2008, issuing its mandate on 27 March 2008 (Id. at 88-90).
Spears v. State, No. 12-07-00168-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 98 (Tex. App.—Tyler
Jan. 9, 2008, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). On 5 March 2008,
three weeks before issuance of the mandate, the trial court entered a second judgment
of conviction, almost identical to the first, with nearly the same conditions of
community supervision (Clerk’s R. at 93-98). Only the dates and names of counsel of
record for each party were changed in the second judgment (Id. at 93-94), and the
specific conditions of community supervision forming the basis of appellant’s
subsequent revocation are identical in each probation order (Id. at 73-76, 95-98). On
25 April 2011, the State filed its first application to revoke appellant’s community
supervision, and appellant pleaded “true” to each alleged violation (Id. at 123-28, 131-
32). Nevertheless, the State’s application to revoke was dismissed on 30 November
2011, and at the end of the following year, the trial court amended the conditions of
supervision, extending the term for an additional five years (Id. at 131-32). See Tex.
Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 42.12, § 15(b) (West 2014). On 2 April 2014, the State
filed its second application to revoke (Clerk’s R. at 134-37), which the trial court
4
granted on 13 June 2014, finding that appellant had violated the conditions of her
community supervision by failing to submit mail-in reports and failing to obtain a GED
(Id. at 146-47; I Rep.’s R. at 46).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
As the original judgment of conviction and conditions of community supervision
were not void, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s
supervision. The original judgment remained in full force and effect despite the
subsequent void judgment, entered by the trial court before this Court had issued its
mandate in a prior appeal. As the conditions forming the basis of the revocation were
contained in the original judgment and supervision order, the trial court properly
revoked appellant’s community supervision after finding that she had violated them.
Lastly, while neither the judgment revoking appellant’s supervision nor the withdrawal
order show the imposition of any court costs, the bill of costs does reflect the
assessment of $300 in appointed attorney fees. Thus, the Court should order the trial
court clerk to delete the appointed attorney fees from the bill of costs, or abate the
appeal and remand the cause for entry of an appealable order by the trial court.
5
I. ISSUE ONE: While a second, nearly identical judgment entered before
mandate had issued in appellant’s first appeal was void, the original judgment
of conviction was still in full force and effect at the time appellant violated the
conditions of her community supervision, and therefore the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in granting the State’s application to revoke.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
"The only question legitimately before this Court on a probation revocation
proceeding is whether or not there was an abuse of discretion in the trial court,"
Flournoy v. State, 589 S.W.2d 705, 709 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979) (quoting Isabell v.
State, 494 S.W.2d 572, 573-574 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973)). Even one sufficient ground
for revocation will support the trial court's order revoking probation. Jones v. State,
571 S.W.2d 191, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
ARGUMENT
In his first issue, appellant argues that the judgment and supervision order entered
on 5 March 2008 were void, and the trial court’s subsequent revocation of her
community supervision was therefore an abuse of discretion (Appellant’s Br. 5, 7-8).
As the Court of Criminal Appeals explained in Davis v. State, 195 S.W.3d 708, 710
(Tex. Crim. App. 2006):
In Basaldua v. State, we recognized, in the "regular" probation context, that the
Legislature has authorized appeal in two instances: (1) from an order granting
probation and (2) from an order revoking probation. There is no legislative
authority for entertaining a direct appeal from an order modifying the conditions
of community supervision. A complaint about a modification can, however, be
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raised in an appeal from a revocation if the validity of the revocation depends
on the validity of the modification. (footnotes omitted).
However, “[a] complaint about a condition that was not a basis for revocation,” will
not be considered on direct appeal. Id. at 711. “[A] defendant can raise on appeal
from a revocation proceeding an error in the original plea hearing if the error would
render the original judgment void.” Nix v. State, 65 S.W.3d 664, 668 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001). “The sentence and the conditions of community supervision are each separate
parts of the ‘judgment.’” Speth v. State, 6 S.W.3d 530, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).
In Nix, the Court of Criminal Appeals provided a nearly exhaustive list of errors
resulting in a void judgment:
(1) the document purporting to be a charging instrument (i.e. indictment,
information, or complaint) does not satisfy the constitutional requisites of a
charging instrument, thus the trial court has no jurisdiction over the defendant,
(2) the trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the offense charged, such
as when a misdemeanor involving official misconduct is tried in a county court
at law, (3) the record reflects that there is no evidence to support the conviction,
or (4) an indigent defendant is required to face criminal trial proceedings
without appointed counsel, when such has not been waived, in violation of
Gideon v. Wainwright.
Nix, 65 S.W.3d at 668 (footnotes omitted). Further, “for a judgment to be void, the
record must leave no question about the existence of the fundamental defect. If the
record is incomplete, and the missing portion could conceivably show that the defect
does not in fact exist, then the judgment is not void, even though the available portions
of the record tend to support the existence of the defect.” Id. at 668-669. “A void
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judgment is a nullity from the beginning, and is attended by none of the consequences
of a valid judgment. It is entitled to no respect whatsoever because it does not affect,
impair, or create legal rights.” Ex parte Seidel, 39 S.W.3d 221, 225 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001) (quoting Ex parte Spaulding, 687 S.W.2d 741, 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)
(Teague, J., concurring)).
Regarding the second voiding defect listed in Nix, “the subject-matter jurisdiction
of the trial court over the case and the defendant extends, should the defendant timely
file a sufficient notice of appeal, to the point in time at which the record is filed in the
appellate court.” State v. Moore, 225 S.W.3d 556, 568 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). As
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to enter the 2008 judgment and supervision order
before this Court had issued its mandate in the appeal of the original judgment of
conviction, the 2008 judgment appears to be void. However, both the original
supervision order and the 2008 order contained the following identical conditions
(Clerk’s R. at 73-76, 95-98):
If supervision of your case is transferred from Smith County, send completed,
dated and signed mail-in reports to your Smith County Supervision Officer by
the 15th of each month1.
Obtain a GED within 1 year and provide proof to your supervision officer for
which you will receive 50 hours credit for Community Service Restitution2.
1
Condition 32 in the original supervision order and condition 33 in the 2008 order.
2
Condition 59 in the original supervision order and condition 60 in the 2008 order.
8
At the revocation hearing on 13 June 2014, and based on her pleas of “true”, the trial
court found that appellant had violated both of these conditions as alleged in the State’s
application to revoke (Id. at 134-37, 146-47; I Rep.’s R. at 46). The conditions forming
the basis for the revocation of appellant’s community supervision were thus present in
the original judgment (Clerk’s R. at 73-76). “[I]f a defendant files a timely and
effective notice of appeal, that filing stays the commencement of the community-
supervision term imposed until appellate mandate has issued affirming the judgment
of conviction.” Lundgren v. State, 434 S.W.3d 594, 598 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). See
Tex. R. App. P. 25.2(g). After this Court issued its mandate on 27 March 2008,
Conditions 32 and 59 in the original judgment remained in full force and effect and
were unaffected by the void judgment subsequently entered by the trial court. See
Hardy v. State, 297 S.W.3d 785, 792 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2009, pet. ref’d)
(original order placing defendant on community supervision in full force and effect
despite subsequent void order releasing him from supervision). Cf. Simon v. State, 442
S.W.3d 581, 585 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2014, no pet.) (modification of
supervision order before mandate issued was void, and because subsequent revocation
based solely on violation of that condition, trial court abused its discretion). Therefore,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking appellant’s community
supervision based on these conditions, and her first alleged issue should be overruled.
9
II. ISSUES TWO AND THREE: The assessment of $300 in appointed attorney
fees should be deleted from the bill of costs.
ARGUMENT
In her second and third issues, appellant argues that the trial court erred by
imposing appointed attorney fees as court costs and that the Smith County District
Clerk erred by including these fees in the itemized bill of costs (Appellant’s Br. 9-15).
The record does not reflect the trial court’s imposition of any court costs following the
revocation of appellant’s supervision, either in the judgment or the withdrawal order
(Clerk’s R. at 146-51). However, the bill of costs does show the assessment of $300
in appointed attorney fees as court costs by the District Clerk (Id. at 151-52). While
the bill of costs itself does not appear to be a final, appealable order, and the appellant’s
claims are most likely premature, this Court may abate the appeal, remand the cause
for entry of an appealable order granting or denying relief on the erroneous bill of
costs, and then order the trial court clerk to prepare and file a corrected bill, if
necessary. See Tex. R. App. P. 27.1(b), 34.5(d); Owen v. State, 352 S.W.3d 542, 548
(Tex. App.—Amarillo 2011, pet. ref’d) (appeal abated and cause remanded for entry
of final, appealable order by trial court and trial court clerk subsequently ordered to
prepare and file a corrected bill of costs and withdrawal notification).
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PRAYER
WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the State of Texas prays that the
Court overrule appellant’s first issue, and after the assessment of attorney fees is
deleted from the bill of costs, affirm the judgment of the 7th District Court of Smith
County, Texas, in the above-captioned cause.
Respectfully submitted,
D. MATT BINGHAM
Criminal District Attorney
Smith County, Texas
/s/ Aaron Rediker
Aaron Rediker
Assistant District Attorney
SBOT #: 24046692
100 North Broadway, 4th Floor
Tyler, Texas 75702
Office: (903) 590-1720
Fax: (903) 590-1719 (fax)
arediker@smith-county.com
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CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned attorney
certifies that the word count for this document is 1,900 words as calculated by
Microsoft Word 2013.
/s/ Aaron Rediker
Aaron Rediker
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that on this 4th day of February 2015, the State’s
Brief in the above-numbered cause has been electronically filed, and a legible copy of
the State's Brief has been sent by email to James W. Huggler Jr., attorney for appellant,
at jhugglerlaw@sbcglobal.net.
/s/ Aaron Rediker
Aaron Rediker
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