David Lee Coleman v. State ( 2005 )

IN THE

TENTH COURT OF APPEALS

 

No. 10-04-00237-CR

David Lee Coleman,

                                                                      Appellant

 v.

The State of Texas,

                                                                      Appellee

From the Criminal District Court

Jefferson County, Texas

Trial Court No. 89897

MEMORANDUM  Opinion

      Coleman appeals his conviction for possession of cocaine.  See Tex. Health & Safety Code Ann. § 481.115(a) (Vernon 2003).  We affirm.

      Sufficiency of the Evidence.  In Coleman’s first and second issues, he contends that the evidence that he knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine was insufficient.  Coleman argues that there is no evidence.  Coleman concedes that he “was in exclusive care, control and management of the powder rock cocaine as it was in the bottom [sic] his front pocket mixed with lint at jail book-in.”   

      Legal Sufficiency.  Considering the record evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we determine that a rational jury could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that Coleman knowingly or intentionally possessed cocaine.  See Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979); Prible v. State, No. AP-74,487, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 110, at *12-*13 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 26, 2005); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 1.07(a)(39) (Vernon Supp. 2004-2005) (“possession” defined).  We overrule Coleman’s first issue. 

      Factual Sufficiency.  Viewing the evidence in a neutral light, we determine that the evidence is not so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust, nor is the contrary evidence so strong that the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt standard could not have been met. See Prible, 2005 Tex. Crim. App. LEXIS 110, at *16; Zuniga v. State, 144 S.W.3d 477, 481 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). We overrule Coleman’s second issue.

      Charge.  In Coleman’s fourth and fifth issues, he complains of the jury charge.

      Verdict Form.  In Coleman’s fifth issue, he contends that the trial court erred in instructing the jury, “After you have reached a unanimous decision, your foreperson should sign the appropriate verdict attached to the charge, rather than, “If you reach a unanimous decision.”  Assuming, without deciding, that the trial court erred, any error was harmless.  In light of the otherwise unobjectionable charge and the overwhelming evidence, Coleman suffered no harm.  See Ellison v. State, 86 S.W.3d 226, 228 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Marvis v. State, 36 S.W.3d 878, 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001). We overrule Coleman’s fifth issue.

      Burden of Proof on Prior Convictions.  In Coleman’s fourth issue, he contends that the trial court erred in denying Coleman’s request for a penalty-phase instruction that Coleman’s prior convictions must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt.  The trial court does not err in not giving such an instruction.  Bluitt v. State, 137 S.W.3d 51, 54 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004).  We overrule Coleman’s fourth issue.

      Evidence of Prior Convictions.  In Coleman’s third issue, he contends that the trial court erred in overruling Coleman’s objections to the judgments of Coleman’s prior convictions in the penalty phase.  Coleman argues that the quality of the fingerprints and photographs is poor.  These objections go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.  See Robinson v. State, 739 S.W.2d 795, 802 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987).  We overrule Coleman’s third issue.

      Having overruled Coleman’s issues, we affirm the judgment.

TOM GRAY

Chief Justice

Before Chief Justice Gray,

      Justice Vance, and

      Justice Reyna

      (Justice Vance concurring with note)*

Affirmed

Memorandum opinion delivered and filed July 6, 2005

Do not publish

[CR25]

  *  “(Justice Vance concurs with a note:  It is hard to understand why this opinion, even though it is a memorandum opinion, does not adequately address Appellant’s issues.  The sufficiency issues contain no analysis of the evidence whatsoever; no explanation is given how a charge that assumes a unanimous guilty verdict is harmless. Although I concur in the judgment, I cannot join this opinion.)”