Freddie Lee Walker v. Janice O'guin, E. Franco, and Victoria Dodson ( 2005 )

Opinion issued July 7, 2005

  In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

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NO. 01-03-00689-CV

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FREDDIE LEE WALKER, Appellant

V.

JANICE O’GUIN, E. FRANCO, & VICTORIA DODSON, Appellees

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On Appeal from the 12th District Court

Walker County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 22046

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MEMORANDUM OPINION

          On May 6, 2005, we issued an order in which we explained that the record before us presented questions pertaining to our jurisdiction to consider this appeal and that we would dismiss the appeal unless a supplemental clerk’s record, demonstrating that we have jurisdiction, was filed by June 6, 2005. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a). That deadline has passed without a supplemental clerk’s record having been filed. Accordingly, we dismiss the appeal.

          Appellant, Freddie Lee Walker, an inmate currently confined in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice Institutional Division (TDCJ-ID), sued Janice O’Guin in his “Original Motion for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief” on the grounds that he was wrongfully downgraded from his “State approved trusty two” (sic) inmate status due to the Unit Classification Committee’s allegations that he was a suspected gang member. Appellant added E. Franco and Victoria Dodson as defendants in his “First Amended Supplemental Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief.” The trial court’s order dismissed appellant’s claims against Janice O’Guin as frivolous. See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.003(a)-(b) (Vernon 2002). Appellant challenges that ruling in three issues on appeal.

          Appellant’s live pleadings show three named defendants. However, the trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s claims as frivolous names only one defendant, Janice O’Guin. Because the record before us presents questions pertaining to our jurisdiction, we issue this order, as required by rule 42.3(a) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. See Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

Jurisdiction - Finality

          The date the judgment is signed begins the appellate timetable. Tex. R. Civ. P. 306a(1); Tex. R. App. P. 26.1. A signed, written judgment or order is, therefore, an absolute prerequisite to this Court’s exercise of appellate jurisdiction. See Harris County Flood Control Dist. v. Adam, 66 S.W.3d 265, 266 (Tex. 2001); see also Estate of Townes v. Wood, 934 S.W.2d 806, 807 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1996) (orig. proceeding); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code §§ 51.012-.014 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 2004-2005) (all referring to appeals from a signed “final judgment” or an “interlocutory order” made appealable by statute); Tex. R. App. P. 25.1(c) (referring to “judgment or other appealable order”). Section 51.014(a) recognizes this requirement in authorizing appeals from certain interlocutory orders. Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 51.014(a).   

          Excluding those statutory exceptions, which do not apply here, this Court’s appellate jurisdiction is, therefore, limited to review of final judgments that dispose of all parties and claims. See Adam, 66 S.W.3d at 266; Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp. 39 S.W.3d 191, 192 (Tex. 2001). In the event of vagueness that may exist in the judgment or order challenged, the record on appeal will determine finality. See M.O Dental Lab v. Rape, 139 S.W.3d 671, 674 (Tex. 2004) (citing Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 206).

          The trial court’s order dismissing appellant’s claims as frivolous lists Janice O’Guin as the only defendant in the case and states, “It is hereby ORDERED that all claims against Defendant are hereby DISMISSED AS FRIVOLOUS. Any other relief not granted expressly herein is denied.” However, appellant’s “First Amended Supplemental Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Injunctive Relief” names two other defendants, E. Franco and Victoria Dodson. Although a trial court may dismiss a portion of a prison inmate’s claims, pursuant to section 14.010(a) of the Remedies Code, the court must designate “the issues and defendants on which the claim may proceed.” Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 14.010(a)-(b) (Vernon 2002). The trial court’s order here does not attempt the partial dismissal authorized by section 14.010(b), but attempts, instead, to dismiss appellant’s entire cause.

          An order that disposes of claims by only one of multiple plaintiffs or against one of multiple defendants does not adjudicate claims by or against other parties. Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 205. “Language that . . . the case is dismissed shows finality if there are no other claims by other parties; but language that ‘plaintiff take nothing by his claims against X’ when there is more than one defendant or other parties in the case does not indicate finality.” Id. If the record reveals the existence of parties or claims not mentioned in the order, the order is not final. Id. at 206.

          Furthermore, although the trial court’s order includes a “Mother Hubbard” clause denying all relief not expressly granted, a “Mother Hubbard” clause in an order issued without a full trial on the merits cannot be construed to indicate finality. See id. at 192. “[I]n cases in which only one final and appealable judgment can be rendered, a judgment issued without a conventional trial is final for purposes of appeal if and only if either it actually disposes of all claims and parties then before the court, regardless of its language, or it states with unmistakable clarity that it is a final judgment as to all claims and all parties.” Id. at 192-93.

          Nothing in the trial court’s order indicates that it is a final judgment, and it does not dispose of all pending claims and parties. See id. at 206. The order dismisses appellant’s claims as frivolous against “Defendant,” Janice O’Guin, but this language does not show that appellant’s claims against the remaining two defendants, E. Franco and Victoria Dodson, are also denied. See id. As the order recites and as the record demonstrates, the defendant named in the order is not the only defendant remaining in the case. See id. Thus, it appears to this Court that the trial court’s order is not final because it does address all parties and all claims. See id.; Adams, 66 S.W.3d at 266.

Conclusion

          We dismiss the appeal. Tex. R. App. P. 42.3(a).

                                                             Elsa Alcala

                                                             Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Alcala, and Higley.