Richard Urdiales, Jr. v. Concord Technologies Delaware, Inc. ( 2005 )

Opinion issued June 23, 2005

    In The

Court of Appeals

For The

First District of Texas

---

NO. 01–04–00020–CV

---

RICHARD URDIALES, JR., Appellant

V.

ALFREDO CANTU, Appellee

---

On Appeal from 157th District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 2001–23198

---

MEMORANDUM OPINION

          This appeal follows a bench trial in which the trial court awarded appellant, Richard Urdiales Jr., actual damages against appellee, Alfredo Cantu, for civil assault. The trial court concluded that there was no evidence to support Urdiales’s claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress and determined that Urdiales was not entitled to punitive damages against Cantu. In two issues, Urdiales (1) challenges the trial court’s determination that no evidence exists to support his intentional infliction of emotional distress claim and (2) contends that he is entitled to punitive damages.           We affirm.

Background

          Cantu was Urdiales’ supervisor at Concord Technologies Delaware, Inc. (“Concord”), where both worked in the machine shop. On March 24, 2000, Urdiales returned from his lunch break and approached Cantu. When Urdiales began speaking, Cantu became upset and told Urdiales to go back to work. Cantu was angry with Urdiales because he believed that Urdiales had taken too long for lunch. Urdiales left but then immediately returned to speak with Cantu. In one of his hands, Cantu held a stainless steel part. Cantu swore at Urdiales and used the hand holding the part to make physical contact with Urdiales’s chest. Three days after the altercation, Urdiales sought medical treatment for his injury.

          Urdiales contacted the authorities and criminal charges were brought against Cantu. As a result, Cantu was placed on nine months community supervision, ordered to perform 80 hours community service, assessed a $200 fine, and ordered to pay $500 in restitution to Urdiales.

          Urdiales was later terminated from his job and brought suit against Concord and Cantu. Concord obtained a summary judgment against Urdiales, leaving Cantu as the only remaining defendant. After the trial court severed the claims against Concord and entered a final judgment, Urdiales appealed the judgment to the Fourteenth Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Urdiales v. Concord Technologies Dela., Inc., 120 S.W.3d 400 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied).

          Urdiales pursued his claims against Cantu for assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress. Following a bench trial, the trial court signed a judgment, awarding Urdiales $400 for pain and suffering and $750 for mental anguish damages. The judgment also provided that the trial court was “of the opinion that [Urdiales] should take nothing on his claims for medical expenses and punitive damages.” Based on Urdiales’s request, the trial court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law in support of its judgment. Urdiales neither objected to the findings of fact and conclusions of law nor requested the trial court to make additional or amended findings.

Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress

          In his first issue, Urdiales challenges the trial court’s conclusion of law that “no competent evidence” was offered to support a finding of intentional infliction of emotional distress against Cantu. Urdiales does not expressly challenge any of the trial court’s findings of fact; rather, Urdiales cites to evidence in the record that he contends supports his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress.

          In an appeal from a bench trial, we review a trial court’s conclusions of law as legal questions, de novo, and will uphold them on appeal if the judgment can be sustained on any legal theory supported by the evidence. BMC Software Belg. v. Marchand, 83 S.W.3d 789, 794 (Tex. 2002); In re Moers, 104 S.W.3d 609, 611 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.). An appellant may not challenge a trial court’s conclusions of law for factual insufficiency, but we may review the legal conclusions drawn from the facts to determine their correctness. BMC Software Belg., 83 S.W.3d at 794. If we determine that a conclusion of law is erroneous, but that the trial court nevertheless rendered the proper judgment, the error does not require reversal. Id.

          To recover damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the defendant acted intentionally or recklessly; (2) the defendant’s conduct was extreme and outrageous; (3) the defendant’s actions caused the plaintiff emotional distress; and (4) the resulting emotional distress was severe. Standard Fruit & Vegetable Co. v. Johnson, 985 S.W.2d 62, 65 (Tex. 1998).

          Urdiales focuses on evidence that he contends shows that Cantu’s conduct was “extreme and outrageous.” Broadly construed, Urdiales’s contention can be read as a sufficiency of the evidence challenge to the trial court’s findings of fact that underpin the conclusion that Cantu’s conduct was not “extreme and outrageous.” However, we need not determine whether Urdiales offered sufficient evidence to satisfy the “extreme and outrageous” element of intentional infliction of emotional distress.

          We overrule sufficiency challenges to the evidence supporting fact findings that bolster a legal conclusion or disposition when other fact findings that also support that legal conclusion or disposition go unchallenged. See In re L.R., 67 S.W.3d 332, 338–39 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2001, no pet.). Here, Urdiales does not challenge other fact findings that support the trial court’s disposition of Urdiales’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim. See Firefighters’ & Police Officers’ Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Herrera, 981 S.W.2d 728, 732 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1998, pet. denied) (“Unchallenged findings are binding on the parties and this Court”). Specifically, the trial court’s unchallenged findings of fact support a conclusion that Cantu’s actions did not cause Urdiales “severe emotional distress”—a necessary element to maintain a successful claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress. “Severe emotional distress” means distress so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. GTE Southwest, Inc. v. Bruce, 998 S.W.2d 605, 618 (Tex. 1999); Fields v. Teamsters Local Union No. 988, 23 S.W.3d 517, 533 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000, pet. denied).

          In this regard, two of the unchallenged findings state that “Urdiales sought limited additional medical care after the initial medical care” and that “Urdiales experienced some limited degree of physical pain and mental anguish as a result of the March 24, 2000 altercation.” [Emphasis added.] These findings are antithetical to a conclusion that Urdiales suffered “severe emotional distress.” To the contrary, these unchallenged conclusions support the trial court’s “no competent evidence” conclusion and the ultimate disposition of Urdiales’s intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.

          We overrule Urdiales’s first issue.

Punitive Damages

          In his second issue, Urdiales contends that the trial court erred in denying his request for punitive damages. The trial court made no findings of fact or conclusions of law referable to Urdiales’s punitive damages claim.

          Once a trial court files findings of fact, either party may ask the trial court to make specific additional findings within ten days of the date the court files the original findings. Tex. R. Civ. P. 298. If a trial court’s original findings do not address a ground of recovery or a defense, then the party relying on that ground or defense must request additional findings to avoid waiver of that claim or defense on appeal. Limestone Group, Inc. v. Sai Thong, L.L.C., 107 S.W.3d 793, 799 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2003, no pet.); Smith v. Smith, 22 S.W.3d 140, 149–50 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, no pet.). Because our record contains no request for additional findings or conclusions, Urdiales has waived his right to complain on appeal that the trial court denied his request for punitive damages. See Limestone Group, 107 S.W.3d at 799 (holding that claimant waived right to complain of trial court’s denial of attorney’s fees on appeal when it did not request additional findings or conclusions in trial court); Smith, 22 S.W.3d at 150 (concluding that husband waived right to complain on appeal regarding manner in which trial court had calculated division of retirement benefit account in divorce proceeding when husband did not request additional findings and conclusions regarding how court made division).

          We overrule Urdiales’s second issue.

  Conclusion

          We affirm the judgment of the trial court.

                                                                        Laura Carter Higley

                                                                        Justice

Panel consists of Justices Taft, Alcala, and Higley.