Jamie Lee Bledsoe v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
06-14-00138-CR
SIXTH COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
5/4/2015 9:45:08 AM
DEBBIE AUTREY
CLERK
NO. 06-14-00138-CR
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FILED IN
6th COURT OF APPEALS
TEXARKANA, TEXAS
SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF TEXAS
5/4/2015 9:45:08 AM
DEBBIE AUTREY
TEXARKANA, TEXAS Clerk
JAIME LEE BLEDSOE, APPELLANT
VS.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, APPELLEE
APPEALED FROM THE 71ST DISTRICT COURT
HARRISON COUNTY, TEXAS
TRIAL COURT NO. 12-0374X
APPELLEE’S BRIEF
Jonathan Hyatt
Assistant District Attorney
State Bar No. 24072161
Harrison County District Attorney’s Office
200 West Houston Street
Marshall, Texas 75670
Telephone: 903 935-8408
Facsimile: 903 938-9312
jonh@co.harrison.tx.us
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLEE
STATE OF TEXAS
1
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellant:
Jamie Lee Bledsoe, Inmate #1945574
Wynne Unit
810 FM 2821
Huntsville, Texas 77349
Appellant’s Standby Trial Counsel
Cheryl Cooper-Sammons
P.O. Box 8517
Marshall, Texas 75671
State’s Trial Counsel
Shawn Connally
Harrison County District Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 776
Marshall, Texas 75670
Trial Judge
Hon. Brad Morin
71st Judicial District Court
200 West Houston, Suite 219
Marshall, Texas 75670
Appellant’s Counsel on Appeal
Ebb Mobley
P.O. Box 2309
Longview, Texas 75606
State’s Counsel on Appeal:
Jonathan Hyatt
Harrison County District Attorney’s Office
P.O. Box 776
Marshall, Texas 75670
2
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Cover Page 1
Identity of Parties and Counsel 2
Table of Contents 3
Index of Authorities 4
Issues Presented 6
Statement of the Case 7
Statement of Facts 8
Issue One: The enhancement of Appellant’s punishment
complies with statutory guidelines and is therefore
legally valid. 10
Standard of Review 10
Statutory Framework 11
Argument 12
Issue Two: Searches conducted and evidence seized
from the motel room used against the Appellant at trial
were legally obtained and did not violate Appellant’s
Fourth Amendment Rights 16
Standard of Review 16
Warrants/Consent in Question 17
Law Enforcement Legally Justified to Seize Shirt
Without Warrant 17
Appellant Consent to Search 20
Warrant Errors Insufficient to Invalidate Warrant24
Prayer for Relief 27
Certificate of Compliance 28
Certificate of Service 28
3
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Case Law
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.Crim.App.1991) 10
Carmen v. State, 358 S.W.3d 285 (Tex.Crim.App.2000) 18
Harris v. State, 359 S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex.Crim.App.
2011) 10
Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128 (1990) 18
Jones v. State, 914 S.W.2d 675 (Tex.Ct.App.-Amarillo
1996) 24,25,26
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1978) 20,21
State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587 (Tex.Crim.App. 2006)
16,17
Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179 (Tex.Crim.App.2012) 21
United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48 (5th Cir. 1990) 24
United States v. Jackson, 131 F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1997)
18
Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442 (Tex.Crim.App. 2010)
16
Walter v. State, 28 S.W.3d 538 (Tex.Crim.App. 2000) 18
Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831 (Tex.Crim.App. 2014)
10
4
Statutes
Tex. Const., Art I, Sect. 9 21
Tex. Penal Code Sect. 12.35(a) (Vernon 2011) 11,14,15
Tex. Penal Code Sect. 12.42(a)(2) (Vernon 2007) 15
Tex. Penal Code Sect. 12.425(b)(Vernon 2011)11,12,14,15
5
ISSUES PRESENTED
ISSUE ONE: The enhancement of Appellant’s punishment
complies with statutory guidelines and is therefore
legally valid.
ISSUE TWO: Searches conducted and evidence seized from
the motel room used against the Appellant at trial were
legally obtained and did not violate Appellant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
6
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Appellant was charged by indictment with the
offense of Burglary of a Building (CR-2). A
Suppression Hearing was conducted on April 14, 2014 (RR
Vol. 2). The State filed a State’s Notice of Intent to
Seek Enhanced Punishment Due to Prior Conviction on May
8, 2014, alleging prior convictions in cause number 99-
0124x and 08-177x(CR 138-9). Voir dire commenced on
July 21, 2014 with the trial on merits beginning
immediately afterwards (RR Vol.3). At the conclusion
of the guilt/innocence phase, the Appellant was found
guilty (CR-224). The punishment phase began and the
Appellant pled “Not True” to the enhancement
allegations (5 RR 18-19). At the conclusion of the
punishment phase, the jury found the enhancements to be
true and sentenced the Appellant to 20 years in the
Institutional Division of the Texas Department of
Criminal Justice with a $10,000 fine (CR-224).
7
STATEMENT OF FACTS
On July 16, 2012, Brad Horn, the Manager at Fish &
Still Equipment arrived at work to discover that a
Burglary had occurred at his place of business(3 RR
100). Horn called law enforcement and upon reviewing
surveillance material, the investigating officers
recognized the Defendant (3 RR 127). Officers
investigated the crime scene and went by neighboring
businesses, discovering additional surveillance videos
with an individual that they identified as the
Defendant at a time that was proximate to the alleged
Burglary (3 RR 118). After securing an arrest warrant,
officers with the Marshall Police Department scoured
local motels and eventually discovered that the
Defendant was staying at the local Motel 6 (3 RR 135).
Officers went to the motel where the Defendant was
residing, knocked on his door, and when he answered
they arrested him on a felony warrant and secured the
premises (3 RR 120). While arresting the Defendant,
law enforcement saw in plain view a shirt on the floor
8
of the Defendant’s motel room that matched the shirt
the alleged burglar was wearing on the videos they had
previously seen (3 RR 140). Subsequent to arrest,
officers obtained a signed consent from the Defendant
to search his motel room (3 RR 140). In addition to
the signed consent, officers obtained a magistrate’s
signature on a search warrant to search the motel room,
specifying seeing the shirt in the motel room in the
supporting affidavit (3 RR 140). Upon returning to the
secured motel room, law enforcement retrieved the
Defendant’s shirt (4 RR 9). Law enforcement then
secured a second warrant to obtain the Defendant’s DNA,
retrieved such DNA via a mouth swab and had it analyzed
by DPS (4 RR 85).
9
ISSUE ONE: The enhancement of Appellant’s punishment
complies with statutory guidelines and is therefore
legally valid.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
In reviewing a lower court’s interpretation of a
statute, the standard of review for appellate courts is
de novo. Yazdchi v. State, 428 S.W.3d 831
(Tex.App.Crim. 2014). “In construing a statute, the
court must seek to effectuate the collective intent or
purpose of the legislators who enacted the
legislation.” Yazdchi citing Harris v. State, 359
S.W.3d 625, 629 (Tex.Crim.App.2011). As Boykin
emphasizes, “When attempting to discern this collective
legislative intent or purpose, we necessarily focus our
attention on the literal text of the statute in
question and attempt to discern the fair, objective
meaning of that text at the time of its enactment,”
Boykin v. State, 818 S.W.2d 782 (Tex.App.Crim. 1991).
10
As such, a literal application of the enhancement
statute to the case at hand leads to the conclusion
that Mr. Bledsoe was enhanced properly.
Statutory Framework
Appellant’s sentence is lawful because it meets the
requirements of § 12.425(b). That specific section of
the Texas Penal Code reads:
If it is shown on the trial of a state jail felony
punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the
defendant has previously been finally convicted of
two felonies other than a state jail felony
punishable under Section 12.35(a), and the second
previous felony conviction is for an offense that
occurred subsequent to the first previous
conviction having become final, on conviction the
defendant shall be punished for a felony of the
second degree. Tex. Penal Code § 12.425(b)(Vernon
2011)
The only outside reference that this section makes is
to § 12.35(a). § 12.35(a), the Penal Code provision
that speaks to the range of punishment for a State Jail
Felony, reads:
Except as provided by Subsection (c), an individual
adjudged guilty of a state jail felony shall be
punished by confinement in a state jail for any
term of not more than two years or less than 180
days. Tex. Penal Code § 12.35(a)(Vernon 2011)
11
Argument
The Defendant plead “Not True” to the enhancement
allegations during the punishment portion of trial (5
RR 18-9). As contained in the Exhibit Index, Exhibits
50 and 51, the Judgements from Appellant’s previous
convictions in cause numbers 08-0177x and 99-0124x,
respectively, were entered with no objection from the
Defense (Vol. 5, p. 10-11). After deliberations, the
jury found the enhancement allegations to be true and
sentenced Appellant to the maximum of 20 years
confinement and a $10,000 fine (Vol. 5, p. 32).
The requirements of §12.425(b) of the Texas Penal
Code is that any two sequential felony convictions that
were not punished as State Jail Felonies may be alleged
to enhance a State Jail Felony’s punishment range to
that of a Second Degree Felony. After being admitted
with no objection by the Defense, a closer look at the
judgments reveals that they occurred sequentially.
With respect to the first enhancement allegation,
in Cause Number 99-0124x, exhibit 51 reveals that the
12
underlying offense in that case was Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a Second Degree Felony.
Furthermore, there are no “Findings on Enhancement” on
the face of the Judgement because it was charged and
punished as a Second Degree Felony, with Bledsoe being
sentenced to 15 year confinement. It was signed
October 3, 2003.
Concerning the 08-0177x enhancement allegation,
exhibit 50 reveals that it was a Burglary of a Building
enhanced to a Second Degree Felony. As there are no
allegations that such Burglary occurred in a
Habitation, the charged offense is 08-0177x was that of
a State Jail Felony. Bledsoe pled true to the
enhancement allegations and was sentenced to 7 years in
the Institutional Division of TDCJ after pleading
guilty on January 26, 2009.
Appellant argues that because 08-0177x was for an
underlying State Jail offense, that the Court cannot
use said conviction for purposes of a 12.425(b)
enhancement. Appellee must respectfully disagree.
13
Applying the de novo standard of review and reading the
plain text of the statute reveals that 12.425(b) states
“If it is shown on the trial of a state jail felony …
that the defendant has previously been finally
convicted of two felonies other than a state jail
felony punishable under Section 12.35(a)…” (emphasis
added). Having sequential State Jail convictions is
not enough to meet the requirements of 12.425(b). The
sequential felonies must not have been punished as
State Jail offenses. For purposes of this statutory
section, the underlying felony conviction is not as
important as the punishment assessed for said felony.
The two convictions used to enhance Appellant were
punished as Second Degree felonies. Because the two
enhancement convictions were felonies, sequential and
not punished as State Jail Felonies, the charged State
Jail Felony must be enhanced to a Second Degree
punishment.
Appellant cites numerous cases and the specific
Texas Penal Code section 12.42(a)(2) in his arguments.
14
He contends that applying the 12.42(a)(2) standard to
his case shows that the underlying State Jail Felony
conviction from 08-0177x that the State used to enhance
him is improper. Unfortunately for Appellant, the law
changed. Texas Penal Code section 12.42(a)(2) reads:
If it is shown on the trial of a state jail felony
punishable under Section 12.35(a) that the
defendant has previously been finally convicted of
two felonies, and the second previous felony
conviction is for an offense that occurred
subsequent to the first previous conviction having
become final, on conviction the defendant shall be
punished for a second-degree felony. Tex. Penal
Code Sect. 12.42(a)(2)(Vernon 2007)
In 2011, the Legislature amended the statutes, adding
Texas Penal Code Section 12.425, a specific provision
dictating “Penalties for Repeat & Habitual Felony
Offenders on Trial for State Jail Felony.” As
previously noted, the new, current law emphasizes
punishment as opposed to conviction. As such, Mr.
Bledsoe’s contention that his underlying 08-0177x State
Jail conviction can’t be used to enhance him to a
Second Degree Felony is improper.
15
ISSUE TWO: Searches conducted and evidence seized from
the motel room used against the Appellant at trial were
legally obtained and did not violate Appellant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
The Court reviews a trial court’s ruling on a
motion to suppress evidence under a bifurcated standard
of review. Valtierra v. State, 310 S.W.3d 442, 447
(Tex.Crim.App. 2010).
First, the court applies an abuse of discretion
standard to the trial court’s findings of fact.
State v. Dixon, 206 S.W.3d 587, 590 (Tex.Crim.App.
2006). Affording almost total deference to the
trial court’s findings, especially those based on an
evaluation of the witnesses’ credibility and demeanor.
Valtierra, 310 S.W.3d at 447. Second, the court
reviews de novo the trial court’s application of the
law to the facts. Id. Should the court determine that
the ruling is reasonably supported by the record and
16
its correct on any theory of law, the lower court’s
ruling will be affirmed. Id. at 447.
WARRANTS/CONSENTS IN QUESTION
There are three areas where the Appellant raises
issues with respect to warrants/consents in the instant
case. Going in the order in which they occurred, the
Appellant (1) signed a consent to search his motel
room, (2) law enforcement obtained a search warrant and
searched the motel room, and (3) law enforcement
obtained a warrant for DNA on the shirt seized during
the previous warrant search. At various points in his
appeal and at trial, Appellant attacks these three
issues, but for purposes of clarity, Appellee is
combining the response to these complaints.
LAW ENFORCEMENT LEGALLY JUSTIFIED TO SEIZE SHIRT
WITHOUT WARRANT
In the instant case, law enforcement was within its
bounds to seize the shirt (evidence of a crime), at the
time it was first observed. Under the Plain-View
Doctrine, appellate courts apply a two-prong test to
determine whether seizure of an item meets the
17
requirements of the exception to the Fourth Amendment’s
warrant requirement. “First, the police must have a
right to be in the location where the article is in
plain view. Second the article found in plain view
must be evidence that leads the police to have the
immediately apparent belief that the article may be
evidence of a crime, contraband, or otherwise subject
to seizure.” Carmen v. State, 358 S.W.3d 285, 294
(Tex.App.-Houston 2011) (citing Walter v. State, 28
S.W.3d 538 (Tex.Crim.App.2000))(also citing Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 (1990)). Said limitation
on items that may be seized are confined to objects
that are “perceived to be contraband, stolen property,
or incriminating in character” U.S. v. Jackson, 131
F.3d 1105 (4th Cir. 1997), (citing Horton v.
California, 496 U.S. 128, 136 (1990)).
At the time the Appellant was arrested, law
enforcement was exercising a lawful arrest warrant. The
legality of the underlying arrest warrant was not
18
attacked; therefore, the Court should conclude that the
arrest warrant was valid.
With respect to the two prong approach to the
validity of the Plain-View Doctrine, law enforcement
was present due to a valid arrest warrant. Law
enforcement knocked on Bledsoe’s motel room door with a
valid arrest warrant and when he opened the door, they
saw on the floor, the shirt he had worn while
committing the burglary they were investigating (2 R.R.
19). Having been at the location with a legal
justification, we must now examine the second prong:
the evidence in plain-view must be evidence of a crime
(amongst other things). As stated previously, the
shirt seized was used as justification to obtain the
search warrant. This shirt was the same shirt that DNA
analysis later concluded was the one worn by the
Defendant. Furthermore, it is the same shirt that law
enforcement discussed at the Suppression Hearing and
later at trial. Applying the bifurcated standard of
review’s abuse of discretion prong, giving the Court
19
deference with respect to the reliability of the
witnesses, this Court should allow for the fact that
law enforcement knew what they saw, and that what they
saw was the shirt later described in the warrant.
Applying this evidence to the law with the standard of
review’s de novo prong reveals that the theory of the
law relied upon by the Prosecution was valid. This
discussion is beside the point because out of an
abundance of caution, law enforcement received consent
and obtained a warrant to seize the shirt.
APPELLANT CONSENTED TO THE SEARCH
Appellant’s consent to the search of his motel room
trumps any error that may or may not have been made in
the warrant to search his motel room. Whether applying
the Supreme Court’s requirement for consent, requiring
that consent be voluntary and intelligent as proved by
a preponderance of evidence Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218 (1978) or the Texas Constitution’s
requirement that consent must be proved by clear and
20
convincing evidence, Tex. Const., art. I, Sect. 9, the
evidence presented at trial was clear: Bledsoe
consented to the search of his motel room. When
determining whether consent was voluntary, the Court
looks at several factors. Taking a totality of the
circumstances approach, Courts look at factors
including:
Whether the accused was advised of his
constitutional rights, the length of the detention,
whether the questioning was repetitive or
prolonged, whether the accused was aware that he
could decline to answer the questions, and what
kind of psychological impact the questioning had on
the accused. Tucker v. State, 369 S.W.3d 179
(Tex.Crim.App. 2012) citing Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. at 226-27 (1978).
Applying these factors to the case at hand, the only
reasonable conclusion is that Bledsoe knew what he was
doing. Testimony indicated that consent was received
fairly quickly, so the length of detention was minimal.
According to the officer that received consent, 20
minutes transpired from the time that Bledsoe was
arrested, transported to the Harrison County Jail,
taken to an interrogation room and consented to the
21
search (2 R.R. 24). As such, the length of
interrogation along with the transportation to the jail
was anything but lengthy. Furthermore, due to the
short length of time in the actual interrogation room,
it would be impossible for the questioning to be very
repetitive. With respect to the Appellant’s ability to
understand what was going on, we must bear in mind that
the Appellant is a hardened career criminal with the
intelligence and ability to write and brief cases. The
criminal was mirandized and due to his prior brush-ins
with law enforcement, was savvy to the process. The
Defendant knew he could decline consent and as such, it
is highly unlikely that this sort of a detention would
have any psychological impact on the Defendant.
As proven in testimony and the video played at
trial, Mr. Bledsoe signed away his right to complain
about the search (2 RR 8). Additionally, during the
Suppression hearing of this case, the Court had an
opportunity to review said consent and gauge the
credibility of the testifying witnesses before
22
ultimately coming to the conclusion that Bledsoe knew
what he was doing when he signed the consent. Bledsoe
even testified at the Suppression. Applying the bi-
furcated standard of review, the abuse of discretion
hurdle requires that deference be given to the trial
court’s analysis of the evidence presented. At trial,
Appellant had an opportunity to examine/cross-examine
law enforcement at both the Suppression hearing and at
trial. Based on the evidence presented: recorded
consent video and testimony from the officers that
received consent, the trial court determined that based
on the credibility of the witnesses and the consent of
the defendant himself, the consent was valid. Moving
onto the de novo prong, the theory of the law in cases
involving consent shows that there was adequate
evidence to substantiate the Trial Court’s denial of
Appellant’s Motion to Suppress.
23
WARRANT ERRORS INSUFFICIENT TO INVALIDATE THE WARRANT
Appellant contends that the typographical error on
the warrant justifies this Court throwing out the
Search Warrant. Appellee respectfully disagrees. Per
Jones v. State, in a similar case, where an apartment
number was wrong on a search warrant, the Court of
Appeals in Amarillo determined that that error alone
was insufficient to invalidate the warrant. 914 S.W.2d
675 (Tex.Ct.App.-Amarillo 1996). Citing federal cases,
Jones states:
federal courts have taken into account facts known
by the executing officer but not expressly stated
in the supporting affidavit, such as where (1) an
officer involved in the search was the affiant to
the search warrant's supporting affidavit, and (2)
the evidence shows that the same officer had
previously been to the premises considered covered
by the warrant
citing United States v. Gordon, 901 F.2d 48, 49–50 (5th
Cir.). In the instant case, Sgt Darryl Griffin filled
out the affidavit to get the warrant, secured the
magistrates signature to said warrant and personally
took the warrant to the motel room that was searched (4
RR 9-10). In fact, Griffin testified to the fact that
24
he was present at the time that the premises was
secured (4 RR 9).
Jones also cites concerns about having sufficient
information so that law enforcement searches the right
premises. In the instant case, because of Sgt.
Griffin’s involvement from the outset of the
investigation, and his knowledge of the Defendant and
where he lived, those justifications hold in the
instant case as well. Jones, 914 S.W.2d 675, 679.
Applying the bifurcated standard of review, the
trial court weighted the evidence and credibility of
witnesses both at the suppression hearing and at trial
and correctly determined that law enforcement met their
Constitutional obligations. Additionally, any error in
the warrant is nullified because of the Appellant’s
consent to the search.
Appellee also contends that due to errors in the
DNA warrant’s description of the property, the results
should be thrown out. The Appellant/Defendant thought
he had consented to the DNA search per his testimony at
25
the Suppression Hearing (2 R.R. 42). The error in the
DNA warrant is analogous to any error in the initial
search warrant. There is no threat of the DNA warrant
searching an innocent third-party’s property. In fact,
the physical evidence had already been seized by the
state due to the previously discussed consent and
warrant. Based on the 4-corners of the warrant, there
was probable cause to obtain a DNA sample from the
Defendant. Whether a shirt is white, grey or light
blue is an issue best determined by the Court during
the Suppression Hearing and jury during trial. Any
delineation in shirt color in the warrant is analogous
to a typographical error in the warrant, similar to
Jones v. State.
In summation, Appellant’s arguments were
insufficient at his Suppression Hearing, at trial and
once again on appeal. Attempting to circumvent his own
representation, he now seeks to invalidate a conviction
that is largely his own doing. He burglarized a
business, consented to the search that law enforcement
26
ultimately got a warrant to conduct and thought he had
consented to a DNA search. The findings of both the
Trial Court and Jury should be upheld.
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
Based on the foregoing, the Appellee prays that the
Appellant’s points of error be overruled and judgment
be affirmed.
Respectfully Submitted,
Jonathan Hyatt
Assistant District Attorney
Harrison County District
Attorney’s Office
200 West Houston Street
Marshall, Texas 75670
Telephone: 903 935-8408
Facsimile: 903 938-9312
/s/ Jonathan Hyatt
Jonathan Hyatt
State Bar No. 24072161
27
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
I certify that this brief contains 2,857 words
according to the computer program used to prepare the
document.
/s/ Jonathan Hyatt
Jonathan Hyatt
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
A copy of this brief was provided on May 4, 2015
to:
Jamie Bledsoe, Inmate #1945574 by U.S. mail return
receipt requested,
Cheryl Cooper-Sammons via facsimile,
Hon. Brad Morin via facsimile, and
Ebb Mobley via facsimile.
/s/ Jonathan Hyatt
Jonathan Hyatt
28