Herring Bancorp, Inc. C.C. Burgess And C. Campbell Burgess v. John Mikkelsen, Acting Solely in His Capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
07-15-00327-CV
SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS
AMARILLO, TEXAS
11/20/2015 4:46:55 PM
Vivian Long, Clerk
No. 07-15-00327-CV
___________________________
FILED IN
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 7th COURT OF APPEALS
SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEXAS AMARILLO, TEXAS
AMARILLO, TEXAS 11/20/2015 4:46:55 PM
____________________________ VIVIAN LONG
CLERK
HERRING BANCORP, INC.; C.C. BURGESS; and C. CAMPBELL
BURGESS
v.
JOHN MIKKELSEN, acting solely in his capacity as Trustee of the John
Mikkelsen Trust,
_____________________________
On Appeal from the 46th Judicial District Court,
Wilbarger County, Texas
Trial Court No. 24,955
_____________________________
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
_____________________________
Cornell D. Curtis Thomas S. Leatherbury
State Bar No. 24007069 State Bar No. 12095275
CORNELL D. CURTIS, P.C. Manuel G. Berrelez
1716 Main Street State Bar No. 24057760
Vernon, Texas 76384 Stephen S. Gilstrap
940.552.9100 State Bar No. 24078563
940.552.2655 (facsimile) VINSON & ELKINS LLP
vernonlaw@sbcglobal.net 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201
214.220.7700
214.999.7792 (facsimile)
tleatherbury@velaw.com
mberrelez@velaw.com
sgilstrap@velaw.com
Attorneys for Appellants Herring Bancorp, Inc.;
C.C. Burgess; and C. Campbell Burgess
Oral Argument Requested November 20, 2015
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
Appellants/Cross-Appellees Herring Bancorp, Inc.; C.C. Burgess; and C.
Campbell Burgess
Cornell D. Curtis Thomas S. Leatherbury
State Bar No. 24007069 State Bar No. 12095275
CORNELL D. CURTIS, P.C. Manuel G. Berrelez
1716 Main Street State Bar No. 24057760
Vernon, Texas 76384 Stephen S. Gilstrap
940.552.9100 State Bar No. 24078563
940.552.2655 (facsimile) VINSON & ELKINS LLP
vernonlaw@sbcglobal.net 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201
214.220.7700
214.999.7792 (facsimile)
tleatherbury@velaw.com
mberrelez@velaw.com
sgilstrap@velaw.com
Appellee/Cross-Appellant John Mikkelsen, acting solely in his capacity as
Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust
Lee F. Christie
Michael L. Atchley, II
POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, LLP
500 West 7th Street, Suite 600
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817.332.3245
817.877.4781 (facsimile)
lfchristie@popehardwicke.com
matchley@popehardwicke.com
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel ...................................................................................i
Table of Contents ...................................................................................................... ii
Index of Authorities ................................................................................................... v
Record References ....................................................................................................ix
Statement of the Case................................................................................................. x
Statement Regarding Oral Argument ..................................................................... xii
Issues Presented ..................................................................................................... xiii
Statement of Facts ...................................................................................................... 1
I. Mikkelsen’s Prior Involvement at Herring Bancorp. ...................................... 1
II. The 2006 Conversion and Redemption. .......................................................... 2
III. The 2013 Redemption and Tender. ................................................................. 4
IV. Pre-Trial Proceedings/Partial Summary Judgment for Mikkelsen. ................. 7
V. The Trial. ......................................................................................................... 8
VI. The Final Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings. .................................. 10
Summary of the Argument....................................................................................... 11
Standards of Review ................................................................................................ 14
Argument.................................................................................................................. 16
I. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s
Minority-Oppression Claims. ........................................................................ 16
A. Ritchie v. Rupe Held That Minority Oppression Is Not a Viable
Cause of Action Under Texas Law. .................................................... 17
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the Relevant Holding
in Ritchie v. Rupe Was Dicta. ............................................................. 18
C. Alternatively, the Evidence at Trial Was Not Legally or
Factually Sufficient to Constitute Minority Oppression. .................... 20
II. Mikkelsen Cannot Recover on His Breach of Contract Claim or on His
Declaratory Judgment Claim, and Defendants Should Prevail on Their
Declaratory Judgment Claim. ........................................................................ 22
A. The 2006 Redemption Was Valid. ...................................................... 22
ii
B. Defendants Are Entitled to Prevail on Their Declaratory
Judgment Claim Because the 2013 Redemption and Tender
Were Valid. ......................................................................................... 26
C. Regardless of the Validity of the Two Redemptions, Mikkelsen
Cannot Show Any Damages Resulting from Defendants’
Actions................................................................................................. 37
D. Even Assuming a Breach, Mikkelsen Is Not Entitled to Remain a
Shareholder in Perpetuity; He Only Is Entitled to the Par Value
of His Preferred Shares Plus Unpaid Dividends. ................................ 38
III. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claim Against C.C. Burgess for an Additional Reason
Than the One Found by the Jury. .................................................................. 39
A. C.C. Burgess Owes No Fiduciary Duties to Mikkelsen Under
Texas Law. .......................................................................................... 40
B. Alternatively, the Evidence Was Not Legally or Factually
Sufficient to Show That C.C. Burgess Violated Any Purported
Fiduciary Duties. ................................................................................. 42
IV. The $127,442 Fee Award Should Be Reversed. ........................................... 43
A. Because Mikkelsen Cannot Prevail on His Breach of Contract
Claim, He Is Not Entitled to an Attorneys’ Fee Award. ..................... 43
B. Alternatively, if Mikkelsen Is Entitled to Some of His Fees, the
$127,442 Award Cannot Stand Because It Is Unsupported and
Because Mikkelsen Did Not Segregate His Attorneys’ Fees
Properly. .............................................................................................. 44
C. Defendants Are Entitled to Their Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees
Spent Pursuing Their Declaratory Judgment Claim. .......................... 47
V. To the Extent the Court Does Not Render Judgment in Favor of
Defendants, a New Trial Also Is Warranted Because the Trial Court
Impermissibly Commented on the Weight of the Evidence When It
Instructed the Jury That Herring Bancorp Had Breached its Articles of
Incorporation as a Matter of Law. ................................................................. 48
Conclusion and Prayer ............................................................................................. 52
Certificate of Compliance ........................................................................................ 53
Certificate of Service ............................................................................................... 54
iii
Index of Appendix Materials ................................................................................... 55
(1) Final Judgment (June 16, 2015) (2CR472-507)
(2) Jury Verdict (January 30, 2015) (2CR228-58)
(3) Orders Denying Defendants Post-Judgment Motions (August 19, 2015)
(2CR409-10)
(4) Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(August 4, 2011) (1CR306-07)
(5) Herring Bancorp Articles of Incorporation (13RR, DX-1)
(6) October 31, 2006 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-18)
(7) Acceptance of Subchapter S Status by IRS (13RR, DX-31)
(8) October 30, 2013 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-33)
(9) November 22, 2013 Tender (13RR, DX-35)
(10) Refused Jury Instructions Related to 2013 Redemption/Tender
(January 30, 2015) (2CR260-61, 2CR267)
(11) Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP, No.
03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on
February 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties)
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases
7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v. Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc.,
245 S.W.3d 488 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) ..............46
A.G. Edwards & Sons, Inc. v. Beyer,
235 S.W.3d 704 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................................46
American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Caruth,
786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1990, no writ) ...........................................50
Arcadia Fin., Ltd. v. Sw.-Tex. Leasing Co.,
78 S.W.3d 619 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied) ......................................14
Associated Indemnity Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc.,
964 S.W.2d 276 (Tex. 1998) ................................................................................41
Bair Chase Prop. Co., LLC v. S&K Dev. Co., Inc.,
260 S.W.3d 133 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied) ....................................16
Bd. of Regents v. Denton Constr.,
652 S.W.2d 588 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) ......................50
Bocquet v. Herring,
972 S.W.2d 19 (Tex. 1998) ..................................................................................15
BP Am. Prod. Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC,
466 S.W.3d 335 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet. filed) ....................................16
Cardiac Perfusion Servs., Inc. v. Hughes,
436 S.W.3d 790 (Tex. 2014) ......................................................................... 17, 18
Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP,
No. 03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on
February 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties) ................................................19
City of Keller v. Wilson,
168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) ................................................................................15
Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc.,
187 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2006, pet. denied),
overruled by Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) ................................30
Davis v. Sheerin,
754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied),
overruled by Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) ......................... 17, 21
v
Dilling v. Nationsbank, N.A.,
897 S.W.2d 451 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995),
rev’d on other grounds, 922 S.W.2d 950 (Tex. 1996).........................................31
Dow Chem. Co. v. Francis,
46 S.W.3d 237 (Tex. 2001) ..................................................................................15
Enzo Invs., LP v. White,
468 S.W.3d 635 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, pet. denied) ..............45
Ex parte Ellis,
279 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008),
aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) .....................................................32
First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo v. Jarnigan,
794 S.W.2d 54 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, writ denied) ..................................50
Grinnell v. Munson,
137 S.W.3d 706 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied) ...........................40
Guerra v. Guerra,
No. 04-10-00271-CV, 2011 WL 3715051 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011,
no pet.)..................................................................................................................21
Hagedorn v. Tisdale,
73 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.) .........................................15
Harrison v. Williams Dental Grp., P.C.,
140 S.W.3d 912 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.)............................................44
Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
1 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. 1999) ......................................................................................14
Iliff v. Iliff,
339 S.W.3d 74 (Tex. 2011) ..................................................................................15
In re Mandel,
578 F. App’x 376 (5th Cir. 2014) ........................................................................19
Indian Beach Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Linden,
222 S.W.3d 682 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no pet.) .......................16
Jensen v. Covington,
234 S.W.3d 198 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) ......................................32
Jones v. Thompson,
338 S.W.3d 573 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet. denied) ...................................41
vi
Long v. Griffin,
442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014) ................................................................................45
Mader v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.,
683 S.W.2d 731 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) ..............................50
MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co.,
995 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1999) ................................................................................29
Opperman v. Opperman,
No. 07-12-00033-CV, 2013 WL 6529228 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 9,
2013, no pet.)........................................................................................................40
Pabich v. Kellar,
71 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet. denied) ...............................40
Pool v. Ford Motor Co.,
715 S.W.2d 629 (Tex. 1986) ................................................................................15
Quick v. City of Austin,
7 S.W.3d 109 (Tex. 1998) ....................................................................................14
Rauch v. RCA Corp.,
861 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1988) ...................................................................................24
Redwine v. AAA Life Ins. Co.,
852 S.W.2d 10 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) ...................................... 49, 50
Ritchie v. Rupe,
443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014) ........................................................................ passim
S. Tex. Water Auth. v. Lomas,
223 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2007) ................................................................................29
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson,
959 S.W.2d 171 (Tex. 1997) ................................................................................41
Seymore v. Dorsett,
No. 07-03-0175-CV, 2005 WL 2849061 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 31,
2005, no pet.)........................................................................................................49
Somers ex rel. EGL, Inc. v. Crane,
295 S.W.3d 5 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.) ...........................40
Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc.,
846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ) ..............................32
Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green,
921 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. 1996) ................................................................................21
vii
Tex. Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B.,
802 S.W.2d 647 (Tex. 1990) ................................................................................16
Tex. Ear Nose & Throat Consultants, PLLC v. Jones,
--- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 3918130 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June
25, 2015, no pet.)..................................................................................................19
Tex. Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex.
2000).....................................................................................................................36
Tilton v. Marshall,
925 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. 1996) ................................................................................12
Tony Gullo Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa,
212 S.W.3d 299 (Tex. 2006) ................................................................... 44, 46, 47
White Point Minerals, Inc. v. Swantner,
464 S.W.3d 884 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.) ..............................19
Statutes
Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code § 11.404 ................................................................................18
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009 ...................................................................47
Rules
Tex. R. App. P. 44(a)(1) ................................................................................... 16, 37
Tex. R. Civ. P. 277 ...................................................................................................49
Other Authorities
James Dawson, Ritchie v. Rupe and the Future of Shareholder Oppression,
124 YALE L.J. FORUM 89 (2014) ..........................................................................20
Lyndon Bittle & Kelli Hinson, Texas Turns a Corner: Resolving Shareholder
Disputes in Closely Held Businesses After Ritchie v. Rupe,
67 BAYLOR L. REV. 339 (2015)............................................................................19
Todd A. Murray, The Texas Courts’ Ongoing Struggle to Harmonize the
Texas Business Organizations Code with the Texas Rules of Civil
Procedure in Derivative Shareholder Litigation,
47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245 (2015) ........................................................................20
viii
RECORD REFERENCES
Citations to the record will be formatted as follows:
(1) Clerk’s Record Vol. No. CR Page No.
(2) Reporter’s Record from February 5, 2009 2RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing
(3) Reporter’s Record from April 18, 2011 3RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing
(4) Reporter’s Record from May 19, 2014 4RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing
(5) Reporter’s Record from November 12, 2014 5RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing
(6) Reporter’s Record from January 26, 2015 6RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing on Motions in Limine & Voir Dire
(7) Reporter’s Record from January 26, 2015 7RR Page:Line Nos.
(8) Reporter’s Record from January 27, 2015 8RR Page:Line Nos.
(9) Reporter’s Record from January 28, 2015 9RR Page:Line Nos.
(10) Reporter’s Record from January 29, 2015 10RR Page:Line Nos.
(11) Reporter’s Record from January 30, 2015 11RR Page:Line Nos.
(12) Plaintiff’s Trial Exhibits 12RR, PX-Exhibit No.
(13) Defendants’ Trial Exhibits 13RR, DX-Exhibit No.
(14) Reporter’s Record from April 27, 2015 14RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing on Motion to Enter Judgment
(15) Reporter’s Record from August 19, 2015 15RR Page:Line Nos.
Hearing on Post-Judgment Motions
ix
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case This dispute raises the issue of whether Herring Bancorp, Inc.
(“Herring Bancorp”), as part of its conversion into a
Subchapter “S” Corporation, properly redeemed the small
number of Herring Bancorp preferred shares that John
Mikkelsen (and his brother, Mallory) inherited. This dispute
also raises questions about (1) whether minority oppression is
a valid cause of action following the Texas Supreme Court’s
decision in Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014), and
(2) whether C.C. Burgess, as an officer, director, and majority
shareholder of Herring Bancorp, owed any fiduciary duties to
Mikkelsen, as a minority shareholder.
In 2011, the trial court granted Mikkelsen’s motion for partial
summary judgment on his breach of contract claim, holding
that the 2006 redemption of Mikkelsen’s shares was invalid.
In light of that ruling, Defendants again redeemed
Mikkelsen’s preferred shares in 2013 by giving him a tender
(in the form of a cashier’s check) for more than he was owed
under the Articles of Incorporation.
In 2015, after a three-day jury trial, the trial court entered
Final Judgment, which (1) held that Herring Bancorp
breached its Articles of Incorporation in redeeming
Mikkelsen’s preferred shares; (2) declared that the 2006
redemption and subsequent 2013 redemption were void as to
Mikkelsen and that Mikkelsen remains a preferred
shareholder of Herring Bancorp with the right to inspect its
books and records; and (3) held that C.C. Burgess and C.
Campbell Burgess (“Burgess Defendants”) engaged in
oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsen. The Final Judgment
awarded Mikkelsen $23,112.00 in compensatory damages
(representing the par value and unpaid dividends on his
preferred shares from October 31, 2006 to December 31,
2014), $5,222.25 in prejudgment interest, $127,442.00 in
attorneys’ fees through trial, conditional appellate attorneys’
fees, costs, and postjudgment interest. Ex. 1.
Trial Court Honorable Dan Mike Bird, 46th Judicial District Court,
Wilbarger County, Texas
x
Trial Court Order Granting Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, signed
Disposition on August 4, 2011
Final Judgment, signed on June 16, 2015
Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion to
Disregard Jury Findings, and Conditional Motion for
Judgment, denied by Order signed on August 19, 2015
Additional Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
denied by Order signed on August 19, 2015
Motion for New Trial, for Remittitur, and to Modify, Correct
and/or Reform the Judgment, denied by Order signed on
August 19, 2015
xi
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Defendants respectfully request that the Court hold oral argument. This
appeal presents an important question about the effect of Ritchie v. Rupe on
minority-oppression claims. It also presents novel questions about whether a
preferred shareholder can hold his shares in perpetuity—based on the allegation that
a prior redemption was ineffective as to him—even though the Articles of
Incorporation permit the Corporation to purchase and/or redeem preferred shares at
any time and even though a shareholder is only entitled to receive the par value of his
shares plus any unpaid dividends.
Defendants believe that oral argument will aid the Court in understanding
these complex issues and the factual record.
xii
ISSUES PRESENTED
1. In 2014, the Texas Supreme Court held that no common-law cause of
action for minority oppression exists under Texas law. See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443
S.W.3d 856 (Tex. 2014). In light of Ritchie, did the trial court err by not granting
judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the minority oppression
claims, and alternatively, does legally and/or factually sufficient evidence support
the jury’s findings on Mikkelsen’s minority-oppression claims?
2. Did the trial court err by concluding, as a matter of law, that the 2006
redemption violated the Articles of Incorporation as to Mikkelsen because it was not
done “by lot, or pro rata” when undisputed evidence shows that all outstanding
preferred shares were redeemed on November 20, 2006, meaning that the “by lot, or
pro rata” language—which only applies to partial redemptions—is inapplicable?
3. Were Defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the breach
of contract claim relating to the 2006 redemption, or alternatively, did the trial court
err in denying Defendants’ motion for a new trial on this claim?
4. Did the trial court err by holding, as a matter of law and/or fact, that the
2013 redemption and tender were invalid when (a) there is no dispute that the
Mikkelsens were the only remaining shareholders in 2013 (assuming the 2006
redemption was invalid as to them), and (b) the tender more than covered any
amounts due under the Articles of Incorporation?
xiii
5. Were Defendants entitled to judgment as a matter of law on their
declaratory judgment claim relating to the 2013 redemption and tender, or
alternatively, did the trial court err in failing to submit these issues for the jury to
decide, thus warranting a new trial?
6. The jury found “$0.00” damages proximately caused by any breach of
fiduciary duty and denied relief on Mikkelsen’s breach of fiduciary duty claims.
Given that officers, directors, and majority shareholders of a corporation do not owe
fiduciary duties to other shareholders under Texas law, did the trial court further err
by not granting judgment as a matter of law in favor of Defendants on the breach of
fiduciary duty claims, and alternatively, does legally and/or factually sufficient
evidence support the jury’s finding that C.C. Burgess breached his alleged fiduciary
duties to Mikkelsen?
7. Can the fee awards be upheld on legal/factual sufficiency review where
(a) the trial evidence showed that, to the extent Mikkelsen is entitled to any
attorneys’ fees, they are limited to at most $39,545.87, (b) Mikkelsen failed to
segregate his fees properly, and (c) the trial court did not ask the jury whether
Defendants were entitled to attorneys’ fees based on their declaratory judgment
claim?
8. Should this Court render a fee award in favor of Defendants based on
their declaratory judgment claim because undisputed trial evidence showed that
xiv
Defendants incurred $5,500 in reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees pursuing
that claim through trial plus $12,500 in conditional appellate fees? Alternatively,
are Defendants entitled to a new trial on their request for attorneys’ fees?
9. Even though the trial focused on whether Herring Bancorp breached its
Articles of Incorporation, the trial court instructed the jury that the 2006 redemption
breached the Articles of Incorporation as a matter of law. Is this instruction an
impermissible comment on the weight of the evidence that further requires a new
trial to the extent there are any remaining fact issues for the trial court to resolve?
xv
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I. Mikkelsen’s Prior Involvement at Herring Bancorp.
Herring National Bank became a chartered bank in 1903. 8RR 22:22-25.
Mikkelsen became Chairman of Herring National Bank in 1982 and served in that
position until 1997. 8RR 22:10-15. About ten years before Mikkelsen became
Chairman, C.C. Burgess purchased stock in Herring National Bank and was elected
to its Board shortly thereafter. 8RR 26:13-27:8. In 1984, Herring Bancorp, Inc.
(“Herring Bancorp”), a bank holding company for Herring National Bank, was
formed. 8RR 22:16-21. Mikkelsen served as Chairman of Herring Bancorp from its
formation in 1984 until 1992. 8RR 27:21-24.
In 1992, Herring Bancorp held a special shareholder meeting, and the Burgess
Defendants were elected as directors, such that control of Herring Bancorp and
Herring National Bank shifted away from Mikkelsen and in favor of the Burgess
Defendants. See 8RR 33:7-22. Afterwards, Mikkelsen participated in a lawsuit
against the Burgess Defendants. That lawsuit resulted in a settlement through which
the Burgess Defendants purchased 10,000 Herring Bancorp shares from Mikkelsen
and his family. 8RR 35:10-22. Mikkelsen then sold his remaining 280 Herring
Bancorp shares in January 1998. 8RR 35:23-36:9. As of January 1998, Mikkelsen
owned no shares in Herring Bancorp and “was completely out of the bank.” 8RR
36:10-37:3.
1
In 2005, Mikkelsen and his brother, Mallory, inherited a total of 300 Herring
Bancorp preferred shares from their late mother. 8RR 46:9-47:5. Of those 300
shares, 150 shares were issued to the John Mikkelsen Trust and 150 shares were
issued to Mallory Mikkelsen. 8RR 47:16-48:17; 12RR, PX-4; 12RR, PX-5.1
II. The 2006 Conversion and Redemption.
The year after Mikkelsen inherited this small number of preferred shares from
his late mother, Herring Bancorp decided to convert into a Subchapter “S”
Corporation. See, e.g., 12RR, PX-34 at 3. As relevant here, a Subchapter “S”
Corporation is different from a traditional corporation because a Subchapter “S”
Corporation (1) can have only one class of stock, (2) cannot have more than 100
shareholders, and (3) avoids double taxation of dividends. See 8RR 56:7-24,
61:18-24; 9RR 29:24-30:5; 13RR, DX-10. Mikkelsen has never questioned the
Herring Bancorp Board’s business judgment to convert into a Subchapter “S”
Corporation, and testified during trial that being a Subchapter “S” Corporation
offers a “better, more effective utilization of the income of the corporation.” 8RR
56:23-24.
1
In 2008, after the 2006 redemption, Mallory Mikkelsen purportedly assigned his 150 shares to
the John Mikkelsen Trust. See 8RR 48:21-49:23; 12RR, PX-6. This purported assignment was not
effective (or otherwise is irrelevant) for at least three reasons. First, this assignment was not
effective because it was not done in accordance with Herring Bancorp’s Bylaws regarding the
transfer or assignment of shares. See infra Section II.B.2. Second, given that the 2006 redemption
was valid, these shares no longer were Mallory Mikkelsen’s to assign in 2008. Third, because the
2013 tender more than compensated both John and Mallory Mikkelsen for the value of their
preferred shares, the tender was effective. See infra Section II.B.2.
2
Because Subchapter “S” Corporations are limited to 100 shareholders, the
Herring Bancorp Board decided to implement neutral criteria to restrict which
preferred shares could be converted into common stock so the number of
shareholders would not exceed the maximum 100-shareholder cap. These criteria
were implemented to ensure that Herring Bancorp would preserve its ability to
attract new investment and shareholders in the future. See 9RR 29:10-30:5
(testifying that the purpose of these criteria was to ensure that, as the Bank grew, it
would be able to attract new shareholders without sacrificing its Subchapter “S”
status). The two neutral criteria selected by the Herring Bancorp Board were that the
preferred shareholder: (1) had a banking relationship with Herring Bank; and (2)
would own at least 50 shares of common stock in the Subchapter “S” Corporation
after the conversion.2 Ex. 6 at 1. If preferred shareholders met these two criteria,
they had the opportunity to exchange their preferred shares for common stock in the
new Subchapter “S” Corporation. Id. If preferred shareholders did not satisfy these
criteria, their shares were redeemed on November 20, 2006. Id. All preferred
shareholders were given notice of these criteria and notice of both the conversion
and redemption deadlines on October 31, 2006. Ex. 6; 13RR, DX-20.
2
The conversion ratio for converting preferred shares into common stock was approximately 7.8
to 1, meaning that a preferred shareholder was required to have about 390 preferred shares to be
eligible to convert those shares into common stock. See 8RR 65:23-66:22. As noted, Mikkelsen
only inherited 150 preferred shares, as did his brother. Mikkelsen and his brother thus did not
satisfy the 50-share criterion for conversion.
3
Between the October 31, 2006 notice and the November 20, 2006 redemption,
preferred shareholders that met the criteria and wanted to convert their preferred
shares into common stock had to make that election. See 13RR, DX-20 at 3 (“If you
elect to exchange your shares of Preferred Stock of the Company, please return an
executed copy of the Stock Exchange Agreement as soon as possible, but no later
than 5:00 p.m. on November 20, 2006.”) (emphasis omitted). No shareholder (other
than Mikkelsen) complained about this process, and all preferred shares not
exchanged for common stock (i.e., all outstanding preferred shares as of November
20, 2006) were redeemed on that date. Id. at 3-4.
On November 20, 2006, Herring Bancorp redeemed Mikkelsen’s preferred
shares by placing sufficient funds to cover the par value of his shares and any unpaid
dividends in an escrow/deposit account in Mikkelsen’s name.3 13RR, DX-26 at 2.
On July 30, 2007, Herring Bancorp’s status as a Subchapter “S” Corporation was
accepted by the IRS. Ex. 7.
III. The 2013 Redemption and Tender.
Mikkelsen claimed that the 2006 redemption was invalid and that he
continued to be a preferred shareholder in Herring Bancorp. See 13RR, DX-26 at 1.
3
This same procedure was followed for Mallory Mikkelsen and any other preferred shareholders
who elected not to convert their preferred shares into common stock.
4
Specifically, Mikkelsen asserted that, even though Herring Bancorp’s Articles of
Incorporation allow the Corporation to redeem and/or repurchase preferred shares at
any time, see Ex. 5, art. IV, XII, the redemption was invalid because it was not done
“by lot, or pro rata,” Ex. 5, art. IV(c). Because only partial redemptions are subject to
the “by lot, or pro rata” restriction, Mikkelsen’s argument necessarily (and
incorrectly) assumes that the 2006 redemption was a partial redemption. Ex. 5, art.
IV(c). Mikkelsen ignores that, on November 20, 2006, Herring Bancorp completed a
“whole” redemption because it redeemed all outstanding preferred shares on that
date. See supra Facts Section II.
Ultimately, Mikkelsen filed this lawsuit in 2008, alleging a breach of contract
claim, tort claims for breach of fiduciary duty, minority oppression, and conspiracy,
and a demand to inspect Herring Bancorp’s books and records. 1CR5-13. In 2011,
the trial court—apparently accepting Mikkelsen’s incorrect argument about the
2006 redemption being a “partial” redemption—granted Mikkelsen’s partial
summary judgment motion, finding that the 2006 redemption as to Mikkelsen was
invalid as a matter of law. Ex. 4.
After that ruling, Defendants sought to remove any doubt about Mikkelsen’s
purported ownership of Herring Bancorp’s preferred stock, especially considering
that a Subchapter “S” Corporation can have only one type of outstanding stock. See
1CR344 (“The Herring Board’s decision to redeem the Preferred Stock in 2013 was
5
consistent with the Board’s decision in 2006 but also sought to correct any issues
that led to this Court’s August 4, 2011 Order on partial summary judgment, and pay
the Mikkelsens everything they could be owed.”). Accordingly, in 2013, Defendants
sent the Mikkelsens a tender—in the form of a cashier’s check—for $115,548.24, an
amount greater than the Mikkelsens were owed under Herring Bancorp’s Articles of
Incorporation. Compare Ex. 9 (unconditional tender included $28,500 for
redeeming 300 shares at $95 per share (par value), $21,070.48 in unpaid dividends,
$15,977.76 in interest, and $50,000 in attorneys’ fees), with Ex. 5, art. IV (stating
that a preferred shareholder is only entitled to the $95 par value per share plus
dividends).
Despite receiving a larger payment than he was entitled to under the Articles
of Incorporation, Mikkelsen pressed forward with this lawsuit and never cashed the
cashier’s check. See 8RR 137:4-5. And while Mikkelsen claimed that the 2006
redemption was invalid because it was a partial redemption that was not done “by
lot, or pro rata,” Mikkelsen concedes that, when the 2013 redemption took place, the
Mikkelsens were the only preferred shareholders of Herring Bancorp. See 8RR
151:2-5 (“So after the 2006 adventure that you and Herring Bank had, you and
Mallory [Mikkelsen] were the only shareholders of preferred stock, right? A. Yes.”);
see also infra Section II.B.1. The 2013 redemption thus was a “whole” redemption
not subject to the “by lot, or pro rata” requirement, which means that—even
6
assuming that the 2006 redemption was invalid—the 2013 redemption complied
with the Articles of Incorporation and redeemed Mikkelsen’s preferred shares such
that he no longer is a preferred shareholder in Herring Bancorp.
IV. Pre-Trial Proceedings/Partial Summary Judgment for Mikkelsen.
As noted, Mikkelsen originally filed this action in 2008, claiming that the
2006 redemption breached his contractual rights under the Articles of Incorporation
and constituted (1) a breach of the Burgess Defendants’ fiduciary duties, (2)
minority oppression, and (3) a civil conspiracy. 1CR5-13. In March 2011,
Mikkelsen moved for partial summary judgment as to whether the 2006 redemption
was valid. 1CR58-103. Defendants responded to that motion and filed a
cross-motion for partial summary judgment on all of Mikkelsen’s claims.
1CR105-45. On August 4, 2011, the trial court granted Mikkelsen’s motion for
partial summary judgment and denied Defendants’ cross-motion. Ex. 4. In deciding
the cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court found as a matter of law that
the 2006 redemption was invalid as to Mikkelsen and that Mikkelsen continued to be
a preferred shareholder in Herring Bancorp. 1CR307.
In December 2013, after Herring Bancorp had undertaken the 2013
redemption and tendered to Mikkelsen more than he was owed under the Articles of
Incorporation, see supra Facts Section III, Defendants filed their Original
Counterclaim, seeking a declaratory judgment that the 2013 redemption was valid,
7
1CR389-92. Defendants also filed a second traditional motion for partial summary
judgment on their newly asserted counterclaim, 1CR338-81, as well as a
no-evidence summary judgment motion on causation and damages, 1CR382-85.
The Court denied both of Defendants’ summary judgment motions on August 1,
2014. 1CR432-35.
In September 2014, Defendants filed their third traditional motion for partial
summary judgment. 2Supp.CR3-8. This motion was based largely on the Texas
Supreme Court’s decision in Ritchie v. Rupe, and sought summary judgment on
Mikkelsen’s minority oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy tort
claims. The trial court denied that motion on December 23, 2014. 2CR148-49.
Finally, less than two weeks before trial began in January 2015, Mikkelsen
added a cross-declaratory judgment claim related to the validity of the 2013
redemption and tender. 2CR158.
V. The Trial.
The case was tried to a jury beginning on January 26, 2015. During three days
of testimony, the jury heard argument and evidence about whether the 2006 and
2013 redemptions were valid. See, e.g., 8RR 151:15-22; 8RR 156:21-157:2; 10RR
37:1-25. Indeed, Mikkelsen’s counsel began his opening and closing statements by
claiming that “this case is about the breach of a covenant” in the Articles of
8
Incorporation and by asserting that “the evidence” showed that a covenant had been
breached. 7RR 16:12-14; 11RR 32:23-33:17.
But when the jury received its instructions, instead of being asked to decide
whether the redemptions were valid, the trial court: (1) instructed the jury that it
“previously determined, as a matter of law, that Defendant Herring failed to comply
with the Articles of Incorporation . . . when it purported to involuntarily redeem
Mikkelsen’s preferred shares in 2006”; and (2) did not ask the jury to decide whether
the 2013 redemption was valid. See Ex. 2. Thus, even though Mikkelsen’s attorney
had previewed the case as being “about the breach of a covenant” and asserted that
“the evidence” showed that such a breach occurred, the only question the jury was
instructed to answer related to Mikkelsen’s breach of contract claim was the amount
of attorneys’ fees associated with that claim. Ex. 2 at 8-9. The only other questions
the jury was instructed to answer related to Mikkelsen’s tort claims. See Ex. 2 at
10-30.
Ultimately, the jury awarded Mikkelsen $23,314.80 in compensatory
damages based on its findings that the Burgess Defendants engaged in oppressive
conduct, and it awarded Mikkelsen $127,442.00 in attorneys’ fees through trial plus
$50,000.00 in conditional appellate fees based on Mikkelsen’s breach of contract
claim that had been determined as a matter of law almost four years earlier. See Ex. 2
at 8-12.
9
VI. The Final Judgment and Post-Judgment Proceedings.
After the jury verdict, Defendants filed a Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict, Motion to Disregard Jury Findings, and Conditional
Motion for Judgment. 2CR268-91. Mikkelsen then filed a Motion for Judgment, and
the trial court heard argument on those motions on April 27, 2015. 2CR292-332.
On May 14, 2015, the trial court granted Mikkelsen’s Motion for Judgment in
all respects, except that it slightly adjusted the damages award given that a portion of
the calculated unpaid dividend amount was “not yet due.” 2CR333. The trial court
entered Final Judgment on June 16, 2015. Ex. 1.
On July 16, 2015, Defendants timely filed: (1) an Additional Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, see 2CR344-52, and (2) a Motion for New
Trial, for Remittitur, and to Modify, Correct, and/or Reform the Judgment, see
2CR353-407. The Court denied these motions, as well as Defendants’ previously
filed Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict, by Orders signed on August
19, 2015 after hearing argument. Ex. 3.
Defendants timely filed a Joint Notice of Appeal on September 3, 2015.
2CR411-61. Mikkelsen timely filed a Notice of Cross-Appeal on September 17,
2015. See 2CR468-517.
10
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
This lawsuit is the most recent instance where Mikkelsen has attempted to use
his purported shareholder status in Herring Bancorp to extract money and other
concessions from the Burgess Defendants. Mikkelsen sold his interest in Herring
Bancorp to the Burgess Defendants almost 20 years ago and only became involved
with Herring Bancorp again by inheriting a handful of shares from his late mother.
Through this lawsuit, Mikkelsen is attempting to use his purported shareholder
status to call into question Herring Bancorp’s Subchapter “S” Corporation status and
otherwise to disrupt the Burgess Defendants’ ability to run the Corporation
efficiently. The Court should reject Mikkelsen’s thinly veiled efforts because
Herring Bancorp validly redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares in 2006 (and again in 20134),
and because Mikkelsen’s tort claims are based on invalid legal theories. Moreover,
Mikkelsen’s claim that he is entitled to hold preferred shares in Herring Bancorp in
perpetuity is wrong because Mikkelsen only is entitled to the par value of his
preferred shares plus any unpaid dividends, which he already received both in 2006
and 2013.
All of Mikkelsen’s tort claims should have been dismissed before trial as a
matter of law, and the trial court misapprehended binding precedent in allowing
4
Out of an abundance of caution, Defendants redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares again in 2013 because
the trial court held, incorrectly, that the 2006 redemption was invalid as to Mikkelsen as a matter of
law. See supra Facts Section III.
11
Mikkelsen’s minority oppression, breach of fiduciary duty, and conspiracy claims to
reach the jury. Texas does not recognize a common-law cause of action for minority
oppression. Moreover, corporate officers/directors only owe fiduciary duties to the
corporation itself, and majority shareholders do not owe fiduciary duties to minority
shareholders.5 The trial court should have dismissed these claims and, if it had done
so, the only claims left for the jury would have been the cross-declaratory judgment
claims regarding the 2013 redemption.6 See 1CR390; 2CR158.
On the breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims, under Herring
Bancorp’s Articles of Incorporation, Herring Bancorp had the absolute right to
redeem all of its preferred shares at any time, and it also had the absolute right to
purchase its shares “without submitting such purchase to a vote of the shareholders
of the Corporation.” Ex. 5, art. IV, XII. On two occasions—first in 2006 and then in
2013—Herring Bancorp redeemed all outstanding preferred shares, including
Mikkelsen’s, and both of these redemptions complied with the Articles of
Incorporation. The trial court held, however, that the 2006 redemption was invalid as
to Mikkelsen and—while it denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion on the
5
The jury found that C.C. Burgess breached his alleged fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen, but
awarded no damages. Ex. 2 at 17, 19-22. The Final Judgment addresses this claim only by denying
Mikkelsen relief in the “Mother Hubbard” clause. Ex. 1.
6
If the substantive tort claims had been dismissed before trial, the derivative conspiracy claim
necessarily would have been dismissed as well. See Tilton v. Marshall, 925 S.W.2d 672, 681 (Tex.
1996).
12
validity of the 2013 redemption and tender—it refused to ask the jury about that
redemption and tender. Ex. 10; 11RR 16:20-17:8. Rather, the trial court held, as a
matter of law and/or fact, that the 2013 redemption and tender were also invalid. Ex.
1 at 2. The trial court should have determined that the 2006 redemption was valid, or
alternatively, that the 2013 redemption was valid. At the very least, it should have
submitted these questions to the jury.
All of Mikkelsen’s claims should have been decided as a matter of law in
Defendants’ favor. The 2006 redemption was valid, and all of Mikkelsen’s tort
claims fail as a matter of law. Alternatively, to the extent the 2006 redemption was
invalid as to Mikkelsen, the trial court should have held, as a matter of law, that the
2013 redemption and tender were valid and that they compensated Mikkelsen for all
amounts owed under the Articles of Incorporation. While all of these claims should
have been decided as a matter of law, the trial court’s failure to follow binding
precedent led to a confusing trial where evidence relating to Mikkelsen’s breach of
contract claim (which the trial court already had decided, albeit wrongly) was
presented, giving the jury the false impression that it would decide that disputed
issue. Then, in instructing the jury, the trial court committed reversible error by
commenting on the weight of the evidence and telling the jury that it already had
decided that Defendants breached Herring Bancorp’s Articles of Incorporation in
13
2006. This improper instruction was prejudicial and also requires a new trial to the
extent the Court does not render judgment in favor of Defendants.
To the extent the Court does not reverse the trial court’s finding on the 2006
redemption, it must reverse the attorneys’ fee award and remand for a new trial on
attorneys’ fees. If the Court reverses the trial court’s holding on the 2013 redemption
and renders judgment for Defendants on that claim, the Court should also render
judgment on Defendants’ claim for attorneys’ fees or at least grant a new trial on
Defendants’ fee request.
Finally, if the Final Judgment is reversed, the awards of interest and costs in
favor of Mikkelsen should be reversed as well.
STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Texas appellate courts review questions of law de novo, “exercis[ing] [their]
own judgment and redetermin[ing] each issue,” while affording the lower courts’
decisions “absolutely no deference.” Quick v. City of Austin, 7 S.W.3d 109, 116
(Tex. 1998). When reviewing questions of law, an appellate court independently
evaluates the trial court’s conclusions of law to determine whether the trial court
drew the correct legal conclusions from the facts. See Arcadia Fin., Ltd. v. Sw.-Tex.
Leasing Co., 78 S.W.3d 619, 623 (Tex. App.—Austin 2002, pet. denied); see also
Holland v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 1 S.W.3d 91, 94 (Tex. 1999).
14
Appellate courts must sustain legal sufficiency challenges when the record
shows one of the following: (1) a complete absence of evidence of a vital fact; (2)
that rules of law or evidence bar the court from giving weight to the only evidence
offered to prove a vital fact; (3) that the evidence offered to prove a vital fact is no
more than a scintilla; or (4) that the evidence establishes conclusively the opposite of
the vital fact. City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 810 (Tex. 2005). For factual
sufficiency challenges, appellate courts must examine, consider, and weigh all of the
evidence that supports or contradicts the jury’s determinations, and set aside the
verdict if the evidence is so weak or the finding is so against the great weight and
preponderance of the evidence that it is clearly wrong or manifestly unjust. See Dow
Chem. Co. v. Francis, 46 S.W.3d 237, 242 (Tex. 2001); Pool v. Ford Motor Co., 715
S.W.2d 629, 635 (Tex. 1986).
An award of attorneys’ fees generally is reviewed for an abuse of discretion,
while the amount of such an award also is reviewable for legal and factual
sufficiency. See Bocquet v. Herring, 972 S.W.2d 19, 20-21 (Tex. 1998); Hagedorn
v. Tisdale, 73 S.W.3d 341, 353 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2002, no pet.); see also Iliff v.
Iliff, 339 S.W.3d 74, 78 (Tex. 2011) (“A trial court abuses its discretion when it acts
arbitrarily or unreasonably, without reference to guiding rules or principles.”)
(citations omitted). The need to segregate fees is a question of law, while the extent
to which certain claims can or cannot be segregated is a mixed question of law and
15
fact. See Bair Chase Prop. Co., LLC v. S&K Dev. Co., Inc., 260 S.W.3d 133, 128
(Tex. App.—Austin 2008, pet. denied).
Complaints of jury charge error are reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Tex.
Dep’t of Human Servs. v. E.B., 802 S.W.2d 647, 649 (Tex. 1990); see BP Am. Prod.
Co. v. Red Deer Res., LLC, 466 S.W.3d 335, 341 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2015, pet.
filed). A jury charge error warrants reversal when the improper instruction probably
caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Indian Beach Prop. Owners’
Ass’n v. Linden, 222 S.W.3d 682, 703 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2007, no
pet.); see also Tex. R. App. P. 44(a)(1).
ARGUMENT
I. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s
Minority-Oppression Claims.
Clear error underlies the trial court’s Final Judgment in favor of Mikkelsen on
the minority-oppression claims. Minority oppression does not exist as a
common-law cause of action in Texas, and the Texas Supreme Court recently
clarified that this cause of action never existed. See Ritchie v. Rupe, 443 S.W.3d 856
(Tex. 2014). Instead of submitting questions on minority oppression to the jury and
entering judgment for Mikkelsen on its findings, the trial court was required to
dismiss these claims as a matter of law.
16
A. Ritchie v. Rupe Held That Minority Oppression Is Not a Viable Cause
of Action Under Texas Law.
For decades, Texas intermediate appellate courts recognized a common-law
cause of action known as minority shareholder oppression. See, e.g., Davis v.
Sheerin, 754 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, writ denied),
overruled by Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d 856. The Texas Supreme Court, however, never
recognized that common-law cause of action and, more than a year ago, it explicitly
held that no such cause of action exists in Texas. See Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at 860
(“Moving beyond the statutory claims, we decline to recognize or create a Texas
common-law cause of action for ‘minority shareholder oppression.’”); see id. at
877-91 (outlining the Court’s reasoning and concluding that “[w]e . . . therefore
decline to recognize a common-law cause of action for ‘shareholder oppression’”);
id. at 904-05 (Guzman, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court acknowledges that its . . . failure
to impose a common-law remedy for oppression leaves a ‘gap’ in the protection that
the law affords to individual minority shareholders when the harm to the minority
shareholders does not harm the corporation.” (citation omitted)). The Texas
Supreme Court also has made clear that Ritchie applies retroactively to
minority-oppression claims pleaded or decided prior to Ritchie. See, e.g., Cardiac
Perfusion Servs., Inc. v. Hughes, 436 S.W.3d 790, 792 (Tex. 2014) (applying
Ritchie’s holding to a minority-oppression claim decided before Ritchie was
decided).
17
B. The Trial Court Erred in Concluding That the Relevant Holding in
Ritchie v. Rupe Was Dicta.
Defendants brought the Ritchie decision to the trial court’s attention and filed
a summary judgment motion asserting that Ritchie was “fatal” to Mikkelsen’s
minority-oppression claim and other tort claims. See 2Supp.CR3. In response to that
motion, Mikkelsen argued that one of Ritchie’s holdings—i.e., that Texas did not
recognize a common-law cause of action for minority oppression—was dicta.
2CR118-20 (asserting that “[t]he discussion in Ritchie of common law oppression
claims is dictum and not binding”); see also 5RR 36:18-19 (“On the oppression issue
this Ritchie case is not binding on anybody because it is dicta.”). The trial
court—despite the unmistakable language in Ritchie, see supra Section
I.A.—allowed the minority-oppression claims against the Burgess Defendants to go
to the jury. See Ex. 2 at 10-16.
The trial court’s decision was error. It cannot be squared with the plain
language in Ritchie, and it runs counter to every single Texas appellate court that
has considered the vitality of common-law minority-oppression claims since
Ritchie. See, e.g., Cardiac Perfusion Servs., 436 S.W.3d at 792 (“In Ritchie, we
clarified that a claim for shareholder oppression is only available under section
11.404 of the Texas Business Organizations Code, and that the only remedy
available under that statute is a rehabilitative receivership.”); Tex. Ear Nose &
Throat Consultants, PLLC v. Jones, --- S.W.3d ----, 2015 WL 3918130, at *16 (Tex.
18
App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 25, 2015, no pet.) (noting that Ritchie was a “sea
change” and that, “[i]n Ritchie, the Texas Supreme Court held that there is no
common law cause of action for shareholder oppression”); White Point Minerals,
Inc. v. Swantner, 464 S.W.3d 884, 890 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 2015, no pet.)
(noting that Ritchie “held that Texas does not recognize a common law action for
minority shareholder oppression”); Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin
Holdings, LP, No. 03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op.
withdrawn on Feb. 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties) (Ex. 11 at 25-26) (holding
that, “[i]n Ritchie v. Rupe, the Texas Supreme Court . . . held that there is no
common law cause of action for minority oppression in Texas,” and rendering
judgment in favor of defendants on the minority-oppression claim). In addition to
these state-law authorities, the Fifth Circuit, applying Texas law, has concluded that
Ritchie’s statements on common-law minority-oppression claims were binding and
more than mere dicta. See In re Mandel, 578 F. App’x 376, 387 (5th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he Supreme Court of Texas held that there is no common law cause of action
for shareholder oppression.”) (emphasis added).7
7
In addition to this undisputed appellate authority, Mikkelsen’s argument that the relevant
language in Ritchie is nothing more than dicta is contradicted by scholars and commentators. See,
e.g., Lyndon Bittle & Kelli Hinson, Texas Turns a Corner: Resolving Shareholder Disputes in
Closely Held Businesses After Ritchie v. Rupe, 67 BAYLOR L. REV. 339, 383 (2015) (“Based on
[the Supreme Court’s] consideration of [factors], [it] determined it would not ‘recognize a
common-law cause of action for ‘shareholder oppression.’’”) (quoting Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d at
891); Todd A. Murray, The Texas Courts’ Ongoing Struggle to Harmonize the Texas Business
Organizations Code with the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure in Derivative Shareholder Litigation,
19
Defendants are not aware of any case law that either supports Mikkelsen’s
reading of Ritchie or stands for the proposition that a common-law claim for
minority oppression remains viable in Texas. The Final Judgment must be reversed
insofar as it holds the Burgess Defendants liable based on a cause of action that does
not exist, and judgment must be rendered in favor of the Burgess Defendants on the
minority-oppression claims.
C. Alternatively, the Evidence at Trial Was Not Legally or Factually
Sufficient to Constitute Minority Oppression.
Because common-law minority oppression is not a valid cause of action in
Texas, Defendants only briefly address why the alleged evidence of minority
oppression at trial was not legally or factually sufficient to sustain the jury’s findings
even under the now-defunct test for minority oppression. Under the trial court’s
instructions on minority oppression, Mikkelsen was required to show that the
majority member’s conduct constituted:
burdensome, harsh, or wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and fair
dealing in the company’s affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a
visible departure from the standards of fair dealing and a violation of
fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely.
47 TEX. TECH L. REV. 245, 261 (2015) (noting that Ritchie “foreclosed” a common-law remedy for
shareholder oppression). Even commentators who disagree with Ritchie acknowledge that, in that
case, the Texas Supreme Court held that no common-law cause of action for minority oppression
exists under Texas law. James Dawson, Ritchie v. Rupe and the Future of Shareholder
Oppression, 124 YALE L.J. FORUM 89, 90, 92 (2014) (stating that Ritchie “gutted the cause of
action for shareholder oppression in Texas” and that, “[u]nder Ritchie, majority shareholders are
not liable for oppression unless their conduct is irrational and harmful to the corporation”).
20
Ex. 2 at 10-11; see also Davis, 754 S.W.2d at 381-82. Mikkelsen failed to present
sufficient evidence to satisfy this “definition” of minority oppression.
The Herring Bancorp Board’s decision to institute two neutral criteria for
determining which preferred shares could be converted into common stock did not
constitute “burdensome,” “harsh,” or “wrongful” conduct. In fact, the evidence at
trial demonstrated that this decision was based on the Herring Bancorp Board’s
business judgment and was made to ensure that Herring Bancorp would remain a
Subchapter “S” Corporation. See 9RR 29:10-30:5 (testifying that the purpose of
implementing the two criteria was to ensure that, as the Bank grew, it would be able
to attract new shareholders without sacrificing its Subchapter “S” status). Such
conduct does not constitute minority oppression, especially considering that both the
2006 and 2013 redemptions complied with the Articles of Incorporation. See infra
Sections II.A.-B.; Guerra v. Guerra, No. 04-10-00271-CV, 2011 WL 3715051, at
*6-7 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2011, no pet.) (noting that conduct is not wrongful
when the defendant has followed corporate procedure and exercised business
judgment); see also Tex. Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211 (Tex. 1996)
(“Whatever a man has a legal right to do, he may do with impunity, regardless of
motive, and if in exercising his legal right in a legal way damage results to another,
no cause of action arises against him because of a bad motive in exercising the
right.”) (citation omitted).
21
Further, there was no legally or factually sufficient evidence of damages “that
proximately resulted” from any minority oppression. Ex. 2 at 12. As explained
below, see infra Sections II.C.-D., Mikkelsen has received everything that he was
entitled to under the Articles of Incorporation, and thus any alleged minority
oppression did not harm him.
In sum, common-law minority oppression is not a valid cause of action in
Texas but, even if it were, Mikkelsen failed to present legally or factually sufficient
evidence at trial to support a finding of minority oppression by either of the Burgess
Defendants here. The Final Judgment should be reversed and judgment should be
rendered in favor of Defendants on Mikkelsen’s minority-oppression claims.
Alternatively, to the extent the Court finds that a fact issue prevents the rendition of
judgment in Defendants’ favor, a new trial is warranted on the minority oppression
claims.
II. Mikkelsen Cannot Recover on His Breach of Contract Claim or on His
Declaratory Judgment Claim, and Defendants Should Prevail on Their
Declaratory Judgment Claim.
A. The 2006 Redemption Was Valid.
Mikkelsen does not contest that Herring Bancorp had the right to redeem his
preferred shares; he only attacks the procedure Herring Bancorp used. According to
Mikkelsen, the 2006 redemption was invalid because only some of the preferred
shares were redeemed, and thus, under the Articles of Incorporation, that redemption
22
had to be done “by lot, or pro rata.” Ex. 5, art. IV(c). Mikkelsen, like the trial court,
misunderstands the structure of the 2006 redemption.
Under the Articles of Incorporation, there is no restriction on Herring
Bancorp’s ability to redeem all outstanding preferred shares, except that it must pay
preferred shareholders the par value and accrued dividends associated with their
preferred shares. Ex. 5, art. IV. The record shows that Mikkelsen’s (and his
brother’s) preferred shares were redeemed on November 20, 2006, and that this
redemption covered all outstanding preferred shares. See 9RR 214:10-20 (“[A]s of
5:01 p.m. [on November 20, 2006], John Mikkelsen and Mallory Mikkelsen, they
were the only ones that had preferred stock because all the others had elected to
convert. A. Yes.”). All other preferred shares had been converted into common stock
in the new Subchapter “S” Corporation prior to the redemption. Mikkelsen cannot
cite a provision in the Articles of Incorporation restricting Herring Bancorp’s ability
to convert preferred shares into common stock and, because the 2006 redemption
involved “the whole . . . of the preferred shares outstanding,” that redemption was
not required to be done “by lot, or pro rata.” Ex. 5, art. IV(c).
Despite the fact that Herring Bancorp followed the Articles of Incorporation
in conducting the 2006 redemption, Mikkelsen convinced the trial court that all of
the preferred shares were not redeemed because the 2006 conversion of preferred
23
shares into common stock constituted a partial redemption. Mikkelsen’s argument is
wrong.
There is no provision in the Articles of Incorporation addressing the
conversion of preferred shares, restricting Herring Bancorp’s ability to convert some
or all of its shares, or outlining the criteria that must be used in making such a
conversion. In fact, the provision most closely related to converting shares is Article
XII, which allows Herring Bancorp “to purchase, directly or indirectly, its own
shares . . . without submitting such purchase to a vote of the shareholders of the
Corporation.” Ex. 5, art. XII (emphasis added). The language in Article XII suggests
no restriction on Herring Bancorp’s ability to “indirectly” purchase its own stock,8
and Mikkelsen cannot point to any such restriction. Once the other shares were
converted, Herring Bancorp redeemed all outstanding shares in accordance with
Article IV.
Mikkelsen’s argument boils down to the insupportable assertion that he was
entitled to convert his preferred shares into common stock. See 8RR 163:16-23 (“Q.
Okay. So, you’re not complaining about what happened to anybody else [during the
2006 redemption], are you? A. No. Q. Only what happened to yours and Mallory’s?
A. Yes. Q. And the only complaint is that you wanted common stock. A. Yes.”). But,
8
Mikkelsen’s attempt to treat the conversion as a redemption is misguided. See Rauch v. RCA
Corp., 861 F.2d 29, 30-32 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that a conversion of shares as part of a corporate
restructuring is legally distinct from a redemption).
24
as noted, the Articles of Incorporation gave Mikkelsen no such right. Accordingly,
the Herring Bancorp Board was permitted to allow preferred shareholders that met
certain criteria to convert their preferred shares into common stock in the new
Subchapter “S” Corporation, while not providing that right to every preferred
shareholder. In fact, the Articles of Incorporation explicitly provide that Mikkelsen,
as a preferred shareholder, has no preferential right to purchase stock. See Ex. 5, art.
V. Mikkelsen thus fails to show how the Board’s actions breached the Articles of
Incorporation.9
Because Herring Bancorp redeemed every outstanding preferred share on
November 20, 2006, the 2006 redemption complied with the Articles of
Incorporation. There is no restriction on Herring Bancorp’s ability to convert its
preferred shares, and it is permitted to purchase those shares (directly or indirectly)
at any time and for any reason. Mikkelsen’s attempt to turn a conversion of shares
into a redemption of shares is without merit. The Final Judgment should be reversed
on this issue, and this Court should render judgment in favor of Defendants.
Alternatively, to the extent the Court finds that a fact issue prevents the rendition of
9
Mikkelsen’s argument about the 2006 redemption also elevates form over substance. Herring
Bancorp could have redeemed all of its preferred shares before any conversion, and then allowed
certain former preferred shareholders to purchase common stock in the new Subchapter “S”
Corporation. If Herring Bancorp had proceeded in that manner, Mikkelsen’s contract claim would
be baseless. While Herring Bancorp ultimately chose to convert certain preferred shareholders
before the November 2006 redemption simply “to save time,” the record is clear that Herring
Bancorp “just as easily [could have] paid everybody out and then had them buy the [common]
stock, had they wanted to . . . .” 9RR 215:5-12.
25
judgment in Defendants’ favor, a new trial is warranted so a jury can decide whether
Defendants’ actions complied with the Articles of Incorporation.
B. Defendants Are Entitled to Prevail on Their Declaratory Judgment
Claim Because the 2013 Redemption and Tender Were Valid.
The 2006 redemption was valid and complied with the Articles of
Incorporation. See supra Section II.A. But, to the extent the Court disagrees, it
should hold that the 2013 redemption and tender were valid, that Defendants prevail
on their declaratory judgment claim, and that Mikkelsen is not entitled to any
additional damages or attorneys’ fees.
The trial court denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion on their
declaratory judgment claim about the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender,
1CR434-35, and denied Defendants’ motions for directed verdict on that claim,
10RR 76:12-77:22, 85:8-10; 239:3-240:18, 245:19:24. The trial court appears to
have granted a directed verdict in favor of Mikkelsen on this claim, 11RR
16:20-17:8; 2CR294, but the record reveals no motion or request by Mikkelsen for
any such relief and no order or ruling during trial granting any such ruling. The trial
court also denied Defendants’ relevant post-judgment motions on this claim. Ex. 3.
In any event, the trial court took this issue away from the jury, and refused to include
Defendants’ requested instructions and questions on this claim in the jury charge.
This error warrants a new trial should the Court not render judgment in favor of
Defendants about the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender.
26
1. The 2013 Redemption Was Valid.
Mikkelsen made several admissions at trial that demonstrate the validity and
effectiveness of the 2013 redemption:
 Mikkelsen admitted that he and his brother were the only preferred
shareholders in Herring Bancorp when the (alternative) 2013
redemption took place. See 8RR 151:2-5 (“So after the 2006 adventure
that you and Herring Bank had, you and Mallory [Mikkelsen] were the
only shareholders of preferred stock, right? A. Yes.”).10
 Mikkelsen admitted that Herring Bancorp had the right to redeem his
shares in November 2013 if he was the only shareholder (or if he and
his brother were shareholders and they both were redeemed). See 8RR
171:2-4 (“Q. If you were the only shareholder, [Herring Bancorp] had
the right to redeem you, correct? A. If I was the only shareholder.”).
 Mikkelsen admitted that he is entitled to receive only money for his
preferred shares under the Articles of Incorporation. See 8RR 171:9-12.
In addition to these admissions, there is no dispute that Mikkelsen was given
proper notice of the 2013 redemption. Ex. 8. And there is no dispute that the 2013
tender that accompanied the redemption more than covered the amounts owed to
10
After testifying to this point, Mikkelsen attempted to walk back his admission based on his
argument that the conversion of other preferred shareholders was somehow ineffective. 8RR
27
Mikkelsen under the Articles of Incorporation. See Ex. 9 (unconditional tender
included $28,500 for redeeming 300 shares at $95 per share (par value), $21,070.48
in unpaid dividends, $15,977.76 in interest, and $50,000 in attorneys’ fees). So, even
if the 2006 redemption was invalid, the 2013 redemption and tender made
Mikkelsen whole. See infra Section IV (demonstrating that maximum amount of
recoverable attorneys’ fees is less than $40,000, and thus less than the amount
provided for in the 2013 tender).
In attempting to convince the trial court that the 2013 redemption was invalid,
Mikkelsen made erroneous arguments that this Court should reject.
First, Mikkelsen argued at the hearing on Defendants’ post-judgment motions
that “[w]e still have serious questions about . . . whether the Mikkelsens were the
only preferred shareholders” in 2013. 15RR 14:23-25. That conclusory assertion is
contradicted by the record and Mikkelsen’s own testimony at trial. See 8RR 151:2-5.
Moreover, while Mikkelsen may be attempting to call into question whether the
other preferred shareholders were properly converted in 2006 before the redemption,
he has no standing to make such a claim and cannot undermine the validity of the
conversion, especially considering he was not eligible to convert his shares and he
was not a third-party beneficiary to the conversion offer. See S. Tex. Water Auth. v.
152:13-153:2. Mikkelsen lacks standing to make such an assertion, and the trial court never
invalidated the 2006 conversion. See infra Section II.B.1.
28
Lomas, 223 S.W.3d 304, 306 (Tex. 2007) (noting that courts presume that a
noncontracting third party has no justiciable interest in a contract); MCI Telecomms.
Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 652 (Tex. 1999) (noting presumption
against conferring third-party-beneficiary status on noncontracting parties). In any
event, there was no evidence at trial that any other preferred shareholder complained
about the 2006 conversion or redemption, or challenged the validity of either. 8RR
159:24-163:15. In fact, Mikkelsen conceded at trial that he is “not complaining
about what happened to anybody else” during 2006 and affirmed that his only
complaint is that he should have been given the option to obtain common stock. 8RR
163:16-23; see also supra Section II.A. (explaining that Mikkelsen had no right to
convert his shares under the Articles of Incorporation).
Second, Mikkelsen’s suggestion that the 2006 conversion and redemption
somehow prevent the 2013 redemption from being valid is wrong. 15RR 14:19-23
(asserting that the 2013 redemption “was really sort of an extension of the invalid
2006 redemption”). As an initial matter, the trial court never called into question the
validity of the 2006 conversion or redemption as regards other shareholders (or
otherwise, set those transactions aside), meaning that any alleged invalidity of the
2006 conversion or redemption does not prevent the 2013 redemption from being
valid. Moreover, Mikkelsen cannot point to any authority to support the proposition
that an invalid redemption of stock taints a subsequent redemption such that the
29
stock never can be redeemed. In fact, the case cited time and again by Mikkelsen at
trial—Cotten v. Weatherford Bancshares, Inc., 187 S.W.3d 687 (Tex. App.—Fort
Worth 2006, pet. denied), overruled by Ritchie, 443 S.W.3d 856, stands for the
opposite proposition and confirms that the validity of a subsequent redemption does
not depend on whether a prior redemption was effective. Id. at 704 (considering the
validity of a subsequent redemption independently from the validity of a prior
redemption, and holding that the second redemption was void only because the
purported shareholder did not receive proper notice).
Because (1) all former preferred shareholders (other than the Mikkelsens)
were converted or redeemed in 2006, (2) those conversions and redemptions (except
as to Mikkelsen) never were invalidated by the trial court, and (3) Mikkelsen lacks
standing to challenge them, the 2013 redemption necessarily is separate from the
2006 redemption, and Mikkelsen cannot use any alleged invalidity related to the
2006 redemption to undermine the 2013 redemption. The 2013 redemption was
valid and complied with the Articles of Incorporation. The trial court erred in
deciding to the contrary as a matter of law and/or fact. For the foregoing reasons, the
trial court’s findings are not supported by legally or factually sufficient evidence.
2. The 2013 Tender Is Valid.
Mikkelsen claims that the 2013 tender is invalid or otherwise not sufficient,
but his arguments are belied by the record. The 2013 tender was for $115,548.24,
30
which more than covered the value of Mikkelsen’s preferred shares, unpaid
dividends, interest, and attorneys’ fees related to the breach of contract claim. The
trial court erred to the extent it held, as a matter of law and/or fact, that the 2013
tender was invalid, and its findings are not supported by legally or factually
sufficient evidence. At the very least, there are fact issues related to the tender that a
jury should decide.11
Mikkelsen asserts that the 2013 tender cannot be effective because Herring
Bancorp sent Mikkelsen a cashier’s check instead of depositing funds in an
escrow/deposit account. See 15RR 15:1-17. This formalistic argument about the
mechanics of payment, however, does not call into question the validity of the
tender. See 1CR437. The Articles of Incorporation do not require Herring Bancorp
to redeem preferred shares by depositing funds in an escrow/deposit account; the
Articles of Incorporation only specify that depositing funds in an escrow/deposit
account is an acceptable method of effectuating a redemption. Ex. 5, art. IV(d). The
Articles also state that shares can be redeemed “by paying in cash,” which is the
equivalent of a cashier’s check. Id., art. IV(c); see Dilling v. Nationsbank, N.A., 897
S.W.2d 451, 457 (Tex. App.—Waco 1995), rev’d on other grounds, 922 S.W.2d
950 (Tex. 1996) (calling a cashier’s check “a cash equivalent”); Ex parte Ellis, 279
11
As noted, even though the trial court denied Defendants’ motion for summary judgment on this
issue, it refused to instruct and to ask the jury about the 2013 redemption and tender. See supra
Facts Section V; see also 11RR 14:9-17:12; Ex. 10.
31
S.W.3d 1, 25 (Tex. App.—Austin 2008), aff’d, 309 S.W.3d 71 (Tex. Crim. App.
2010) (same).
As these provisions suggest, the key language in the Articles of Incorporation
is that the transfer of funds/payment associated with a redemption be “irrevocable”
and “available” to the preferred shareholder on the redemption date. Ex. 5, art.
IV(c)-(d). The 2013 tender (in the form of a cashier’s check) met those criteria, and
thus was an effective mechanism of payment. See Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d
198, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet. denied) (noting that a tender is an
unconditional offer); Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d
542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
Mikkelsen also incorrectly claims that the tender is invalid because the
cashier’s check is payable to both Mikkelsen and his brother, Mallory, even though
Mallory Mikkelsen purportedly assigned his shares to John Mikkelsen in 2008. See
15RR 15:2-10. As an initial matter, Mikkelsen is wrong that the purported
assignment of Mallory Mikkelsen’s shares was effective as to Herring Bancorp. The
tender correctly listed both John Mikkelsen and Mallory Mikkelsen because that was
how the shares were listed on Herring Bancorp’s books. See 4RR 37:3-7; 10RR
158:18-22 (Jack Hall, Herring Bank’s CFO, testifying that John and Mallory
Mikkelsen were both shareholders of record in 2013, assuming the 2006 redemption
was invalid). Under Herring Bancorp’s Bylaws, “[s]hares of stock of the
32
Corporation shall be transferable only on the books of the Corporation by the
shareholders thereof . . . . Upon surrender to the Corporation . . . of a certificate
representing shares duly endorsed or accompanied by proper evidence of
succession, assignment, or authority to transfer, the Corporation . . . shall issue a
new certificate to the person entitled thereto, cancel the old certificate, and record
the transaction upon its books.” 12RR, PX-3, § 7.05 (emphasis added). Mikkelsen
never properly presented the purported assignment to Herring Bancorp, never
surrendered any stock certificates to Herring Bancorp, and never received any new
stock certificates from Herring Bancorp.12 Thus—assuming that Mikkelsen and his
brother remained shareholders after 2006—the purported assignment was not
effective, and the old certificates remained valid under the Articles of Incorporation.
Herring Bancorp was required to make the tender based on its books and records,
meaning that the tender was effective regardless of any purported assignment. In any
event, Mikkelsen has never argued (and has put forward no evidence to suggest) that
his brother is unwilling to sign the cashier’s check, or that Mikkelsen is prevented in
any way from negotiating the tender.
Finally, to the extent that Mikkelsen argues that the tender amount is
insufficient, that argument is wrong. There never has been a dispute about the
12
Nothing in the Bylaws suggests that producing a purported certificate of assignment in litigation
is sufficient to comply with Section 7.05.
33
amount paid for the shares or the amount of unpaid dividends, which means that the
2013 tender was sufficient to redeem Mikkelsen’s shares. See 12RR, PX-16
(showing Mikkelsen’s calculations). 13 Accordingly, the only contested issue is
whether the tender covers any remaining amounts owed to Mikkelsen.14
The only other possible amounts owing to Mikkelsen are attorneys’ fees,
interest amounts, and damages. The tender more than covers these amounts,
assuming the Court finds the 2006 redemption invalid. First, Mikkelsen only
incurred about $40,000 in attorneys’ fees related to his breach of contract claim, see
infra Section IV.B., which is $10,000 less than the amount for attorneys’ fees
provided in the 2013 tender. See Ex. 9 at 2.15 Second, Mikkelsen has put forward no
evidence showing that the interest calculation in the 2013 tender is less than what is
owed, and the tender includes $10,000 more in interest than the amount of
prejudgment interest in the Final Judgment. See Ex. 1 at 2; Ex. 9 at 2. Third, the only
damages that Mikkelsen was awarded in the Final Judgment “represent[] preferred
dividends,” which the 2013 tender covered. See Ex. 1 at 2; see also Ex. 9. Mikkelsen
13
Because Mikkelsen only was entitled to the par value of his shares and any unpaid dividends
under the Articles of Incorporation, because those amounts are not in dispute, and because the
tender covered those amounts, Mikkelsen has received all amounts necessary to redeem his shares.
14
If the 2013 redemption and tender are effective, Mikkelsen is not entitled to any dividends after
the date of the 2013 redemption. See infra note 16.
15
If the Court finds that the 2006 redemption was valid, Mikkelsen is not entitled to any attorneys’
fees because he will not have prevailed on his breach of contract claim, see infra Section IV.A.,
and the Court will not need to decide whether the 2013 redemption and tender are valid.
34
has not disputed Defendants’ dividend calculation in the 2013 tender, and the tender
even covers the extra $2,041.52 awarded for unpaid dividends in the Final
Judgment16 because the tender included more than $10,000 in excess attorneys’ fees
and an excess amount of interest. See infra Section IV.B.; compare Ex. 1 at 2
(awarding $23,112.00 in damages based on unpaid dividends and $5,222.25 in
prejudgment interest), with Ex. 9 at 1 (tender includes $21,070.48 in unpaid
dividends and $15,997.26 in interest). While Mikkelsen appears to have resisted
accepting the 2013 tender because it did not include all damage amounts he
originally sought, 8RR 137:6-9, the jury was not asked to award and did not award
any actual damages above the amounts of unpaid dividends, see Ex. 2 at 12-30.
Moreover, the jury failed to find “malice” and did not award any punitive damages.
Ex. 2 at 13-16, 20-23, 27-30. And, for the reasons stated in Sections I and III,
Mikkelsen’s tort claims fail as a matter of law. Thus, the tender covers all damages
owed to Mikkelsen.
For these reasons, the tender is effective both to redeem Mikkelsen’s shares
and to cover all amounts he is owed. This Court should reverse the trial court’s
finding that the 2013 redemption was invalid, hold that the 2013 tender redeemed
Mikkelsen’s shares and sufficiently covered all amounts owed to Mikkelsen, and
16
The unpaid dividend amount in the Final Judgment is slightly higher than in the tender because
more dividends accrued between November 2013 and June 2015.
35
render judgment in favor of Defendants. Alternatively, there is, at the very least, a
fact issue related to whether the amount of the tender is sufficient, requiring a new
trial on the declaratory judgment claims. See Ex. 10.
3. The Trial Court Abused its Discretion by Refusing to Instruct
and Ask the Jury About the 2013 Redemption and Tender.
As noted, the trial court denied Defendants’ summary judgment motion,
motions for directed verdict, and post-judgment motions related to the 2013
redemption and tender. See supra Section II.B. While the record shows no motion
or request from Mikkelsen that the trial court issue a directed verdict in his favor
about the validity of the 2013 redemption and tender, the trial court appears to have
issued such a ruling, 11RR 16:20-17:8; 2CR294, and refused to let the jury decide
these issues, Ex. 10.
To the extent a fact issue prevents this Court from rendering judgment in
Defendants’ favor, it should conclude that the trial court’s findings are not supported
by legally or factually sufficient evidence, as argued supra in Sections II.B.1.-2., and
that the trial court erred and abused its discretion by not submitting instructions and
questions to the jury about the 2013 redemption and tender. Defendants’ requested
questions and instructions were substantially correct. See supra Section II.B.2; Ex.
10. The trial court’s failure to ask the jury about the 2013 redemption and tender is
reversible error because it prevented the jury from rendering a proper verdict and
because it probably caused the rendition of an improper judgment. See Tex.
36
Workers’ Comp. Ins. Fund v. Mandlbauer, 34 S.W.3d 909, 911 (Tex. 2000); Tex. R.
App. P. 44.1(a).
C. Regardless of the Validity of the Two Redemptions, Mikkelsen Cannot
Show Any Damages Resulting from Defendants’ Actions.
Mikkelsen has received payment for all he is owed for any breach of the
Articles of Incorporation. See supra Sections II.A.-B. In 2006, Herring Bancorp
deposited in escrow the par value of Mikkelsen’s preferred shares plus any unpaid
dividends. 13RR, DX-26 at 2; 13RR, DX-32. In 2013, Herring Bancorp sent
Mikkelsen a tender, in the form of a cashier’s check (No. 120987), for $115,548.24,
which included $28,500 for redeeming 300 shares at $95 per share (par value),
$21,070.48 in unpaid dividends, $15,977.76 in interest, and $50,000 in attorneys’
fees. See Ex. 9. If the 2006 redemption is valid, then Mikkelsen is entitled to the
amount in escrow; if the 2006 redemption is invalid, then Mikkelsen is entitled to the
tender amount paid in 2013. Either way, Mikkelsen has received payment for the
value of his preferred shares and any unpaid dividends, which means that he no
longer is a shareholder of Herring Bancorp. Ex. 5, art. IV(c)-(d). And, as explained,
the tender also included amounts for interest and attorneys’ fees which, to the extent
those amounts are required, more than cover what Mikkelsen is owed. See supra
Section II.B.2.; see infra Section IV.B. Mikkelsen thus cannot show any damages to
support his breach of contract claim.
37
D. Even Assuming a Breach, Mikkelsen Is Not Entitled to Remain a
Shareholder in Perpetuity; He Only Is Entitled to the Par Value of His
Preferred Shares Plus Unpaid Dividends.
Mikkelsen has asserted that, because he considers the 2006 redemption
invalid, Herring Bancorp is incapable of redeeming his preferred shares, and he can
hold those shares and exercise his alleged rights to inspect the corporate books and
records in perpetuity. That argument finds no support in the Articles of
Incorporation or in Texas law.
Regardless of the validity of the 2006 redemption, Herring Bancorp has the
right to redeem and/or repurchase Mikkelsen’s shares at any time, and Mikkelsen
only is entitled to the value of his shares plus any unpaid dividends. Specifically,
Article IV of the Articles of Incorporation allows Herring Bancorp to redeem all
preferred shareholders at any time, and Article XII allows Herring Bancorp to
“purchase, directly or indirectly, its own shares” at any time and without submitting
that decision to a shareholder vote. Ex. 5, art. IV, XII.
Herring Bancorp redeemed Mikkelsen’s shares twice (in 2006 and 2013). The
trial court erroneously held that the 2006 redemption was invalid, and Mikkelsen
convinced the trial court to deny summary judgment on the 2013 redemption and to
take this issue away from the jury based on the incorrect assertion that the 2013
redemption was improper simply because Mikkelsen did not “think the [2006]
redemption was proper.” 4RR 36:4-19. Mikkelsen already has received what he was
38
owed under the Articles of Incorporation—both in 2006 through the amount
deposited in escrow and in 2013 through the tender. See supra Section II.C.
Accordingly, even if the Court determines that Herring Bancorp breached the
Articles of Incorporation, it must reverse the Final Judgment insofar as it declared
that Mikkelsen remains a preferred shareholder with the right to inspect Herring
Bancorp’s books and records. At a minimum, and to the extent the redemptions and
tender were invalid, this Court should reverse and remand the action for the trial
court to determine the proper amount that Herring Bancorp must pay Mikkelsen to
redeem his shares.
III. Defendants Are Entitled to Judgment on Mikkelsen’s Breach of
Fiduciary Duty Claim Against C.C. Burgess for an Additional Reason
Than the One Found by the Jury.
The jury found that only C.C. Burgess breached fiduciary duties he allegedly
owed to Mikkelsen but awarded no damages based on that finding. Ex. 2 at 17-23.
The jury’s breach of fiduciary duty finding was not specifically incorporated into the
Final Judgment, which denied all relief “not expressly herein granted.” Ex. 1 at 3.
The trial court correctly did not award relief on the jury’s breach of fiduciary duty
finding in the Final Judgment because no damages were awarded on that claim.
Additionally, there should have been no liability finding as to C.C. Burgess because
(1) directors, officers, and majority shareholders of a corporation do not owe
fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as a matter of law, and (2) the evidence at
39
trial was not legally or factually sufficient to show that C.C. Burgess violated any
alleged fiduciary duty to Mikkelsen. Defendants address why the jury’s finding that
C.C. Burgess breached his fiduciary duties is wrong as a matter of law and fact only
out of an abundance of caution.
A. C.C. Burgess Owes No Fiduciary Duties to Mikkelsen Under Texas
Law.
Texas law is clear that officers and directors do not owe formal fiduciary
duties to individual shareholders—including minority shareholders; the only
fiduciary duties they owe are to the corporation as a whole. See, e.g., Somers ex rel.
EGL, Inc. v. Crane, 295 S.W.3d 5, 11 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no
pet.) (“A director’s fiduciary duty runs only to the corporation, not to individual
shareholders or even to a majority of the shareholders.” (citation omitted)); Grinnell
v. Munson, 137 S.W.3d 706, 718 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2004, pet. denied).
Texas law also is clear that shareholders in closely held corporations do not owe
fiduciary duties to other shareholders, even where the relevant relationship is
between a majority and minority shareholder. See Opperman v. Opperman, No.
07-12-00033-CV, 2013 WL 6529228, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec. 9, 2013, no
pet.); Pabich v. Kellar, 71 S.W.3d 500, 504 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, pet.
denied). Thus, under well-established Texas law, C.C. Burgess owed no formal
fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen.
40
While courts have, on occasion, held that an informal fiduciary relationship
can arise from “a moral, social, domestic or purely personal relationship of trust and
confidence,” Associated Indemnity Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276,
287 (Tex. 1998), such relationships are not inferred or created “lightly,”
Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. Swanson, 959 S.W.2d 171, 176-77 (Tex. 1997);
see also Jones v. Thompson, 338 S.W.3d 573, 583 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2010, pet.
denied) (“Texas courts are reluctant to recognize informal fiduciary relationships.”).
Indeed, “[t]o impose an informal fiduciary duty in a business transaction, the special
relationship of trust and confidence must exist prior to, and apart from, the
agreement [underlying] the suit.” Associated Indemnity Corp., 964 S.W.2d at 288.
Here, Mikkelsen has not pleaded, let alone shown, the existence of any special
relationship with C.C. Burgess that would create an informal fiduciary relationship
between the two of them. See 2CR153-61. And there is no evidence in the trial
record to support the existence of such a relationship.
Despite these precedents, the trial court erred and instructed the jury that
majority shareholders owe fiduciary duties to minority shareholders as a matter of
law. Ex. 2 at 17-18; see also 11RR 20:1-22:9 (objecting to instructions regarding
fiduciary duties). This instruction was erroneous under the authorities cited above.
The jury’s “$0.00” damage finding justified the trial court’s denial of the relief
Mikkelsen requested on his breach of fiduciary duty claim. Because C.C. Burgess
41
owed no fiduciary duties to Mikkelsen as a matter of law, the Court should render
judgment in favor of Defendants on the breach of fiduciary duty claim for this
additional reason. Certainly, the trial court’s erroneous jury instruction and question
prevents the rendition of judgment against C.C. Burgess on this claim, as does the
insufficiency of the evidence discussed below.
B. Alternatively, the Evidence Was Not Legally or Factually Sufficient to
Show That C.C. Burgess Violated Any Purported Fiduciary Duties.
Even if C.C. Burgess somehow owed Mikkelsen a fiduciary duty (which he
did not), insufficient evidence was introduced at trial for the jury to conclude that
C.C. Burgess breached any such duty. C.C. Burgess’s involvement (as relevant here)
was limited to his participation on the Herring Bancorp Board subcommittee that
selected the two neutral criteria for deciding which preferred shares could be
converted and which shares would be redeemed—i.e., whether the preferred
shareholder had a banking relationship with Herring Bank, and whether the
preferred shareholder would own at least 50 shares of common stock after the
conversion, 13RR, DX-19 at 1. Formulating these criteria cannot form the basis of a
breach of fiduciary duty claim because the evidence at trial showed that these criteria
were adopted because the Herring Bancorp Board believed that they were in the best
interests of the Corporation. See 9RR 27:17-30:5 (C.C. Burgess stating that the
reason for adopting the 50-share threshold was the concern that as the bank grew,
new shareholders would need to be attracted and the bank needed “to maintain as
42
many openings . . . for inviting those shareholders to join the bank”); 10RR
121:15-122:18 (Todd Clark testifying that, in his view, “[y]ou want people to have a
reasonable investment in the bank, be customers in the bank if they are going to own
shares in the bank”). In any event, Defendants presented unrefuted evidence at trial
that these criteria were not developed to affect Mikkelsen, or otherwise breach any
purported fiduciary relationship with Mikkelsen. See 9RR 28:3-6 (“Q. Did [the
50-share threshold] have anything to do with the number of shares [Mikkelsen]
would have after a conversion . . . . ? A. Absolutely not.”); 9RR 33:4-11 (“It was
never our intent to ostracize Mr. Mikkelsen in any way.”); 10RR 91:18-94:2 (Susan
Couch discussing that the two criteria were approved by outside legal counsel);
10RR 107:22-108:16 (Todd Clark testifying that he did not know whether
Mikkelsen met the two criteria until this lawsuit was filed).
In sum, Mikkelsen failed to introduce legally or factually sufficient evidence
at trial to justify the jury’s liability finding on the breach of fiduciary duty claim as to
C.C. Burgess. In the unlikely event that the Court reverses the Final Judgment on
this claim, at least a new trial is warranted for the reasons stated above.
IV. The $127,442 Fee Award Should Be Reversed.
A. Because Mikkelsen Cannot Prevail on His Breach of Contract Claim,
He Is Not Entitled to an Attorneys’ Fee Award.
As explained, see supra Section II, Mikkelsen should not have prevailed on
his breach of contract claim that the trial court decided on summary judgment in
43
2011. And because the breach of contract claim was the basis for Mikkelsen’s fee
award, see 10RR at 54:17-19 (basing claimed fee amount on “the contract claim”),
reversing the trial court’s Final Judgment on the breach of contract claim requires
this Court to reverse the fee award as well and render judgment in favor of
Defendants. See, e.g., Harrison v. Williams Dental Grp., P.C., 140 S.W.3d 912, 918
(Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (“[W]e have reversed the trial court’s judgment
as to the breach of contract claim, so we cannot uphold the award of attorney’s fees
based on that claim.”).
B. Alternatively, if Mikkelsen Is Entitled to Some of His Fees, the
$127,442 Award Cannot Stand Because It Is Unsupported and Because
Mikkelsen Did Not Segregate His Attorneys’ Fees Properly.
Texas law is clear that, in order to recover attorneys’ fees, a party must
establish the amount of time/expenses incurred pursuing claims which allow for
attorneys’ fees, and must segregate that time/expense from the time/expense
incurred pursuing claims which do not allow for attorneys’ fees. See Tony Gullo
Motors I, L.P. v. Chapa, 212 S.W.3d 299, 311 (Tex. 2006). While Mikkelsen’s
attorney generally stated at trial that 80% of his time and expenses should be
recoverable because they were “tied” with the contract claim, this generalized claim
is not sufficient for segregation purposes and is belied by the record. See 10RR
53:6-58:7.
44
First, under Long v. Griffin, 442 S.W.3d 253 (Tex. 2014), a ballpark
percentage guess about the amount of time spent pursuing a specific claim is not
sufficient for segregation purposes; the party seeking its fees must present “evidence
of the time spent on specific tasks” to show proper segregation. Id. at 255; see also
Enzo Invs., LP v. White, 468 S.W.3d 635, 652 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.]
2015, pet. denied) (holding that attorney’s statement that 95% of the attorney time in
a case was attributable to a breach of contract claim was insufficient evidence of
segregation). While Mikkelsen may claim that he provided more evidence than a
ballpark percentage guess because his fee invoices were admitted into the record, a
review of those invoices demonstrated that the 80% ballpark guess was not accurate.
In fact, Defendants’ trial counsel conducted an “audit-like” review of Mikkelsen’s
invoices and, based on that review, he testified at trial that Mikkelsen’s reasonable
and necessary attorneys’ fees related to the breach of contract claim were at most
$39,545.87. See 10RR 180:12-183:24. Thus, far from an 80% ballpark guess, an
accurate, audit-like review showed that Mikkelsen only incurred about $40,000 in
attorneys’ fees pursuing the breach of contract claim—roughly 25% of the total fees
incurred. Id.
Second, while Mikkelsen’s counsel suggested that 80% of his fees could not
be segregated because the claims at issue were “inextricably intertwined,” 10RR
54:25-55:19, this assertion is contradicted by binding authority. The Texas Supreme
45
Court has held that segregation between claims is not required “only when legal
services advance both recoverable and unrecoverable claims . . . .” A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc. v. Beyer, 235 S.W.3d 704, 710 (Tex. 2007) (citing Tony Gullo, 212
S.W.3d at 313-14) (emphasis added); see also 7979 Airport Garage, L.L.C. v.
Dollar Rent A Car Sys., Inc., 245 S.W.3d 488, 509 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th
Dist.] 2007, pet. denied) (“If any of the component tasks relate solely to a cause of
action for which legal fees are not recoverable, the claimant must segregate the
fees.”). Since Mikkelsen’s contract claim was decided on summary judgment in
2011—almost four years before trial—time and expenses incurred after that claim
was decided as a matter of law cannot have “advanced” that claim, and thus
Mikkelsen’s contract claim is not “inextricably intertwined” with his tort claims that
proceeded to trial. When Mikkelsen’s contract claim was decided as a matter of law
in 2011, Mikkelsen had incurred less than $50,000 in attorneys’ fees litigating this
case. See 12RR, PX-50. While it is possible that 80% of those fees were spent
pursuing the contract claim (which would comport with the “audit-like” review of
Mikkelsen’s invoices, see 10RR 180:12-183:24), that same percentage cannot hold
for the remaining fees that Mikkelsen incurred from 2011 through trial, almost four
years after the contract claim was decided on summary judgment. Indeed, even a
cursory review of Mikkelsen’s invoices demonstrates that the fees and expenses
incurred after 2011 did not relate to the breach of contract claim. See, e.g., 12RR,
46
PX-50 at MIK0087 (time entries for motion to compel not related to breach of
contract claim); id. at MIK0107-0108 (time entries related to Defendants’ Third
Motion for Summary Judgment on tort claims only).17
In sum, Mikkelsen failed to segregate his fees properly, and the record
demonstrates that the fee award is unsupported by legally or factually sufficient
evidence. Under Tony Gullo, should this Court affirm the trial court’s finding on
Mikkelsen’s breach of contract claim, it must reverse the fee award and remand for a
new trial on that issue.
C. Defendants Are Entitled to Their Reasonable Attorneys’ Fees Spent
Pursuing Their Declaratory Judgment Claim.
As explained, the trial court erred in denying Defendants’ declaratory
judgment claim on the 2013 redemption and tender. See supra Section II.B.2. Under
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code § 37.009, Defendants are entitled to their reasonable
and necessary attorneys’ fees spent pursuing this claim—specifically, $5,500 in
reasonable and necessary attorneys’ fees through trial plus $12,500 in conditional
17
To the extent Mikkelsen asserts that his fee award is based on the cross-declaratory judgment
claims as well as the contract claim, that argument is belied by the record. See 10RR 55:17-19
(asserting that 80% of the time is “tied with the contract claim”). Further, even if Mikkelsen’s fee
claim relates to his cross-declaratory judgment claim as well, Mikkelsen never accounted for the
large gap of time between when the contract claim was decided on summary judgment in 2011 and
when he pleaded his cross-declaratory judgment claim in 2015. See 2CR158. While Mikkelsen
may attempt to claim that the fees he incurred defending against Defendants’ declaratory judgment
are rightfully included in a fee award, it is telling that Defendants sought only $5,500 in fees based
on that claim. 10RR 186:25-191:6. Finally, Mikkelsen fails to account for the fact that several time
entries on his attorneys’ invoices from late 2013 through trial had nothing to do with the contract
claim or cross-declaratory judgment claims. See, e.g., PX-50 at MIK0107-0108.
47
appellate fees. See 10RR 186:25-191:6. Accordingly, if this Court agrees with
Defendants that the 2013 redemption and tender are valid, then it should award
Defendants the attorneys’ fees they spent pursuing their declaratory judgment claim,
or alternatively, remand for further proceedings on these fees.
V. To the Extent the Court Does Not Render Judgment in Favor of
Defendants, a New Trial Also Is Warranted Because the Trial Court
Impermissibly Commented on the Weight of the Evidence When It
Instructed the Jury That Herring Bancorp Had Breached its Articles of
Incorporation as a Matter of Law.
As Defendants have argued, judgment should be rendered in their favor on all
of the issues raised in this appeal. All of Defendants’ arguments about new trial and
remand are alternative arguments and apply only if the Court finds that it cannot
render judgment in Defendants’ favor. To the extent the Court finds that Defendants
are not entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the contract or tort claims, a new
trial also is required given the trial court’s prejudicial comment on the weight of the
evidence in its jury instructions.
As noted, Mikkelsen presented this case to the jury as a breach-of-contract
dispute. See supra Facts Section V. Yet, when the jury received its instructions, the
trial court erred and abused its discretion and told the jury that it already had
determined the breach-of-contract claim as a matter of law in Mikkelsen’s favor. Ex.
2 at 7 (“You are instructed that the Court has previously determined, as a matter of
law, that Defendant Herring failed to comply with the Articles of Incorporation of
48
Herring Bancorp when it purported to involuntarily redeem Mikkelsen’s preferred
shares in 2006.”). The trial court gave this instruction over repeated objections, see
8RR 203:20-220:8; 11RR 9:22-13:11; 2CR259, and this prejudicial statement
infected the jury charge with error and probably caused the rendition of an improper
judgment. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 277; Redwine v. AAA Life Ins. Co., 852 S.W.2d 10, 14
(Tex. App.—Dallas 1993, no writ) (“Reversal is required if an improper comment
on the weight of the evidence is one that was calculated to cause and probably did
cause the rendition of an improper judgment.”); Seymore v. Dorsett, No.
07-03-0175-CV, 2005 WL 2849061, at *3 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Oct. 31, 2005, no
pet.).
Several appellate courts have reversed judgments where the trial court gave
similar “instructions” that amounted to improper comments on the weight of the
evidence. For example, in Redwine, the Dallas Court of Appeals explicitly held that,
“[a]lthough the assumption of an uncontroverted fact in the jury charge is generally
not held to be a comment on the weight of the evidence, we cannot conclude that the
instructions given in the instant case concerning issues decided as a matter of law . . .
were not comments on the weight of the evidence.” 852 S.W.2d at 16. In reaching
this conclusion, the Redwine court reviewed the holdings of other courts of appeals
and noted that those “courts held that jury instructions concerning issues decided as
a matter of law were improper comments on the weight of the evidence because they
49
suggested to the jury how the remaining issues should be resolved.” Id. Similarly, in
American Bankers Insurance Co. v. Caruth, 786 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.—Dallas
1990, no writ), the court held that instructing the jury about a prior ruling was an
improper comment on the weight of the evidence, was not “helpful to the jury in
answering any of the questions in the court’s charge,” and “tended to imply to the
jury that the trial judge thought the law and the facts were in favor” of one party over
the other. Id. at 435; see also First Nat’l Bank of Amarillo v. Jarnigan, 794 S.W.2d
54, 61-62 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 1990, writ denied) (“[A]nything which does not aid
the jury in answering the jury questions submitted . . . must be excluded from the
charge.”); Mader v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 683 S.W.2d 731, 733 (Tex.
App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ) (“The trial court, in effect, informed the jury
on a finding which it had made as a matter of law. This was error. . . . [W]e believe
that the instruction strongly suggested to the jury that [it] should answer the
accompanying issue [in favor of one party] . . . . We can see no useful purpose for the
instruction other than to steer the jury . . . . As such, we find that the instruction was
an impermissible comment on the evidence . . . .”); Bd. of Regents v. Denton Constr.,
652 S.W.2d 588, 594-95 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.) (“We are at
a loss to determine why this instruction was included in the charge. . . . [T]his
instruction was not explanatory of anything, except that the court had [made a
ruling] as a matter of law . . . . We think this tended to imply to the jury that the court
50
thought the law and the facts were with the appellee, and as such, the instruction was
erroneously prejudicial.”).
These cases demonstrate that comments about prior rulings do not aid the jury
and can improperly influence the jury’s deliberations. That is especially true where,
as here, Mikkelsen framed the trial such that the breach-of-contract claim was the
focus. See 7RR 16:12-14 (“[T]his case is about the breach of a covenant.”); 7RR
22:2-5 (“If they had been all redeemed, we would not be here today because that
complied with the covenant, the Articles of Incorporation.”); 11RR 32:23-34:2 (“I
told you in our opening that I believe the evidence would show that the covenant, the
Articles of Incorporation had been broken . . . . Now, in our closing arguments, this
is our chance to summarize for you what we think the evidence has shown. . . . First
and foremost in this charge, on page seven, is the following: Finding by the Court
that the Articles of Incorporation were violated.”). Indeed, where the entire trial is
framed as a question about whether the Articles of Incorporation were breached, and
then the Court instructs the jury that it previously found that the Articles were
breached, it is difficult to imagine a more prejudicial instruction. This erroneous
instruction likely had spillover effects and affected the jury’s deliberations regarding
the minority oppression and breach of fiduciary duty claims (despite the trial court’s
addition that “failure to comply with the Articles of Incorporation, standing alone, is
51
not sufficient to constitute minority oppression or breach of fiduciary duty”). Ex. 2
at 7.
The trial court’s instruction regarding its prior ruling on Mikkelsen’s
summary judgment motion was erroneous and likely caused the rendition of an
improper judgment. To the extent the Court determines that it cannot render
judgment in Defendants’ favor, the Court should reverse the Final Judgment and
remand for a new trial for this additional reason.
CONCLUSION AND PRAYER
For the reasons stated, Defendants respectfully pray that this Court reverse the
trial court’s Final Judgment and render judgment in favor of Defendants.
Alternatively, Defendants respectfully pray that this Court reverse the Final
Judgment insofar as it awards Mikkelsen relief and remand the case for a new trial to
resolve any disputed fact issues. Defendants also pray for any further relief to which
they are justly entitled.
52
Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Thomas S. Leatherbury
Cornell D. Curtis Thomas S. Leatherbury
State Bar No. 24007069 State Bar No. 12095275
CORNELL D. CURTIS, P.C. Manuel G. Berrelez
1716 Main Street State Bar No. 24057760
Vernon, Texas 76384 Stephen S. Gilstrap
940.552.9100 State Bar No. 24078563
940.552.2655 (facsimile) VINSON & ELKINS LLP
vernonlaw@sbcglobal.net 2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 3700
Dallas, Texas 75201
214.220.7700
214.999.7792 (facsimile)
tleatherbury@velaw.com
mberrelez@velaw.com
sgilstrap@velaw.com
Attorneys for Appellants Herring Bancorp, Inc.;
C.C. Burgess; and C. Campbell Burgess
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. P. 9.4(i)(3), the undersigned hereby certifies that the
foregoing Brief of Appellants complies with the applicable word count limitation
because it contains 12,940 words, excluding the parts exempted by Tex. R. App. P.
9.4(i)(1). In making this certification, the undersigned has relied on the word-count
function in Microsoft Word 2010, which was used to prepare this brief.
/s/ Thomas S. Leatherbury
Thomas S. Leatherbury
53
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document has
been served upon the following counsel of record via electronic filing on November
20, 2015:
Lee F. Christie
Michael L. Atchley, II
Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, LLP
500 West 7th Street, Suite 600
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
817.332.3245
817.877.4781 (facsimile)
lfchristie@popehardwicke.com
matchley@popehardwicke.com
/s/ Thomas S. Leatherbury
Thomas S. Leatherbury
54
INDEX OF APPENDIX MATERIALS
(1) Final Judgment (June 16, 2015) (2CR472-507)
(2) Jury Verdict (January 30, 2015) (2CR228-58)
(3) Orders Denying Defendants Post-Judgment Motions (August 19, 2015)
(2CR409-10)
(4) Order Granting Plaintiff’s Motion for Partial Summary Judgment
(August 4, 2011) (1CR306-07)
(5) Herring Bancorp Articles of Incorporation (13RR, DX-1)
(6) October 31, 2006 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-18)
(7) Acceptance of Subchapter S Status by IRS (13RR, DX-31)
(8) October 30, 2013 Notice of Redemption (13RR, DX-33)
(9) November 22, 2013 Tender (13RR, DX-35)
(10) Refused Jury Instructions Related to 2013 Redemption/Tender
(January 30, 2015) (2CR260-61, 2CR267)
(11) Cent. Austin Apartments, LLC v. UP Austin Holdings, LP, No.
03-13-00080-CV (Tex. App.—Austin Dec. 8, 2014) (op. withdrawn on
February 6, 2015 based on settlement of parties)
US 3776991
55
EXHIBIT 1
472472472472472
NOW
•
. .1„ . . • - "
.
•
•
CAUSE NO: 24,955. •
JOHN MIRK:EISEN, § • IN THE Disnutil
acting solely in his capacity as Trustee trie / to cifqq. 5 ••
§
of the John Mildcelsen Trust § At 3 tio047_M
:§.
Plaintiff § aeri5 Dist Court Wifbarger Co. .
HERRING BANCORP, INC.;
C.C. BURGESS; and
C. CAMPBELL BURGESS,
§
Defendants. § 445TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
FINAL JUDGMENT
On January 30, 2015, this cause came on to be beard, and John Nfildrelsen, acting solely in
his capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen Trust, Plaintiff; appeared in person and by attorney
of record and announced ready for trial, and. Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell
Burgess, Defendants, appeared in person or by, attnrney.of record and, announced ready for trial,
and a jury having been previously demanded, a'jury consisting of 12 qualified jurors was duly
empaneled and the case proceeded to trial.
The Court, by granting Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Suminary JudgMent on August 4,..
2011, granted Plaintiff's breach of contract claim in Count One of Plaintiffs First Amended
Original Petition, and the Order granting Plaintiff's Motion, which is copied and aitached hereto
as Exhibit "A," is incorporated herein. With respect to Count Four of Plaintiff's First Amended
Original Petition, which alleged that an. October 2006 purported redemption of Plaintiff's preferred
shares in Herring Bancorp, Inc. constituted unlawful oppression of a minority shareholder, the
Court submitted said issue to the jury, and the jury returned its verdict in accordance with the
instructions of the Court. The charge of the Court and the verdict of the jury are copied and
FINAI-JtmcktErir PAGE
472
473473473473473
"MI
attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated for all purposes by reference. Bprause the Court
found for Plaintiff and it appears to the Court that the verdict of the jury was for the Plaintiff and
against Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess, the Court finds
that judgment should be rendered as herein provided. It is, therefore,
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff John Mikkelsen have and recover
from this Court a declaratory judgment whereby this Court declares, pursuant to the Texas
Declaratory Judgments Act and the jury's verdict, tbat the purported October 2006 and November
2013 redemptions of the preferred shares of Plaintiff John Mikkelsen were void and of no force or
effect, and did not deprive Plaintiff of his status as a preferred shareholder of Herring Bancorp,
Inc. Accordingly, Plaintiff at all times had and has the right to inspect the books and records of
Herring Bancorp, Inc. The Court further finds that Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc. breached its
Articles of Incorporation and that Defendants C.C. Burgess and C. Campbell Burgess wrongfully
engaged in oppressive conduct towards Plaintiff, as found by the jury. In connection therewith,
the Court further finds, and it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the Plaintiff
remains a preferred shareholder of said Herring Bancorp, Inc., is entitled to have and recover of
and from Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell Burgess, jointly and
severally, judgment in the amount of $23,112.00, representing preferred dividends on Plaintiff's
preferred shares in Herring Bancorp, Inc. from and after October 31, 2006, through December 31,
2014, plus prejudgment interest thereon through the date' of judgment rendered herein in the
amount of $ )jk '••
*-- "t
---
1 is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that Plaintiff John Mikkelsen should have and
recover of and from the Defendant Herring Bancorp, Inc. judgment for his reasonable and
necessary attorneys' fees, as awarded by the jury, in the amount of $127,442.00 for preparation
FINAL JUDGMENT PAGE 2
473
474474474474474
and trial of this cause., and the additional sum of $25,000.00 for an appeal to the Court of Appeals,
$10,000.00 for representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas,
$10,000.00 for representation at the merit briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas, and
$10,000.00 for representation through oral argument and completion of proceedings in the
Supreme Court of Texas. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all costs of court should be and hereby are
taxed jointly and severally against Defendants Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C.
Campbell Burgess. It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the contract award of $23,112.00 shall bear
interest from the date this Judgment is signed at the rate of ten percent (10%) per annum until paid.
It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that the other monetary awards shall bear
interest from the date this Judgment is signed at the rate of five percent (5%) per annum until paid.
It is further
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and DECREED that all relief not expressly herein granted is
denied, and this is intended to be a final, appealable judgment.
SIGNED this 14 day of d , 2015.
A(
DAN MIKE IRD, T
DIS CT;
GE
PAMitiothcAPIck6nesTroposl Flnal limigrutrn dx
FINAL JUDGMENT PAGE 3
474
475475475475475
FILED
The`+ day of___011
o'clock ill: o'clo
Brenda Paterson
CAUSE NO. 24,955 0 Dist. C
Ey
JOHN MUCKELSEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT
acting solely in his capacity as Trustee
of the John Mikkelsen Trust,
Plaintiff,
v. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS
HERRING BANCORP, INC.;
C.C. BURGESS; and
C. CAMPBELL BURGESS,
Defendants. 46Th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDF12.
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion") and Defendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion") came on for hearing on April 18,
2011. The Court finds Plaintiff's Motion was timely filed and that notice of Plaintiffs Motion
and the hearing thereon was duly and properly given_ The Court also finds thAt Defendants'
Motion was timely filed and served by agreement of the parties, and hereby grants leave to file
and serve the Motion on less than. 21 -days' notice prior to the hearing. The Court also fords that
Plaintiff's Response to Defendants' Motion was timely filed and served by agreement of the.
parties, and hereby grants Plaintiff leave to file and serve the Response and the evidence attached
thereto, including discovery products, within seven days of the hearing. After considering
Plaintiff's Motion and the Response thereto, and after considering Defendants' Motion and the
Response thereto, and after considering the admissible summary judgment evidence and the
arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion should be granted and Defendants'
Motion should be denied.
ORoER PACE I
EXHIBIT A
475
476476476476476
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
is denied in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Special Exceptions and Plea in Abatement
are overruled and denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
granted in all respects.
The Court further finds as a marte.r of law that (1) the purported redemption of Plaintiff's
300 shares of preferred stock of Herring Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") was undertaken in
violation of the Company's Articles of Incorporation and is void and (2) that Plaintiff is, and
continues to be, the holder of 300 shares of the Company's preferred stock, and has all the rights
appurtenant thereto, including the right to inspect Company's books and records.
SIGNED on the day of 2011.
udge
Approved as to form:
Lee F. Christie, Counsel for Plaintiff
James W. Bowen, Counsel for Defendants
ORDER PAGE 2
476
477477477477477
021021ZOI5 ADIS 12:26 wax R1002/041,
CAUSB NO. 24,915
JOHN MIKKELSEN, Acting Solely in his IN TEE 46Th DISTRICT COURT
Capacity as Trustee of the John Mil:ire/5w
That,
PiainfziBiColutter Defendant,
IN AND FOR
BEERRING. BANCORP, INC, C.C.
BIJR.OESS and C CAMPBELL BURGESS,
Ddraulants/Coanter-Plaizeffs. WI:LRAM:0Z COUNTY, TEXAS
CHAR( TO TIM JURY
LAWS AND GENTLE/MI OF MB JURY:
This cese is submitted to you by esktog quesfions aboigibt fist; vibirtt you must deride
from the evidence you have heard in Cids nisi_ You are the sole j4.Ligcb of the creditegy of the
wit: rases end the %eight to be given their lesEmsony, baton mash: of law, you roust br governed
by the instructions in this chatge. 5icrisharging your responsibility on this jury, you will observe
qrt {be instrunfions which have previously been given you. I shalt now give you additional
instructions which you should razthlly and strictly follow doting your deliirsaftons.
L
Do not let bias, ptejurke at sympathy play toy pad in your deliberations.
IL
arriving at yoga ansvarits, oonsicier only the evidence introduced here undet oath sod such
etchilais
' , if any, as have beta introduced for your considerafiern labia the nefings of the Cour4 that
whet you have seen and heard in this courtroom, together with the kw as gives you by fire Court_
CHARGE TO THE JURY PACE I OF 30
EXHIBIT B
477
478478478478478
02/0212015 1l4Y 1_24 26 ail',
taossioss
In your&aerations, you will not consider or discuss anything that Es not manse:And by the
evidence In this case.
DI
ghtre every answer that is enquired by the charge is irafaxmot, no juror shanid state or
coosider that any requhrd answer is not important.
You must not decide vela) you think should win, and then by to EUIVAPet the questions
accadingly. Simply answer de questicas, sod do not discuss tor coon= yourselves vrith the effect
ofyour =Wens.
V.
You will not decide ilse =won to a (Reit:ion by lot or by drawing straws, or by may other
method &chance. Do not return. a quotient verdict. A quot4 tat vertfiet means that the jurors agree
tri abidc b9 them& to be mooted bY eataS together each jam* Ego:mond cfivkling by themtanber
of knots to get an average. Do not do any herring mar stoss that is, are; juhn thouid not
agree to answer a. =slain question one way Toth= will agree to answer another qnassion mother
VI.
You may rendet your watt upon the vote of ten or more menthol of the jusy. Tito same
test or mote of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the cadre meter. You will net,
thembotr, enter into en agreernemt to be holm! by a taajocity many other vote &less than ten jusons.
If thre verrhst and al:loft:beans-wets therein are reached by is mores agreement, am presidiod tutor
stata sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any jtartt disagrees as to any answer made by the Vetilta,
eflARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 2 08 30
478
479479479479479
.41•11,"
• 2/o 2/ 2 011 max 12,24 rxx 00 0 4 / t141
those jurors wbo agree to all f =flogs shall each sif,n the verdict.
VII.
These instractiors are given to you because your conduct is subject to review theca= as that
of the witnesses, parftes, attorneys and the judo Ifit should be found dud you have cilsreganied any
of these instructions, it will be Jury mioxindoct and it may require another tried by arrotheritay; then
all of our fune will have been wasted.
VB1
The presicrrog juror or any of= yam observes iotation of the Courts instractions abaft
immediately warn the one who is violating tie same and elm the juror not to do so 'win
IX.
When weeds are used in this chums in a sense which wake from tee eletremcnalytraciastood
running, you =givens proper legal defurifion, orb ich you are bound to scoeptin place of any other
meaning.
X.
Answer by checking "Yes' or "No" to all questions realm otherwise to mated. A "Yes"
answer mast be based on a prepoodesonce of the kA, ;lack- Ifyou do not find that a preponderance
of the evidence supports tt'Yesr server, then answer 'No." Tithe question directs you to give an
answer area than ''Yes" or 'No," you must still base your taw= on a preponderance of the
evidence with respect to each mutter inquired about in the question. Preponderance of the evidence
means the greater Weight and degree of orecilble testimony or evidence inhodoced before you and
admitted in evidence io this cam
Kt.
CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 3 OF 30
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480480480480480
02/02/ZOIS 2aYS L2427 MX
asfo at
Atter your refire to the jury room, yon. will stlect your own presithngiuror. The first thing
the ;merit:fin:dreg will do is to have/Ns complett charge readdoral together with the accompanying
instructions and If= you will deliberate upon your answers to the ate:stir:0s asked in the verdict
them. It is the duty of the presiding juror to:
(I) ?reside daring your deliberations.
(2) See tbatyour clebirensfmns art conducted in an adz:4 manner and in accordance with
the insirractions in this charge.
(3) Vidtt out and bard to the bailiff any communkatians c000nrag the ease that you
desire to have dethvered to the Mgt.
(4) Coodort voting on each cyoeseron.
(5) Write your agiVictill to the questions in the spaces provided.
(6) Certify to your verdict in the space provided for tht dding juror's ;Agostino, or to
obtain the signatures of all the jut= who agree with the yenfict if your verdict is tern than
pnaninioas.
XEL.
Yousliop3drot thacasewithanyone,notaveaioaidlibthermembessb€ffiejury,turners
all aria are present and gasembled ia the jury morn_ Should foryoos attempt to talk to you also*
the cast beft4e the yet dict Is returned, whether at the covutlxxise, or your home, or elsewhere, plena
inform fits Judge of this fact
XL
When you have calsweutd aid foe questions you 618 LeyUhed to =MtUnder the instroefions
of the Judge and your presirthog juror has placed yr= answess tbe spaces provided end signed the
venikt as pueskrang juror or obtained the signatures, you will infectra the bairiffat the door of the jury
CBARCE TO MR JURY PA043 4 OF 30
480
481481481481481
22/22/2015 CM U.:27 sax moocieu
room that you're nada a ittdiat, aid bayou will retam Igo Cow with par teem
SIGNED this "50 day of Isaagy.201.5.
&NORMA ai BMW
40 Maid Coat/edge
Med /1301/
.vi-9:90 A AT
e
/130//5-
at 5 0 PM
4
7
CHARGE TO TEM JURY PAGE 5 On°
481
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e007/041
DliFiNTIJONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
You are instructed that when wads are used in the Questions in a sense which varies from
the meaning commonly tradevasooci, you will be given in this Charge a proper legal de6nitton what
yea ECFC bound to swept in (he place of any other inanition or =anatg. in answering the Questions
you she give the following terms the following meanings:
1. The trim "pm:tender:are of the evidence" means the greeter weight of ontale
evidence presented In this case. 'fru do not freed that a pep:We:rat= of the evidence supports a
"yes" answer, then answer "no.' A prepondentoce of the evidence is not measured by the =her
of or by the number of documents admitted in tvidenot. For a fact to be proved by a
preponderance of tie evidence, you must find that the fact. is tams likely tate-than not tree. A fact
may be estabftsined by direct wide:toe or by tai evidence, or both. A fact is established
by rrtnect evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or
herd fin words spoken, A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and
reasonably inferred from other feats pawed.
2. A Mot may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both-
A fact is established by &cot evidence wiesPiand by dootnnentnry evidence or by witneists who
sem the at done or beard the words spoken. A feet is established by circumstantial evidence when
it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from ofttee facts proved.
3. "htikkelscen" means Plaintifflohn Pet313relsen, acting palely bids capaohy asTrustee
of the Joint KA:then Trust end his agents, thaneys, and repnesentatives noting in the nausea and
scope of their ageney or artployment
CLIARG13 TO THB JURY PAGE 6 OF 30
482
483483483483483
OZ/02/2015 MOS 12127 WILX
Hit ogle
4. 'Herring Bancorp" means Eferang Brmoorp, Inr—, and its agents, attorneys, employees,
officers, directons, and representatives acting in the comseancl scope of theiragencyor ertspioymmt.
S. "C.C. Mugu." menus C.C. Burgess and his agents, atimneys, and representatives
tiding En the ea= and recce of their irgency or eraployment
.
6. 'Campbell Blare' mews C. Campbell Hanes; and Ws ages* attorneys, and
representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment
7. The 'Articies of Incorpootioe m and refers to the Ankles of Incorporation of
Herring (Plaintiff's ExhibitDr.
INSTRUCTION REGARDING BREA_CH OF Ali I1CLES OF INCORPORATION
You are instructed that the Carat lust previously determined, as a matter of law, that
Defendant Herring failed to comply with tl>w Articles offacorferatine of Fleming Bancorp when it
pmyoiD d to involuntarily redeem ms's prefecOnd shares in 2006. However, this fare to
comply with the Axticies of Incorporation, standing alone, Is tat sufficient to consffinte adnority
oppression or breach of fiduciary duty.
CHARGES TO THE JURY PAGE 7 OF 30
483
484484484484484
0 7 /02/701S ION 12:77 FAX
W09/041
.Q.ICMON NO 1;
What is a reasonable fee for the =unary services oflelikkeisea's attorney in coniection
. n?
with the Mute of Herring Bancorp to comply with the Articles of incorporatio
In answering this Question, you /we to consider the attomoy's fees and expenses beamed said
reasonably anticipated to be armed by MIkielvert in eaforoing his rights in this action and any
appeal thereof In dercrosium
' g the amount of attorney's fits and expanses, yon are to cons der the
fallowing
• (heti= and Ink( involved, the novelty and dittionhy of the cinestires involved, and the
skill required to pal= the legal services properly;
• the Edahlood that the arxeptarece of the particular =Nap:Dent will preclude other
employment by the lawyer,
• the fee castaroactly charged in the locality fix shinier legal service
▪ the amount involved and the results obtaineck
• the time limitations imposed by the client or the circurnstancen
• the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
• the experlencr., teiiutation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers pedorming the servicosc
and
• whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained of moccrtsirty of collection
before the legal seevioes have been rendered.
CHARGE TO THE IVRY PACE $ Of 30
484
485485485485485
•
02102/2015 KOJI 11-. 129 PAS
;bras/cat
Answer with an amount for each of the folkiwing:
a. For preparation in the trial court.
ANSWER: ia 7/ eede.ob
b. For representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals,
ANSWER: di; nor,
c. For representation at the pelf:Sion for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.
ANSWER:
I OP €13
d_ For represizitalion at the merits briefing stage in the Supra= Court of Tares.
ANSWER: /,3(f
• e. Far rtprescniafron *sough oral argnmast and the corapletien of proceedings in rho
Srpreine Coast ofTeadia.
ANSWER: /6 iv° sA
CHARGE TO `MB JURY ?AC 9 OF 30
485
486486486486486
02/02/20LS 1H3Y 12t2t rxx 11011/0+1
Do yon find that C. C. Burgess engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsm?
`Ocpimtve conduce rams harsh, or wrongful conduct a. Lxic of probity end
fair &sling in the company's affairs to [Iv prejuc6oe of =re metubessti cc a via 4e departure from
the standards of fair dealing and aviolation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely.
Lt also means unfair treatment of minority peers by the directors or those in control
tiL corporation,
Answer 'yes" or "no."
Answer:
MARGE 10 THE JURY PA.0310 OP 30
486
487487487487487
487487487487487
02/D2 / 2015 x0if 12121 714.1C WIZ/041
00E87TON NOV. 3:
Do you furl runt Campbell Burgess talgagod in oppressive conduct toward ladosism?
"Oppressive conduct" axams banicoscane, busk orwroagEol Conduct a lack of probity and
fair deeding in the compsay's affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from
' g and aviolaffrai affair play on which each shareholder is endtlecrto rely.
the standards of fair &din
Ii abo mons mfr traatroerd of mhxrrity sbantholdess by the di:redoes or those In control
of the corporation,
Answer "yes* or 'mi."
Answer: 'bp
MARGE TO THE ,may PAGB 11 OF 30
487
488488488488488
02/ 0 2/ 20 i5 DIVI4 12324 )]X Rs rats at
gc 'tie* tve e-e ‘‘Yr.-6
• - Y g-f dot
0Mk-110N NO. 4:
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and eensonobly comperadet
Mfickelsen for his damages, if emy, that proximately resulted from such oppressive conduct, if any,
you have formd?
Consider Etas following elements of damages, if any, and none othm.: The lost crrvidend
became on lakelsea's prefeized shares from November 21, 2006 tmtil Jeattary 26, 201S.
Answer tin dollars and cents.
Answer: S 3, azy,50
CHARGE TO THB JURY PAGE 12 OF 30
488
489489489489489
489489489489489
02/02/2015 NO10 L2:23 FAX
OVESTION)40. 5:
Answer the following quiesfion rely if yen; nraiinnoosly answered 'yes" to Q nNo. 2_
Ofinerwlft, do not answer the folk:owing question.
To amwer "Yes" it, the mowing cEnr-stkri, your answer must be ILMOILLE0713. Yon may
answer 'Nos to the following titration only upon a vole of ten Or more :FM& Otherwise, you most
not answer the folkwring question.
Do you find by clear and convimoing etiderrne that the basin to lackelsen resalied from
rEtiine?
"Clear and =mincing evidence" means flys measure or degree of prooftbat produces a fox/
baler or ocen4o6 on oldie troth of the allegatinna recraghi to be estabUsikel.
`Malice means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to
Mikkelaen.
Answer "y or 'no."
Answer: __716
CHARGE TO Tht JURY PAGE 13 OP 30
489
490490490490490
490490490490490
02(02/2011 12r2t rIX Upis/041
OUBSTtON NO. 6:
Answer the following question May if you tmaniamusly answered 'yes* to Questa)
* No.3.
Otherwise, do sat answer tbe following question_
To sumer "Yes" to the following question, your answer mist be manimma. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upcat a vote of tea or =Tejo:mini. Otherwise, you most
not answer the fallowing question.
1) you furl by clear and comb:icing ovtdence that the ha= to hfillre/sen revolted from
malice?
`Clear and =wincing evidence' roe= the measure or degree ofproof that produces a fiat
belief or =victims of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
'Malice" mesas a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause sob Gal injury or harm
to Mika/sista.
Answer "yes" or 'rm."
n toll6r; 2
(MARGE TO TE113 JURY PAM 14 OF 30
490
491491491491491
491491491491491
\NI
OZ/02/205 ,mar 12r28 raz WRI6/641.
QUESTICRNINO, 7:
Answer the foikrwing question cdy if you tmanimiattify answered ^yes" to QuesdonNo. 5.
You must rataninumsfy agree on the tonctaut deny award of exemplary damages.
Whet scan of money, Vasty, paid now in cash, aitordd be assessed against C.C. 13nrgess and
awarded to M5dcelvat as entrtnplaiy daraagns, raw, for the cordnet frnmd In response to Question
2?
"Exemplary damages" means an amp Oast you may in your dLscretion tward eta penalty
or by way of great
Factors to be conaered in awartilng exemplary dantr.ges, if any, are—
a. The nature of the
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpabirdy of C.C. Burgess.
d. Ibe situation and semulalities of tile patties comexced.
e. Ile Went to ?Aria Jamb conduct offends a pobrvc sense of justice wad propriety.
f. The net worth of C.C. Earwig.
Answa in dolists sad onits, [fray.
Answtc $
CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE1S OF 30
491
492492492492492
492492492492492
vow
02/02/201S SOX 12:21 sat tan?/061
OLIMION NO. 8:
Answer tbe farming questim only ifyou ttaanimonsly areweeetryee to Queeitoo 143.6. You
imat neenimonsly 8106 an the amount of any award of exemplar] damages.
What sum of roomy, ffany, paid now in Garb, alma be assessed against Campbell s and
awarded b Wel:a= as exemplary clan-Agee, if any, for the conduct &mod in respotec b Question 3?
lactophri damages' means an amount that rat may In yaw discretion award es a pcm/ty or
by way of ponishroart.
Factors to be considered in away troempitry damages, if paly, aro—
a. 7Ls nature of the wrong,
b. The amen= of the coodnct Involved.
The degree of cripabffdy of Campbell Bur&ess.
cl. Tie situation and amatTsties of the partles =calmed,
e. The orient to which sow ecinduet of a public same a:tint:lion end propriety.
The not Rath of Campbell Dorms.
Answer in &tiros end oats, if any.
Answer: $
CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 16 OF 30
492
493493493493493
Vow,
01/02/20LS BOX 12+29 TAX Z0111/041.
11113.? OUPWION NO, 9:
Do yoo find dart C. C. atagess used his peasonal control ofIleviug Banoshares to breach
fiduciary duties owed to latelsca?
In connection withthe foregoing qmasf on, you are instractorl that a majotity sltareholrier of
a. Cettparatio
. n owes fiduciary duties to a minority stiacchold= and to show compflance with these
duties roust thaw be acted fairly told equitably, in the utmost good faith with the most scrupulous
honesty, folly and fairly disclosing ail important information to a minority tharebolder such as
Wiricelseu
Answer "yes" or 'no."
Answer:
CHARGE TO Tim JURY PAGE 17 OF 30
493
494494494494494
%MI
02102/2015 NMI Iz 29 nix la 9 / 0 41
OUESTIONNO. 10:
Do you find that Campbell Burgess usedbis personal coatrol ofHerring Bauosblues to breach
fidnAlry duties owed to With/see
In connection with tho foregoing question, you are instracted that a majority almachokier of
a corparafion crams 5-h3ciary &ties to a minority shareholder and to show compilanoe with those
dailies mast show he robed fairly and equitably. in thc utmost good faith wili2 tilt most scrapnions
honesty. folly and fairly di,r4rudng all important information to a minority charehokler such as
Mikkalsee.
Answer 'yes" or 'on."
Av
CHARGE TO 1TM JURY PAGE 18 OF 30
494
495495495495495
Vow
02l12/ 2015 104 12:2) PltX
020/041
• -I frvt Wel e-cr "Xci5 -A-4e l(7)
q n S Pee4s- 67.174-11/v1-0.-4 de---ftri-7;:k.,45"4,Y
QUESTIONNO.ii:
What tam of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reesorobly =rpm:cafe
KIdaisegi for bia *we*, if soy, that pnxdmitely math &mists& treacIrs of fiduciary duties,
if any you have hood?
Consider The fonerv.ing elements of damn if any. and nom other: The kost clividtxx1
income on Mikkehen's plefeExed shares from November 2l, 2006 until Ison=y 26, 2015.
Answer in dollars end cents.
Anmec S 0,00
CHAIM TO THE JURY PAGE 19 OF 30
495
496496496496496
132/c2/2015 fl 12129 1,11- 0.21/e41.
. Ilowiclgques6om only ityou tmardirensty answmed 4yes" to Quad:1°04a. iiEt
Answer the So
Otherwise, do not answer the following questruu.
To answer 'Yea" to the following cinesSrm, yorcr answer must be unanimous. You may
answer lie to the following qiics6cm only upon wrote of ten or more juircs. O•ticerwi=, yea must
not answer the following graistion.
Do yon find by clear and convincing evidence gad the harm to Mildialsen resalted from
malice?
'Clear and convine gevidence'meanstbe:meoedegczeofpcooftineproduces a firm
Wit( or conviction of the truth. of the allegations sought to be establiebed.
"Malice" means a specific best by C.C. Burgess to e:asso substantial injury cc lemon to
italcefacn.
Answa. "yes' or "no."
Amcvez
CIJA.R.013 TO TE03 JURY PAGE 20 OF 10
496
497497497497497
497497497497497
0 2 / 112/ 2 01.5 ical 12:2, ru Salo 221:41
OUESTION NO. 13;
Amwerthe following question ooly ifyou ttaanimueslyanswered`yes- Quesflon
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer 'Yee to the following question, your ansWer most be unanimous. Yost may
answer lice to the following question only noses a voitof bat or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
. g evidence That d harm to liiiiirkelsen resulted from
Do you find by clear and eunvinein
malice?
`Clear and ear:miming evirlascer means the measure cr degree of proof that produces alarm
belief or eouvidicm of the truth of the allegations sought to be eskl,lishe-fl
`Mace mews a specific iotem by Campbell Burgess to came substantial inOry or hann
to Mik1eiien.
ARSVCI "yes' or 'no."
Anse n
CHARM TO THE JURY PACE 21 OF 30
497
498498498498498
0210212915 WM 1.2129 rax D1023 /001
QVXDON NO. 1 t
Answertbe foBowing.questionoffly Wye's mumirnously ranweeeyea" to QuestianNo. 12.
You aunt raurOnwArily agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of mussy, If any, paid now inoush, shonld be assessed aglinst C. C. Burgess and
KWIII4ed to MBIelsen as exemplary dataages, Lenny, for the coorinr:t found in response so Question
97
"Exemplary damages" means an amounithat you may in your &action award as aptaalty
or by way of punisturreect.
Factors So be considered is awarding exemplary damages, if any, aro—
a.. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the ccmdz invoired.
The degree of cralpahalty of C. C. Burgess.
d. The situation and sertsibilifses of the patties concerned.
a. The ecterst to which snob conduct cis a public sense ogre:nee and propriety.
£ The net worth DIG C. Burgess.
Answer in doll= and cents, if any.
Answer S
ClfARGE TO -173B JURY PACE 22 OF 30
498
499499499499499
07/0 2/ 2015 MOW 2.2329 FAX 2024/041
QUESTION NO, Sr
&Inlet fb, following question onlyifyon unanisMonstr answered 'yes" to OnestionNo. 13.
YOU LIMA TIFIAtemowly agree on the amount of any Rivard of exemplary damages.
Whatemn of mooey, ifany, paid now itt cash, slmuld be asse.ssed against Campbell Burgess
and awarded to Milescisen as exemplary damages, if an for the =duct found in response In
Question le?
'glary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as speciality
• or by way of pa :Inhalant.
Pact= ta be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, en,—
a. Thene of the wnang.
b. "Fhb obararsOz of tins txmcluct involved.
o. The degree of calpatelity of Campbell Burgess.
d. The sittatraon and searitalities ofthe patties cxmcemed.
a The extent to which such conduct offeadat pub& sense of justice and propriety,
f The net wrath of Campbell Brag=
Answer in dodos and carts, if any
Answer. S
CHARM TO TDB JURY PACE 73 OF 30
499
500500500500500
i
02102/2015 1011.12:30 PEI zs1oat
OUESTJON NO. 16:
Answer the fallowing Question only if you have answered "yes" to Questicus 2 or 9.
Was C. C. Burgess part of a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive igfildoelsen of his preferred
shares in Ilming Enamor??
To be part of a conspiracy, C. C. Burgess arid another person or persons mast have had.
knondedge of agreed to, and irdended a common objective or course of ex4on that resulted in
damages to Mildrelsen. One or mare persons involved in the conspiracy must have perforroM some
ant or nets to further the conspiracy.
Answer 'yes" or "am"
Answer: /45
(MARGE TO TEE TJRY PAGE 24 OP 30
500
501501501501501
02/02/24115 NOW 12t30 rkz ao2i/Oat
OUBSTION NO. 17:
Answer the following Qnestion only era had ansvdered "yes" to Questions 3 be 10.
Was Campbell Burgess pact of a conspiracy to WIDogli2lly deprive lvfildmisen of his
preferred shares in Herring Bancorp?
Tb be part ofa conspiracy, Campbell But = and another pawnor pasins must have had
Imowledgc of agreed to, and intended a couture objective or course of action that resulted in
damages to hfildrelseu. One or morepersons involved in thecorripiracy must have pedal-rued some
act or acts to Sather tbsconspiracy.
Answer 'yes" or 'no.'
Anst.ier:
CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 25 OF 30
501
502502502502502
02/02/2 025 )N 124 30 Pas 0027/o4i
71,/- ji(k /6-,77 W/.
7,1 •Gb-rki
91=1-211KJI:
What anal of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fitly and nessonably comp-stoop.
NEddieisen fur his damages, daisy, that west plea :minty caused by such conspiracy?
Consider the follow* Ammts of druirk,r, if any, and none oil= The lost dividend
income on la's preferred sin= limn November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015.
Answer in dollars and cents.
Affirm S
CBAIt To TEE1 JURY PAGE 26 OR 30
502
503503503503503
02/112/21315 110X 17-1311 FAX 2021io4t
• OUESTIONNO. 19:
Answertie falkavingqoestion only &you nnanimottslyeasw=aryte to Qrstsfunt Ha. 16.
Offal-wise, do nct wawa the kollawingemestion.
To answer 'Yee to the following goserion, your extwer mast be unanimous. You may
answer "Ho" to thofollowing.goestion on/yr:No a vote of ten or [melons's.. Otherwise, youncust
not =wet the following quest/On..
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to heathen resulted from
=lire
Clear and convincing evidence" means Ilse measure °ree ofprooftbst prodoces a frort
belief or couviction old= truth eat allegaliort anaght to be established.
"Malice" means a aixcific interzt by Cc. Bargees to maze substan641 initty or harm to
hfiliasixa
Answer "yea" or 'on."
Answec
CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 27 OF 30
503
504504504504504
02/02/2015 SOS 12r 31 IJX Tinsfiost.
WEST/9N NO- 20!
Answertirefolkrwing questio
' nonly Ifyounnanimonsly answIserl'yee Que.:IirazNo. 17.
Otherwise, do not answer the Moving question_
To answer 'Yes" to the folicsiving question, yaw answer must be unanimous. You may
answer"No" to the following question only upon &vete of ten or marejorors. Otherwise, lotto:east
not answer the Mowing question.
Do you fad by al= sod convincing evidence that the Iona to Mild:elsen resulted from
"Clear and convineing evidence means the measure or degree ofprooftind panda= a firm
beUef or conviction of the troth of the alkgstions naught to be etfabrtihrel:
MaEct" mesas a specifto intent by Campbell Burgess tottc= ,zrrbusuni,'sl injury or harm
to Mikkelsen.
Answer-yes" or "no.'
Answer
CHARGE TO THE JURY" PAGE 28 OF 30
504
505505505505505
02/0212015 101 /2.00 ris 0030/04/
QUESTiON NO, 21:
Answer thefoLlo wing qtasstinti only ifyourtustabourly answered 'yet° QuestionNo. 1.9.
You must urestrimondy agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages-
Wbat sum ofrocasery, If any, paid uow ta cash, shook' be assessed against C. C....Burgess sad
awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, radix conduct fbnad in response to Question
16?
'Exemplary damages" mcansatt amount tbayou =yin your dist:mental EONIZITI as apepally
or by way of ',mistimed.
Faritors to be considered in marring exemplary damages, if may, are—
a. The rem of the wrong.
b. The ohs actor of the conduct involved.
e. Tie degree of culpelatzy of C. C. Bin=
4. The tide= end attasibiftties of tie parties mod.
e. The extent to wbich such oombxt offends s public muse of uatiee and propriety.
£ The net worth of C. C Burgess. .
Answer in dollats and cents, if any.
CHARGE TO THE JURY PAGE 29 OF 30
505
506506506506506
-- ,
02/02/ZY15 taro 12:30 Pi2 fite 311 041
OUBSTION NO, 22:
Answertbe folio " question only ifyou unanimously answered 'yes' to Question No. 20.
You mast unanimously agree on the amt ofMU sward of exemplary damages.
What cora °frac:my, nay, paid now in cash. should be assessed ag2dast Caropbetl Burgess
and marled to Mikkeisca as exemplary ;Images, if nay, fee the corduct found in response to
Quesgon 17?
"Exemplary &saws" means- an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty
or by way of putibisment_
Fact= to be considered in awarding exemplary Awl, if any, ape—
a_ The nal= of the wrong.
b, The &natter af the conduct involved-
o. The degree ofixdpetality of Campbell Burgess.
d. The sib and senstisilifxs atilt pastie ' s oonctsned.
The extent to which snub condeot atkods a public seam of justice and propriety.
t The net wren af Campbell Burgess-
Answer in dolls= and casts, if any.
Answer
506
507507507507507
507
EXHIBIT 2
228228228228228
CAUSE NO. 24,955
JOHN MIKKELSEN, Acting Solely in his § IN THE 46TH DISTRICT COURT
Capacity as Trustee of the John Mikkelsen §
Trust, §
§
Plaintiff/Counter Defendant, §
§
v. § IN AND FOR
§
HERRING BANCORP., INC., C.C. §
BURGESS and C. CAMPBELL BURGESS, §
§
Defendants/Counter-Plaintiffs. § WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS
CHARGE TO THE JURY
LADIES AND GENTLEMEN OF THE JURY:
This case is submitted to you by asking questions about the facts, which you must decide
from the evidence you have heard in this trial. You are the sole judges of the credibility of the
witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, but in matters of law, you must be governed
by the instructions in this charge. In discharging your responsibility on this jury, you will observe
all the instructions which have previously been given you. I shall now give you additional
instructions which you should carefully and strictly follow during your deliberations.
I.
Do not let bias, prejudice or sympathy play any part in your deliberations.
II.
In arriving at your answers, consider only the evidence introduced here under oath and such
exhibits, if any, as have been introduced for your consideration under the rulings of the Court; that
is, what you have seen and heard in this courtroom, together with the law as given you by the Court.
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In your deliberations, you will not consider or discuss anything that is not represented by the
evidence in this case.
HI.
Since every answer that is required by the charge is important, no juror should state or
consider that any required answer is not important.
IV.
You must not decide who you think should win, and then try to answer the questions
accordingly. Simply answer the questions, and do not discuss nor concern yourselves with the effect
of your answers.
V.
You will not decide the answer to a question by lot or by drawing straws, or by any other
method of chance. Do not return a quotient verdict. A quotient verdict means that the jurors agree
to abide by the result to be reached by adding together each juror's figure and dividing by the number
of jurors to get an average. Do not do any trading on your answers; that is, one juror should not
agree to answer a certain question one way if others will agree to answer another question another
way.
VI.
You may render your verdict upon the vote of ten or more members of the jury. The same
ten or more of you must agree upon all of the answers made and to the entire verdict. You will not,
therefore, enter into an agreement to be bound by a majority or any other vote of less than ten jurors.
If the verdict and all of the answers therein are reached by unanimous agreement, the presiding juror
shall sign the verdict for the entire jury. If any juror disagrees as to any answer made by the verdict,
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those jurors who agree to all findings shall each sign the verdict.
VII.
These instructions are given to you because your conduct is subject to review the same as that
of the witnesses, parties, attorneys and the judge. If it should be found that you have disregarded any
of these instructions, it will be jury misconduct and it may require another trial by another jury; then
all of our time will have been wasted.
VIII.
The presiding juror or any other who observes a violation of the Court's instructions shall
immediately warn the one who is violating the same and caution the juror not to do so again.
IX.
When words are used in this charge in a sense which varies from the commonly understood
meaning, you are given a proper legal definition, which you are bound to accept in place of any other
meaning.
X.
Answer by checking "Yes" or "No" to all questions unless otherwise instructed. A "Yes"
answer must be based on a preponderance of the evidence. If you do not find that a preponderance
of the evidence supports a "Yes" answer, then answer "No." If the question directs you to give an
answer other than "Yes" or "No," you must still base your answers on a preponderance of the
evidence with respect to each matter inquired about in the question. Preponderance of the evidence
means the greater weight and degree of credible testimony or evidence introduced before you and
admitted in evidence in this case.
XI.
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After you retire to the jury room, you will select your own presiding juror. The first thing
the presiding juror will do is to have this complete charge read aloud together with the accompanying
instructions and then you will deliberate upon your answers to the questions asked in the verdict
form. It is the duty of the presiding juror to:
(1) Preside during your deliberations.
(2) See that your deliberations are conducted in an orderly manner and in accordance with
the instructions in this charge.
(3) Write out and hand to the bailiff any communications concerning the case that you
desire to have delivered to the Judge.
(4) Conduct voting on each question.
(5) Write your answers to the questions in the spaces provided.
(6) Certify to your verdict in the space provided for the presiding juror's signature, or to
obtain the signatures of all the jurors who agree with the verdict if your verdict is less than
unanimous.
XII.
You should not discuss the case with anyone, not even with other members of the jury, unless
all of you are present and assembled in the jury room. Should anyone attempt to talk to you about
the case before the verdict is returned, whether at the courthouse, or your home, or elsewhere, please
inform the Judge of this fact.
XIII.
When you have answered all the questions you are required to answer under the instructions
of the Judge and your presiding juror has placed your answers in the spaces provided and signed the
verdict as presiding juror or obtained the signatures, you will inform the bailiff at the door of the jury
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room that you have reached a verdict, and then you will return into Court with your verdict.
SIGNED this day of January, 2015.
HONORABLE DAN MIKE BIRD
46'h District Court Judge
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DEFINITIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS
You are instructed that when words are used in the Questions in a sense which varies from
the meaning commonly understood, you will be given in this Charge a proper legal definition which
you are bound to accept in the place of any other definition or meaning. In answering the Questions
you shall give the following terms the following meanings:
1. The term "preponderance of the evidence" means the greater weight of credible
evidence presented in this case. If you do not find that a preponderance of the evidence supports a
"yes" answer, then answer "no." A preponderance of the evidence is not measured by the number
of witnesses or by the number of documents admitted in evidence. For a fact to be proved by a
preponderance of the evidence, you must find that the fact is more likely true than not true. A fact
may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence, or both. A fact is established
by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who saw the act done or
heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when it may be fairly and
reasonably inferred from other facts proved.
2. A fact may be established by direct evidence or by circumstantial evidence or both.
A fact is established by direct evidence when proved by documentary evidence or by witnesses who
saw the act done or heard the words spoken. A fact is established by circumstantial evidence when
it may be fairly and reasonably inferred from other facts proved.
3. "Mikkelsen" means PlaintiffJohn Mikkelsen, acting solely in his capacity as Trustee
of the John Mikkelsen Trust and his agents, attorneys, and representatives acting in the course and
scope of their agency or employment.
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4. "Herring Bancorp" means Herring Bancorp, Inc., and its agents, attorneys, employees,
officers, directors, and representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment.
5. "C.C. Burgess" means C.C. Burgess and his agents, attorneys, and representatives
acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment.
6. "Campbell Burgess" means C. Campbell Burgess and his agents, attorneys, and
representatives acting in the course and scope of their agency or employment.
7. The "Articles of Incorporation" means and refers to the Articles of Incorporation of
Herring (Plaintiff's Exhibit "2").
INSTRUCTION REGARDING BREACH OF ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION
You are instructed that the Court has previously determined, as a matter of law, that
Defendant Herring failed to comply with the Articles of Incorporation of Herring Bancorp when it
purported to involuntarily redeem Mikkelsen's preferred shares in 2006. However, this failure to
comply with the Articles of Incorporation, standing alone, is not sufficient to constitute minority
oppression or breach of fiduciary duty.
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QUESTION NO 1:
What is a reasonable fee for the necessary services of Mikkelsen's attorney in connection
with the failure of Herring Bancorp to comply with the Articles of Incorporation?
In answering this Question, you are to consider the attorney's fees and expenses incurred and
reasonably anticipated to be incurred by Mikkelsen in enforcing his rights in this action and any
appeal thereof. In determining the amount of attorney's fees and expenses, you are to consider the
following:
• the time and labor involved, the novelty and difficulty of the questions involved, and the
skill required to perform the legal services properly;
• the likelihood that the acceptance of the particular employment will preclude other
employment by the lawyer;
• the fee customarily charged in the locality for similar legal services;
• the amount involved and the results obtained;
• the time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances;
• the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client;
• the experience, reputation, and ability of the lawyer or lawyers performing the services;
and
• whether the fee is fixed or contingent on results obtained or uncertainty of collection
before the legal services have been rendered.
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Answer with an amount for each of the following:
a. For preparation in the trial court.
1
ANSWER: /X / rra oo
b. For representation through appeal to the Court of Appeals.
ANSWER: j- ' Ma OV
c. For representation at the petition for review stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.
ANSWER: 4 00, di
d. For representation at the merits briefing stage in the Supreme Court of Texas.
ANSWER: /4./ ave. at,
e. For representation through oral argument and the completion of proceedings in the
Supreme Court of Texas.
ANSWER: /D/oc,e7 ' el)
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QUESTION NO. 2:
Do you find that C. C. Burgess engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsen?
"Oppressive conduct" means burdensome, harsh, or wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the company's affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from
the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely.
It also means unfair treatment of minority shareholders by the directors or those in control
the corporation.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer:
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QUESTION NO. 3:
Do you find that Campbell Burgess engaged in oppressive conduct toward Mikkelsen?
"Oppressive conduct" means burdensome, harsh, or wrongful conduct; a lack of probity and
fair dealing in the company's affairs to the prejudice of some members; or a visible departure from
the standards of fair dealing and a violation of fair play on which each shareholder is entitled to rely.
It also means unfair treatment of minority shareholders by the directors or those in control
of the corporation.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer:
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QUESTION NO. 4:
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
Mikkelsen for his damages, if any, that proximately resulted from such oppressive conduct, if any,
you have found?
Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The lost dividend
income on Mikkelsen's preferred shares from November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015.
Answer in dollars and cents.
Answer: $ 3, 3/e( ffo
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QUESTION NO. 5:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 2.
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from
malice?
"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm
belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
"Malice" means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to
Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer: X0
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QUESTION NO. 6:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 3.
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from
malice?
"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm
belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
"Malice" means a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm
to Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
4 115'tlfra n) C1
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QUESTION NO. 7:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 5.
You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against C.C. Burgess and
awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question
2?
"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty
or by way of punishment.
Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are—
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of C.C. Burgess.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
f. The net worth of C.C. Burgess.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer: $
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QUESTION NO. 8:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 6. You
must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against Campbell Burgess and
awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question 3?
"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty or
by way of punishment.
Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are—
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of Campbell Burgess.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
f. The net worth of Campbell Burgess.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer: $
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JURY QUESTION NO. 9:
Do you find that C. C. Burgess used his personal control of Herring Bancshares to breach
fiduciary duties owed to Mikkelsen?
In connection with the foregoing question, you are instructed that a majority shareholder of
a corporation owes fiduciary duties to a minority shareholder and to show compliance with those
duties must show he acted fairly and equitably, in the utmost good faith with the most scrupulous
honesty, fully and fairly disclosing all important information to a minority shareholder such as
Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer:
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OUESTION NO. 10:
Do you find that Campbell Burgess used his personal control of Herring Bancshares to breach
fiduciary duties owed to Mikkelsen?
In connection with the foregoing question, you are instructed that a majority shareholder of
a corporation owes fiduciary duties to a minority shareholder and to show compliance with those
duties must show he acted fairly and equitably, in the utmost good faith with the most scrupulous
honesty, fully and fairly disclosing all important information to a minority shareholder such as
Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer: /VA
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OUESTION NO. 11:
5WW,
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
Mikkelsen for his damages, if any, that proximately resulted from such breaches of fiduciary duties,
if any you have found?
Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The lost dividend
income on Mikkelsen's preferred shares from November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015.
Answer in dollars and cents.
Answer: $ 0. 00
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OUESTION NO. 12:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. Ht.
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from
malice?
"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm
belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
"Malice" means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to
Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer: N6
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OUESTION NO. 13:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 10.
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from
malice?
"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm
belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
"Malice" means a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm
to Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer:
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QUESTION NO. 14:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 12.
You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against C. C. Burgess and
awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question
9?
"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty
or by way of punishment.
Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are—
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of C. C. Burgess.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
f. The net worth of C. C. Burgess.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer: $
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QUESTION NO. 15:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 13.
You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against Campbell Burgess
and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to
Question 10?
"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty
or by way of punishment.
Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are—
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of Campbell Burgess.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
f. The net worth of Campbell Burgess.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer: $
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OUESTION NO. 16:
Answer the following Question only if you have answered "yes" to Questions 2 or 9.
Was C. C. Burgess part of a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Mikkelsen of his preferred
shares in Herring Bancorp?
To be part of a conspiracy, C. C. Burgess and another person or persons must have had
knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common objective or course of action that resulted in
damages to Mikkelsen. One or more persons involved in the conspiracy must have performed some
act or acts to further the conspiracy.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer: ifiel
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OUESTION NO. 17:
Answer the following Question only if you had answered "yes" to Questions 3 or 10.
Was Campbell Burgess part of a conspiracy to wrongfully deprive Mikkelsen of his
preferred shares in Herring Bancorp?
To be part of a conspiracy, Campbell Burgess and another person or persons must have had
knowledge of, agreed to, and intended a common objective or course of action that resulted in
damages to Mikkelsen. One or more persons involved in the conspiracy must have performed some
act or acts to further the conspiracy.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer: A
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QUESTION NO. 18:
What sum of money, if any, if paid now in cash, would fairly and reasonably compensate
Mikkelsen for his damages, if any, that were proximately caused by such conspiracy?
Consider the following elements of damages, if any, and none other: The lost dividend
income on Mikkelsen's preferred shares from November 21, 2006 until January 26, 2015.
Answer in dollars and cents.
Answer: $
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OUESTION NO. 19:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 16.
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote often or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from
malice?
"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm
belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
"Malice" means a specific intent by C.C. Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm to
Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer:
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QUESTION NO. 20:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 17.
Otherwise, do not answer the following question.
To answer "Yes" to the following question, your answer must be unanimous. You may
answer "No" to the following question only upon a vote of ten or more jurors. Otherwise, you must
not answer the following question.
Do you find by clear and convincing evidence that the harm to Mikkelsen resulted from
malice?
"Clear and convincing evidence" means the measure or degree of proof that produces a firm
belief or conviction of the truth of the allegations sought to be established.
"Malice" means a specific intent by Campbell Burgess to cause substantial injury or harm
to Mikkelsen.
Answer "yes" or "no."
Answer:
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QUESTION NO. 21:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 19.
You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against C. C. Burgess and
awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to Question
16?
"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty
or by way of punishment.
Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are—
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of C. C. Burgess.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
f. The net worth of C. C. Burgess.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer: $
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QUESTION NO. 22:
Answer the following question only if you unanimously answered "yes" to Question No. 20.
You must unanimously agree on the amount of any award of exemplary damages.
What sum of money, if any, paid now in cash, should be assessed against Campbell Burgess
and awarded to Mikkelsen as exemplary damages, if any, for the conduct found in response to
Question 17?
"Exemplary damages" means an amount that you may in your discretion award as a penalty
or by way of punishment.
Factors to be considered in awarding exemplary damages, if any, are—
a. The nature of the wrong.
b. The character of the conduct involved.
c. The degree of culpability of Campbell Burgess.
d. The situation and sensibilities of the parties concerned.
e. The extent to which such conduct offends a public sense of justice and propriety.
f. The net worth of Campbell Burgess.
Answer in dollars and cents, if any.
Answer: $
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EXHIBIT 3
409409409409409
08/19/ 2 015 13:19 8178774781 POPE HARDWICKE PAGE 02/03
FILED
The \ C1 day of Ct.L.A_c , 20 15
At I 55 o'clock p _NA: o'clock
Brenda Peterson
,lerk Dist. Court Wilbarger Co.
CAUSE NO. 24,955 By
Deputy
JOHN M1KKELSEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT
acting solely in his capacity as Trustee
of the John Mikkelsen Trust,
Plaintiff,
V. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS
HERRING BANCORP, INC.;
C.C. BURGESS; and
C. CAMPBELL BURGESS,
Defendants. 46TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
DRDER DENYING MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL FOR REMITTUR
AND TO MODIFY, CORRECT AND/OR REFORM THE JUDGMENT
CAME ON FOR HEARING on August 19, 2015 the Motion of Defendant/Counter-
Plaintiffs Herring Bancorp, Inc., C. C. Burgess and C. Campbell Burgess for a New Trial, for
Remittur, and to Modify, Correct and/or Reform the Judgment. The Court, having considered
the Motion and the arguments of counsel, finds that the Motion should be DENIED.
it is so ORDERED.
SIGNED on the /? day of , 2015.
Dan Mike Bird, Judge Presiding
Mikitc15 »=wings \ Order Denying Tzial,Doc
ORDER PAGE 1
409
410410410410410
FILED
The 1 ci day of auk.% 20 15-
At I". 5 5 o'clock_p M: o'clock
Brenda Peterson
CAUSE NO. 24,955 Jerk Dist. Court Wilbarger Co.
By
JOHN MIKKELSEN, IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF
acting solely in his capacity as Trustee
of the John Mikkelsen Trust,
Plaintiff,
v. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS
HERRING BANCORP, INC.;
C.C. BURGESS; and
C. CAMPBELL BURGESS,
Defendants. 46th JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR
JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND ADDITIONAL MOTION
FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT
Came on for consideration Herring Bancorp, Inc., C.C. Burgess, and C. Campbell
Burgess's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and Additional Motion for
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict (the "Motions"). The Court, having reviewed and
considered the Motions, any related responses, and the arguments of counsel, is of the opinion
that the Motions should be DENIED.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the
Verdict is hereby DENIED.
IT IS THEREFORE FURTHER ORDERED that the Additional Motion for Judgment
Notwithstanding the Verdict is hereby DENIED.
SIGNED this, the 1i day of
HON. DAN MIKE BIRD, DISTRICT JUDGE
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANTS/COUNTER-PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE
VERDICT AND ADDITIONAL MOTION FOR JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT--PAGE 1
410
EXHIBIT 4
306306 FILE
The Lday ot OAA-1,
At ul b O'CIOCKILM: O'CiOCK
Brenda Peterson
k Dist.Cov4 ilibarget Co.
. CAUSE NO. 24,955
De-
JOHN MIKKELSEN, • IN THE DISTRICT COURT
acting solely in his capacity as Trustee
of the John Mikkelsen Trust,
Plaintiff,
v. WILBARGER COUNTY, TEXAS
HERRING BANCORP, INC.;
C.C. BURGESS; and
C. CAMPBELL BURGESS,
Defendants. 46TH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
ORDER
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment ("Plaintiff's Motion") and Defendants'
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment ("Defendants' Motion") came on for hearing on April 18,
2011. The Court finds Plaintiffs Motion was timely filed and that notice of Plaintiff's Motion
and the hearing thereon was duly and properly given. The Court also finds that Defendants'
Motion Was timely filed and served by agreement of the parties, and hereby grants leave to file
and serve the Motion on less than 21-days' notice prior to the hearing. The Court also finds that
Plaintiffs Response to Defendants' Motion was timely filed and served by agreement of the
parties, and hereby grants Plaintiff leave to file and serve the Response and the evidence attached
thereto, including discovery products, within seven days of the hearing. After considering
Plaintiff's Motion and the Response thereto, and after considering Defendants' Motion and the
Response thereto, and after considering the admissible summary judgment evidence and the
arguments of counsel, the Court finds that Plaintiff's Motion should be granted and Defendants'
Motion should be denied.
ORDER PAGE 1
306
307307
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Defendants' Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment
is denied in its entirety.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Defendants' Special Exceptions and Plea in Abatement
are overruled and denied.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment is
granted in all respects.
The Court further finds as a matter of law that (1) the purported redemption of Plaintiff's
300 shares of preferred stock of Herring Bancorp, Inc. (the "Company") was undertaken in
violation of the Company's Articles of Incorporation and is void and (2) that Plaintiff is, and
continues to be, the holder of 300 shares of the Company's preferred stock, and has all the rights
appurtenant thereto, including the right to inspec the Company's books and records.
SIGNED on the day of , 2011.
udge residing
Approved as to form:
Lee F. Christie, Counsel for Plaintiff
James W. Bowen, Counsel for Defendants
ORDER PAGE 2
307
EXHIBIT 5
ILED
• sr 1 • Or the
Arrexas
ARTICLES OF INCORPORATION DEC 9 1983
OF
HERRING BANCORP, INC. Clerk E
Corporations Section
I, the undersigned natural person of the age of eighteen (18) years or more,
acting as an incorporator of a corporation (hereinafter called the "Corporation")
under the Texas Business Corporation Act, do hereby adopt the following
Articles of Incorporation for the Corporation:
ARTICLE ONE: NAME
The name of the Corporation is Herring Bancorp, Inc.
ARTICLE TWO: DURATION
The Corporation's period of duration is perpetuaL
ARTICLE THREE: PURPOSE
The purpose or purposes for which the Corporation is organized are:
(a) To act as a bank holding company;
(b) To transact any and all lawful business for which corporations may
be incorporated under the Texas Business Corporation Act;
(c) To do each and every thing necessary, suitable, or proper for the
accomplishment of any of the purposes or for the attainment of
any one or more of the objects herein enumerated or which at any
time appear conducive to or expedient for the protection or benefit
of the Corporation.
The foregoing clauses shall be construed as powers as well as objects and
purposes, and the matter expressed in each clause shall, unless herein otherWise
expressly provided, be in nowise limited by reference to or inference from the
terms of any other clause, but shall be regarded as independent objects, purposes
and powers, and shall not be construed to limit or restrict in any manner the
meaning of the general terms or the general powers of the Corporation.
ARTICLE FOUR: STOCK
The Corporation is authorized to issue two classes of shares to be
designated respectively "preferred" and "common." The total number of shares
which the Corporation is authorized to issue is 125,000 shares. The number of
HERR 000075
preferred shares authorized is 25,000 shares, and the par value of each such
share is $95.00. The number of common shares authorized is 100,000 shares, and
the par value of each such share is $20.00.
(a) The holders of the preferred shares shall be entitled to receive
dividends, out of any funds legally available therefor, at the rate of
ten percent (10.0%) per annum of the par value thereof, and no
more, payable in cash semi-annually, or at such intervals as the
Board of Directors may from time to time determine. Such
dividends shall accrue from the date of issuance of the respective
preferred shares and shall be deemed to accrue from day to day
whether or not earned or declared.
Such dividends shall be payable before any dividends shall be paid,
declared, or set apart for the common shares, and shall be
cumulative so that if for any dividend period such dividends on the
outstanding preferred shares at the rate of ten percent (10.0%) per
annum of the par value thereof are not paid or declared and set
apart therefor, the deficiency shall be fully paid or declared and
set apart for payment, without interest, before any distribution, by
dividend or otherwise, shall be paid on, declared, or set apart for
the common shares.
(b) On any voluntary or involuntary liquidation of the Corporation, the
holders of the preferred shares shall receive an amount equal to
the par value of such shares plus any dividends declared and unpaid
thereon, and no more, before any amount shall be paid to the
holders of the common shares. If the assets of the Corporation
should be insufficient to permit payment to the preferred share-
holders of their full preferential amounts as herein provided, then
such assets shall be distributed ratably among the outstanding
preferred shares. Subject to such preferential rights, the holders
of the common shares shall receive, ratably, all remaining assets of
the Corporation. A consolidation or merger of the Corporation
with or into any other corporation or a sale of all or substantially
all of the assets of the Corporation shall not be deemed a
liquidation, dissolution, or winding up of the Corporation within the
meaning of this paragraph.
(c) The Corporation, at the option of the Board of Directors, may at
any time redeem the whole, or from time to time redeem any part,
of the preferred shares outstanding by paying in cash therefor the
sum of $95.00 per share, plus all dividends declared but unpaid
thereon as provided in this Article Four to and including the date
of redemption, hereinafter referred to as the "redemptive price,"
and by giving to each preferred shareholder of record at his last
known address, as shown on the records of the Corporation, at least
twenty (20), but not more than fifty (50), days' prior notice
personally or in writing, by mail, postage prepaid, stating the class
or series or part of the class or series of shares to be redeemed and
2
HERR 000076
the date and plan of redemption, the redemptive price, and the
place where the shareholders may obtain payment of the redemp-
tive price on surrender of their respective share certificates,
hereinafter called the "redemption notice." Should only a part of
the outstanding preferred shares be redeemed, such redemption
shall be effected by lot, or pro rata, as prescribed by the Board of
Directors. On or after the date fixed for redemption, each holder
of shares called for redemption shall surrender his certificate for
such shares to the Corporation at the place designated in the
redemption notice and shall thereupon be entitled to receive
payment of the redemptive price. Should less than all the shares
represented by any surrendered certificate be redeemed, a new
certificate for the unredeemed shares shall be issued. If the
redemption notice is duly given and if sufficient funds are available
therefor on the date fixed for redemption, then, whether or not the
certificates evidencing the shares to be redeemed are surrendered,
all rights with respect to such shares shall terminate on the date
fixed for redemption, except for the right of the holders to receive
the redemption price, without interest, on surrender of their
certificate therefor.
(d) If, on or prior to any date fixed for redemption of preferred shares
as herein provided, the Corporation deposits with any bank or trust
company in Texas, or any bank or trust company in the United
States duly appointing and acting as transfer agent for the Cor-
poration, as a trust fund, a sum sufficient to redeem, on the date
fixed for redemption thereof, the shares called for redemption,
with irrevocable instructions and authority to the bank or trust
company to publish the notice of redemption thereof, or to
complete such publication if theretofore commenced, and to pay,
on and after the date fixed for redemption or prior thereto, the
redemptive price of the shares to their respective holders on
surrender of their share certificates, then from and after the date
of the deposit, even though such date may be prior to the date
fixed for redemption, the shares so called shall be deemed to be
redeemed and dividends on those shares shall cease to accrue after
the date fixed for redemption. The deposit shall be deemed to
constitute full payment of the shares to their holders and from and
after the date of the deposit, the shares shall be deemed to be no
longer outstanding, and the holders thereof shall cease to be
shareholders with respect to such shares and shall have no rights
with respect thereto, except the right to receive from the bank or
trust company payment of the redemptive price of the shares,
without interest, on surrender of their certificates therefor.
(e) Shares redeemed by the Corporation shall be restored to the status
of authorized but unissued shares of the Corporation.
(f) Except where otherwise provided in these Articles of Incorporation
or by law, the holders of the common shares shall have the
3
HERR 000077
exclusive voting rights and powers, including the exclusive right to
notice of shareholders' meetings.
ARTICLE FIVE: PREEMPTIVE RIGHTS DENIED
No holder of any shares of common stock or preferred stock shall have
any preemptive or preferential right to receive, purchase, or subscribe to (a) any
unissued or treasury shares of any class of stock (whether now or hereafter
authorized) of the Corporation, (b) any obligations, evidences of indebtedness, or
other securities of the Corporation convertible into or exchangeable for, or
carrying or accompanied by any rights to receive, purchase, or subscribe to, any
such unissued or treasury shares, (c) any right of subscription to or right to
receive, or any warrant or option for the purchase of, any of the foregoing
securities, or (d) any other securities that may be issued or sold by the
Corporation.
ARTICLE SIX: COMMENCING BUSINESS
The Corporation will not commence business until it has received con-
sideration for the issuance of its shares amounting to One Thousand Dollars
($1,000.00) in value and consisting of money, labor done, or property actually
received.
ARTICLE SEVEN: CUMULATIVE VOTING
Cumulative voting for the election of directors is prohibited.
ARTICLE EIGHT: VOTING
Except where otherwise provided in these Articles of Incorporation or the
bylaws of the Corporation, the holders of the common stock shall have the
exclusive voting rights and powers, including the exclusive right to notice of
shareholders' meetings.
ARTICLE NINE: ADOPTION OF BYLAWS
The Board of Directors of the Corporation shall adopt the initial bylaws of
the Corporation and may thereafter alter, amend, or repeal the bylaws of the
Corporation or may adopt new bylaws, subject to the shareholders' concurrent
right to alter, amend, or repeal the bylaws or to adopt new bylaws. The
shareholders may provide that any or all bylaws altered, amended, repealed, or
adopted by the shareholders shall not be altered, amended, reenacted, or
repealed by the Board of Directors of the Corporation.
4
HERR 000078
ARTICLE TEN: INTERESTED PARTIES
A contract or transaction between the Corporation and any other Person
(as used herein the term "Person" means an individual, firm, trust, partnership,
joint venture, association, corporation, political subdivision or instrumentality,
or other entity) shall not be affected or invalidated by the fact that (a) any
director, officer, or security holder of the Corporation is also a party to, or has a
direct or indirect interest in, such contract or transaction; or (b) any director,
officer, or security holder of the Corporation is in any way connected with such
other Person or with any of its officers or directors.
Every person who may become a director of the Corporation is hereby
relieved from any liability that might otherwise exist from contracting with the
Corporation for the benefit of himself or of any Person in which he has any
interest, whether or not the interested director's presence at a meeting or his
vote or votes were necessary to obligate the Corporation in such transaction, if
such interest shall have been disclosed to, or known to, the Corporation's
directors or shareholders who shall have approved such transaction.
ARTICLE ELEVEN: INDEMNIFICATION
Section A. The Corporation shall indemnify any person who was or is a
party or is threatened with being made a party to any threatened, pending, or
completed action, suit, or proceeding, whether civil, criminal, administrative, or
investigative (all such actions, suits, and proceedings and accompanying modi-
fiers being comprehended by the term "Proceeding") (excluding actions by, or in
the right of, the Corporation), by reason of the fact that he is or was a director
or officer of the Corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the
Corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of another Person. Such
indemnification may be made only against those expenses (including attorneys'
fees), judgments, fines, and amounts paid in settlement actually and reasonably
incurred by such person in connection with such Proceeding if (i) he is successful
on the merits or otherwise; or (ii) he acted in the transaction which is the subject
of the Proceeding in good faith and in a manner he reasonably believed to be in
or not opposed to the best interest of the Corporation, and, with respect to any
criminal Proceeding, he had no reasonable cause to believe his conduct was
unlawful. The termination of any Proceeding by judgment, order, settlement,
conviction, or upon a plea of nolo contendere or its equivalent, shall not, of
itself, create a presumption that the person did not act in good faith and in a
manner which he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest
of the Corporation, nor, with respect to any criminal Proceeding, that he had
reasonable cause to believe that his conduct was unlawful.
Section B. The Corporation shall indemnify any person who was or is a
party or is threatened with being made a party to a Proceeding by or in the right
of the Corporation by reason of the fact that he is or was a director or officer of
the Corporation, or is or was serving at the request of the Corporation as a
director, officer, employee, or agent of another Person. Such indemnification
may be made against expenses (including attorneys' fees) actually and reasonably
5
HERR 000079
incurred by such person in connection with the defense or settlement of such
Proceeding if (1) he is successful on the merits or otherwise; or (ii) he acted in
the transaction which is the subject of the Proceeding in good faith and in a
manner he reasonably believed to be in or not opposed to the best interest of the
Corporation. However, no indemnification may be made in respect of any claim,
issue, or matter in relation to which such person shall have been adjudged to be
liable for negligence or misconduct in the performance of his duty to the
Corporation. Notwithstanding the foregoing exception, indemnification may be
made to the extent that the court in which such Proceeding was brought shall
determine upon application that, despite the adjudication of liability but in view
of all the circumstances of the case, such person is fairly and reasonably entitled
to indemnification for such expenses as the court of appropriate jurisdiction shall
deem proper.
Section C. Any indemnification under Section A or Section B of this
Article (other than one ordered by a court) may be made by the Corporation only
upon a determination that indemnification of such person is proper in the
circumstances because he has met the applicable standard of conduct set forth in
such Section. Such determination shall be made by the Board of Directors by a
majority vote of a quorum consisting of directors who were not parties to such
Proceeding; or, if such a quorum is not obtainable (or, even if obtainable, if a
quorum of disinterested directors so directs), by independent legal counsel in a
written opinion, or by the shareholders of the Corporation; or through such
procedures as shall be authorized in the bylaws of the Corporation.
Section D. Expenses incurred in defending a civil or criminal Proceeding
may be paid by the Corporation in advance of the final disposition of such
Proceeding as authorized by the Board of Directors or other appropriate body or
party in the manner provided in Section C of this Article only when the
Corporation has received an undertaking by or on behalf of the person who is to
receive such payment to repay such amount unless it shall ultimately be
determined that he is entitled to be indemnified by the Corporation as
authorized in this Article.
Section E. In determining whether the standard of conduct set forth in
Section A or Section B has been met, it may be determined that a person has met
the standard as to some matters but not as to others, and the amount of
indemnification may be accordingly prorated.
Section F. The indemnification provided by Sections A through E shall not
be exclusive of any other rights to which a person may be entitled by law, bylaw,
agreement, vote of shareholders, or otherwise.
Section G. The indemnification provided by Sections A through E shall
inure to the heirs, executors, and administrators of any person entitled to
indemnification under this Article.
Section H. The Corporation may purchase and maintain insurance on any
person who is or was a director or officer of the Corporation or is or was serving
at the request of the Corporation as a director, officer, employee, or agent of
6
HERR 000080
another Person against any liability incurred by him in any such position, or
arising out of his status as such, whether or not the Corporation would have the
power to indemnify him against such liability under Sections A through E.
ARTICLE TWELVE: REPURCHASE OF STOCK
The Corporation is authorized to purchase, directly or indirectly, its own
shares to the extent of the aggregate of the unrestricted capital surplus and
unrestricted reduction surplus available therefor, without submitting such pur-
chase to a vote of the shareholders of the Corporation.
ARTICLE THIRTEEN: AUTHORITY TO BORROW
The Board of Directors is expressly authorized, without the consent of the
stockholders, except so far as such consent is herein or by law provided, to issue
and sell or otherwise dispose of, for any purpose, the Corporation's bonds,
debentures, notes or other securities or obligations, upon such terms and for such
consideration as the Board of Directors shall deem advisable and to authorize
and cause to be executed mortgages, pledges, charges and liens upon all or part
of the real and personal property rights, interest and franchise of the Corpor-
ation, including contract rights, whether at the time owned or thereafter
acquired.
ARTICLE FOURTEEN: INITIAL OFFICE AND AGENT
The address of the initial registered office of the Corporation is 1900
Pease Street, Vernon, Texas, and the name of its initial registered agent at such
address is H. W. Dozier.
ARTICLE FIFTEEN: INITIAL DIRECTORS
The number of directors constituting the initial Board of Directors of the
Corporation is five and the names and addresses of the persons who are to
serve as directors until the first annual meeting of shareholders, or until their
respective successors are elected and qualified, are:
NAME ADDRESS
Robert B clew 2603 Mansard Street
Vernon, Texas 76384
Cow. C. Burgess Suite 1000
Amarillo National Bank Bldg.
Amarillo, Texas 79101
H, W. Dozier 1102 Hillcrest Drive
Vernon, Texas 76384
7
HERR 000081
NAME ADDRESS
Curtis D. Johnson 2230 Hilltop
Vernon, Texas 76384
John Mikkelsen 2801 Gordon Street
Vernon, Texas 76384
ARTICLE SIXTEEN: INCORPORATOR
The name and address of the incorporator is:
NAME ADDRESS
Tonia T. Kittelson 4700 InterFirst Two
Dallas, Texas 75270
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have executed this document as of the /4 tL
day of aete,...bet- , 1983.
\77
Tonia T. Kittelson
STATE OF TEXAS
COUNTY OF DALLAS S
I. ..ler)cxy , a Notary Public, hereby certify that on
this n day `tot C eir 1983, personally appeared before me
Tonia T. Kittelson, who, being first duly sworn by me, declared that he is the
person who signed the foregoing document as incorporator and that the
statements contained therein are true.
AWAY K GOEBtL, Notary Public
in and for the State of Texas
My commission expires Feb 19, 1986 Nota Pub is id nd fod exas
8
HERR 000082
EXHIBIT 6
UZ/UVUY VYLA
HE C. C. Burgess
kmaiumem4fe*A.d
Notice of Redemption
2201 Crpic Circle, Salsa 1001
Amarillo, IX 79109 October 31, 2006
for 9900
Amarillo, TX 791054900
Dear Preferred Stock. Shareholder:
(809 375-3921 Phone
(8019 3724230 Fax This letter is to notify you that the board of directors (the "Board')
cebargees@kerringbantcom of Herring Bancorp, Inc_ (the "Coneeleeny") has called for the retiene0oe
(the "Redemption") of your outstanding shares of Preferred Stock (the
"Preferred Stock") of the Company on November 20, 2006.
Ae you know on July 26, 2006, our Board approved taking the
necessary acts for the Company to become an "S corporgon" under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended. In order to become eligible
to reeve the Subchapter S election, the Company is. 9nly allowed to have
one class of outstanding capital stock, and voting rights between shares of
stork are disregarded for determining whet & a company has more than
one bass of stock. At the current time, the Company has a number of
outstanding classes of stock, which include your Preferred Stock shares, as
well as Class A Nonvoting Common. Stock, Class A-Series 2 Nonvoting
Common Stock, and Class B Nonvoting Common Stook (collectively, the
"Nonvoting Shares"). Therefore, we must currently consolidate our
Nonvoting Shares into one class_ The Class A Nonvoting Common Stock
and the Class B Nonvoting Common Stock will be allowed to exchange
their shares for Common Stoek-Sefies A, and the Class A-Series 2
Nonvoting Common Stock will be converted into a subordinated
debetnere, As a result of this process, the Board appointed a committee to
recommend the criteria for determining which Preferred Stock
shareholders would be offered to exchenge their shares for the Company's
common stock (the "Common Stock"), the nonvoting Common Stock-
Series A (the "Common Stook-Series A") or to have their s_res
redeemed. The Board's criteria for making this determination iriehlde4
whether the Preferred Stock shareholder heti a bererie5 relationship with
Herring Bank (the "Bank"), and whether they would own at least 50
shares of Common Stock won the wnversion. If these criteria were met,
the Board offered the Preferred Stock shareholders the option to exchange
their shares for the Common Stock If the Prefened Stock shareholder did
not meet these criteria, the Board determined the Preferred Stock
shareholders would be redeemed_ Additionally, if the Preferred Stock
shareholder did not have a banking relationship with the Bank, we would
offer them the option of either e:cchanging their shares for the nonvoting
Common Stock-Series A or having their shares redeemed. From our
Defendants' 111.1.1111111111111Eni
exeme
M 0003
02/01/07 13:55 FAL
conversations with you Mid the Board's determinations regarding our
classes of seock, your Preferred Stock will be redeemed.
The Redemption will take plate after 5:00 pm on November 20,
2006 (the "Redemption Date"). The price to be paid for each share of
Preferred Stock will be $95.00 per share, plus an amount equal to all
dividends accrued and unpaid thereon, whether or not declared, pro rata to
the date fixed for the redemption (the "Redemptive Price"). As a result of
the Redemption, the Company will pay you $95,00, in cash, for the shares
of Preferred Stock you hold that will be redeemed..
Prior to or at the open of beefiness after 5:00 p.m. on November 20,
2006, the Company will deposit with Herring Bank, Amarillo, Texas
(hereinafter the "Transfer Agent"), as a trust fund, an amount necessary to
pay the aggregate Redemptive Price, together with hievocable instructions
and authority to the Transfer Agent to pay, on or after the Redemption
Date, the Redemptive Price to the holders of the Preferred Stock upon the
Transfer Agent's receipt of the duly surrendered certificates representing
their Preferred Stock. As a result of the ComiAny's deposit of funds with
the Transfer Agent, you will cease to be a holder of shares of Preferred
Stock as of the Redemption Date and will only be entitled to the receipt of
the Redemptive Price.
In order to receive the Redemptive Price, you should deliver to the
Transfer Agent the following: (1) a duly executed Letter of Transmittal, a
copy of which is enclosed herewith, and (ii) the stock certificate(s)
representing your shares of Preferred Stock. The address of the Transfer
Agent is Herring Bank, P.O. Box 9900, Amarillo, Texas 79105. The
telephone number of the Transfer Agent is (806) 355-0153.
Please follow carefully the instructions to the Letter of Transmittal
when compleeing it Assuming the Transfer Agent receives the applicable
doeriments from you prior to The Redemption Date (and assuming there is
no problem with these documents), the Transfer Agent will hold. them in
escrow for you until the Redemption Date, at which time you will receive
payment for your shares. The Company will pay the Redemptive Price by
check of same day funds. Please refer to the Letter of Transmittal
provided herewith for further instructions on how to surrender certificates
and receive delivery of the Redemptive Price.
You may obtain additionnl copies of the Letter of Transmittal from
the Company. Also, if any of your Preferred Stock certificates have been
lost, stolen or misplaced, or if any of your shares are pledged or
membered, you will need to make additional arrangements in order to
receive the Redemptive Price for your shares_ Please contact the Transfer
Agent for thriller details.
MIK 0004
02/01/U7 13;55 YAA
Preferred Stock Shareholder
October 31, 2006
Page 3
Assuming that the Transfer Agent has received these documents from you
on or before 5:00 p.m. on November 20, 2006 (and that there are no problems
with your documents), you will be able to receive payment for your shares on the
Redemption Date. You may pick up your check on the Redemption Date at
Herring Bank, 2201 Civic Circle, Amarillo, Texas during regular business hours.
If you will not be available to pick up your check in person at That time, please
contact the Transfer Agent so that you can arrange an alternate method of delivery
of the Redemptive Price for your Preferred Stock. If you do not pick up your
check on the Redemption Date or contact the Transfer Agent to make other
arrangements, the Transfer Agent will mail your check to you at the close of
business on the Redemption Date. If your documents are not in order so that your
check is not available on the Redemption Date.. your check will be mailed to you
as soon as possible after your documents are received and approved.
Please remember that the Redemption of your Preferred Stock may be a
taxable transaction for federal income tax purposes. There also may be state,
local or foreign income or other tax consequences to the Redemption. You should
consult your own tax advisor to determine the precise tax consequences of this
transaction.
If you should lave any questions in connection with any aspect of this
letter, please feel free to call C.C. Burgess at (806) 373-3921.
Very truly yours,
ITERRING BANCORP, INC.
C.C. Burgess
Chairman of the Board
MIK 0005
EXHIBIT 7
11.., UU 000000 /.!,.n I.Y":".-nY.5-1)1.34.3-1 &ULM 177.7 .1.61
200729 061750 79109 IRS USBONLY 751922006 S13 0
Depai truant of the Treasury For assistance„ call'
luteruut Revenue Service 1-800-829-0115
P.O. BOX 249
st
MEMPHIS, Th36'01-0249
Notice Number: CP261
Date: July 30, 2007
Taxpayer Identification Number:
75-1922(106
051810.406213,0215.005 1 AB 0.341 530
Tax Form:
Tax Pella!:
HERRING BANCORP INC
2201 CIVIC CIR
AMARILLO TX 79109-1817016
051000
Notice of Acceptance as an S Corporation
We have accepted your election to be treated as an S corporation beginning January 1, 2007. Your
accounting period will end in December.
We would also like to take this opportunity to infonn you of your tax obligations related to the payment of
compensation to shareholder-employees of S corporations
When a shareholder-employee of an S corporation provides services to the S corporation, reasonable
compensation generally needs to be paid, This compensation is subject to employment taxes.
Tax practitioners and subchapter S shareholders need to be aware that Revenue Ruling 74-44 states that
the Internal Revenue Service (as) will re-characterize small business corporation dividends paid to
shareholders as salary when such dividends are paid to the shareholders in lieu of reasonable
compensation for services
The IRS may also re-characterize distributions other than dividend distributions as salary. This position
has been supported in several recent court decisions
If you have any questions about this notice or the action we have taken, please call us at the telephone
number listed above. If you prefer, you. may write to us at the address shown at the top of this notice. If
you write to us, please provide your telephone number and the most convenient time for us to call so we
—can resolve y011linqUify.-PieaSe fel WM the Luit,;m-irant of this notice to help us identify your case.
For tax forms, instructions and information visit www,irs,gov. (Access to this site will not provide you
with your specific taxpayer account information.)
Defendants'
Exhibit DEPOSITION
31
IL% amommiL,
t.t)2389
, au+ IV u.: 113.A.,0
TIN: XX-XXXXXXX Form: Tax Period:
0519 SO
of CUT HERE
_ _ Return this vat!cher with your payment or con-espandence. C3 Correspondence enclosed:
• • Write your Taxpayer Identification
Your Telephone Number. Best Time to Coll: Number, tax period and tax form number
( AM PM on your inquiry or correspondence
SS 200729 29953-593-01343-7
• 261 Internal Revenue Service
P.O. BOX 249
. MEMPHIS, TN 38101z-0249 HERRING BANCORP INC
2201 CIVIC CIR
t 111111118111111111111 1(1 111 .1111,1111 AMARILLO TX 79109-1817016
751922006 IL HERR 00 2 000000
HERR 002390
EXHIBIT 8
HERRING i ANCORA INC. C. C. Burgess
Chairman of the Board
October 30, 2013
Notice of Redemption
John Mikkelsen and John Mikkelsen Trust Via Overnight Mail
c/o Lee Christie
POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, LLP
306 West 7th Street, Suite 901
Fort Worth, TX 76102
Dear Preferred Stock Shareholder:
This letter is to notify you that the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Herring Bancorp,
Inc. (the "Company") has called for the redemption (the "Redemption") of all shares of Preferred
Stock (the "Preferred Stock") of the Company on November 22, 2013.
The Redemption will take place after 3:00 p.m. on November 22, 2013 (the "Redemption
Date"). The price to be paid for each share of Preferred Stock will be $95.00 per share, plus an
amount equal to all dividends accrued and unpaid thereon, whether or not declared, pro rata to
the date fixed for the redemption (the "Redemptive Price"). As a result of the Redemption, the
Company will pay you $95.00, in cash, for the shares of Preferred Stock you hold that will be
redeemed.
Please remember that the Redemption of your Preferred Stock may be a taxable
transaction for federal income tax purposes. There also may be state, local or foreign income or
other tax consequences to the Redemption. You should consult your own tax advisor to
determine the precise tax consequences of this transaction.
If you should have any questions in connection with any aspect of this letter, please feel
free to call C.C. Burgess at (806) 373-3921.
Very truly yours,
HERRING BANCORP, INC.
C.C. Burgess
Chairman of the Board
2201 Civic Circle. Suite 1001, Amarillo, TX 79109
RO. Box 9900, Amarillo, TX 79105-5900
(806) 373 3921 Phone (806) 372.8230 Far
erburgess@herringbank.com
HERRING BANCO►RP, INC. C. C. Burgess
Chairman of the Board
October 30, 2013
Notice of Redemption
Mallory Mikkelsen Via Overnight Mail
do Lee Christie
POPE, HARDWICKE, CHRISTIE, SCHELL, KELLY & RAY, LLP
306 V►%est 7th Street, Suite 901
Fort Worth, TX 76102
Mallory Mikkelsen Via Overnight Mail
3912 Winter Park Road
Addison, Texas 75001
Dear Preferred Stock Shareholder:
This letter is to notify you that the Board of Directors (the "Board") of Herring Bancorp,
Inc. (the "Company") has called for the redemption (the "Redemption") of all shares of Preferred
Stock (the "Preferred Stock") of the Company on November 22, 2013.
The Redemption will take place after 3:00 p.m. on November 22, 2013 (the "Redemption
Date"). The price to be paid for each share of Preferred Stock will be $95.00 per share, plus an
amount equal to all dividends accrued and unpaid thereon, whether or not declared, pro rata to the
date fixed for the redemption (the "Redemptive Price"). As a result of the Redemption, the
Company will pay you $95.00, in cash, for the shares of Preferred Stock you hold that will be
redeemed.
Please remember that the Redemption of your Preferred Stock may be a taxable transaction
for federal income tax purposes. There also may be state, local or foreign income or other tax
consequences to the Redemption. You should consult your own tax advisor to determine the
precise tax consequences of this transaction.
If you should have any questions in connection with any aspect of this letter, please feel
free to call C.C. Burgess at (806) 373-3921.
Very truly yours,
HERRING BANCORP, INC.
C.C. Burgess
Chairman of the Board
2201 Civic Circle, Suite 1001, Amarillo, TX 79109
P.D. Box 9900, Amarillo, TX 79105-5900
(806) 373.3921 Phone (806) 372,8230 Fax
ccburgess@herringbank.com
EXHIBIT 9
HERRING BA_NCORP, INC. C. C. Burgess
Guthman of the Boolci
November 22, 2013
John Mikkelsen Trust
c/o Lee Christie
Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, LLP
306 West 7th Street, Suite 901
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Mallory Mikkelsen
c/o Lee Christie
Pope, Hardwicke, Christie, Schell, Kelly & Ray, LLP
306 West 7th Street, Suite 901
Fort Worth, Texas 76102
Mallory Mikkelsen
3912 Winter Park Road
Addison, Texas 75001
Dear Mr. John Mikkelsen and Mr. Mallory Mikkelsen:
Herring Bancorp, Inc. is making the following unconditional tender in the amount of $115,548.24
("Tender Amount"). The Tender Amount is calculated as follows and is shown on the attached worksheet:
Preferred Stock Redemption Price $28,500.00
[$95/share X 300 shares]
Unpaid Dividends $21,070.48
[($95/share X 300 shares) X 10%] ÷ 365 = $7.80/day
Unpaid for 2006 Prior to November 21, 2006 $1,112.67
November 21, 2006 — December 31, 2006 $ 312.33
(40 Days X $7.80)
January 1, 2007 — December 31, 2007 $2,850.00
January 1, 2008 — December 31, 2008 $2,850.00
January 1, 2009 — December 31, 2009 $2,850.00
January 1, 2010 — December 31, 2010 $2,850.00
January 1, 2011 — December 31, 2011 $2,850.00
January 1, 2012 — December 31, 2012 $2,850.00
January 1, 2013 — November 22, 2013 $2,545.48
(326 Days X $7.80) $21,070.48
2201 Civic Circle, Suite 1001, Amarillo, TX 79109
P.O. Box 9900, Amarillo, TX 79105-5900
(806) 373.3921 Phone (806) 372.8230 Fax IiERR_3279
ccburgess@herringbank.com
Interest $15,977.76
[5% per annum from the date due, compounded annually]
Attorney's Fees $50,000.00
[Billing Statements Produced in the Lawsuit plus an additional amount]
TOTAL $115,548.24
We are enclosing a cashier's check made payable to the order of John Mikkelsen Trust and
Mallory Mikkelsen. The actual check is being placed in the envelope delivered to Mr. Christie.
Very truly yours,
HERRING BANCORP, INC.
C.C. Burgess
Chairman of the Board
HERR_3280
Preferred Redemption
Rate 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 5%
Days 40 326
Int 2006 Int 2007 Int 2008 Int 2009 Int 2010 Int 2011 Int 2012 Int 2013 Total Total Int
Preferred Stock 28,500.00 156.16 1,432.81 1,504.45 1,579.67 1,658.65 1,741.59 1,828.67 1,714.94 40,116.94 11,616.94
Dividends Days
January 1, 2006- December 31, 2006 2,850.00
Less November 21, 2006-December 31, 2006 (312.33)
Less paid Distributions Paid (1,425.00)
Unpaid 2006 1,112.67 27.82 57.02 59.88 62.87 66.01 69.31 72.78 68.25 1,596.61 483.94
November 21, 2006-December 31, 2006 40 312.33 1.71 15.70 16.49 17.31 18.18 19.09 20.04 18.79 439.64 127.31
January 1, 2007- December 31, 2007 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 161.03 169.09 177.54 166.50 3,894.84 1,044.84
January 1, 2008- December 31, 2008 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 161.03 169.09 158.57 3,709.37 859.37
January 1, 2009- December 31, 2009 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 161.03 151.02 3,532.73 682.73
January 1, 2010- December 31, 2010 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 153.37 143.83 3,364.51 514.51
January 1, 2011- December 31, 2011 2,850.00 71.25 146.06 136.98 3,204.29 354.29
January 1, 2012- December 31, 2012 2,850.00 71.25 130.46 3,051.71 201.71
January 1, 2013- November 22, 2013 326 2,545.48 92.12 2,637.60 92.12
Distributions 21,070.48 29.53 143.97 293.68 450.86 615.90 789.20 971.16 1,066.52 25,431.30 4,360.82
Legal Fees 50,000.00 50,000.00
Total 115,548.24 15,977.76
Summary
Preferred Redemption 28,500.00
Unpaid Dividends 21,070.48
Legal 50,000.00
5% interest from 11-21-2006 15,977.76
115,548.24
HERR_3281
CASHIER'S CHECK - CUSTOMER COPY
MA3 November 22, 2013
120987
Purchaser: HERRING BANCORP $115,548.24
MIKKELSEN
NON NE GOT I LE
PAY TO THE ORDER OF:
JOHN MIKKELSEN TRUST AND MALLORY MIKKELSEN Notice to'Customer
If:this .check is lost, destroyed,_or stolen, the bank
rill not accept a replacement request on the check
until 90 days after the iSsue.date and then only with
the issuance of a "beciaration of Loss" certification.
WARNING: THIS DOCUMENT CONTAINS MULTIPLE SECURITY FEATURES. RE/Ma REVERSE SIPE FOR FULL DISCLOSURE.
CASHIER'S CHECK
•:-' ,'HERk11\1G BANK tttice to Customer
Member FOle idf this'Cheotis lost destroyed, or stolen, the bati,
2201 C1,k Clnie • Amoral*. TX • 79109
(806)677-7000
tnot accept ,p.replae'rrient reciuest on the check Oil.
r.90 days after the issue date and then only with the:,.
issuance of a "Declaration of Loss" certification '
MA3 November 22, 2013 120987
PutChaser: HERRING BANCORP
MIKKELSEN $115,548.24
0nalitndred- Fifteeri. ThotisandFiye Hundred Forty.:Eight Dollars And 24/100*************
.• , 7
PAY TO THE JOHN MIKKELSEN TRUST AND MALLORY MIKKELSEN
ORDER OF: Must Piave 2 ignatures
Authorized Signature
THIS AREA CONTAINS A DISAPPEARING BACKGROUND. RUB TO AUTHENTICATE.
L 2098 7" L L L 30 284 61: Hs 704 S 3 28ng
HERR_3282
EXHIBIT 10
260260260260260
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. Otherwise, proceed
to Question No. 4.
OUESTJON NO. 2
Did Herring Bancorp. make a full tender to John Mikkelsen on November 22, 2013?
You are instructed that a full tender is an unconditional offer by Herring Bancorp., the
debtor, to pay John Mikkelsen, the creditor, a sum of money not less than the sum due Mikkelsen
at the time the tender is made.
Answer "Yes" or "No"
Answer:
Authority: Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet denied)(citing
Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963)); Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark
Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
Given 0 Given as modified 0 Refused Ii'
Date
FIL D H. orable Dan ike Bird
The day of 20 /5 46th District Court Judge
At o'cl M: o'clock
A" Brenda Pete
qleyk Disf CVlb 0. (2)
By (---kb(--id
Deputy
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED CHARGE QUESTIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS PAGE 8 OF 25
LATcm1Herring Bank-5998WIcadings\Jury ChArgel,wpc1
260
261261261261261
If you answered "Yes" to Question No. 1, then answer Question No. 2. Otherwise, proceed
to Question No. 4.
OUESTION NO. 2
Did Herring Bancorp. make a full tender to John Mikkelsen on November 22, 2013?
You are instructed that a full tender is an unconditional offer by Herring Bancorp., the
debtor, to pay John Mikkelsen, the creditor, a sum of money not less than the sum due Mikkelsen
at the time the tender is made.
Answer "Yes" or "No"
Answer:
Authority: Jensen v. Covington, 234 S.W.3d 198, 206 (Tex. App.—Waco 2007, pet denied)(citing
Baucum v. Great Am. Ins. Co., 370 S.W.2d 863, 866 (Tex. 1963)); Staff Indus., Inc. v. Hallmark
Contracting, Inc., 846 S.W.2d 542 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1993, no writ).
Given 0 Given as modified 0 Refused EV
VILED
The.W____day of \•
Zoe Honorable Dan Mike Bird
o'clock M: o'clock 46th District Court Judge
At 2 '.0 0
Brenda Peterson
perk pist. Court ilbarger Co.
By Deputy
DEFENDANTS' FIRST AMENDED PROPOSED CHARGE, QUESTIONS, AND INSTRUCTIONS WITH ANNOTATIONS PAGE 9 OF 26
laem1Herring Bank-5998 Tleadings\lury ChargeI a.wpd
261
2E5 /2b I:Iti 145 145
267267267267267
If you answered "No" to Question No. 2, then answer Question No. 3. Otherwise, do not
answer Question No. 3.
QUESTION NO. 3
Do you find that all sums due to John Mikkelsen under the Articles of Incorporation have
been tendered or paid in full by Herring Bancorp?
Answer "Yes" or "No"
Answer:
Authority: See Pierce v. Baker, 238 S.W. 699, 699 (Tex. Civ. App.—Texarkana 1922, no writ).
Given D Given as modified 0 Refused
Date
FILED
the day o 20n L
At 3I sr)-- o'cl ck M: o'clock Honorable Dan Mike Bird
46th District Court Judge
Brenda Peterson
iqerk C.ipyq arger Co.
EWA- Li LLUI:.( Deputy
DEFENDANTS' PROPOSED
PROPOSED CHARGE, QUESTIONS. AND INSTRUCTIONS W I TI I ANNOTATIONS PAGE 9 OF 25
LATem1Hcrring Bank-599R \PIcadingsVury Cliarcel.wpd
267
Exhibit 11
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