Javier Reyes v. Rosa Reyes ( 2018 )


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  •                               Fourth Court of Appeals
    San Antonio, Texas
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    No. 04-18-00012-CV
    Javier REYES,
    Appellant
    v.
    Rosa REYES,
    Appellee
    From the 57th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
    Trial Court No. 2017-CI-00772
    Honorable Angelica Jimenez, Judge Presiding
    Opinion by:       Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Sitting:          Karen Angelini, Justice
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    Irene Rios, Justice
    Delivered and Filed: December 12, 2018
    AFFIRMED
    Javier Reyes appeals from a final decree of divorce. He argues the trial court erred by
    granting Rosa Reyes’s motion to enter the final decree and by denying him a just and right division
    of the marital estate. We affirm the final decree of divorce.
    BACKGROUND
    Javier and Rosa filed cross-petitions for divorce. Both alleged the marriage had become
    insupportable, stated there were no children from the marriage, and sought a division of their
    04-18-00012-CV
    marital estate and an award of their attorney’s fees. On May 2, 2017, the parties entered into a
    settlement agreement, and the trial court rendered judgment on the agreement.
    Rosa thereafter filed a motion to enter a final order, and the trial court held a hearing on
    Rosa’s motion in December 2017. When asked whether Rosa’s proposed final decree comported
    with the handwritten agreement, Javier’s attorney first equivocated before stating the final decree
    did in fact comport with the parties’ agreement. However, Javier’s attorney argued the handwritten
    settlement agreement was invalid because it did not state the agreement “was not subject to
    revocation” as required by section 6.604 of the Texas Family Code. The trial court granted Rosa’s
    motion and signed the final decree of divorce. Javier timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    Javier contends the trial court erred by entering the final decree because the settlement
    agreement did not “provide[], in a prominently displayed statement that is in boldfaced type or in
    capital letters or underlined, that the agreement is not subject to revocation.” See TEX. FAM. CODE.
    § 6.604(b). He also contends the trial court erred by not rendering a just and right division of the
    marital estate. In support of his contention, Javier cites only to his lawyer’s representation at the
    December 2017 hearing on Rosa’s motion that Javier desired to mediate a new settlement
    agreement.
    After the trial court rendered judgment on the parties’ agreement on May 2, 2017, Javier
    was bound by the judgment and could not revoke his consent to the agreement at the December
    2017 hearing. See S & A Rest. Corp. v. Leal, 
    892 S.W.2d 855
    , 857 (Tex. 1995) (per curiam); Wright
    v. Wright, No. 04-08-00175-CV, 
    2009 WL 331892
    , at *2–3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 11,
    2009, no pet.) (mem. op.). The entry of the final decree of divorce in December 2017 was a purely
    ministerial act. Wright, 
    2009 WL 331892
    , at *3.
    -2-
    04-18-00012-CV
    Furthermore, in the final divorce decree, the trial court found the parties’ division of the
    marital estate was a “just and right division.” There is nothing in the record (other than Javier’s
    counsel’s representation that Javier wanted to revoke his consent to the agreed judgment)
    suggesting the trial court erred by finding the parties’ agreed division of the marital estate was just
    and right. See Roberts v. Roberts, 
    402 S.W.3d 833
    , 838–39 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no
    pet.). Based on counsel’s argument about Javier’s mere desire to enter into a new settlement
    agreement, we cannot say the trial court abused its discretion by not rendering a just and right
    division of the marital estate. See 
    id.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s final decree of divorce.
    Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
    -3-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 04-18-00012-CV

Filed Date: 12/12/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021