in the Interest of A.R.R. ( 2018 )

Fourth Court of Appeals
San Antonio, Texas
MEMORANDUM OPINION
No. 04-18-00578-CV
IN THE INTEREST OF A.R.R., A.R., and A.R, Children
From the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2017PA00486
Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Judge Presiding 1
Opinion by: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Sitting: Marialyn Barnard, Justice
Luz Elena D. Chapa, Justice
Irene Rios, Justice
Delivered and Filed: December 12, 2018
AFFIRMED
This is an appeal from an order terminating appellant mother’s (“Mother”) parental rights
to her children, A.R.R., A.R., and A.R. 2 On appeal, Mother contends the evidence is legally and
factually insufficient to support certain grounds relied upon by the trial court for termination. We
affirm the order of termination.
BACKGROUND
A detailed factual recitation is unnecessary for the disposition of the appeal. Accordingly,
we provide a brief factual and procedural background for context.
1
The Honorable Renée Yanta is the judge of the 150th Judicial District Court, Bexar County Texas. However, the
order that is the subject of this appeal was signed by the Honorable Charles E. Montemayor, Associate Judge.
2
The trial court also terminated the parental rights of the children’s father. However, he did not file a notice of appeal
and is, therefore, not a party to this appeal.
04-18-00578-CV
The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services (“the Department”) received a
report alleging that Mother was using illegal drugs, specifically crack cocaine and
methamphetamines. There was also a report that Mother engaged in a physical confrontation with
a maternal aunt. Eventually, the Department filed a petition seeking to terminate Mother’s parental
rights in the event reunification was unattainable. A service plan was prepared for Mother, and
the trial court held the required statutory hearings. A final hearing on the case was held at which
a Department supervisor and Mother testified. At the conclusion of the final hearing, the trial court
rendered a termination order in which it found Mother: (1) knowingly placed or allowed her
children to remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-
being; (2) engaged in conduct or knowingly placed her children with people who engaged in
conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being; (3) constructively abandoned her
children; (4) failed to comply with the provisions of a court order that established the actions
necessary for her to obtain the return of her children; and (5) used a controlled substance in a
manner that endangered the health or safety of her children and failed to complete a court-ordered
drug treatment program. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). The
trial court further found termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interests of
her children. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). Thereafter, Mother perfected this appeal.
On appeal, Mother contends the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support the
trial court’s findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(N) and (O) of the Texas Family Code (“the
Code”). See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(N), (O). Mother has not challenged the sufficiency of the
evidence with regard to the trial court’s findings under subsections (D), (E), or (P). See id.
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (P). Nor has Mother challenged the sufficiency of the evidence to support
the trial court’s best interest finding. See id. § 161.001(b)(2).
-2-
04-18-00578-CV
ANALYSIS
A trial court may terminate a parent’s right to a child only if it finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the parent committed an act prohibited by section 161.001(b)(1) of the Code and
termination is in the best interest of the child. Id. § 161.001(b). Only one predicate finding under
section 161.001(b)(1) is necessary to support a judgment of termination when there is also a finding
that termination is in a child’s best interest. In re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003); In re
R.S.-T., 522 S.W.3d 92, 111 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, no pet.); In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d
24, 37 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied). Thus, if multiple predicate grounds are found
by the trial court, we will affirm based on any one ground, assuming a proper best interest finding.
In re E.W., 494 S.W.3d 287, 292 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.); In re I.G., 383 S.W.3d
763, 768 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2012, no pet.); see In re A.A.T., No. 04-16-00344-CV, 2016 WL
7448370, at *10 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Dec. 28, 2016, no pet.) (mem. op.).
As noted above, the trial court found Mother’s parental rights should be terminated on the
five statutory grounds, specifically those set out in subsections (D), (E), (N), (O), and (P) of section
161.001(b)(1). See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P). The trial court
also found termination of Mother’s parental rights would be in the best interests of her children.
See id. § 161.001(b)(2). On appeal, however, Mother challenged only two of the five grounds
upon which the trial court based its termination decision — subsection (N) and (O) — and did not
challenge the trial court’s best interest finding. Mother has, therefore, waived any complaint about
the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the findings under sections 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), and
(P), and these findings are sufficient to support termination when coupled with the trial court’s
unchallenged best interest finding. See, e.g., In re J.J.S., No. 04-17-00747-CV, 2018 WL 1072336,
at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Feb. 28, 2018, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re B.M., No. 14-13-
00599-CV, 2013 WL 6506659, at *6 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 10, 2013, no pet.)
-3-
04-18-00578-CV
(mem. op.) (citing Toliver v. Tex. Dep’t of Family and Protective Servs., 217 S.W.3d 85, 102 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2006, no pet.)); In re N.L.D., 412 S.W.3d 810, 818 (Tex. App.—
Texarkana 2013, no pet.); In re C.P.V.Y., 315 S.W.3d 260, 269 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2010, no
pet.). Because only one statutory ground for termination is required to be established and Mother
challenged only two of the five grounds found by the trial court and failed to challenge the trial
court’s best interest finding, we overrule Mother’s appellate issues.
CONCLUSION
Mother has neither contested the sufficiency of the evidence with regard to all of the
statutory grounds found by the trial court nor challenged the trial court’s best interest finding.
Thus, the trial court’s termination order is supported by unchallenged grounds on both prongs
necessary for termination. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order of termination.
Marialyn Barnard, Justice
-4-