Veliz, Luis Enrique ( 2015 )

PD-1078-15
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
AUSTIN, TEXAS
Transmitted 8/18/2015 12:14:46 PM
Accepted 8/20/2015 11:29:38 AM
No.____________ ABEL ACOSTA
CLERK
In the
Court of Criminal Appeals

No. 14-14-00057-CR
In the Court of Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas at Houston

No. 1892229
In the County Criminal Court at Law No. 2 of Harris County, Texas

LUIS ENRIQUE VELIZ
Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee

STATE’S PETITION FOR DISCRETIONARY REVIEW

DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
ERIC KUGLER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
TBC No. 796910
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
Tel.: 713-755-5826
FAX: 713-755-5809
Counsel for Appellee
ORAL ARGUMENT REQUESTED
IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL
Counsel for the State:
Devon Anderson  District Attorney of Harris County
Eric Kugler  Assistant District Attorney on appeal
Rishabh Godha; Lindsey Vanik  Assistant District Attorneys at trial
Appellant or criminal defendant:
Luis Enrique Veliz
Counsel for Appellant:
Carmen Roe  Counsel on appeal
440 Louisiana, Suite 900; Houston, Texas 77002
Jeffrey Greco  Counsel at trial and on appeal
701 N Post Oak Rd #425; Houston, TX 77024
Oliver King  Counsel at trial and on appeal
77 Sugar Creek Center Blvd Suite #230, Sugar Land, TX 77478
Trial Judge:
Hon. William T. Harmon  Presiding Judge
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
IDENTITY OF JUDGE, PARTIES, AND COUNSEL...............................................i
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES .................................................................................... iii
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT ................................................. v
STATEMENT OF THE CASE..................................................................................vi
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY ........................................................vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS ......................................................................................... 1
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW ....................................................................................... 2
A. The lower court erred in holding that an expert witness’s answer to the
question, “do you have an opinion as to whether the defendant was intoxicated at
the time of driving,” did not constitute retrograde extrapolation...........................2
B. The lower court erred in reversing the trial court’s admission of retrograde
extrapolation testimony where the expert witness allowed two hours to run from
the time of driving before starting to calculate the elimination phase and used a
0.01 elimination rate for the bottom range. ............................................................2
C. The lower court erred in finding the admission of extrapolation testimony
harmful where other extrapolation testimony was admitted without objection and
where the appellant was still over the legal limit three and one-half hours after
driving dangerously. ...............................................................................................2
ARGUMENT ............................................................................................................. 2
PRAYER FOR RELIEF ........................................................................................... 16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE............................................. 17
ii
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bagheri v. State,
119 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ..............................................................12
Bagheri v. State,
87 S.W.3d 657 (Tex. App.—
\San Antonio 2002), aff'd,
119 S.W.3d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ..............................................................14
Bhakta v. State,
124 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) ....................................................................10
Ethington v. State,
819 S.W.2d 854 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) ................................................................7
Guzman v. State,
955 S.W.2d 85 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997) ..................................................................6
Lane v. State,
151 S.W.3d 188 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004) ................................................................6
Martinez v. State,
22 S.W.3d 504 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000) ..................................................................6
Mata v. State,
46 S.W.3d 902 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001) ..................................................... 6, 7, 8, 9
Morris v. State,
214 S.W.3d 159 (Tex. App.—
Beaumont 2007), aff’d,
301 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) ....................................................... 10, 13
Motilla v. State,
78 S.W.3d 352 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ................................................................12
iii
Owens v. State,
135 S.W.3d 302 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.)......................................................................14
Valle v. State,
109 S.W.3d 500 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) ................................................................6
Veliz v. State,
14-14-00057-CR (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] August 18, 2015, pet. filed) ...................................... vi, 7, 10
RULES
TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1 ....................................................................................................6
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b) ..............................................................................................12
TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3 ....................................................................................................2
TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2 .................................................................................................. vi
TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4 (c) ...............................................................................................v
TEX. R. EVID. 103(a) ........................................................................................... 6, 12
iv
STATEMENT REGARDING ORAL ARGUMENT
Pursuant to TEX. R. APP. P. 68.4 (c), the State requests oral argument because
the fact-finding by the court of appeals played a decisive role in the outcome of
this case, and an oral argument may help to further clarify the factual issues.
v
TO THE HONORABLE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TEXAS:
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The appellant was charged with driving while intoxicated (CR – 8). He pled
“not guilty,” but the jury found him guilty, and the court thereafter sentenced him
to three days in jail (CR – 120).
STATEMENT OF PROCEDURAL HISTORY
The appellant appealed, and the court of appeals reversed the conviction,
finding that the trial court erred in admitting retrograde extrapolation testimony
and that the appellant was harmed by such admission. Veliz v. State, 14-14-00057-
CR (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] August 18, 2015, pet. filed) (attached as
Appendix A). No motion for rehearing was filed because the opinion of the lower
court was unanimous. This petition for discretionary review is timely if filed on or
before September 17, 2015. TEX. R. APP. P. 68.2.
vi
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Around midnight on April 26, 2013, Joel Quezada with the Houston Police
Department’s (HPD) DWI Task Force was on patrol with his partner when they
saw the appellant driving a pickup truck (RR. III – 15-16). The appellant was on
the Eastex Freeway, his pickup had a broken taillight, and his headlights were off
(RR. III – 18-19). He was also drifting into the other lanes of traffic without
signaling, and there were other vehicles on the freeway, which caused a safety
concern (RR. III – 18). Quezada turned on his emergency lights, and the appellant
pulled over to the side of the road (RR. III – 19).
As Quezada approached the appellant, he noticed the odor of alcohol coming
from the appellant’s pickup (RR. III – 20). The appellant had slurred speech and
red glassy eyes (RR. III – 20). He admitted to drinking the ubiquitous “two beers.”
(RR. III – 21). The appellant performed some field sobriety tests and showed
numerous signs of intoxication (RR. III – 22-38). He refused to provide a sample
of his breath despite being warned that such a refusal could result in a suspended
driver’s license (RR. III – 40-44). Quezada then obtained a search warrant for the
appellant’s blood, which was drawn at 3:32 a.m., more than three hours after the
stop (RR. III – 44, 48) (RR. IV – 10). A laboratory analysis showed that the
appellant’s alcohol concentration was 0.81, which was above the legal limit and
would have been so at the time of driving (RR. IV – 41-46, 62, 72).
GROUNDS FOR REVIEW
A. The lower court erred in holding that an expert witness’s
answer to the question, “do you have an opinion as to
whether the defendant was intoxicated at the time of
driving,” did not constitute retrograde extrapolation.
B. The lower court erred in reversing the trial court’s
admission of retrograde extrapolation testimony where the
expert witness allowed two hours to run from the time of
driving before starting to calculate the elimination phase
and used a 0.01 elimination rate for the bottom range.
C. The lower court erred in finding the admission of
extrapolation testimony harmful where other extrapolation
testimony was admitted without objection and where the
appellant was still over the legal limit three and one-half
hours after driving dangerously.
ARGUMENT
This petition for discretionary review should be granted because the analysis
used by the court of appeals has so far departed from the accepted and usual course
of judicial proceedings so as to call for an exercise of this Court’s power of
supervision. TEX. R. APP. P. 66.3. Specifically, the court of appeals found that the
trial court erred in admitting retrograde extrapolation testimony when similar
testimony was admitted without objection, where the trial court could have
believed that the expert sufficiently explained the theory of extrapolation and gave
the appellant every benefit of the doubt, and where the evidence was nevertheless
overwhelming in favor of guilt.
2
HPD’s blood analyst, Dwan Wilson, testified during the guilt stage of trial
(RR. IV – 39). She had been with HPD’s crime lab for nearly two years and was
assigned to the toxicology section (RR. IV – 39). She earned a bachelor of science
in toxicology from the University of Louisiana at Monroe and studied inorganic
and organic chemistry as well as instrumental analysis, quantitative analysis, and
biochemistry (RR. IV – 40). Wilson also studied the physical effects of alcohol
upon the human body, which included reading articles and textbooks and attending
the Borkenstein course on alcohol at Indiana University (RR. IV – 47). She was an
associate member of the Society of Forensic Toxicologists and had testified
previously as an expert (RR. IV – 40-41).
During the State’s examination of Wilson, the appellant asked to question
her outside the presence of the jury (RR. IV – 47-48). Wilson testified that she
was “given information about the time of the stop, if the defendant ate anything,
the weight, the height, the concentration at the time of the test.” (RR. IV – 49).
Wilson also knew the appellant’s gender and that he admitted to having two drinks
(RR. IV – 50). She explained that “[b]ecause you can take the time between the
time of the stop and the time of the blood draw, and since the absorption could take
anywhere from 30 minutes to two hours, if the time was greater than two hours,
you can perform an extrapolation.” (RR. IV – 51).
3
Wilson testified that extrapolation could be performed even when certain
data are unknown, such as the time of the last drink (RR. IV – 53). She stated that
“retrograde extrapolation is an assumption generally accepted by the scientific
community. It’s based on assumption. The person being in the elimination phase at
the time of the stop and eliminating at a rate of .01 to .03.” (RR. IV – 57)
(emphasis added). However, she later corrected herself and confirmed that she
assumed that the appellant was still absorbing at 2:05 a.m., more than two hours
after the stop, which would have been the longest possible time for absorption (RR.
IV – 61-62). Thus, the appellant received the greatest benefit of the doubt (RR. IV
– 62). At the end of the hearing, the appellant asked for a “limine instruction to
say, look, this is all predicated upon an assumption.” (RR. IV – 68). But the
appellant never obtained a ruling on his motion to suppress during that hearing,
and the jury was returned to continue the trial (RR. IV – 68).
Near the conclusion of Wilson’s testimony before the jury, the appellant
objected “to the 702, 703 and the relevance,” and the trial court overruled the
objection (RR. IV – 71). The appellant also objected “under 702, 703, and her lack
of being an expert in pharmacodynamics, analytical chemistry and all the other
areas of expertise that one would need to be able to do this without missing data
we discussed.” (RR. IV – 73). The trial court overruled that objection (RR. IV –
73).
4
Wilson testified that, based on two assumptions “that the individual is in the
elimination phase and eliminates that of a normal rate of .01 to a .03 grams per one
hundred liters of blood [that the] alcohol concentration at the time of the stop can
range from a .095 to a 0124.” (RR. IV – 72).1 The following exchange then
occurred:
Q. So based on your experience and training and the results of this
blood test, do you have an opinion as to whether the defendant
was intoxicated at the time of driving?
A. Yes.
Q. What is that opinion?
A. The opinion is that the result given in the case which was, it
was a .081 grams per one hundred milliliters of blood.
(RR. IV – 74). The appellant did not object to this testimony regarding whether
the appellant was intoxicated at the time of driving.
1
The mathematical calculations are done in detail in Section B. Wilson assumed the greatest
period of time for the absorption phase, two hours, which meant that the appellant was presumed
to not enter the elimination phase until 2:05 a.m., two hours after the traffic stop (RR. IV – 61-
62). The blood draw was at 3:32 a.m., which meant that giving the appellant the greatest benefit
of the doubt, he was in the elimination phase for 87 minutes prior to the blood draw. Applying a
range of elimination rates from 0.01 to 0.03 per hour meant that the appellant’s blood alcohol
level dropped from 0.015 to 0.045 during those 87 minutes (RR. IV – 72). See also Morris v.
State, 214 S.W.3d 159, 179 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007), aff’d, 301 S.W.3d 281 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009) (“Merkord used a 0.015 elimination rate, the lower of the range of normals.”). And
adding the calculated drop range to the 0.081 test result gave an extrapolated range of “a .095 to
a 0124.” (RR. IV – 72). Thus, Wilson’s calculations truly did give the appellant every benefit of
the doubt. If Wilson had assumed that the appellant was in the elimination phase at the time of
the stop, her extrapolation range would have been 0.136 to 0.186, which is much higher than
Wilson’s calculations at trial.
5
A trial court’s ruling on the admission of extrapolation evidence is reviewed
for abuse of discretion. Mata v. State, 46 S.W.3d 902, 908 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
The reviewing court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial
court’s ruling, giving the trial court almost total deference on its findings of
historical fact that find support in the record. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 89
(Tex. Crim. App. 1997).
If a defendant claims on appeal that the trial judge erred in admitting
evidence offered by the State, this error must have been preserved by a proper
objection and an adverse ruling on that objection. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; TEX. R.
EVID. 103(a). The purpose of requiring an objection is to give the trial court or the
opposing party the opportunity to correct the error or remove the basis for the
objection. Martinez v. State, 22 S.W.3d 504, 507 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). “[T]o
preserve error in admitting evidence, a party must…object each time the
inadmissible evidence is offered or obtain a running objection. An error [if any] in
the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence comes in elsewhere
without objection.” Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(quoting Valle v. State, 109 S.W.3d 500, 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)).
In the present case, the appellant objected the first time that Wilson testified
regarding the appellant’s level of alcohol concentration at the time of driving (RR.
IV – 72). But the appellant completely failed to object when Wilson later stated
6
that the appellant’s intoxication “at the time of driving” was “the result given in the
case which was, it was a .081 grams per one hundred milliliters of blood.” (RR. IV
– 74). Therefore, the appellant waived any error regarding the admission of
extrapolation testimony. See Ethington v. State, 819 S.W.2d 854, 858 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1991) (“[I]t is well settled that an error in admission of evidence is cured
where the same evidence comes in elsewhere without objection; defense counsel
must object every time allegedly inadmissible evidence is offered.”).
The court of appeals held that Wilson’s “testimony is not retrograde
extrapolation testimony because Wilson did not answer the question the prosecutor
asked.” Veliz, slip op. at 4. But if the appellant thought that it was a non-
responsive answer, he should have objected on that basis at trial. According to this
Court, retrograde extrapolation is the “computation back in time of the blood-
alcohol level—that is, the estimation of the level at the time of driving based on a
test result from some later time.” Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 908–09. And if the trial
court believed, as the finder of fact, that Wilson was answering the question of
whether the defendant was intoxicated at the time of driving, then Wilson’s
testimony constituted retrograde extrapolation. Wilson’s first opinion on
extrapolation gave a possible range, 0.095 to 0.124 (RR. IV – 72). And her second
opinion on extrapolation merely expanded that range down to 0.081, which was
still above the legal limit. The appellant did not object to that second opinion on
7
retrograde extrapolation, and therefore, should not have been able to challenge its
admission on appeal. The lower court of appeals erred in holding otherwise.
Even if the appellant had properly preserved his appellate complaint, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the extrapolation testimony. In
Mata, this Court instructed how to evaluate the reliability of retrograde
extrapolation testimony. After reviewing the scientific literature published prior to
2001 and the positions taken by courts in other jurisdictions, the Mata Court
concluded that “the science of retrograde extrapolation can be reliable in a given
case,” but cautioned that the “expert’s ability to apply the science and explain it
with clarity to the court is a paramount consideration.” Id., 46 S.W.3d at 916.
The Mata court formulated a detailed test to determine whether the reliable
theory and technique had been properly applied in a given case. It required a
recognition of the subtleties of the science and the risks inherent in any
extrapolation and a consideration of: (a) the length of time between the offense and
the test(s) administered; (b) the number of tests given and the length of time
between each test; and (c) whether, and if so, to what extent, any individual
characteristics of the defendant were known to the expert in providing his
extrapolation. Id. Individual characteristics include the person’s weight and
gender, the person’s typical drinking pattern and tolerance for alcohol, how much
the person had to drink on the day or night in question, what the person drank, the
8
duration of the drinking spree, the time of the last drink, and how much and what
the person had to eat either before, during, or after the drinking. Id. This Court
refused to set out an exact blueprint for reliability in every case, but stated simply
that the above factors must be “balanced.” Id., 46 S.W.3d at 916-17.
The only unresolved issue with regard to the admission of retrograde
extrapolation evidence is whether the technique was properly applied in a given
case. And the expert in Mata fell short of the mark. In Mata, the breath test
technical supervisor testified that he did not know how much Mata weighed, how
much Mata had to eat or drink before taking the breath test, or when Mata took his
last drink. Mata, 46 S.W.3d at 905. The technical supervisor acknowledged that he
did not know when Mata began drinking or when he stopped. Id., 46 S.W.3d at
906. The technical supervisor based his testimony in Mata on a “normal” or
“average” person and “normal drinking patterns,” with a 0.02 elimination rate. Id.,
46 S.W.3d at 905, 906.
In the present case, there were sufficient known factors to allow for a rough
extrapolation, and the technique was properly applied. Wilson knew the time of
the stop, whether the appellant ate anything, the appellant’s weight, his height, his
gender, and the fact that the appellant admitted to having two drinks (RR. IV – 49-
50). Thus, there was evidence concerning the majority of the factors listed in the
Mata test. Whether or not to admit this expert testimony fell within a zone of
9
reasonable disagreement, and the trial court in the present case did not abuse its
discretion in admitting that testimony. See Bhakta v. State, 124 S.W.3d 738, 742
(Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, pet. ref’d) (allowing extrapolation when
expert knew time of last drink, weight and height, time of breath tests, results of
breath tests, last meal, and time of last meal).
The court of appeals claimed that the expert witness “contradicted herself,
undermining the assertion that she had given appellant every benefit of the doubt.”
Veliz, slip op. at 10. But a simple mathematical calculation, as provided by the
State, demonstrated to the lower court that Wilson had in fact given the appellant
every benefit of the doubt. Wilson assumed the greatest period of time for the
absorption phase, two hours, which meant that the appellant was presumed to not
enter the elimination phase until 2:05 a.m., more than two hours after the traffic
stop (RR. IV – 61-62). The blood draw was at 3:32 a.m., which meant that, giving
the appellant the greatest benefit of the doubt, he was in the elimination phase for
87 minutes prior to the blood draw. Applying a range of elimination rates from
0.01 to 0.03 per hour meant that the appellant’s blood alcohol level dropped from
0.0145 to 0.0435 during those 87 minutes (RR. IV – 72). Thus, the lower range
used by Wilson also gave the appellant the benefit of the doubt. See Morris v. State,
214 S.W.3d 159, 179 (Tex. App.—Beaumont 2007), aff’d, 301 S.W.3d 281 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2009) (“Merkord used a 0.015 elimination rate, the lower of the range
10
of normals.”). And adding the calculated drop range to the 0.081 test result gave
an extrapolated range of roughly “a .095 to a 0124.” (RR. IV – 72). Such simple
calculations can be further illustrated as:
02:05 (time used by Wilson) 00:00 (approximate time of stop)
– 03:32 (time of blood draw) – 03:32 (time of blood draw
= 87 minutes = 212 minutes
/ 60 minutes / 60 minutes
= 1.45 hours = 3.53 hours
0.01 elimination rate 0.03 elimination rate
1.45 hour 1.45 1.45
extrapolation period X 0.01 X 0.03
(range used by Wilson) = 0.0145 = 0.0435
0.081 (test result) 0.081 (test result)
+ 0.0145 + 0.0435
= 0.0955 = 0.1245
3.53 hour 3.53 3.53
extrapolation period X 0.01 X 0.03
(actual time) = 0.0353 = 0.1059
0.081 (test result) 0.081 (test result)
+ 0.0353 + 0.1059
= 0.1163 = 0.1869
Thus, Wilson’s calculations truly did give the appellant every benefit of the doubt.
If Wilson had assumed that the appellant was in the elimination phase at the time
of the stop, her extrapolation range would have been 0.1163 to 0.1869, which is
much higher than Wilson’s calculations at trial.
11
Even if the trial court abused its discretion in admitting the extrapolation
testimony, the admission was harmless. The erroneous admission of retrograde
extrapolation testimony is considered non-constitutional error. Bagheri v. State, 119
S.W.3d 755, 762-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). Therefore, the lower court should
have disregarded any such error unless it affected the appellant’s substantial rights.
TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b); TEX. R. EVID. 103(a). It should also have considered the
entire record, including testimonial evidence, voir dire, closing arguments, and the
jury instructions to determine whether the jury was affected. Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d
at 763; Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 355-56.
The weight of the evidence of the defendant’s guilt is a relevant factor in
conducting a harm analysis under Rule 44.2(b). Motilla, 78 S.W.3d at 360. In the
present case, evidence of the appellant’s guilt was overwhelming. He had lost his
mental faculties to the extent that he forgot to turn on his headlights at midnight
and was drifting into other lanes of traffic with other vehicles on the freeway (RR.
III – 18-19). He had also lost his physical faculties to the extent that he was
slurring his speech and showed numerous signs of intoxication in the field sobriety
tests, including swaying and using his arms for balance against the vehicle (RR. III
– 22-38, 76). More than three and one-half hours after the traffic stop, his breath
alcohol level was still over the legal limit (RR. III – 44, 48) (RR. IV – 10) (St. Ex.
12
7). The evidence of the appellant’s guilt was more than sufficient even if the
extrapolation evidence had been excluded.
Another relevant factor is “the character of the alleged error and how it
might be considered in connection with other evidence in the case.” Id., 78 S.W.3d
at 359 (quoting Morales, 32 S.W.3d at 867). In the present case, the objected-to
testimony was not a definite opinion on the appellant’s actual blood alcohol level at
the time of the traffic stop; rather, Wilson merely gave a possible range (RR. III –
62, 72). Moreover, Wilson later testified without objection that the appellant’s
intoxication “at the time of driving” was “the result given in the case which was, it
was a .081 grams per one hundred milliliters of blood.” (RR. IV – 74). Finally, as
stated previously, Wilson’s anaylsis gave the appellant every benefit of the doubt
by using a two-hour window for absorption, which is the greatest period of time for
the absorption phase, and by using a rate of elimination of 0.01, which is far below
even “the lower of the range of normals.” (RR. IV – 62). Morris, 214 S.W.3d at
179. In light of all the other evidence of intoxication, the admission of the
extrapolation testimony could not have had more than a slight effect in determining
the jury’s verdict.
The court of appeals held that the extrapolation was harmful in part because
“the defendant in Bagheri had intoxilyzer results demonstrating a blood alcohol
concentration greater than .10 and there was additional non-scientific evidence of
13
the defendant’s intoxication, yet the court held that the erroneous admission of
retrograde extrapolation evidence was harmful.” But applicable law in Bagheri
defined intoxication as having an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. See
Bagheri v. State, 87 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002), aff'd, 119
S.W.3d 755 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) (“…a person is deemed to be intoxicated while
driving within the meaning of the law if: …he has an alcohol concentration of 0.10
percent or more.”). Thus, it was not as if the actual results were a full two
percentage points over the legal limit in Bagheri and this Court nevertheless held
the admission of such evidence to be harmful. Rather, the actual results were
apparently just 0.007 over the legal limit. Bagheri, 119 S.W.3d at 758-759.
Moreover, the expert in Bagheri either assumed no absorption phase or a very short
absorption phase when he calculated the defendant’s level to be between 0.107 and
0.143 just one hour after driving. Id., 119 S.W.3d at 759. It certainly could not
have been the two-hour absorption phase used by Wilson in the present case. Thus,
Bagheri does not control the result in the present case.
The lower court of appeals also cited Owens v. State, 135 S.W.3d 302, 310
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.), in support of its harm analysis.
Veliz, slip op. at 14-15. But in Owens, the expert witness used 0.03 and 0.022 as
2
While the expert in Owens testified that he was using a 0.03 elimination rate, a
check with simple mathematics shows that he was actually using a 0.02 elimination
rate. Owens, 135 S.W.3d at 308.
14
the elimination rates, which are both far higher than the lowest rate used by
Wilson, which was 0.10. Owens, 135 S.W.3d at 308. Furthermore, the expert in
Owens did not allow any time for absorption. Id. But most importantly, the
defendant in Owens was out of custody for one and one-half hours between the
time of the crash and the breath test during which he could have been consuming
vast amounts of alcohol. Id. Thus, Owens has nothing to do with the facts of this
case.
The admission of the extrapolation testimony in the present case was not
preserved for appellate review, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in
admitting that evidence, and its admission was harmless. Therefore, this Court
should grant review and correct the errors of the lower court of appeals.
15
PRAYER FOR RELIEF
It is respectfully requested that this petition should be granted and that the
opinion of the court of appeals should be reversed.
DEVON ANDERSON
District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
/s/ Eric Kugler
ERIC KUGLER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
kugler_eric@dao.hctx.net
TBC No. 796910
16
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND COMPLIANCE
This is to certify that: (a) the word count function of the computer program
used to prepare this document reports that there are 3,504 words in the relevant
sections; and (b) a copy of the foregoing instrument will be served by
efile.txcourts.gov to:
Carmen Roe Lisa McMinn
Attorney at Law State Prosecuting Attorney
440 Louisiana, Suite 900 P.O. Box 13046
Houston, Texas 77002 Austin, Texas 78711
carmen@carmenroe.com
/s/ Eric Kugler
ERIC KUGLER
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, Suite 600
Houston, Texas 77002
(713) 755-5826
TBC No. 796910
Date: August 18, 2015
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Appendix A
Veliz v. State,
14-14-00057-CR
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] August 18, 2015, pet. filed)))
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