Marie A. Reilly v. State ( 2008 )


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  •                             NUMBER 13-06-00563-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI - EDINBURG
    MARIE A. REILLY,                                                             Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                           Appellee.
    On appeal from the 226th District Court
    of Bexar County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Chief Justice Valdez and Justices Yañez and Benavides
    Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Valdez
    A jury found appellant, Marie A. Reilly, guilty of murder and sentenced her to twenty
    years’ imprisonment. See TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . §§ 19.02, 12.32 (Vernon 2003). By two
    issues, Reilly challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting her
    conviction. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On the morning of Monday, April 17, 1989, the San Antonio Police Department
    received a call regarding the murder of Jayne Hays, a seventy-five-year-old retiree. When
    police arrived at Jayne’s apartment, they discovered Jayne’s bloody body laying face-up
    on the kitchen floor; a pillow covered her face and there were flowers in the kitchen trash
    can. The apartment was in order except for the master bedroom. In the master bedroom
    the window was open; the screen to the window was on top of some bushes outside of the
    bedroom. The dresser, which sat below the window, was away from the wall, and the
    dresser had a shoe print on top of it. Investigators searched the apartment for fingerprints.
    They also identified DNA on several items, including a Buddha statue, which was found in
    the living room, and a kitchen rag. However, no suspect was immediately charged.
    In 2003, the cold-case homicide division reopened the case. In 2005, Reilly,
    Jayne’s former cleaning lady, was indicted on a single count of murder. The indictment
    alleged that Reilly caused Jayne’s death by striking her with a statue and an unknown
    object. Reilly, who was born in 1928, pleaded not guilty to the indictment; the case was
    tried to a jury. Forensic experts, police officers, Jayne’s family and neighbors, Reilly, and
    Reilly’s acquaintances testified at trial.
    A.     Forensic Evidence
    Vincent Dimaio, M.D., the chief medical examiner for Bexar County, testified about
    the autopsy report that his office prepared. According to the report, Jayne sustained fifteen
    wounds shortly before her death, which included: defensive wounds on her forearms, a
    broken nose, a depressed skull fracture, and numerous lacerations to her head and face.
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    Dimaio testified that the lacerations were caused by a linear object and that the depressed
    skull fracture was caused by a different object. He opined that a sixty-year-old woman,
    such as Reilly, was capable of causing the wounds. Dimaio also opined that Jayne might
    have known the murderer because a pillow was placed over her face, and a murderer who
    knows the victim sometimes covers the victim’s face because the murderer does not want
    to see what was done.
    Erin Reat, a forensic scientist, testified about the results of genetic tests that he
    conducted on the Buddha statue, a kitchen rag, and other items found in Jayne’s
    apartment. Reat compared genetic material found on those items to Jayne’s and Rielly’s
    DNA. According to the test results, the kitchen rag tested positive for blood and also tested
    positive for Jayne’s and Reilly’s DNA. Reat could not, however, specify whether the DNA
    came from the blood on the rag or other sources. The test results also showed that there
    were some “genetic markers which were foreign to both [Jayne and Reilly] on a swabbing
    from the Buddha statue.”
    B.     Law Enforcement Testimony
    Jimmy Porter, a detective in the evidence unit when Jayne was murdered, helped
    process the crime scene by drawing a diagram of Jayne’s apartment. He testified that a
    brass clock and a Buddha statue both had blood on them and were found in the living
    room. Detective Porter testified that police officers had “mixed feelings” about whether the
    apartment had been burglarized. Some evidence technicians felt that the apartment had
    been burglarized, but others felt that it was made to look like a burglary.
    George Saidler, a police officer in the cold-case division, testified about his
    investigation. Officer Saidler reviewed the case file and spoke to Detective Ernest Tavitas,
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    who was the detective-in-charge of the case in 1989. Detective Tavitas had interviewed
    Reilly and provided Officer Saidler with a tape recording of his interview. Officer Saidler
    determined that Reilly had been a main suspect in the case from the beginning of the
    investigation. He located Reilly’s whereabouts and, with the help of other police officers,
    obtained a DNA sample from Reilly.
    Alvin Brown II, a detective at the time of the murder, testified that Detective Tavitas
    assigned him to locate Reilly and obtain her fingerprints and a photograph of her. On April
    20, 1989, Detective Brown reviewed the case file and staked-out Reilly’s home. When
    Reilly left her home in a car, Detective Brown followed her, witnessed her make a traffic
    violation, and called for a uniformed police officer to initiate a traffic stop. During the traffic
    stop, Detective Brown approached Reilly and she told him, “I didn’t kill her.” Reilly also told
    him that:
    She—she indicated to me that she was—people had said she was a suspect
    but she said she wasn't, she hadn't done it. And at that time, I noticed that
    she had her finger on her right hand, I think it was her middle finger, was
    bandaged and had a splint on it and I asked her what had happened. And
    she indicated that she had slammed it in a car door and then she produced
    a handwritten note from—I think that name was Keller, a Ms. Keller, that
    supposedly said that she had witnessed the Defendant slam her finger in the
    car door. And I obviously thought that was really strange.
    She told me that she had been treated at Brooke Army Medical Center for
    the injuries and she last saw the complainant on April the 12th and there was
    no problem between the two of them.
    Detective Brown further testified that Reilly recalled taking flowers to Jayne a few days
    before the murder.
    C.     Keller’s Testimony
    4
    Paulette Keller, a teacher, testified that Reilly was her cleaning lady around the
    same time that Jayne was murdered. Keller further testified that on Sunday, April 16,
    1989, Reilly called between 9:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m. to advise her that she had taken
    soup to Keller’s house, but that she hurt her finger on the car door and had not dropped
    off the soup. Reilly went to clean Keller’s house the next day but she could not clean
    everything because of her injured finger. On Thursday of that week, Reilly called Keller at
    6:30 in the morning, asking for a note explaining that she had injured her finger on Sunday.
    Keller refused to provide Reilly with a note because she did not witness Reilly injure her
    finger.
    D.        Scott’s, Pamela’s, and Laird’s Testimony
    Scott Hays, Jayne’s son, testified that Reilly was his mother’s cleaning lady but that
    Jayne had fired her.        Shortly after the firing, Jayne received a letter threatening a
    defamation lawsuit from an attorney who represented Reilly. The letter states:
    I have been retained by Marie Reilly to consider filing a defamation of
    character lawsuit against you. Marie Reilly has related to me that she
    believes you have unjustly accused her of stealing a sum of money from your
    house.
    Ms. Reilly feels deeply hurt by this accusation, and quite naturally feels very
    bitter because she is convinced that it is unjust. Additionally, Marie Reilly
    has worked for, and does work for some of the most prominent members of
    the San Antonio community in the capacity of a domestic, and prides herself
    upon an excellent reputation.
    Please know that in the event false accusations continue to be made against
    Marie Reilly to other persons, Ms. Reilly has instructed this office to
    immediately file a lawsuit for defamation.
    Scott opined that once Jayne fired Reilly, she would not have rehired her because “once
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    [Jayne] did something, it’s set in stone.”
    Pamela Hays, Jayne’s daughter-in-law at the time of the murder, testified that Jayne
    told her that she fired Reilly because she suspected that Reilly pried open a lockbox and
    stole $800. Jayne confronted Reilly about the missing money, but Reilly denied the
    accusation. Pamela further testified that on April 16, 1989, she visited Jayne, left her
    young daughter with Jayne, and went to the grocery store to buy Jayne groceries. When
    Pamela returned, Jayne seemed scared and told Pamela that she had changed the locks.
    Pamela also testified that:
    [Jayne] didn’t tell me the exact day, but she told me that a few days before
    I had been there, that Marie had come over and that she had like—I don’t
    think she used the word pushed, but she came into her apartment and she
    was demanding to see her letter. She wanted to go make a copy of it, the
    letter that was sent from the attorney’s office, and she also wanted to see the
    lockbox. And Jayne said that she refused to let her take the letter, said it
    wasn’t going to leave her apartment, and she said she wasn’t going to show
    her the lockbox.
    Catherine Laird, Jayne’s apartment manager, testified that everyone at the
    apartment complex was friendly, that everyone got along, and that there had never been
    a burglary at the complex. She testified that, on the Thursday before the murder, Jayne
    called her and requested a lock change. The next morning, Tony Cruz, the apartment
    maintenance man, changed the locks on Jayne’s apartment. On Monday, April 17, Laird
    received a phone call from one of Jayne’s neighbors who was concerned because she had
    not seen Jayne. Laird then went to Jayne’s apartment, and she asked Cruz to inspect it.
    Cruz discovered Jayne’s body, and the police were called.
    E.     Defense Witnesses
    Reilly called two of Jayne’s neighbors to testify about Jayne’s interactions with an
    6
    unidentified man at the apartment complex shortly before the murder. Helen Vacek
    testified that she saw Jayne arguing with a homeless man by the apartment’s dumpster.
    Janice Hollingsworth testified that on April 16, 1989, she also saw Jayne arguing with a
    homeless man near her apartment.
    Reilly testified that she did not murder Jayne and that she was not physically
    capable of murdering Jayne because of an automobile accident she had in 1988. She
    testified that she hurt her finger while taking some soup to Keller.            During cross-
    examination, Reilly testified that she had visited Jayne on the Friday before the murder to
    take her to a doctor’s appointment. When Reilly arrived, Jayne told her that she had
    already been to the doctor, but she asked Reilly to clean the apartment. Reilly obliged and
    cleaned Jayne’s apartment. While Reilly was cleaning, she testified that she cut her finger
    on the blinds and used a kitchen rag to stop the bleeding. When asked by the State to
    explain why she had never mentioned cutting her finger at Jayne’s apartment during the
    initial investigation in 1989, Reilly responded, “I don’t recognize, I don’t think so.”
    Cindy Baltimore, Reilly’s daughter, testified that she and Reilly had been involved
    in an automobile accident on April 4, 1984, and Reilly was injured in the accident because
    she was not wearing her seatbelt. Baltimore also testified that Reilly returned home
    complaining about a hurt finger on Sunday, April 16, 1989.
    The jury convicted Reilly of murder in the first degree and sentenced her to twenty
    years’ imprisonment. This appeal followed.
    II. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
    By two issues, Reilly contends that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient
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    to support her conviction. In a legal sufficiency review, we consider the entire trial record
    to determine whether, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, a
    rational jury could have found the accused guilty of all essential elements of the offense
    beyond a reasonable doubt. See Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318-19 (1979);
    Vodochodsky v. State, 
    158 S.W.3d 502
    , 509 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). In conducting our
    review of the legal sufficiency of the evidence, we do not reevaluate the weight and
    credibility of the evidence, but ensure only that the jury reached a rational decision. Muniz
    v. State, 
    851 S.W.2d 238
    , 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993). In circumstantial evidence cases,
    it is unnecessary for every fact to point directly and independently to appellant’s guilt; it is
    enough if the conclusion is warranted by the combined and cumulative force of all the
    incriminating circumstances. See Johnson v. State, 
    871 S.W.2d 183
    , 186 (Tex. Crim. App.
    1993) (citing Russell v. State, 
    665 S.W.2d 771
    , 776 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983)).
    When conducting a factual-sufficiency review, we view all of the evidence in a
    neutral light. Ladd v. State, 
    3 S.W.3d 547
    , 557 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). We will set the
    verdict aside only if (1) the evidence is so weak that the verdict is clearly wrong and
    manifestly unjust or (2) the verdict is against the great weight and preponderance of the
    evidence. Johnson v. State, 
    23 S.W.3d 1
    , 11 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Under the first
    prong of Johnson, we cannot conclude that a conviction is “clearly wrong” or “manifestly
    unjust” simply because, on the quantum of evidence admitted, we would have voted to
    acquit had we been on the jury. Watson v. State, 
    204 S.W.3d 404
    , 416 (Tex. Crim. App.
    2006). Under the second prong of Johnson, we cannot declare that a conflict in the
    evidence justifies a new trial simply because we disagree with the jury’s resolution of that
    8
    conflict. 
    Id. Before finding
    that evidence is factually insufficient to support a verdict under
    the second prong of Johnson, we must be able to say, with some objective basis in the
    record, that the great weight and preponderance of the evidence contradicts the jury’s
    verdict. 
    Id. In conducting
    a factual-sufficiency review, we must also discuss the evidence
    that, according to the appellant, most undermines the jury's verdict. See Sims v. State, 
    99 S.W.3d 600
    , 603 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
    “Appellate courts should afford almost complete deference to a jury’s decision when
    that decision is based upon an evaluation of credibility.” Lancon v. State, 
    253 S.W.3d 699
    ,
    705 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). “The jury is in the best position to judge the credibility of a
    witness because it is present to hear the testimony, as opposed to an appellate court who
    relies on the cold record.” 
    Id. The jury
    may choose to believe some testimony and
    disbelieve other testimony. 
    Id. at 707.
    III. DISCUSSION
    A person commits murder if the person (1) intends to cause serious bodily injury and
    (2) commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that (3) causes the death of an
    individual. TEX . PENAL CODE ANN . § 19.02(b)(2). Here, the State alleged that Reilly struck
    and killed Jayne with a statue and an unknown object.             In challenging the factual
    sufficiency of the evidence, Reilly argues that the only way the jury could convict her was
    through speculation. We disagree.
    The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has explained that juries are “permitted to
    draw multiple reasonable inferences as long as each inference is supported by the
    evidence presented at trial.” Hooper v. State, 
    214 S.W.3d 9
    , 15 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007).
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    In this case, the inferences that the jury made to conclude that Reilly murdered Jayne are
    reasonable and supported by the evidence. Pamela testified, without objection, that Jayne
    fired Reilly for stealing. Reilly’s attorney sent Jayne a letter threatening a defamation
    lawsuit if she did not stop alleging that Reilly stole from her. Pamela further testified that
    Jayne seemed scared only a few days before her murder because Reilly had visited and
    wanted to see the letter and the lockbox. Laird testified that Jayne changed the locks on
    her apartment around the same time that Reilly had visited Jayne. Dimaio testified that a
    murderer who knows the victim sometimes covers the victim’s face because the murderer
    does not want to see what was done. Jayne was found with a pillow over her face. Reilly
    injured her finger at approximately the same time that Jayne was murdered, and she
    telephoned Keller at 6:30 in the morning with a request for a letter to explain the injury.
    And finally, during a traffic stop, Detective Brown approached Reilly, and she volunteered,
    “I didn’t kill her.”
    It is clear that Jayne fired Reilly because she suspected that Reilly was stealing from
    her. The jury could have reasonably inferred that Jayne thought Reilly was dangerous
    because Pamela testified that Reilly scared Jayne on one occasion. Additionally, the jury
    could have reasonably inferred that Reilly injured herself during the murder and sought an
    alibi from Keller. Thus, the record contains some evidence of motive and means. Reilly’s
    first issue, which challenges the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting her conviction,
    is overruled.
    By her second issue, Reilly challenges the factual sufficiency of the evidence by
    arguing that the jury convicted her because of inconsistencies in her testimony, which can
    10
    be explained by her age. She does not cite, however, any authority for this argument. See
    TEX . R. APP. P. 38.1(i) (providing that the brief must contain a clear and concise argument
    for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities). In any event, we defer
    to the jury’s assessment of a witness’s credibility. 
    Lancon, 253 S.W.3d at 705
    . Evaluating
    the evidence in a neutral light, favoring neither party, we cannot say that the guilty verdict
    is clearly wrong and manifestly unjust, or that the evidence in support of the judgment is
    outweighed by the great weight and preponderance of the contrary evidence. See 
    Watson, 204 S.W.3d at 414-15
    .
    IV. CONCLUSION
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    ________________________
    ROGELIO VALDEZ
    Chief Justice
    Do not publish. TEX . R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Memorandum Opinion delivered and
    filed this the 13th day of November, 2008.
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